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                                                           Abstract 
 
The idea of a critical theory is a dominant force in tertiary education, and has become an integral 
part of the pursuit of higher knowledge. Competing ideas have thereby become standard 
bearers in that critical theory acts as a measure of true understanding and/or social rank. The 
only problem, however, is that many of the distinct – and competing – theories similarly 
answering to the description raise two related questions – namely, ‘what is a critical theory?’ 
and what is ‘critical’ about the ‘theory’ (or theories) in question? The idea of a critical theory is 
not only itself subject to criticism, it also remains open to questioning and contestation. The 
following research provides an answer by questioning what has traditionally been taken as 
given. It addresses a perceived lack in the literature regarding the idea’s standard and/or truth-
bearing and interrogates the relation between thought and language in (a) critical theory. The 
thesis explores the problematic connection between criteria and critique, or the distinct ways in 
which the relation between thought and language directs contested ideas of a critical theory. It 
does this by taking each’s measure through competing ontological standards of measurement 
and evaluation. The problem of the criterion and its relation to the question of being therefore 
becomes integral. The thesis primarily considers the critical theories of Derrida, Lyotard and 
Habermas via the circle of understanding. Heidegger and Gadamer pave the way towards the 
idea of a critical theory via hermeneutics’ conception of the circular relation between thought 
and language. The thesis moves towards Derrida, Lyotard and Habermas to follow the distinct 
ways in which the circle calls itself into being and/or question. The thesis’s contribution to 
scholarship is twofold 1) to recall the problematic of hermeneutics as a critical methodology and 
2) to act as a stimulus for future research into the question of the direction of fit between thought 
and language: to what extent do they direct (inform, perform) each other within the circle of 
understanding? The aim is to rethink the hermeneutical circle via a consideration of the critical 
theories in question. The approach is performative in that the competing critical theories are 
interpreted as parts that form a complex whole, and are understood (questioned) with respect 
to each other.  The critical theorists prove to be ‘critical’ in the following way: in prioritising 
linguistic parts over a complex whole – Derrida (the syntactic), Lyotard (the semantic) and 
Habermas (the pragmatic) – the corresponding critical theories return us to the circle in 
conflicting ways. The conflict of interpretations directs our questioning accordingly: in what ways 
do the related moving parts bring forth and/or hold back the complex whole being questioned? 
We argue that the critical issue between them is a normative conception of our practical and/or 
linguistic identities (moral being). The methodological approach to the circle therefore serves a 
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                   INTRODUCTION : THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
 
The thesis analyses the works of Derrida, Lyotard and Habermas in a new light by asking a) 
what is ‘critical’ about critical theory and b) how may hermeneutic principles be followed to 
answer our guiding question.  
 
While the idea of a critical theory is traditionally associated with the Frankfurt School, it now 
encompasses many different – and competing – schools of thought. The recurring theme is the 
role self-reflective theoretical practice actively plays within cultural and philosophical studies. 
The thesis focusses on the works of Derrida, Lyotard and Habermas to represent a paradox at 
the heart of ‘critical theory’: the paradox arises from a situated reason reflecting on the 
conditions of its own possibility as well as its ostensible objects of inquiry. The critical theories 
are self-reflexive (or critical) in that they expressly turn on the question of the limits of their own 
activities and/or ‘contrivances’ (conceptual schemes, linguistic manoeuvres, etc.). We observe 
that the idea of a critical theory continues to have a political telos: it is informed by – and tries 
to transform – the social conditions of reality through questioning. The aim, however, is not to 
reduce the critical to the self-reflexive. The goal is to show how competing ideas attempt to 
realise the telos in question and/or potential conflict –   by bringing themselves into existence 
through the ends to which they strive or compete.  
 
During the course of the thesis, we identify distinct ontological standards and commitments. We 
invariably find ourselves faced with the problem of finding a criterion to critically evaluate the 
critical theories (or ontological standards) in question. The telos of our self-reflexive approach 
follows the lead of the hermeneutical circle in that it transforms the conditions of understanding 
existentially conceived and grounded. The question is therefore not just what constitutes the 
‘critical’ in critical theory but in what way may competing ideas of a critical theory of social 
existence itself be trans/formed (criticised) in turn? 
 
The hermeneutical paradigm is employed throughout the thesis as a mode of self-reference and 
reflection. We not only reflect on our own approach to the guiding question, we answer by 
referring to the way the critical theories turn back on themselves and/or towards each other. We 
therefore follow a performative approach informed by Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s conception 
of the hermeneutical circle. The act of self-reference occurs through the actions of a circle 
invariably calling itself (back) into question. The problem of finding a criterion is thereby resolved 
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(approached) insofar as the circle becomes its own standard bearer and/or may provide 
conflicting standard for evaluation.  
 
Chapter 1  introduces the concepts relevant for approaching the idea of a critical theory within 
the circle of understanding. These include a) the problem of the criterion and its relation to the 
question of being b) the relation between ontological standards and ontological commitments 
c) the relation between criteria and critique and d) the relation between interpretation and 
understanding. While we might be referring to distinct objects of thought, they will nonetheless 
perform the same function throughout the dissertation. Specifically, it is part of the thesis 
statement that there is no getting around the problem of chasing elusive objects of thought 
within the circle of understanding and these objects necessarily recur as tropes across distinct 
contexts of interpretation. Chapter 1 follows the circle’s lead by determining equivalences of 
meaning via an equivalence of function in context(s) –  and such a functional equivalence 
involves a translation of possible meaning (performing the act of uniform movement between 
relevant – if immeasurable – contexts of interpretation). The first chapter is divided in three 
related parts. In the first part, we raise the problem of the criterion of truth within the context of 
Plato’s paradox of inquiry. We note that the paradox calls into question the possibility and/or 
necessity of rational inquiry. We observe that the paradox invariably raises the question of an 
inquiry’s ontological commitments, and the problem is trying to find an ontological criterion that 
doesn’t presuppose the very ontological standard (or truth conditions) in question. In the second 
part, we observe that the idea of a critical theory has become an ontological standard for 
measuring (determining) the relation between meaning and truth via the "linguistic turn"
1
 – or 
"fundamental gambit as to method"
2
 – when approaching the relation between language and 
reality. Our selection of three critical theorists follows the distinct ways each turns towards 
language as an answer to the question of being.  In ontologically committing to distinct parts 
over a complex whole – the syntactic (Derrida), the semantic (Lyotard) and the pragmatic 
(Habermas) respectively –  the idea of a critical theory finds itself moving within an inescapable 
circle. The competing ideas of a critical theory thereby gives rise to the problem of navigating 
conflicting ontological standards and commitments.  We argue that if there is no ontologically 
                                                
1
 Bergmann, Gustav. "Strawson’s Ontology" The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 19, 1960, p.607. 
The phrase linguistic turn was coined by Bergmann in a review of P.F. Strawson’s Individuals. 
According to Bergmann, the linguistic turn is an attempt to get around the problem of how to best 
approach the question of the relation between language and world. As the title of his review 
indicates, this is an ontological question in that the turn to language attempts to study what (truly) 
exists via the existence of language – namely, which way do we turn?  
2
 ibid. The methodological gambit is whether it is possible to truthfully talk about an objective world 
through the concepts of language. Bergmann conceives the gambit in terms of disagreements about 
which way linguistic philosophers should turn: towards language’s attempt to make true statements 
about an objective world or towards language’s capacity to transform objects in a meaningful world 
in different ways (worldmaking).   
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neutral way of resolving the problem of the criterion, the requirement is to find a standard of 
measurement to compare and evaluate competing ontological commitments (standards and/or 
objects). In the third part, we situate this requirement within the ontological structure of the circle 
of understanding invariably calling itself (back) into question.  We thereby direct ourselves 
towards the question of the ontological status of interpreted objects within the given critical 
theory. While we might follow Heidegger’s lead by providing an existential ground for the 
hermeneutical circle, we also go to great lengths to distinguish ourselves from the hermeneutics 
of Heidegger’s own situation and/or questioning. Nonetheless, Heidegger paves the way to our 
guiding question in the following way: the circle turns on the problem of its own normativity, and 
any normative stance taken toward (human) beings necessarily operates in the fore-structure 
of understanding either standing its (existential) ground or providing grounds for further direction 
and movement. 
 
Chapter 2  introduces Gadamer’s conception of the circle of understanding. The goal is twofold: 
to follow the pathways opened up by Gadamer’s turn towards language, and to overturn 
Gadamer’s concept of the linguisticality of understanding as a necessary precondition for critical 
reason. We observe that Gadamer’s questioning proceeds from the following ontological 
standard: to be is to be understood (differently) within a universal horizon of Being. Gadamer 
approaches the problem of the criterion – and its relation to the question of being – via the 
linguistic structure and/or events of understanding. The beings in question turn on the way 
questioning is itself directed and moves through language. Gadamer’s attempt to clarify the 
conditions in which understanding takes place directs our inquiry in the following way: it provides 
a horizon in which to situate and mobilise the possibility of a critical theory.  The Gadamer 
chapter is divided into two main parts – an elucidation of the concepts relevant to our guiding 
question, and a critical discussion seeking to redirect and/or repurpose them. These concepts 
include: the role of prejudices in the historicity of understanding, the proffering of a criterion of 
correct understanding, the dialectic of question and answer, and the hermeneutical circle’s 
orientation towards self-correction and/or direction within language. Given these concepts, 
Gadamer conceives language as a universal horizon for a hermeneutic ontology, where objects 
of interpretation remain open to questioning and reinterpretation. Our critical discussion calls 
into question the rationality – and hermeneutics – of Gadamer’s questioning. The goal is to 
bridge the presupposed divide between truth and method and allow for the possibility of 
movement between them. We observe that there are three main difficulties within Gadamer’s 
conception of the circle and its relation to critical reason. The first is that the ground on which 
reason is said to move cannot direct rational criticisms in a truth-evaluative way, permitting 
competing interpretations to be equally true (or false) without contradiction. We provide an 
overview of conflicting interpretations of Gadamer’s own approach to the circle to illustrate the 
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way the problem of the criterion re-turns there. The second difficulty is that Gadamer’s 
understanding of the dialectic of question and answer fails to adequately clarify the conditions 
of its existence (occurrence) and needs to be corrected (directed) accordingly. We observe that 
the circle’s movements are existentially grounded in a dialectic between knowledge and power 
and conflicting interpretations have their basis in the corresponding conditions of a  (potentially) 
questionable social reality. The third difficulty is Gadamer’s conception of prejudice as truth 
evaluative and/or normatively constraining. Gadamer’s attempt to distinguish between true and 
false prejudices is falsified by his own failure to bridge the ontological divide between truth and 
method. Gadamer cannot provide a rational reason to determine the rationality of our reasons, 
and the problem is whether it is intelligible to invoke a truth evaluative understanding of our 
being-in-the-world in the first place. If prejudices constitute the historical reality of our being, the 
problem is finding a way to arbitrate between them in the circle of understanding. We introduce 
the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons to direct the critical question of the 
rationality of reason, permitting us to distinguish and/or move between (overturn) the prejudices 
in question.  Such a linguistic turn calls into being and/or question the possibility of a critical 
theory, however contested or arbitrary.  
 
Chapter 3  introduces Derrida’s deconstruction of the circle of understanding. The objective is 
two-fold: to find our way (back) to language via Derrida’s differential ontology and differentiate 
Derrida’s ontological commitments there. Chapter 3 is also the first of two chapters discussing 
Derrida’s quasi-transcendental approach to language: parts of our critical discussion are 
displaced into Chapter 6 with a critical discussion of Habermas (where our analysis comes full 
circle). We observe that Derrida proceeds from the following ontological standard: to be is not 
to be on a horizontal axis or plane of non-Being. Specifically, Derrida’s questioning ontologically 
commits itself to syntactical relations across contexts of interpretation, and our guiding question 
is: to what extent is it possible to follow (understand) a differential ontology in a constant state 
of flux and transition? The problem of the criterion – and its relation to the question of being – 
occurs by way of the concept of the undecidability of meaning (the impossibility of deciding 
and/or moving contexts either way). Derrida understands his movements within language to be 
primarily directed towards interpretations of interpretations, and deconstructs contexts of 
interpretation in accordance with the problematic of the performative. That is to say, 
deconstruction is not only predicated upon a description of the reality in question, it purports to 
change the conditions of the reality being described. Derrida is thereby critical of the very idea 
of a critical theory in that it cannot meaningfully refer to the reality in question. Derrida is 
consistent in his approach insofar as his own interpretations may be deconstructed in turn, and 
deconstruction’s conditions of possibility themselves remain undecidable (impossible, 
indecisive). Whilst he recognises that the term deconstruction has been domesticated by 
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academic institutions and popular culture alike, deconstruction remains directed by (or 
presupposes) the problem of the criterion and its relation to the question of the meaning of 
being. Consequently, Derrida’s questioning calls into question the possibility and/or necessity 
of any methodological approach to contexts of interpretation. We witness Derrida ‘perform’ the 
limits of following such a contextual approach on one of Plato’s text, and note the way a given 
linguistic construction invariably deconstructs its own ontological standards and commitments. 
Our critical discussion goes on to question Derrida’s attempt to contextualize the relation 
between thought and language, and determines the extent to which they presuppose (or 
perform) each other within the circle in which deconstruction moves and is directed.  Following 
Derrida’s lead, we locate this question within the problematic of the performative and ask: is 
Derrida caught in a performative contradiction, or is it the circle of understanding that performs 
(enacts, directs,) the contradiction within language? The question of deconstruction’s truth-
value – whether it is possible to ground deconstruction in an object of rational thought and/or 
can make a meaningful difference to the objects caught moving within language – directs our 
overall movements. The question of its truth-value goes to the very heart of the ‘object’ (purpose, 
reality) of deconstruction itself. If we are to ontologically commit to ‘beings’ that remain in a state 
of flux or transition, what are we to make of our moral being –  or normative stance towards 
objects of thought that include ourselves – in the first place? We argue that Derrida’s attempt to 
displace the logical space of reasons is only possible within the historicity of understanding 
governing such interpretations of interpretations (via an ontological standard that may be 
meaningfully understood as a prescribed measure or norm). We further argue that an 
understanding of the undecidability of meaning is predicated upon conscious decision making 
that contradictorily commits to – seizes on and follows – a transitional and/or fluctuating 
ontology. The question of deconstruction’s ‘effectiveness’ therefore turns on a critical activity 
made possible under historical conditions and rulings, and so moves within a linguistically 
constructed intentional horizon that remains open to questioning and reinterpretation.                                                                                             
 
Chapter 4 introduces Lyotard’s semantic conception of (potentially) conflicting rules of 
understanding. Lyotard’s movements within the circle of understanding are primarily directed 
towards the paradox of rule following, and we observe the way Lyotard (paradoxically) follows 
the rules of language there. The paradox is that Lyotard ontologically commits to a situation that 
pulls our understanding of interpreted objects in two different directions at once. Lyotard’s 
inquiry insists on following prescribed rules as a standard for determining the nature of being, 
and he prescribes going against the rules in order to call into question such ontological 
standards and determinations. Lyotard provides a critical theory insofar as a crisis of criteria 
informs his approach to the limits of representing the very reality in question.  Lyotard attempts 
to present what is not presented under the rules of language, and his mode of presentation 
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prescribes a conflict between rulings across contexts of interpretation. Lyotard questioning 
thereby turns on a semantic-referential axis that remains subject to reversals in direction and 
strategic withdrawals: it prescribes an understanding of the boundless or immeasurable via the 
performativity of the very language in question. The chapter’s objective follows Lyotard’s lead 
accordingly: it endeavours to find its way (back) to language by circling around the following 
question: what is the rule for following rules within the labyrinth of language? Unlike Lyotard, 
however, we endeavour to establish a commensurability of reality to concept so as to secure 
the sense of referents brought into conflict and/or question. We observe Lyotard proceeding 
from the following ontological standard: to be is to be ruled (out) or overruled in contexts of 
action. The concepts of language games and phrase regimes become integral here: the 
paradox is determining the rule for following rules when different semantic fields actively come 
into conflict over their respective borders and conceptual terrains. Lyotard introduces the notion 
of a differend to problematize the way distinct rulings may come into being and/or conflict, and 
his approach is critical insofar as it prioritises the role of transporting feelings. We thereby find 
ourselves moved to question the ontological status of conflicting standards and commitments.  
Our critical discussion questions Lyotard’s conception of language as rule-governed and 
conflicted, and we follow his lead to direct us towards the reality in question. We find ourselves 
moving towards differends within Lyotard’s own thinking, and resolve the conflict by way of the 
performativity of the circle of understanding. We argue that the existence of the differend turns 
on a performative contradiction in that it requires us to rule out or overrule an irresolvable conflict 
between rule governed contexts of action. Lyotard’s (over)ruling recontextualizes the conflict by 
insisting upon an overriding context of interpretation. The critical discussion enacts and directs 
this performative contradiction in two main parts. In the first part, we follow the paradox of rule 
following by determining three conditions of possibility making such a paradox (or following) 
possible. In the second part, we determine a public criterion of moral correctness to normatively 
constrain and direct a transporting feeling’s movements within the circle. We thereby argue that 
it is the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons that returns us to rules in (potential) 
question or conflict.   
 
Chapter 5  introduces Habermas’s reconstruction of the circle of understanding. It is primarily 
directed towards Habermas’s rational reconstruction of a pre-theoretical rule consciousness, 
and the role rules pragmatically play within the language game of argumentation. The chapter’s 
objective is to navigate the circle being rationally reconstructed and turns on the question: to 
what extent may the circle of understanding be followed (rule governed, directed, etc.)? Chapter 
5 is also the first of two chapters discussing Habermas’s quasi-transcendental approach to 
language: it acts to bring Habermas into irresolvable conflict with Derrida’s quasi-transcendental 
approach to language in Chapter 6 (where our analysis comes full circle by way of a differend 
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between a deconstruction and reconstruction). We follow Habermas’s methodological approach 
to the circle, and move towards the possibility of reaching mutual understanding and agreement 
via criticizable validity claims. Habermas’s universal pragmatics emphasises the performative 
status of rule following across contexts of interpretation, and directs the circle towards a critical 
theory of communicative action. Habermas argues that language users are already ontologically 
committed to tacit rules making their linguistic interactions possible and/or necessary in the first 
place. Furthermore, rule-following may also potentially bring these linguistic interactions into 
question and/or conflict. Consequently, it is rules themselves which give rise to the possibility 
of a critical theory in that they direct communicative acts (back) towards the question of their 
own normativity. Habermas’s attempt to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of mutual 
understanding thereby proceeds from the following ontological standard: to be is to be directed 
towards (potential conflicting and resolvable) rulings in action contexts. The concepts critical to 
our analysis include: universal conditions of understanding, the performative attitude, criticizable 
validity claims and rationally motivated agreements. Our critical discussion calls into question 
the validity of Habermas’s rational reconstruction by arguing that it is neither rationally motivated 
or directed. The paradox of rule following becomes integral here and requires us to ask: to what 
extent – or by what rule – may courses of action be made to accord or conflict with the rules in 
question? Put another way: if rules are potentially arbitrary – without a rational ground to stand 
or move on – to what extent is it rational to follow them and how do we arbitrate between 
conflicting action contexts? We also introduce a distinction between rational motivation and 
motivated rationality: the distinction turns the performative status of mutual understanding and 
agreement on its head in that the pursuit of a universal(izable) truth remains relative to (or 
conditional upon) the hermeneutics of given situations (the very action contexts in question). 
We thereby observe that the performative attitude rationally motivating linguistic actors to reach 
mutual understanding and agreement is performatively contradictory in re-turn. 
 
Chapter 6 brings our understanding full circle. The question of which way to turn – towards 
Derrida’s deconstruction of understanding or Habermas’s reconstruction of understanding – 
occurs by way of Lyotard’s conflicting rules of understanding (differend). Specifically, the 
linguistic turn as a fundamental gambit regarding methodological approach takes place as an 
irresolvable conflict over how to follow (understand, go in the same direction as) conflicting rules 
put forward about what is possible or permissible in the circle. The problem, then, is giving 
expression to competing ontological standards and commitments (interpretations) within the 
circle enabling such contradictory directives and movements. Given that Habermas and Derrida 
follow the lead of the ‘quasi-transcendental’ in different ways, we turn (back) towards them 
through the very ontological pathways – standards, commitments – in question and/or conflict. 
We argue that these conflicting interpretations form a complex whole and should be understood 
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(interpreted, approached) with respect to each other. The chapter’s aim is therefore twofold: to 
follow the ways in which the circle of understanding itself performs conflicting interpretations of 
its own movements and directives, and to reinterpret (critically evaluate) the interpreted ‘objects’ 
of the one critical theory within the context of the other critical theory. Approached another way: 
we reconstruct Derrida, and deconstruct Habermas via Lyotard’s transporting notion of the 
differend, which enables passage between distinct parts (pathways, rulings) taken as a complex 
whole. While their interpretations of the circle might remain at cross purposes, they direct us 
through the same intersection anyway – ontological commitment as cultural critique. Given the 
competing ontological commitments, we thereby find ourselves turning towards the problem of 
critically evaluating the ontological standards in question, and approach the intersection cutting 
across them via the route of the quasi transcendental. The question before us, then, is the way 
we may move through intersecting pathways and turn back around. We attempt this maneuver 
by clarifying the conditions in which such conflicting interpretations may take place and/or move 
across each other. The aim is not to interpret away Habermas’s reconstruction or Derrida’s 
deconstruction: it is rather to better understand (follow, contextualize) their overall movements 
via the conflict of interpretations. The chapter is divided into two main parts. We begin by 
deconstructing Habermas, and argue that such a deconstruction becomes possible within the 
context of Habermas’s own presuppositions. We problematize Habermas’s attempt to ground 
validity within meaning, and question the limits of meaningfully determining conditions of 
possibility within given contexts of interpretation (i.e., can establish the necessary framework 
for the possible appearance of meaningful objects across contexts). We also deconstruct 
Habermas’s corresponding notion of contexts of relevance, and ask whether it is possible to 
determine the contextual relevance of the very objects being interpreted and/or questioned 
(linguistically constructed) as such. The performative status of interpretations is problematized 
in turn, and we question whether the pursuit of an objective (context independent, unconditional) 
truth can ever be relevant (meaningful, possible). Our reconstruction of Derrida contextualizes 
the relevance of given deconstructive interpretations. We observe the way deconstruction 
necessarily defers to a prior identification of relevant elements – or (con)texts –  to linguistically 
construct and put forward its own arguments. We go on to identify the conditions of possibility 
for deciding (resolving, settling on) instances of undecidable meaning and/or relevant conditions 
of impossibility. We argue that the performative attitude of Derrida’s interpretations must occupy 
and move through the logical space of reasons if he is to displace the reasons put forth or held 
back across contexts of interpretation. Derrida’s attempt to rise above the space of reasons is 
therefore similarly conditional upon the hermeneutic situation in question: his interpretations of 
interpretations must be stabilized within a context of relevance if they are to capture a 
transcendent moment (or movement) of unconditional truth found within critical reason itself. 
We reconstruct Derrida’s argument with Plato’s context(s) accordingly and claim validity for it 
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under universal validity conditions and corresponding world relations. In this way, Derrida’s rule 
governed linguistic interactions are oriented towards all action contexts and remain open to 




































Chapter 1: The problem of the criterion, and its 
relation to the question of being. 
 
 
Aim and objectives: The aim of this chapter is to introduce the problem of the criterion and its 
relation to the question of being. The objective is to foreground related themes and questions 
traced back to the philosophical discourse of antiquity. Our objective is not so much to provide 
an intricate argument but to thematically explore related problems and questions via a historical 
overview. We shall argue that variants of these problems continue to occur in the philosophical 
discourse of (post)modernity. We do this in order to orient our thinking towards the question of 
language and its role within 'critical theory'. Our approach occurs in three related ways. Firstly, 
we raise the problem of reason critically questioning its presuppositions, and explore the 
relationship between criteria and critique in determining the question of reason's rationality. We 
initiate this movement within the context of Plato's paradox of inquiry, and highlight concepts 
that will remain 'critical' to our own questioning – namely, the question of being and the problem 
of critically evaluating competing ontological commitments without presupposing the ontological 
standards in question. We observe that any attempt to be 'critical' presupposes the beings in 
question and remains answerable for its mode of being (criteria of relevance or adequacy). In 
the second part, we note that there are many different theories similarly answering to the 
description of a critical theory, and remain faced with the problem of meaningfully answering 
our own question. The problem is 'critical' in that the competing theories emerge within the 
cultural relations and practices critiqued: the question is determining their status – cultural 
relevance and/or adequacy – as a critical theory. Specifically, how should culturally situated 
thinkers relate to (critically question) competing presuppositions and commitments? We delimit 
our questioning by turning towards the axis on which the problem of the criterion re-turns – 
namely, via the way thought and language turn (back) towards each other within the critical 
theories in question. In the third part, we pave the way towards language by directing ourselves 
towards Heidegger's conception of the relation between the question of being and the being of 
the question. Following Heidegger's lead, the problem is the way an understanding of being 
belongs to the (human) being called into question. Heidegger calls this mode of being our being-
there, and he argues that any given movement within the circle of beings must be questioned 
in turn. Although Heidegger orients our approach, we move beyond his interpretation of the 
circle of understanding. Heidegger not only calls into question the idea of a critique, his 
approach also highlights the limits of interrogating the very beings – and presuppositions – in 
question. Heidegger's attempt to move past (or square) the circle is questioned in turn, and we 




Meno: And how will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as 
the subject of inquiry? And if you do find what you want, how will you know that this is the thing which 
you did not know? 
Socrates: I know, Meno, what you mean; but see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue 
that a man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if 
he knows, he has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about 
which he is to inquire.3 
 
Chasing our tale. 
 
It is possible to ask a question as if it was already intelligible, and attempt to answer this question 
in accordance with this professed intelligibility. Take our question. In asking 'what is critical 
about critical theory', the question simultaneously puts forth a subject of inquiry and 
presupposes the possibility of answering it. Our question thereby seeks to determine a context 
for its meaningfulness and/or truthfulness. Such a determination, however, becomes 
questionable in turn: we risk begging the question in asking our question. Specifically, our 
question appears to presuppose the very concepts called into (a) question. Consequently, "the 
problem of beginning is the beginning of the problem,"
4
 and the requirement is to find our way 
towards the question of an existing conceptuality's5 mode of being. While it is possible to begin 
without avowed qualifications or commitments, presupposing the concepts in (our) question 
cannot occur without question. We need to proceed carefully here. As will be seen, 
presuppositions remain fundamental to the occurrence of meaning and truth and make 
questioning possible in the first place.
6
 An inquiry can only occur within "the context of 
presuppositions"
7
, and the question is determining the limits of the background knowledge 
enabling it as a question.  
 
Perhaps if we asked another question we could better understand the role presuppositions play 
in intelligibility. Specifically, 'what is the time?' This question, of course, couldn't be more 
                                                
3
 The Dialogues Of Plato, Vol. 1 "Meno" 80 d – e, trans. Jowett, B, (New York: Random House, 
1937). 
4
 Said, Edward. Beginnings: Intention and Method (London: Granta Books, 2012), p.42. Said is 
specifically paraphrasing Vico and Hegel here. 
5
 Tugendhat, Ernst. Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.104. Specifically, the problem of beginning is the 
beginning of the problem because "if an exiting conceptuality turns out to be inadequate when 
applied to a wider thematic field, one is obliged to reflect on presuppositions of this conceptuality." 
6
 Simons, Mandy. "Foundational Issues in Presupposition" Philosophy Compass, Vol. 1. No.4, 2006, 
pp. 357–372. 
7
 Amico, Robert. The Problem of the Criterion (Boston: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p.5. 
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straightforward: it occurs on a daily basis without much thought or further ado. The question 
occurs against typically shared background knowledge, and its presuppositions can be readily 
brought forward if given some thought. The question presupposes, for example, claims to 
knowledge that are unquestioned or taken for granted – such as the concept of time, that people 
can tell the time, that they might have access to a watch, that their watch should be working or 
accurate and they would be willing to tell us the time truthfully. Our simple question presupposes 
many things as necessarily true before it has even been determined – about capacity, 
ownership, willingness and trust. To presuppose, then, is to require or imply knowledge as a 
necessary prior condition. Such a simple question, however, can also reveal the limits of prior 
knowledge and result in considerable confusion. While many of us can tell the time, who can 
tell us what time is? A simple question becomes very complex just by taking out the word 'the' 
– namely, 'what is time'? Our straightforward question finds itself moving within an increasingly 
questionable circle: why can we readily tell each other what the time is, but cannot say what 
time is?8 Approached from another direction, "in what sense can we ascribe being to time itself, 




The ancient dialogue between Meno and Socrates remains both timely and timeless.
10
 Meno 
throws into question the very possibility and/or necessity of any given inquiry. He creates a 
dilemma by calling into being the paradox of inquiry. We shall be putting forth this paradox as 
the subject of our inquiry. Meno questions the status of the criteria for knowledge in that he 
forces us to ask if there is any way we can distinguish between true and false beliefs without 
presupposing the truth or falsity of the beliefs in question. The paradox is justifying any claim to 
knowledge without begging the question about the beliefs in question. Specifically, Meno 
questions the "conditions for the possibility of inquiry"
11
 by problematizing our knowledge of the 
world of experience. Meno invokes the idea of experience as a vicious circle, and questions the 
meaningful limits of any given inquiry. The implication is that if we cannot break out of this circle 
we might as well not enter into it.
12
 According to Meno's questioning, the lines at which 
                                                
8
 See, for example, Le Poidevin, Robin and MacBeath, Murray (eds.) The Philosophy of Time 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1993) and Dyke, Heather and Bardon, Adrian (eds.) A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Time (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) for an overview of the many questions 
raised by the concept of time throughout time. 
9
 Chernyakov, Alexei. The Ontology of Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2002), p.11. 
10
 Glymour, Clark and Kelly, Kevin "Thoroughly Modern Meno" in Earman, John (ed.) Inference, 
Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Berkeley: University of 
California Press,1992). 
11
 Fine, Gail. The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox From Socrates to Sextus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p.3. 
12
 Klein, Jacob. Commentary on Meno, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p.44. 
Klein has suggested that the very name of Meno might be relevant here, which could be associated 
with – or derived from – the Greek stem of ‘menein’, meaning ‘to stay put’ or ‘stay as before’. 
Consequently, Meno becomes a mode of being in the world of experience. 
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knowledge and experience appear to intersect remains imperceptible. Claims to knowledge 
merely run parallel to the plane of experience, and can only be determined by the given 
boundary lines. Meno's line of questioning is obviously (performatively) contradictory.
13
 Meno's 
questions are only possible by presupposing the very being (questioning) in question. Meno 
questions the conditions of inquiry in a paradoxical manner – by questioning the possibility 
and/or necessity of questioning. The paradox of inquiry presupposes the rationality of its mode 
of being and directs reason (back) to the question of the nature of its being – namely, what is a 
question anyway? Approached from another direction, in what sense can we ascribe being to a 




Sextus invariably formulated Meno’s paradox as the problem of the criterion15 of truth. The 
"problem of the criterion of truth… is the problem of how we discover or ascertain the truth – the 
truth that we need to find in order to attain knowledge."
16
 If a criterion has already decided what 
is relevant or adequate to an inquiry – i.e., what should be presupposed and/or questioned in 
the first place – how can we "critically"
17
 question (decide, evaluate) its corresponding truth-
value (relevancy, adequacy) without being "forced into circular reasoning"?
18
 As Chisholm 
argued many centuries later, the problem of the criterion has remained "one of the most 
important and one of the most difficult problems of all the problems of philosophy."
19
 The main 
difficulty is that any inquiry into the theory of knowledge can only "deal with the problem by 
begging the question."
20
 Our main difficulty thereby raises a related question: what does 
presupposing the 'being' in question mean here? Heidegger provides a provisional answer by 
drawing attention to an etymological connection between 'critique' and 'criterion'.
21
 Specifically, 
they share a root term in the form of krinein which originally means to separate or distinguish 
thinking. To critically evaluate is to decide on a criterion in which to order or arrange (prioritize 
                                                
13
 We shall be returning to the notion of performative contradiction time and time again, and merely 
anticipate it via the paradox of inquiry. 
14
 We are obviously paraphrasing Chernyakov here. We are also anticipating Heidegger’s 
conception of the being of the question and its relation to the question of being. 
15
 Sextus, Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism trans. R.G. Bury, (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1933), p.15. While Sextus is officially credited with this term, he makes it clear that he is 
discussing an age-old dispute between the Sceptics and Stoics.  See, also, Kyriacou, Christos. 
"Meno's Inquiry Paradox and the Problem of the Criterion" Skepsis Vol.22, No.4, 2012 for an 
elucidation of the connection between Meno and Sextus. 
16
 Striker, Gisela. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p.151. 
17
 Ibid, p.67. 
18
 ibid, p.165. 
19
 Chisholm, Roderick, The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989), p.61. 
20
 ibid, p.75. 
21
 Heidegger, Martin, What Is A Thing? trans. W.B. Barton and Vera Deutsch, (Indiana: Gateway 
Editions, 1967), p.119. 
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and question) our presuppositions. It means to "sort out"
22
 and involves the "positing of what 





 would ideally be "the very condition through which something can come 




Plato's concept of time helps clarify the problem of the criterion and its relation to reason's 
attempts to critically question – sort out, prioritize – its presuppositions. Plato's questioning 
presupposes a distinction between being – identity, structure – and becoming – events, plurality 
– and the problem is bridging the divide when inquiring into the nature of reality. Plato's 
cosmology revolves around the idea of a rationally ordered and divided universe,
26
 and that 
reason "circles around upon itself"
27
 when determining its place within the scheme of things. 
Specifically, Plato defines time as a "moving image of eternity"
28
 to question the nature of being, 
or everything that "always is", "has no becoming" and "does not change."
29
 Plato contrasts the 
realm of Forms (or Ideas) with the physical world (or senses), and in the sensory world 
everything "comes to be and passes away, but never really is."
30
 The beings that exist (occur, 
appear) in the temporal world are therefore moving images of "the ground of all existence"
31
, 
and the question is determining the relationship between the One (unity, stability,) and the Many 
(particulars,  motion). Consequently, "as being is to becoming so truth is to belief."
32
 Plato's 
inquiry into the nature of being raises the question of a rational discourse’s ontological 
commitments,33 or the relation between meaningful concepts (thoughts, categories, etc.) and 




 ibid, p.120. 
24
 Gasche, Rodolphe. The Honour of Thinking: Critique, Theory, Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), p.108. Gasche is elaborating on Heidegger's thoughts here. 
25
 ibid, p.109. 
26
 Timaeus, 37a. 
27
 ibid,  
28






 Dillon, John. "The Question of Being" in Brunschwig, Jacques and Lloyd, Geoffrey (eds.) Greek 
Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge (London: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
32
 Timaeus, 29c. 
33
 Quine, Willard. "On What There Is" in From A Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p.12. Quine introduces the term ontological commitment within the context 
of Plato's inquiry into (non)being (p.1) and extends it the problem of delimiting the meaning of being 
within other contexts of inquiry. While this term of reference might originate with Quine and has a 
specified meaning and objective – as a way of deciding how the existential presuppositions and 
boundaries of a given theory are to be determined – it is important to stress two things in advance. 
Firstly, the meaningful content of the concept ontological commitment remains a contested object of 
inquiry and so becomes theory-laden in turn. See, for example, Balaguer, Mark, Platonism and Anti-
Platonism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) on the age old question of 
whether abstract numbers really (or independently) exist. Secondly, competing definitions of the 
meaning of ontological commitment recur in distinct contexts of inquiry, extending from the social 
and physical sciences to computer programming. Contrast, for example, Kivinen, Osmo and 
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those independent objects presupposed or stated to be true (existent or necessarily related). 
While concepts might refer to or presuppose a meaningful world, they can only represent (act 
or speak for) the objects in question. A given ontological commitment already presupposes 
claims to knowledge about reality or existence as a necessary prior condition
34
 and so first 
occurs at a fundamental (or pre-theoretical) level. Ontological commitments presuppose the 
independent existence of objects represented by the concepts of a given theory or practice, and 
are typically referred to as "existential presuppositions, i.e., a presupposition about reality"35 that 
may be questioned in turn. The question is whether it is possible to determine the ontological 
status of presupposed objects: in what way is the ‘presupposition  about reality’ true? Put 
another way: what is a "fundamental conceptual scheme"
36
 really referring to – its own 
conception (bounding, interpretation) of reality or a potentially boundless (meaningless) 
objective reality itself? While the study of being is careful to distinguish between the existential 
domains of a rational discourse (representations) and the existential realms of possible objects 
or worlds (represented), the problem is whether rational thought can break out of the circle – 
schemes or interpretations – in which it invariably moves. The distinction between pre-
theoretical and theoretical knowledge claims is relevant for that very reason: an inquiry into 
being is a representation – or re-representation – of (other) representations and attempts to 
bring implicit presuppositions about ‘reality’ (the state of being actual or real) to the fore and into 
interrogation.
37
 Consequently,  it becomes "a question about which theory we end up adopting 
                                                
Piiroinen, Tero, "The Relevance of Ontological Commitments in Social Science: Realist and 
Pragmatic Viewpoints" Journal for the Theory for Social Behaviour, Vol.34, No.3, 2004, pp.231-248, 
Esfield, Michael and Deckert, Dirk, A Minimalist Ontology of the Natural World (New York: 
Routledge, 2018) and Poli, Roberto (ed.) Theory and Applications of Ontology: Computer 
Applications (New York: Springer, 2010).  
34
 Chalmers, David Manley, David and Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on 
The Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).  
35
 Lightfoot, David. Natural Logic and the Greek Moods (Paris: Mouton, 1975), p.81. 
36
 Quine, Willard. Word and Object (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 2013), p.254. 
37
 Quine, Willard. Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp.49-50. 
Quine argues that we cannot break out of the circle of representations and the requirement is to try 
and find our way around distinct interpretations accordingly. The problem of representation – or the 
way concepts refer to objects – turns into a problem of translating one "background language" into 
another. Consequently, he urges ontological relativity, or a relational theory of objects that may 
represent (act or speak for) other objects in potentially competing theories or practices. If as Quine 
argues, that there can be no objective facts of the matter about what meaningful terms can possibly 
refer to or mean, his own conception of the meaning of ontological commitment is ironically rendered 
meaningless by his own theory of meaning as indeterminate (i.e., ontologically commits the study of 
being to nothing, or ‘no thing.’) Given that there is no independent reason – or value free way –  to 
prioritise one existence domain over another, competing theories  are reduced to ontologically 
relative inquiries into being. On the one hand, then, Quine’s relativisation of being purports to be 
ontologically neutral or agnostic. On the other hand, it permits the study of being to reduce or multiply 
(the meaning of) beings according  to the prioritised  theory. Note, however, the way he attempts to 
translate the language of physics into a universal ontological standard or measure – i.e., where the 
theoretical objects and applications of physics may help us to meaningfully represent the problem 
of representing all other representations in ontologically relative terms. Quine’s position is worth 
 24 
as our (best) view of the world"
38
 and the "existential claims are the ontological commitments"
39
 
potentially thrown into question. A rational inquiries’ ontological commitments, then, is an 
answer to the real question: in what way can we truthfully think about an already meaningful (or 
presupposed) world? If an inquiry can only occur within a context of presuppositions, the 
question is determining its relationship to the "prior ontological standard"
40
 making questioning 
of an ontologically prior understanding possible and necessary in the first place. Jacquette 
characterises the potentially questionable relation between word and world in the following way. 
 
To be ontologically committed is to accept the existence of an entity or type or kind or category of entities. 
As individual thinkers we make ontological commitments to the things we believe exist, while theories 
in the abstract are ontologically committed to whatever entities would need to exist in order for the 
theories to be true.41  
 
If, for example, human beings believe in 'things' like clocks and watches, they are ontologically 
committed to the belief that 'small portable timepieces' or extended 'periods of time' exist. A 
theoretical determination, however, approaches the beings in question in a more circumscribed 
way – by trying to sort out (prioritize and delimit) the existential presuppositions enabling its own 
                                                
quoting in full because the questions become: if we don’t ontologically commit to an objective (extra-
linguistic) reality, can his own universe of discourse be thought objectively true or false -i.e., be 
applied universally and/or meaningfully? Furthermore, if we deny the existence of universals (class 
of language-independent or universal objects and relations) what is actually being translated from 
one language to another (reinterpreted)? Specifically, "we need a background language to regress 
into. Are we involved now in an infinite regress? If questions of reference of the sort we are 
considering make sense only relative to a background language, then evidently questions of 
reference for the background language make sense in turn only relative to a further background 
language. In these terms the situation sounds desperate, but in fact it is little different from questions 
of position and velocity. When we are given position and velocity relative to a given coordinate 
system, we can always ask in turn about the placing of origin and orientation of axes of that system 
of coordinates; and there is no end to the succession of further coordinate systems that could be 
adduced in answering the successive questions thus generated. In practice of course we end the 
regress of coordinate systems by something like pointing. And in practice we end the regress of 
background languages, in discussions of reference, by acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking 
its words at face value. Very well; in the case of position and velocity, in practice, pointing breaks 
the regress. But what of position and velocity apart from practice? What of the regress then? The 
answer, of course, is the relational doctrine of space; there is no absolute position or velocity; there 
are just the relations of coordinate systems to one another, and ultimately of things to one another. 
And I think that the parallel question regardingdenotation calls for a parallel answer, a relational 
theory of what the objects of theories are. What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a 
theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in 
another."       
38





 Quine, Willard. "On What There Is" in From A Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p.15. 
41
 Jacquette, Dale. Ontology (Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited. 2002), p.156. 
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questioning. As Palore observes, an inquiry into being attempts to "rethink, coherently and 
systematically, the totality of objects, in their irreducible characteristics."
42
 It therefore explores 
"the field of what exists insomuch as it exists, and only relatively to such a specification."
43
 A 
theory’s ontological commitments thereby act as a standard bearer in that it carries a mobilized 
flag or banner when determining the truth-value of potentially meaningful statements.
44
 The 
difficulty, however, is that the study of being presupposes the very being at issue: the specificity 
of the prior ontological standard 'rethinking, coherently and systematically, the totality of objects, 
in their irreducible characteristics.' The problem of the criterion invariably calls into question the 
relativity of any given specification and boundary line (the conditions under which existential 
presuppositions may be thought meaningful and true). If reason is to critically determine the 
ontological status of ‘beings’, it is forced to acknowledge the way a criterion may itself determine 




Such an acknowledgment invariably redirects the study of being back to the problem of 
evaluating an ontological standard of evaluation – i.e., calls for an inquiry into an ontological 
standard’s mode of being. Pike notes that conflicting "modes of explanation"
46
 presuppose 
ontological commitments in two distinct ways. "On the one hand, different ontological 
commitments throw up different series of questions to be answered, on the other, competing 
ontologies entail different conceptions of what counts as a (true) answer."47 The notion of 
ontological commitment thereby conceives contexts of ‘meaning’ in terms of possible world truth 
conditions and presupposes an absolute or context-transcendent standard of measurement 
when answering "the ontological question"48 – that of ontological relativity (the existential 
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 Valore, Paolo.  Fundamentals of Ontological Commitment (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), p.3. 
43
 ibid, p.4. 
44
 ibid, p.7. Valore observes that the study of being "specifies the fundamental categories of being 
by listing which entities are admitted to exist; this, in turn, is done by offering a typological 
characterization of such entities, and at times, a hierarchical taxonomy. Such a conceptual taxonomy 
is mirrored by an articulation of different layers of reality."  
45
 Quine, Willard. "On What There Is" in From A Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p.13. Quine, for example, proffers the following prior ontological standard 
as the true standard bearer for truth : to be is to be the value of a variable. Quine’s argument about 
existence (or existential boundaries) is an attempt to prevent non-existing objects such as unicorns 
or Homeric gods into a given ontology. Although these terms obviously refer to meaningful objects, 
Quine attempts to circumvent the problem of reference – or reference to non-existing objects – by 
way of quantifications over categories of objects. Thus: if we can express or measure the quantity 
of given objects, we can determine the real boundaries between word and world. 
46
 Pike, Jonathan. From Aristotle To Marx: Aristotelianism in Marxist Social Ontology (Aldershot: 




 Quine, Willard. The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), p.68. To reiterate, we 
need to distinguish the meaning of Quine’s theory laden terms ontological commitment and 
ontological relativity from other potential meanings and/or theories. If the ontological question is itself 
linguistically bound and determined, then ‘different ontological commitments throw up different series 
of questions to be answered’, and ‘competing ontologies entail different conceptions of what counts 
as an answer’ in the theory. Witness the way Quine paradoxically attempts to shift the meaning of 
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presupposition that the meaning of being is relative to a context of inquiry and/or possible world). 
The question is whether it is intelligible to translate competing existential presuppositions into 
distinct contexts of inquiry – i.e., express another ontology in a more meaningful way without a 
loss or negation of meaning. Specifically, can the concept of ontological commitment adequately 
convey another theories’ true or complete meaning, or does ‘the ontological question’ itself get 
lost in translation via competing ontological commitments and the relativization of meaning 
(ontologies)?
49
 Bricker summarises the problem of the criterion and its relation to existential 
presuppositions in the following way. 
 
The problem of ontological commitment …asks what entities or kinds of entity exist according to a given 
theory or discourse, and thus are among its ontological commitments. Having a criterion of ontological 
commitment for theories is needed, arguably, if one is to systematically and rigorously attack the problem 
of ontology: typically, we accept entities into our ontology via accepting theories that are ontologically 
committed to those entities. A criterion of ontological commitment, then, is a pre-requisite for ontological 
inquiry. On its face, the notion of ontological commitment for theories is a simple matter. Theories have 
truth conditions. These truth conditions tell us how the world must be in order for the theory to be true; 
they make demands on the world. Sometimes, perhaps always, they demand of the world that certain 
entities or kinds of entity exist. The ontological commitments of a theory, then, are just the entities or 
kinds of entity that must exist in order for the theory to be true. 
 
But complications arise as soon as one tries to specify a theory's truth conditions: different accounts of 
truth conditions lead to different accounts of ontological commitment. Moreover, theories couched in 
ordinary language do not wear their truth conditions—or their ontological commitments—on their 
sleeves. Thus, the need arises to find a criterion of ontological commitment: a test or method that can be 
applied to theories in a neutral way to determine the theory's ontological commitments…(However)… 
the notion of ontological commitment, introduced to help resolve disputes in ontology, becomes hostage 
                                                
his own terms onto another theory. "Shifts of language ordinarily involves a shift of ontology. There 
is one important sense, however, in which the ontological question transcends linguistic convention: 
how economical an ontology can we achieve and still have a language adequate to all purposes of 
science? In this form, the question of the ontological presuppositions of science survives" and the 
requirement is to develop a universal "language adequate to science" in the linguistic form of "logic 
and mathematics."    
49
 Alston, William. "Ontological Commitments" Philosophical Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 1958, p.8. As 
Alston observes, "many philosophers have occupied themselves with translating one linguistic 
expression into another, or with providing general schema for such translations. And some of them, 
sensitive to charges of engaging in parlour games during working hours, have tried, in various ways, 
to exhibit the serious value of such activities". If the ontological question is an attempt to delimit the 
relation between word and world, the charge is whether such a formal pursuit is mere logic or word 
play (i.e., lacks definitive form or limits because of the very activity in question). 
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to disputes over the existential presuppositions of the theory. Strife over the ontological commitments of 
theories begins to appear inevitable.50 
 
Witness the way Plato’s ontological commitments invariably call into question his own 
conception of 'reality'. Plato's questioning is committed to the possibility and/or necessity of 
inquiries into the nature of being (existence) and nature itself is thought to be "providentially 
designed"
51
 and so directs the inquiry into being (existing things). Specifically, Plato is seeking 
an answer to two related questions – namely, what is existence (being) and what kinds of beings 
really exist? To question the being of anything, then, was to determine "the function or purpose 
which it was intended to serve"
52
, and the only way that human beings can properly "determine 
the object in question"
53
 was to fulfil reason's purpose: acquire knowledge through questioning.     
Plato's theory of recollection attempts to get around the problem of circularity by looking for 
rationality in a reason questioning itself in time. Specifically, the dialogues provide criteria for 
knowledge in the form of a "foreknowledge principle"
54
 that insists on the "procedural priority of 
definition."
55
 Plato describes a Form as the "common nature"
56
 possessed by many different 
beings, and "customarily hypothesize a single form in connection with each collection of many 
things to which we apply the same name."
57
 The dialogues argue that we don't really acquire 
new knowledge of the world of the experience but recollect what was previously known about a 
more definitive realm (objective and transcendent reality). Socrates thereby searches for 
definitions in his inquiries: acquiring knowledge of (say) the concept of 'virtue' is to ask 'what 
virtue is' and where its being truly originates or resides. While there might be many different 
virtues – and as many disagreements about what counts as virtuous – it’s nonetheless still 
possible to know virtue’s true (or original) form. To put forth a subject of inquiry involves a search 
for an object that meaningfully answers to such a description – a search allegedly made both 
possible and necessary by recollecting knowledge through the "practice of question and answer 
argument" (dialectic).
58
 Given the priority of definition in the search for (fore)knowledge, 
language nonetheless remains questionable. The Cratylus famously turns on the question of 
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whether language is 'natural' or 'conventional', and the question is whether conventional words 
"divide things according to their natures"
59
 and/or whether the "dividing (of) being"
60
 can be 
questioned through knowledge of (a) given language. Socrates attempts to find definitive 
knowledge of meaningful beings via a true definition –  by defining the nature of the being in 
question. The dialogues turn towards language to move beyond it – towards the beings 
themselves. Plato's transcendental claim is "that all knowledge is a priori in the sense that its 
source is independent of the experience of present incarnate experience"
61
 but depends on an 
experience of 'reincarnation' to bring our knowledge full circle (to completion).  
 
The theory of recollection is, of course, primarily intelligible within Plato's historical and cultural 
context. Socrates' questioning presupposes, for example, a belief in prior lives and/or an afterlife 
– one where an eternal soul is striving to perfect (recollect) itself through knowledge of an ideal 
world. The quest for a meaningful definition of (say) the concept of 'virtue' allegedly provides 
knowledge of true virtue, and recollecting part of this knowledge supposedly provides access to 
a more complex whole via questioning.62 The only problem, however, is that Plato's theory of 
Forms could not withstand his own "criticism"
63
 (questioning) and invariably found itself caught 
in a vicious circle regarding the relation between the One and the many.
64
 The problem emerges 
within the context of Plato's presuppositions and throws the relation between their structure and 
event(s) back into question. Specifically, the problem of One over Many reintroduces the 





 and asks how Being can be included in and/or separated from the beings in question. 
If we are to presuppose unity (Being, or a common identity) in many distinct beings, how can 
we maintain a distinction between Being and beings when determining their relationship? The 
dialogues readily acknowledge that the presupposition of the unity of many beings divides 
                                                
59
 Cratylus, 388b. 
60
 ibid, 388c. 
61
 Gulley, Norman. Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 12. 
62
 "As the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents a man, after 
recalling one thing only – a process men call learning – discovering everything else… (for) searching 
and learning are, as a whole, recollection." Meno 81d. 
63
 Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004). As Russell 
observes, Plato's Parmenides "contains one of the most remarkable cases in history of self-criticism 
by a philosopher", p.128. 
64
 Plato, Parmenides, 131a–166c, Complete Works, Cooper, John (ed.) (Indianapolis: Hacket 






against itself and multiples Beings indefinitely.
67
 Either way, Plato's "critique of impure reason"
68
 
thereby assumes "all our knowledge must conform to objects…establishing something in regard 
to them a priori, by means of concepts."69 The circular nature of Socrates' inquiries is perhaps 
nowhere better exemplified in his conception (definition) of virtue – namely, virtue is 
knowledge.
70
 Socrates quest for knowledge also begs the question as to whether he lived a 
virtuous life. As Vlastos notes, there is a "paradox"
71
 at the heart of Socrates' quest. Socrates' 
attempt to perfect the soul through the acquisition of knowledge contradicts his famed disavowal 
of knowing anything truly worthwhile.
72
 Equally telling was Socrates infamy: calling shared 
beliefs and practices into question was widely interpreted as a moral defect and invariably made 
him very "unpopular."
73
 While the questions asked were intelligible within a given cultural 
context, Socrates' questioning proved to be antisocial. Socrates was "known to his fellow 
citizens as a destructive critic"
74
 since he spent most of his time arguing with people. Greek 
society answered his questioning by eventually putting him to death for impiety and corrupting 
the youth. Nonetheless, the philosophical question remains the source of knowledge and 
experience, and asks how the objects of the one (experience) can either conform to or deviate 
from the objects of the other (knowledge).
75
 Socrates characterizes this question as the problem 
of the divided line, 76 and subsequent inquiry becomes an attempt to bridge the divide between 
Being and beings. Specifically, it involves an inquiry into the nature of the distinction between 
kinds of being/s and (their) modes of being. The concern that motivates our questioning is 
therefore the nature of being – namely, what is an object (of knowledge and/or experience), and 
how do such objects come to be (in such conformity or deviation)? 
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Critical Theory (the idea of). 
 
The "idea of a critical theory"77 has "become a dominant force in higher education…(and) is now 
considered an essential part"
78
 of knowledge acquisition. Indeed, "knowledge of critical theory" 
has become a "mark of status, an educational property for which students and professors 
compete."
79
 The only problem is that many of the theories answering to such a description raise 
a puzzling question – namely, what is a critical theory? The very idea of a critical theory remains 
a contested object of inquiry and "critical theories compete with one another for dominance in 
educational and cultural communities."
80
 The idea might have become institutionalized, but 
there appears to be little rhyme or reason for identifying distinct 'theories' as 'critical'. The 
competing theories not only remain subject to criticism but the idea of a critical theory has taken 
on the form of a Platonic ideal. Witness the way many distinct theoretical orientations – such as 
deconstructionism, Marxism, feminism, semiotics, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, etc. – have 
been similarly positioned and arranged as critical theories within anthologies
81
 and across 
courses. Consequently, the idea of a critical theory has "undertaken a fetishist function"
82
 and 
become "the opium of the intelligentsia"
83
 in that academic institutions have compulsively 
pursued its study and/or contestation in the name of 'higher knowledge'.
84
 Nonetheless, the 
criteria for identifying a critical theory remain so broad as to render the very idea meaningless 
and/or questionable. Particularly questionable is that the original self-professed critical theorists 
– Adorno and Horkheimer – were critical of such identity thinking (objectification through 
naming, defining, etc.). The situation in which we find ourselves appears to have resulted from 
the reification of the theoretical in a traditional social setting. Specifically, where qualitatively 
distinct objects have been conceptualised into a similar quantitative identity and turned into a 
'thing' via subsumptive reasoning. Adorno and Horkheimer's concern was the role reason 
played in administering social relations and practices, and claimed that the "whole logical order, 
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dependency, connection, progression and union of concepts"
85
 has its basis in the historical 
impetus to reify objects in the first place. Reification was said to occur when "being and 
occurrence"
86
 can be "apprehended in unity"
87
 via "position and arrangement"
88
, and was 
"grounded in the corresponding conditions of social reality."
89
 The irony, then, is that the original 
critical theorists wanted to throw traditional forms of knowledge into question – and yet their 
idea of a critical theory has since being subsumed and institutionalized under a 'traditional' 




According to one criterion, what distinguishes critical theory from (say) theories not ideally 
identified as such is the attempt to locate questioning in a "new historical moment"
91
 to transform 
our knowledge and/or practices. Such an attempt, however, runs the risk of "misjudging the 
current situation"
92
 since the idea of a critical theory needs to be constantly "renewed"
93
 through 
questioning. While there can be "no ideal moment"
94
 to identify a critical theory, there are 
nonetheless "canonical questions"
95
 which distinguish a critical theory – and so "many of the 
theorists select themselves."
96
 Given these generally accepted rules or questions, "critique 
involves the determination of rational standards of evaluation and the application of those 
standards to given modes of thought and practice."
97
 The problem, of course, is whether it is 
possible to evaluate the standards of evaluation without presupposing their truth-value. Witness 
Hoy and McCarthy's Critical Theory, which acknowledges that the "idea of a critical theory"98 
has given rise to competing – if not contradictory – conceptions of the "nature, scope and limits 
of human reason." 
99
 Hoy and McCarthy attempt to mediate the dispute within academic circles, 
and the question is what should ideally answer to the description of a critical theory. While the 
debate might go under the seemingly uncontentious heading Critical Theory, it arguably 
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provides "the best statement of the paradigms wars which (has) dominated philosophy as well 
as social and cultural criticism"
100
 and could have conceivably "been called critical theory-
hermeneutics-poststructuralism."
101
 Hoy and McCarthy are quick to remind us, however, that 
the "complex configuration of present-day critical theory"
102
 has its origins in Kant's attempt to 
make objects conform to our concepts. The Kantian revolution involves, of course, a reversal of 
Plato's attempt to make concepts conform to objects, and similarly attempted to answer the call 
of reason by questioning the limits of reason's rationality.
103
 Either way, their transcendental 
arguments turn on the same problem regarding the ontological status of objects of possible 
experience: whether an inquiry into the "sources and conditions of possibility of such criticism"
104
 
can transcend the context of their occurrence (i.e., have objective validity or truth). The idea is 
therefore perhaps best approached "as a set of theoretical discourses variously predicated 
upon...highly unstable tendencies and preoccupations."
105
 The question is not so much what is 
a critical theory, but whether rational thinkers can adopt a "conceptual framework"
106
 in which 
to critically question and/or transform social practice – including the practice of questioning. 
Such an idea, however, is hardly modern – it has its origins in the philosophical discourse of 
antiquity. As Horkheimer reminds us, questioning the ‘nature, scope and limits of human reason’ 
was the "original function of philosophy"
107




The main difficulties, however, are whether critical theory threatens to be "a kind of comedy 
without the humour"
109
 or a form of "intellectual masturbation."
110
 Rorty questions, for example, 
how 'critical' a 'theory' could possibly be, and observes that academia's distinctive contribution 
to society involves research into other researchers’ ideas. "If I had to define ‘critical theory’…it 
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is the attempt of philosophy professors to make the study of…books intelligible only to 
philosophy professors, relevant to the struggle for social justice"
111
 within academic circles. 
Another critic mocks the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie's"
112 attempt to justify purely 
academic exercises. Specifically, "academia is one huge circle jerk. All the sequestered people 
desperately defending the one good idea they have had in their lives."113 The author of The Idea 
of a Critical Theory surprisingly concurs.114 According to Geuss, being a critical thinker involves 
"training aspiring young members of the commercial, governmental or administrative elite in the 
glib manipulation of words, theories and arguments."
115
 Questioning invariably turns out "the 
pliable, efficient, self-satisfied cadres that our economic and political system uses to produce 




Perhaps the best way to illustrate the circuitous route taken when employing a term like ‘critical 
theory’ is to draw attention to a recent historical development. We shall briefly travel the route 
taken by Hazard Adams, and then return the way we came. Specifically, there exist three 
compilations of source material edited by Adams. These are: Critical Theory Since Plato (1971), 
Critical Theory Since 1965 (1986) and Critical Theory Since Plato (revised and updated, 2005). 
It's surprising to observe that Adams is not the editor of Critical Theory Now117 (2003), Critical 
Theory Today118 (2015) or the Handbook of Critical Theory119 (2017). It is also possible to be 
taken further aback by Plato As Critical Theorist (2018) – an unrelated text traversing a  
hazardous path of development.
120
 Either way, the ‘critical theorists’ included within Adams’s 
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volumes range from (say) Plato to Frye (1971), Chomsky to Wittgenstein (1986) and Plato to 
Derrida (2005). Now, what is significant about these compilations is the way Adams's idea of a 
critical theory comes full circle. Adams originally tries to distinguish his use of the term by way 
of cultural specificity and theoretical orientation. Unlike the term originally employed by the 
Frankfurt school, the North American appropriation is not taken to mean cultural theory. Adams 
concern was to delimit its meaning to literary theory, despite the reliance upon other cultural 
traditions and practices. Particularly interesting is what happens between the original and 
revised editions via the intermediate compilation. In the first edition, there is the tendency for 
Adams to isolate Plato’s aesthetic theory from its broader theoretical context(s). Plato’s question 
concerning the "problem of being"
121
 is displaced, and determining the kind of meaning or truth 
available through literary 'objects' is prioritized. In the subsequent editions, we get a more 
integrated account of Plato’s problematic. The issue of the nature of meaning and truth comes 
to determine the question of the nature and object of knowledge in the first place. The question 
of language was originally conceived as a background issue and subsequently foregrounded 
via the "linguistic turn"
122
 in contemporary thought, or the modern claim that "philosophical 
questions are questions of language."
123
 Such a historical development, however, is not so 
much a turn but a return – as evident by Plato's interrogation of language that figures more 
centrally in the revised edition. Unlike Plato, however, the linguistic turn does not attempt to 
move beyond the medium of language and reveals the self-referential paradox of language: the 
turn towards language remains directed by language's delimitation of the beings in question. 
The linguistic turn revolves around the problem of the "direction of fit"
124
 between language and 
world, and claims that language is the "medium in which we think."
125
 Given this approach, there 
is no "ontological gap"
126
 between the structure of thought and the questions of language.
127
 
The question, however, is the nature of the direction of the fit between linguistically determined 
concepts and corresponding objects of thought.
128
 The necessary presuppositions of the 
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linguistic turn, then, are that language conceives – constructs, interprets – objects as 
meaningful, and that knowledge of the world of experience is only possible by questioning the 
internal relationship between them. While the linguistic turn distinguishes between (a) concept 
and (an) object to account for the intelligibility of its questions, the question of "what makes 
language and thought possible remains circular."
129
 Specifically, how is it possible to distinguish 
between language and thought when they presuppose each other? Consequently, an inquiry 
into language remains faced with the problem of critically questioning – sorting out, prioritizing 
– its own relations of presupposition. Before we can turn to the question of language, then, we 
need to invoke two provisos. Firstly, we need to invoke the proviso of a formal mode of thinking. 
Specifically, we need to stress that since our concepts become (and remain) the ostensible 
subject matter of a formal inquiry, they are themselves the object of such inquiries. Secondly, 
we need to invoke the proviso of their intentional relation to each other, or the way concept and 
object are already directed upon and/or refer (back) to each other in language. Although 
concepts and objects may be provisionally distinguished, they continue to circle each other and 
move within the orbit of intentionality (the relation between language and thought). Intentionality 
is the phenomenon in which our thoughts – or rather, those concepts by which we think and 
question – point outside themselves: to those objects they are of or about. The proviso of a 
formal mode of thinking itself becomes questionable in that any given inquiry is already 'informal' 
by way of the everyday occurrence of intentionality. If intentionality is the way in which objects 
are thought and questioned, such thinking and/or questioning remains directed towards the 
objects linguistically conceived (specified) as such. Given that "intentional relations depend on 
how their objects are specified"
130
, the problem is distinguishing between a linguistic concept 
and/or object of thought within the given specification.  
 
The problem of specification is brought into question via Critical Theory Since Plato (revised 
and updated, 2005). In the original edition, Adams attempted to distinguish literary theory (and 
objects) from cultural theory (and objects). Generally speaking, the initial emphasis was upon 
how literary texts may produce and interrogate the ‘culture’ in question. The exclusivity and 
primacy of literature as a cultural category is therefore highlighted and questioned through 
selected texts. However, in the subsequent editions, we encounter an inversion of this 
relationship. Such an inversion bears witness to the rise of cultural studies within comparative 
literature departments across the English-speaking world. Critical theory has now become the 
way in which literary theorists may identify and critique ‘culture’, including the literature – and 
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theories – reproduced within the language of a given culture. The notion of the exclusivity and 
primacy of ‘literature’ as a cultural category is problematized, and the question of language 
becomes integral when questioning cultural relations and practices. Objects of knowledge are 
now thought of as linguistically constituted and/or historically mediated – i.e., determined by 
relations of signification and norms of action.  The concept of 'culture' is taken as given, namely, 
as that "complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."
131
 We find ourselves 
returning to the 'problem of being', or the relation between part and whole (unity in divisible 
parts). Consequently, the critical question is how ‘culture’ produces and interrogates meaningful 
'objects', including the 'theories' questioning them. Such a historical inversion was the result of 
"continental philosophy"
132
 finding its way into English literature and cultural study departments. 
The Anglo-American cultural landscape was transformed by an encounter with German and 
French philosophy which (of course) emerged within culturally distinct traditions
133
, and 
historically moved in different directions across the world.
134
 Nonetheless, original experiences 
of "profound change and disquiet"
135
 culminated in paradigm wars and repressive 
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 Specifically, the complex configurations found within Critical Theory Since Plato 
find expression in the dispute over the idea of critical theory debated in Hoy and McCarthy's 
Critical Theory. The rise of 'critical theory' has taken on imperialist tendencies – as evident by 
the colonizing of the consciousness of academia and power struggles over objects of inquiry.
137
 
The turn to language might have inaugurated the first "genuine moves to self-conscious 
reflective thought"
138
, but the cultural status of 'critical theory' has become questionable in turn: 
what do the fortified positions and theoretical allegiances themselves signify? Consequently, 
there have been renewed calls for a "genuine critique of critique"
139
 – particularly since critical 
thought allegedly "feeds on its own impotence"
140
 as it has given rise to 'theory's empire,'
141
 or 
"passive assent to established routines."
142
 As one critic complains, critical theory has become 
"an empire zealously inquisitorial about every form of empire but its own."
143
 While the paradigm 
wars might be over, conceptual terrain(s) nonetheless continue to be occupied and resisted.
144
 
The 'occupation' has either retreated into the background  – in the form of tacit knowledge – or 
is actively brought forth via advancing social positions (specialized knowledge in the higher 
ranks) at the expense of the proletarianization of academia.
145
 The situation remains critical in 
that there still is the problem of critically questioning – sorting out, evaluating – distinct 
presuppositions and commitments. We return, then, to the problem of the criterion and the 
cultural status of competing knowledge claims. We've claimed that our inquiry is directed by the 
question: what is 'critical' about (a) critical theory? We also observed that there are many 
competing – if not contradictory – cultural theories answering to the description of a 'critical 
theory'. Consequently, there appear to be conflicting criteria as to what might ideally be called 
a critical theory, and the problem is critically questioning (evaluating) their respective knowledge 
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claims. We have followed tradition and delimited our question by acknowledging the axis on 
which the problem of the criterion turns.  Given the linguistic turn, the problem of knowledge 
nonetheless moves around the question of language and/or turns (back) towards questions 
emerging within traditional patterns of thought.  
 
Measure for Measure 
 
We thereby need to question the nature of the direction of fit between a theory of 'culture', and 
the contradictory way/s that culture may direct (inform, inscribe) the content and/or referent of 
competing 'critiques'. Specifically, the problem of the criterion is predicated upon the recognition 
that we need to distinguish between the objects of knowledge and experience to account for 
the relations between them. The problem is particularly acute when we recognize that 
competing theories similarly converge around the claim that (self)knowledge is a cultural object 
or event, and has its basis in linguistic experience. The question of the constitutive – 
constructive, interpretive – element in cultural experience occurs across the theories considered 
– namely, via the way historical relations and/or linguistic practices reproduce the objects in 
question. The claim to knowledge that culture in some way constitutes the object as experienced 
and known is, therefore, a recurring question, and directs us towards the way language 
constitutes the objects in question. We shall primarily consider the so-called critical theories of 
Habermas, Lyotard and Derrida by way of Heidegger and Gadamer.  Our question follows the 
lead of the problem of the criterion and the way language directs (divides, multiplies) 'beings' 
into distinct questions and movements. Following Heidegger and Gadamer, we emphasize the 
being of the question, or the way 'beings' emerge within the context of meaningful interpretations 
and/or questioning. Particularly critical is the concept of the hermeneutical circle and the 
problem of questioning language as a complex whole. While the idea of the hermeneutical circle 
predates Heidegger and Gadamer, their turn to language will direct our inquiry into the circularity 
of questioning. Originally emerging within the context of textual and/or historical studies,
146
 the 
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concept of the hermeneutical circle turns on the problem that all meaningful objects are 
contextually determined, bound and/or mediated. The irony is that Critical Theory Since Plato 
invariably comes full circle again. If objects of knowledge emerge within contexts of 
interpretation, a given inquiry returns to a problem familiar from textual analysis and/or the study 
of history. As Grondin notes, the concept of the hermeneutical circle proceeds from the 
presupposition that there can be no "understanding without presuppositions"
147
 and directs itself 
towards the question of "a more reasonable concept of rationality."
148
 The question, however, 
is: how can reason rationally determine the status of the presuppositions brought into question 
by way of the relation between part and whole? Specifically, if we "always understand or 
interpret out of some presuppositions"
149
, interpreters will invariably find themselves moving 
within a complex whole throwing itself back into question. The concept of the hermeneutical 
circle raises the question of the direction of fit between part and whole insofar as the problem 
of self-referentiality becomes integral to the question of the structure and/or events of 
understanding itself. Questioning the rational status of a critical theory turns on the same 
problematic. We not only find ourselves faced with the problem of delimiting a critical theory but 
determining the limits of their interpretations within the circle of language and thought: what is 
an object (of knowledge or experience), and how do these objects come to be (in such 
conformity or deviation) there? We shall argue that the being of the question determines the 
question of being, or what a given theory assumes to be relevant and/or adequate to its own 
questioning. More specifically, what a cultural theory already presupposes to be 'critical' – 
meaningful and/or truthful – in accordance with its criteria. The status of competing cultural 
theories thereby raises a 'critical' question: if a criterion is an attempt to determine what is 
relevant or adequate to its questioning, how can we determine (question) the relevance or 
adequacy of competing criteria?  
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We shall attempt an answer via a consideration of the hermeneutical circle, or through the 
question of the relation between the parts and/or whole of the language reproducing the objects 
– and presuppositions – in question. The overall aim is to rethink the hermeneutical circle by 
questioning the way conflicting interpretations bring forth and/or hold back relations of 
presupposition within language.
150
 The questions, therefore, become: what are the 
presuppositions in question, and how do we turn towards – relate to – relations of presupposition 
within competing conceptions of language? We shall argue that the requirement is to inquire 
into distinct objects of inquiry by way of the corresponding ontological commitments. If the 
linguistic turn provides a way to interrogate the direction of fit between word and world, our 
questions turn into: which way do we turn (back) towards 'language'? We follow tradition by 
dividing the (study of) 'language' into interdependent parts forming a complex whole
151
 – via 
language's syntactic (Derrida), semantic (Lyotard) and pragmatic (Habermas) parts.152 Our 
inquiry into critical theory will provide distinct ways to approach (relate to) the circle of 
understanding. Specifically, we shall argue that competing critical theories are parts that form a 
complex whole, and should be understood (questioned, interpreted) in relation to each other. 
The conflict of interpretations thereby directs us towards competing conceptions of 'critique' 
(delimitations of self-understanding). Consequently, we shall find ourselves moving towards the 
problem of interpreting other interpretations and evaluating their respective movements and 
commitments. We argue that the circle of understanding directs the conflict of interpretations 
(back) towards the question of being and its relation to the problem of the criterion. Furthermore, 
the conflict that occurs within the circle shall direct the question of being in a related way – 
towards the question of ontological commitment as cultural critique.   
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Getting Our Bearings 
 
Every confrontation of …different interpretations of work…is in reality a mutual reflection on the guiding 
presuppositions: it is the discussion of these presuppositions, a task, which strangely is only tolerated 
marginally and covered up with empty generalisations…The attempt at translation proposed…is possible 
only on the way on which we are already engaged when we ask the question: what calls on us to think? 
With this, the prior assumption of our interpretation is both identified and submitted for discussion.153  
 
 
If meaning is function in context…then equivalence of meaning is equivalence of function in context. 
What the translator is doing when translating or interpreting is making decisions all of the time about 
what is the relevant context within which this functional equivalence is being established.154  
 
 
Let’s turn around prior to proceeding further. Chapter 1 begins with a section called ‘Chasing 
Our Tale’ to orient ourselves. The subtitle attempted to capture two related themes in advance: 
that the pursuit of truth involves going around in circles and that such back and forth movements 
are akin to spinning tales. In chasing our tale, we’ve rotated rapidly on an axis and ran the risk 
of pursuing non-existent or inaccessible objects. If a truth-value is an object of thought about 
the world,
155
 the spinning of tales is a way of worldmaking156 in the meaningful form of make-
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 We’ve thereby put a stake in the ground of the "linguistic turn"
158
 – the "fundamental 
gambit as to method"
159
 – when navigating the circle between language and thought (or relation 
between word and world). In other wor(l)ds, we’ve tethered ourselves –  and moved between – 
seemingly opposing poles in order to orient our thinking and get the measure of the very objects 
in question.  As will be seen, we’ve partially taken our lead from the critical theorists in question 
in that they attempt to ground the truth-value of their objects of inquiry in a methodological 
and/or rhetorical fiction. The problem of going around in circles therefore becomes a critical 
question in turn: if we are to ground the ontological status of our beliefs in the world of make-
believe, what are we to make of our beliefs? The methodological ‘fictions’ also raise the question 
of the nature of the object substitution160 going on within critical theory: in what way does the 
theorist use an imaginary object to determine the truth-value of their reasoning? Specifically, if 
we must imagine a situation to be true for their own arguments – i.e., impose meaning or value 
beyond what can be truthfully grasped or evaluated – does that locate the idea of critical theory 
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While following our tale, we have pursued a dizzying array of guiding presuppositions across 
distinct contexts of inquiry and found our bearings accordingly. Although these presuppositions 
have guided us in different ways, they have also directed us towards related questions and 
problems. Their measure of functionality occurred in a roundabout way for the following reason: 
while we might be referring to distinct objects of thought, they nonetheless perform the same 
function throughout the dissertation. Specifically, it is part of the thesis statement that there is 
no getting around the problem of chasing our tales and these elusive objects necessarily recur 
as tropes across distinct contexts any-way. The thesis statement therefore purports to more 
than just state the situation in question – its stating functions performatively in that it (re)creates 
the circle being navigated by way of potentially related contexts and questions. The task ahead, 
then, is to follow pursuit by determining equivalences of meaning via an equivalence of function 
in context(s) –  and such a functional equivalence involves a translation of possible meaning 
(performing the act of uniform movement between relevant – if immeasurable – contexts of 
interpretation). If the thesis has a thematic through-line, it is that research objects are "as much 
made as they are found"
162
 and the problem is finding (making) our way around conflicting "value 




There is, of course, a more straightforward – and relatively risk averse – approach available. If 
a thesis is a proposition (statement, argument, theory, etc.) to be put forward and proved, it 
would ideally move in the direction straight in front of it – towards the very ‘objects’ in question 
and/or contention. The thesis would follow a direct line of reasoning and seeks to establish a 
formal equivalence between (logical) form and content. By following a methodical process of 
reasoning, such courses of action directly lead towards their avowed objective  – the ‘truth’ of 
the matter. The whole point of adopting a formal argument is to make our conceptual 
frameworks as airtight as possible – to create a logical space so tightly sealed that little air can 
enter or leave it. In formally protecting ourselves from environmental conditions and forces, 
seemingly "airtight arguments"
164
 try to forcibly exclude the passage of (hot or cold) air and enter 
a more rarefied atmosphere – that of an objective or irreversible ‘truth’. The ideal of an airtight 
argument, however, rarely measures up to the reality – they invariably leave themselves open 
to counter arguments or further investigation. The reality necessarily runs counter to (or outruns) 
the ideal any-way: the guiding presupposition of research is to reframe (reposition or reshape) 
bones of contention and objects of inquiry – and these contexts of shifting meaning may go on 
                                                
162
 Goodman, Nelson. Ways Of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hacket Press, 1978), p.22.  
163
 Hall, John. Cultures of Inquiry: From Epistemology to Discourse in Sociohistorical Research New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.63. 
164
 Boutelle, Tony and Gibilisco, Stan. Logic Demystified (New York: The McGrawHill Companies 
Inc., 2011), p.3. 
 44 
to be re-contextualized (reshifted and reinterpreted) in turn. Given the seemingly makeshift 
nature of contexts of inquiry –  i.e., where interpretations invariably act as an interim or 
temporary measure and can only be done using whatever interpreted objects may become 
available a given time and place – the question turns into: what are we to make of such a 
situation and how are we to orient ourselves toward it?  
 
 The Hermeneutical Situation 
 
Following Heidegger’s lead, we shall approach the circle as an "ontological question"
165
 – as a 
problem directed towards the constitution of the meaningful objects within a complex whole 
invariably calling itself back into question.
166
 We will need to proceed carefully however. While 
the (hermeneutical) circle might figure centrally in Heidegger’s questioning, the circular relation 
between interpretation and understanding is not his avowed object of inquiry. Heidegger is  
primarily directed towards something that (allegedly) remains "obscure and hidden"
167
 in the 
circle, and he raises the "question of the meaning of Being"168 in order to "reawaken our 
understanding for the meaning of this question."
169
 Heidegger’s goal is to try and understand 
the circle in a more meaningful way, and his thoroughgoing interpretations attempt to navigate 
the circle in many different ways. Heidegger goes on to claim that his own conception of the 
circle remains "superficial"
170
 any-way and urged that "at bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it 
is extra-ordinary"171 as he purportedly plumbed the depths (or "wellsprings"172) of Being. 
Consequently, many interpreters have found Heidegger’s approach to the circle "downright 
bewildering"
173
 while a tradition of competing interpretations attempt to decipher the "arcane 
mysteries of Heidegger’s obscure texts."
174
 The paradox before us, then, is that Heidegger’s 
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conception of the circle moves against the possibility of a straightforward understanding and 
actively encourages conflicting interpretations of his own movements there. 
175
 Part of the 
problem is Heidegger’s disavowal of traditional thought or practice – or moving within the circle 
of a levelled and/or closed off understanding – since  
 
Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to 
those primordial sources from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part 
quite genuinely drawn. Indeed, it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose 
that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand.176  
 
The ontological question that particularly concerns us, then, is the way the circle of 
understanding itself ‘turns’: it is primarily directed towards the question of whether the 
"ontological structure" 
177
  turns back on itself or may become a place of a change of direction 
and forward movement. The question of its turning moves our interpretation to the complex 
whole’s two main constituent parts, and so directs our questioning towards the "essential 
conditions under which it can be performed."
178
 Firstly, there is the issue of the circle’s 
normativity, or its capacity to (re)direct the way enclosed human beings stand in relation to their 
social being and other ‘beings’ (objects, entities). The ontological question partially turns on the 
problem of the circle of understanding’s sense of well-being : in what way may the equilibrium 
of potentially unstable elements (essential conditions of existence) be held to a truly appropriate 
ontological standard? Heidegger called our "mode of being"
179
 in understanding our being-there 
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(Dasein) in that "understanding is a basic determination of existence"
180
 and "existence is the 
determining character of Dasein."
181
 Meaningful interpretations of the world are therefore 
"possible only because the Dasein as existent is itself an intrinsically understanding entity."
182
 
Heidegger problematizes the way human beings stand in the midst of the "immediate circle of 
beings,"
183
 and it is their normative stance (or moral standing) that becomes the ontological 
issue there. Heidegger goes on to "pursue the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding 
the world"
184
, and his goal is to distinguish its "mode of genuineness"
185
 via the circle in question. 
Heidegger pursues our "being-there as understanding"
186
 and argues that interpretation is 





 for meaningful understanding is therefore determined by Dasein's 
relationship to its own being-in-the-world: the question is whether Dasein should conform to a 
standard of correctness through prescribed social norms and conventions or whether our being-
there can be held to a higher standard of living (way of being). Consequently, "existence formally 
indicates that Dasein is an understanding potentiality-for-Being, which in its Being, makes an 
issue of that Being itself."
189
 Put another way, "in the being of this being it is related to its being. 
As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being. It is being about which this being is 
concerned "
190
 and moves (back) towards. Secondly, there is the related issue of "the fore-
structure"
191
 of understanding in that "every understanding of the world…and all interpretation 
operates in the fore-structure."
192
 The fore-structure is the existential ground on which human 
beings normatively stand and move. The possibility of finding our way around in the world is 
said to be the result of a thrown "projection"
193
 insofar as interpretations necessarily move 
"forward into (meaningful) possibilities."
194
 Such forthright movements receive their directions 
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from within a "totality of (implicit) involvements"
195
 that may be partially brought forth and called 
into question. This meaningful totality "need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic 
interpretation"
196
 and "even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes into an 
understanding which does not stand out from the background."
197
 Interpretations occur by way 
of guiding presuppositions that are projected in advance of what is being interpreted and so 
determine the way human beings immediately stand in the midst of the circle of beings. A given 
understanding  cannot always explicitly understand what is understood because it always 
moves against a background of tacit cultural capacities, stances and presuppositions. 
Nonetheless, "explicitness"
198
 is the determining feature of interpretation: it exhibits an "as 
structure,"
199
 or the "structure of something as something."
200
 The "‘as’ makes up the structure 
of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation" in that we 
"see it as a table, a door, a carriage or a bridge."201 Heidegger claims "whenever something is 
interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-
sight and fore-conception."
202
 The fore-having  of an interpretation is the object of interpretation 
– a ‘being’ that the interpretation tacitly possesses and remains directed to within the circle in 
some way. The fore-sight is the orientation (point of view) directing the interpretation, or the way 
an object of interpretation may be actively seen and understood. The fore-conception is the 
conception (or directed understanding) itself: it constitutes the way objects within the circle may 
be approached (interpreted). The possibility for meaning may therefore be held in ‘reserve’ in 
two distinct ways – as a reservoir of potential meaning that is invariably called on when needed, 
or refraining from making a final decision without further consideration or evidence (more 
understanding, interpretation). The "way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be 
conceived can be drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into 
concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being. In either case, the interpretation has 
already decided for a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with reservations. "
203
 
Either way, the fore-structure charts a course for understanding and actively provides a 
formative standard or quality to those objects already standing before it. Consequently, "an 
interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us"
204
 and 
"what stands there in the first instance"
205
 are the presuppositions of interpreting beings.  
                                                
195














 ibid, 189. 
203
 Ibid, p.191. 
204
 ibid, pp.191-192 
205
 ibid, p.192. 
 48 
We’ve observed Heidegger arguing that human existence is itself interpretive, and "any 
interpretation which is to contribute understanding must have already understood what is to be 
interpreted."
206
 Interpreters thereby remain an integral part of the objects in question: they 
belong to – and move within – a complex whole determining the possibility of a meaningful world 
in the first place. The interpretation of ‘objects’ is "the working-out of possibilities projected in 
understanding"
207
 and it is our involvement with an already meaningful world that "gets laid out 
by the interpretation.
208
 Heidegger calls such projections the "hermeneutical situation,"
209
 or "the 
totality of presuppositions…which needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand, both in a 
basic experience of the object to be disclosed and in terms of such an experience."
210
 Heidegger 
attempts to disclose "the world as a phenomenon"
211
 so as to question the way we "always 
conduct our activities in an understanding of Being."
212
 The "world has already been 
presupposed, and indeed in various ways."
213
 Understanding is conceived as a mode of being 
in which our being-in-the-world and/or being-there invariably moves and remains directed. By 
moving within the immediate circle of beings, different entities may be encountered and 
understood "as such"
214
 – i.e., as being already meaningful and/or distinguished according to 
different "things that are 'in' the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars."
215
 The "circle 
of understanding"
216
 must therefore be approached via the "avenue of the entities within the 
world and the Being which they possess."
217
 Given "the interpretedness of the world"
218
 – 
objects that are "always already"
219
 disclosed as meaningful within the circle – the problem is 
determining the "hermeneutics unique to each situation."
220
 Heidegger’s conception of the 
hermeneutical situation actively resists the ideal of objects as hermetically sealed entities – as 
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objects potentially sealed off from environmental forces invariably throwing them (back) into 
question or a state of disrepair. Contexts of interpretation remain open to question, and their 
corresponding objects may shift in meaning when passing through porous borders or potentially 
accessible spaces of meaning. The hermeneutical situation presupposes that we are already 
"thrown"
221
 into "the interpretedness which life itself stands:"
222
 Living beings don’t so much 
stand under interpretations but move with the circle enabling a projected understanding to work 
out further possibilities for meaning. Consequently, "a concept is not a scheme but rather a 
possibility of being, or how things look in the moment- i.e., is constitutive of the moment – a 
meaning drawn out of something."
223
 The hermeneutical situation "always moves within a 
particular  interpretedness that has been handed down, or revised or reworked anew."
224
 The 
hermeneutical situation, then, is only intelligible (possible, meaningful) in relation to a "whole of 
significance"
225
 in which interpretations are already situated (move, occur). These situations (or 
interpreted parts) form a complex whole in two related ways: they are directed by a totality of 
presuppositions that may remain unquestioned and partial – are taken as given and may be 
incomplete or one-sided – or the corresponding objects may be called into question and 
transformed via interpretations favouring one side (situation) over another. 
 
We have thus far been talking around the circle in question. We have been approaching the 
ontological structure of understanding in a circumscribed way – through the hermeneutical 
situation, or the event of a given understanding. The question, however, is what gives 
understanding its ‘events’ (situations that occur as interpretations within a given time and 
place)? Following Heidegger’s lead, there can be no straightforward answer to this question.  
We can only approach the circle as an "ontological clue"
226
 to be followed and "progressively 
worked out."
227





into the circle in the 'right way'
230
, Heidegger's own directives are (unfortunately) misleading 
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here. Given his own understanding, we are always already in the circle anyway – it can never 
be a question of entering or leaving but approaching (moving within) the circle from a given 
direction. Furthermore, Heidegger remains intent on distinguishing between the hermeneutical 
and the methodological, and maintains that the hermeneutical situation cannot be reduced to 
(or interpreted away) via systematic directives and procedures (established ways of proceeding 
into an area of inquiry or activity). It is more a question of finding our way around the circle of 
understanding through questioning and interpretations that remain open to question and 
reinterpretation. Heidegger raises the question of the meaning of Being in order to situate and 
redirect the hermeneutical situation (i.e., provide indirect access to the enigma of understanding 
our mode of being in the circle). The question of the meaning of Being is therefore a leading 
question – it is not only thought to imply or contain its own answer, it is asked (directed) in such 
a way as to indirectly and/or subtly guide human beings to respond (answer) in a particular way. 
In this way, we need not move methodically in the circle but may follow its lead back to the 
hidden depths of Being.  Specifically, the "circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any 
random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of 
Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle , or even of a circle which is 
merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing."
231
 Nonetheless, Heidegger’s misleading talk of 'entering' and/or 'leaping' into the 
circle in the 'right way' still finds itself moving within a logical circle in two related ways: it 
presupposes the possibility of finding our way around an obstacle to understanding – i.e., 
circumvent the very circle in question – and intimates that it is possible that there may exist a 
correct principle or standard (criterion, norm) by which we can move around the obstruction 
standing in our way of a truer understanding. Heidegger might attempt to circumvent the 
problem of finding and/or needing a criteria for moving in the circle but he still presupposes the 
very being (normativity) at issue: the possibility and/or necessity of a prior ontological standard 
for determining the correctness our movements (existence) there. 
 
Since "Dasein already understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of 
itself"
232
, the question becomes the way our being-there relates to its own possibilities 
(relationship to a meaningful world or a world thus made possible and/or questionable). The 
hermeneutical circle may be said to be "existential-ontological"
233
 for this very reason.  
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The circle in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in 
the existential constitution of Dasein—that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, 
as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.234 
 
Heidegger's conception of the circle of understanding finds itself directed and moving in 
accordance with this hermeneutical situation: by finding our place within the circle in question 
we may lay bare the grounds of questioning and inquire into our own mode of being (meaningful 
existence as a questioning being). Whilst Heidegger obviously recognises the "manifest 
circularity"
235
 in such an approach, he nonetheless maintains that we should direct ourselves 




Such a situation is hermeneutical – meets (encounters, copes with) a critical need – insofar as 
the finitude of existence remains an integral part of the structure of meaning. The circle is 
ontological because objects of interpretation are situated (belongs to an understanding which 
is placed and interprets) and it remains possible to question the significance of given situations 
(displace the meaning of interpreted objects). Furthermore, the "hermeneutics unique to each 
situation has to develop the transparency of its current situation and bring this hermeneutical 
transparency into its starting point and approach to interpretation."
237
 Interpreters therefore need 
to distinguish between "the thematic object in the how of its being interpreted"
238
 and "the 




In approaching the thematic object of our inquiry – the linguistic turn as a fundamental gambit 
as to method for proceeding to the world – we will invariably find ourselves moving within the 
circle potentially calling itself (back) into question there. We simultaneously run the risk of 
receding into an understanding that does not stand out from the background knowledge 
enabling such forward movement. If a gambit is an opening move designed to gain an 
advantage at the outset of given situations, the hermeneutical situation invariably calls into 
question the ontological significance of such movements.  Thus, if we are to ask the question: 
what calls on us to think we are obliged to answer the circle directing us to move back and forth 
as such. It is only by performing (enacting) the circle of understanding that we can bring forth 
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the critical question remaining in the background: what is the hermeneutical significance of 
distinguishing between thematic and comprehensive objects of concern (competing value 
constructions of objects)?  Prior to proceeding further, we turn back to Heidegger regarding the 
ontological status of the interpretedness of the world and its relation to competing value 
constructions (interpretations) of objects. 
 
The objects are there as significant, and it is only in definitively directed and layered theorising that what 
is objective (in the sense of what is object-like or thing-like) arises from the world’s factical character of 
encounter (i.e. from what is already significant)…to understand means not to simply recognise 
established knowledge, but rather to repeat in an original way what was once understood in terms of its 
own situation and for that situation.240   
 
 
Paving the way to language: Heidegger and the quasi-transcendental.  
 
We have already observed that Heidegger notes the etymological connection between 'critique' 
and 'criterion'. Specifically, critique comes from krinein "which means to 'sort out' and thus to 'lift 
out that of special sort'. This contrast against others arises from an elevation of a new order."
241
 
Heidegger is noting two related things here – the occurrence of a prior ontological standard and 
the prioritization (evaluation of) the given ontological commitments. The idea of a critique, then, 
presupposes a criterion attempting to distinguish and/or assign a value to the very 'beings' – 
and presuppositions – in question.
242
 Heidegger, however, raises the question of Being to 
problematize the rational ordering of beings. Although Heidegger's questioning sets out to 
interrogate relations of presupposition, the critical question becomes: how should we relate to 
the presuppositions in question? The question of Being requires a degree of "force against"
243
 
whatever is presupposed, forcing the circle of understanding in "the direction of a more originary 
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 Heidegger claims that such a "destructive"
245
 approach to "hardened tradition"
246
 
is not to be identified with a "critique…of culture"
247
 since the "destruction of the history of 
ontology"
248
 must occur "by way of a critical dismantling of traditional logic down to its hidden 
foundations."
249
 Heidegger is not so much concerned with the conditions of possibility for 
knowledge but with the conditions of possibility for asking about the Being of beings in the first 
place. Heidegger's "quasi-transcendental"
250
 approach obviously raises the more fundamental 
question: what does he mean (presuppose) by 'Being' within the context of his questioning? 
Part of the answer is that even an "unoriented and vague"
251
 understanding of being "bears…the 
possibility of the question within itself."
252
 In "the question which we are to work out, what is 
asked about is Being – that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which 
entities are already understood."
253
 Heidegger approaches the circle between language and 
thought through an existential analytic254 (in terms of what it means to be or exist as a human 
being in a meaningfully constituted world). Heidegger thereby attempted to adjudicate the 
question of Being via our "being-in-the-world."
255
 That is to say, concerning the way a 
meaningful world remains an integral part of the fundamental constitution of those human 
beings "inclined to fall back upon the world (the world in which it is)"
256
 and moves around.  
Heidegger called this "mode of being"
257
 our being-there (Dasein). Since human beings move 
within an understanding of being, "Dasein is its disclosedness"258 in that it is only by being 
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thrown into an "always already"259 meaningful world that anything can be 'known' (disclosed) "in 
the immediate circle of beings."
260
 The question of Being tries to determine what 'Being' could 
possibly mean or refer to within the context of a "pre-ontological understanding of Being"
261
 (a 
prior understanding implicitly understood without question). Heidegger's "guiding question"
262
 
goes on to ask  "what is the mode of being of the entity in which world is constituted?"
263
 Given 
the question of what makes a  meaningful world possible and/or questionable, "the problem of 
being is related – all inclusively – to what constitutes and what gets constituted."
264
 We therefore 
need to find our way back towards a more originary question about the meaning of being and 
we can only do this by way of "fundamental ontology"
265
 (the making explicit of what it means 
to be via formulating the question of the Being).  Such an approach can only meaningfully occur 
when the question of "being in time…functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of 
Being"
266
 or can seek to determine how our temporal existence comes "to have this distinctive 
ontological function."
267
 Consequently, it is only by first questioning the meaning of our being-
in-the-world that human beings can properly understand "that entity which in its Being has this 
very Being as an issue."
268
  The primary goal of Heidegger's questioning is to "arrive at the 
horizon for the understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it."
269
 Further, "any 
interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must have already understood what is to be 
interpreted."
270
 Heidegger directs us to approach the question of Being through the 
"phenomenon"
271
 of a meaningful "world itself"
272
 and calls this phenomenon the "hermeneutical 
situation"
273
 or the "totality of…presuppositions"
274
 determining the horizon of a meaningful 
understanding. In so far as it is possible to move back and forth within a given understanding, 
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Heidegger points the way backwards and/or forwards by "presupposing"
275
 the being/s in 
question and asks us to find our way around accordingly. We will therefore need to proceed 
carefully and distance ourselves from Heidegger's approach. Although Heidegger paves the 
way to the circle of understanding, it is Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics that provides the 
decisive turning point for our questioning. Part of the reason is methodological. Exploring the 
relation between way and weigh, Heidegger cautions against tipping the balance (moving) either 
way
276
 and urges that any attempt to take the measure of Being hangs in the balance (remains 
in a critical state and carries certain risks). Furthermore, "Being, which holds all beings in the 
balance, constantly attracts beings towards and unto itself" and "Being, as the risk, holds all 
beings, as risked, in this relation of attraction."
277
 Given Heidegger's "way-making"
278
 
movements, the entrance to Heidegger's collected thoughts bear the signpost: Ways, not 
Works.
279
 Heidegger advises us to approach his thinking as parts that cannot add up to an 
intelligible whole.
280
 Each part is "merely a way–station along a way (where) the lasting element 
in thinking is the way."
281
 The idea of a way, of course, not only implies direction or movement, 
                                                
275
 ibid, p.27. 
276
 Heidegger, Martin. "Why Poets?" in Young, Julian and Haynes, Kenneth (eds.) Off the Beaten 




 Heidegger, Martin. "A Dialogue On Language" in On The Way To Language trans. Peter Hertz, 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982), p.130. 
279
 Heidegger, Martin. Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works), Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976-
1996. Wege – nicht Arbeiten (Ways – not Works). 
280
 Heidegger's major contribution to traditional philosophy –  via a seminal text generally understood 
to espouse a holistic approach to meaning and truth – is itself comprised of various parts which do 
not add up to a meaningful whole. Being and Time not only remains incomplete, the path taken pulls 
Heidegger in different directions. Of the proposed two parts consisting of an intended three divisions 
(pp.63-64) only Part 1 appears, and the third division of the first part was never published. According 
to Heidegger in the "Letter On Humanism", the missing third division was deliberately "held back" 
because he couldn't manage the proposed reversal from 'being and time' to 'time and being', p.231.  
And as Theodore Kisiel observes in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993) the relation between part and whole "is a story of the movement 
of drafts and redrafts, the shuffling of texts …still bearing signs of incomplete integration, with the 
gaps still showing", p.312-13. 
281
 Heidegger, Martin. "A Dialogue On Language" in On The Way To Language trans. Peter Hertz, 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982), p.12. Following Heidegger’s lead, the tendency within the 
literature is to divide Heidegger’s thinking into distinct temporal parts – into before and after 'the 
turning' ("Letter on Humanism," p.231) that emphasizes the question of the meaning and the truth 
of Being respectively. Nonethless, Heidegger's movements form a complex whole. The question of 
Being is complex insofar as Being and beings remain on the way: as either moving towards a given 
understanding and/or calling whatever is understood back into question. By his own reckoning, the 
possibility of moving towards meaning or truth presuppose each other in that "turning is counter-
turning" (Heidegger, Martin, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.286-7). Specifically, understanding 
has its "innermost occurrence and its widest reach in the turning" around the question of Being. 
Being called upon re-turns us to Being’s own movement, requiring thinking beings to fall back upon 
their "guiding questions and the circle of under-standing…Turning holds sway between the call (to 
the one belonging) and the belonging (of the one who is called). Turning is counter-turning." 
Heidegger’s approach actually begins with a ‘turning’ anyway, where questioning turns back upon 
 56 
it suggests a path being prepared or is available for travelling upon. Questioning may thereby 
offer a way by enabling movement or direction. Heidegger, then, merely paves the way back 
and forth, and such a ‘pavement’ is the ground upon which the question of being moves. 
Heidegger is acutely aware that any attempt to clear the way through questioning threatens to 
throw into question the relations within thinking. Any questioning potentially involves mutually 
exclusive parts, and so requires piety in thinking questions.282 Thought must remain observant 
of and devoted to the question of its own way-making movements – by being wary of its own 
thinking/questioning. On the one hand, thought is preparatory in that it attempts to make a way 
accessible: questions guide thought in a particular direction and seek to uncover or access 
something.
283
 On the other hand, questions may be misguided in that they may lie over or cover 
up something: the very thing being thought through questioning.284 While the question of Being 
might have directed Heidegger's overall movements, thinking about that question took him in 
various directions. If there is a guiding principle, it's Heidegger's attempt to move past the 
"language of metaphysics"
285
 by thinking about the "ontological difference,"
286
 or the difference 
between Being and beings in different ways.
287
 Although Heidegger originally claimed that the 
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 was to determine the "meaning of Being,"
289
 the "relation of Being and 
human being"
290
 was "unsuitably conceived"
291
 insofar as "the truth of Being remains 
unthought"
292
 and lies "concealed"
293
 within any given understanding. Heidegger was forced to 
approach the question of Being in a roundabout way because the "usual conception of 
intentionality misunderstands"
294
 the way rational thought can meaningfully relate to the objects 
of its own questioning. Rational thought was obliged to make "intentionality itself into a 
problem"
295
 since "intentional relations"
296
 are not only "related to beings themselves"
297
, they 




 Being in the first place. As Crowell 
and Malpas observe about Heidegger’s approach, the "scope of the transcendental question"
300
 
extends to "the conditions…of all intentionality, all consciousness of something as 
something."
301
 Consequently, Heidegger’s questioning is itself directed upon and moves within 
"the ‘understanding of being’ upon which all directedness toward objects ‘as’ something 
depends."
302
 The question of Being can therefore only be approached (truthfully understood) 
"as a question into the very possibility of any intelligibility or meaning at all."
303
   
 
Heidegger originally distinguished between practical and theoretical intentionality, or distinct 
ways in which rational beings intentionally relate to the world. The distinction is between the 
ready-to-hand- and the present-to-hand and relates to "an assignment or reference to 
something."
304
 Heidegger presents a hammer to distinguish our modes of being-there
305
 and 
observes that such tools can be approached in two distinct ways. We could either take it in our 
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hand and hammer away without thinking or we could present it to conscious thought and 
contemplate it as an object from a distance. When using a hammer, we don't normally 
understand it as a 'handle and a heavy metal top with a flat side' – the object's physical 
properties retreat into the background (context of presuppositions) from which it emerges. We 
relate to the hammer by way of the task literally at hand: by being orientated to the act of hitting 
nails on the head and become an integral part of an activity occurring within a referential whole. 
Only a breakdown in understanding would typically render it present-to-hand: a broken hammer 
becomes a question insofar as there is a problem calling for immediate resolution. The question 
of Being, however, needs to be approached in different ways. The question is neither ready for 
understanding or can be readily presented in understanding: determining the true meaning of 
Being or the task assigned to human beings lies beyond understanding because Being as the 
determination of beings remains referentially opaque.306 Heidegger argues that the problem of 
intentionality is determining how we should truthfully "think about"
307
 the relation between 
thought and language since "we do not know what is called thinking and what calls for 
thinking."
308
 Heidegger's questioning purports to answer a higher "calling"
309
 when directing 
thought back towards the original "source of the calling."
310
 Thinking is therefore a "recalling"
311
 
in "the sense that it originally directs us to thinking."
312
 Heidegger goes so far as to attribute 






 – to recall 
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Heidegger thereby arrives at the understanding that since truth originally meant unconcealdness, 
Being can only meaningfully occur if a world is disclosed or brought out "into the open that is lighted 
by itself" (clearing, true history, etc.), p.162-163.   
314
 Heidegger, Martin. What is Called Thinking trans. Jesse Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 
1968). According to Heidegger, "The Greek verb keleuein properly means to get something on the 
road, to get it underway. The Greek noun keleuthos means way. And that the old word "to call" 
means not so much a command as a letting-reach, that therefore the "call" has an assonance of 
helpfulness and compliance, is shown by the fact that the same word in Sanskrit still means 
something like to invite", p.117. 
315
 Heidegger, Martin. "Why Poets?" in Young, Julian and Haynes, Kenneth (eds.) Off the Beaten 
Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Heidegger notes the etymological 
connection between way and weigh, and claims that it is only possible to get underway because the 





 question. Calling on the etymological connection between thinking and 
thanking,317 questioning turns into an expression of gratitude for Being's consideration (the 
condition of possibility for more careful thought).
318
 Heidegger's recall occurs as a "mutual 
calling of origin and future"
319
, and human beings may answer the call by bringing "together 
what is concealed within the old."
320
 Heidegger's back and forth movements have their origins 
in his quasi-transcendental approach to the question of Being in time. Specifically, where the 
question of the conditions of possibility of "world meaning constitution"
321
 is located within a 
temporal and/or originating horizon.
322
 Consequently, the "unity of the horizon of temporality is 
nothing other than the temporal condition for the possibility of world and of world's essential 
belonging to transcendence."323 The question of Being is transcendental in that it is thought to 
be immanent and/or imminent – it determines the Being of beings by moving with human beings 
in time. The problem, however, is the intelligibility of conceiving an ontology that points beyond 
(or exists prior to) phenomenal existence: is it possible (meaningful) to introduce a dividing line 
between Being and beings in history? Heidegger claims to be able to bring forth the distinction 
between Being and beings through that "unitary phenomenon"324 passed down and levelled off 
into an undifferentiated mode of being. The difficulty is the way a meaningful whole raises the 
question of "the structure of self-referentiality"
325
 when throwing its directives and movements 
(back) into question. Any move towards quasi-transcendental questioning necessarily moves 
within the complex whole structuring its movements, and so becomes an inquiry into the 
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conditions of its possibility (existence, occurrence). As Bubner observes, the "transcendental 
presupposition"
326
 is directed by the question of its being-there and so attempts to uncover "the 
conditions for the possibility…of understanding 
327
 by determining the limits of its own 
"ontological commitment."
328
 Specifically, questioning referred to as (quasi) "transcendental 
takes as its subject, together with the general conditions of knowledge, the conditions of its own 
genesis and functioning."
329
 The question, then, re-turns to the problem of whether a self-
referential structure can determine the limits of its own objects and events: is it even meaningful 
(intelligible, possible) for reason to question itself in such a roundabout way? Lafont notes that 
Heidegger substitutes the "ontological difference for the empirical/transcendental dichotomy"
330
 
to distinguish between the "ontological structures of Dasein in general and its historical, ontic 
concretizations."
331
 In this way, Heidegger ascribes a "quasi-transcendental status…to the 
particular world-disclosure in which Dasein is thrown"
332
 and Heidegger can "do this in virtue of 
the possibility of affirming that a world-disclosure is something ontic (factually given, a cultural 
product) but at the same time always already ontological."
333
 Heidegger's concept of a world 
meaningfully constituted thereby attempts to have it both ways simultaneously – to interrogate 
our understanding of being within the line at which history and culture meet and yet circumvent 
the circular boundary in which both appear together or move. Heidegger attempts to move 
beyond the circle to question that which bounds and "encircles334 understanding, and so 
determines its mode of being as a circular boundary. The problem was moving towards the 
"determining"
335
 of understanding – a determination which encompasses and relates to the 
circle's own directives and movements. Heidegger's "transcendental historicism"
336
 has been 
called a "non-viable mongrel"
337
 because Heidegger attempts to "historicize the Platonic dividing 
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 by turning the distinction between Being and time around.
339
 Heidegger subsequently 
came to the understanding that there was a "thinking more rigorous than the conceptual"
340
 and 
being understood was "suicidal to philosophy"
341
 any–way. Heidegger originally conceived 
language in instrumental terms,
342
 and his questioning rigorously applied an "act of 
appropriation"
343
 to apportion out the "appropriation of understanding."
344
 Concepts through 
which understanding was brought forth or held back had its basis in Dasein's prior potentiality 
for meaning: language was therefore merely the way in which an always already meaningful 
world was understood. Heidegger came to the understanding, however, that it was really the 
other way around and the requirement was to find our way back to the language calling the 
world into being and/or question in the first place. Heidegger thereby answered the call of being 
"appropriated to Being"
345
 by turning the "ancient quarrel"
346
 between poetry and philosophy on 
its head.
347
 It is rational thinking which finds itself lost in exile,
348
 and poetry paves the way 
towards a "homecoming"
349
 insofar as Being's dwelling within language permits human beings 
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to enter a region where rational method must relinquish its reign.
350
 Following language's "poetic 
activity"
351
 may direct thought's return to "nearness to the origin."
352
 Heidegger calls upon poetry 
not just because he thinks it provides privileged access to language – rather; language is now 
thought to be the original (and long forgotten) poem.
353
 Heidegger's way to language determines 
that human beings are more than a being-in-the-world: they are part of an "originary oneness"
354
 
that calls forth a deeper understanding. The possibility of a meaningful world is said to be 
disclosed via the "relation of all relations"
355
 called the "fourfold"
356
 (referential structure/dwelling 
unfolding the possible relationship between mortals, earth, sky and gods). Consequently, 
"Language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the 
truth of Being, guarding it."
357
  Heidegger, then, attempted to situate his own questioning outside 
the limits of philosophical understanding and within the realm of poetic understanding (a 
thoughtful poeticising determined by the immeasurable or boundless).358 If the ‘task of 
thinking’
359
 was to find a way to delimit what could be understood, we need to determine the 
boundaries our own questioning accordingly. A related reason for existentially bounding our 
inquiry is that Heidegger is a "genuinely novel thinker who breaks with established patterns of 
thought"
360
 and his language is notoriously "difficult to understand"
361
 anyway. Given the 
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 and/or "wilful obscurantism"
363
 of Heidegger's general approach, the 
relation between Heidegger's thinking and language are among the "obstacles to its 
comprehension"
364
 and "tends to paralyse the capacity for lucid thought."
365
 If Heidegger 
purports to be thinking about the enigma of Being, it follows that Heidegger's "innovative but 
often obscure language"
366
 preserves "the enigmatic character of what is to be thought."
367
 
Heidegger doesn't so much ask us to beg the original question but to prostrate ourselves before 
a question that defies rational understanding and directs thinking into an "impenetrable fog, in 
which ideas not clearly understood have to be taken on trust."
368
 As Heidegger readily sees, it 
"remains unclear what we are supposed to think under the name Being"369 when determining 
the "Being of beings"
370
 since the "distinction (is) made only in thought"
371
 and remains 
"questionable"
372
 in turn. Heidegger's questioning subsequently turned towards what he called 
the concealed "clearing of Being,"
373
 or an  "unmeasurable (that) first opens up the open region 
for every measure."
374
 In thinking the question of being, the critical question becomes: what is 
called thinking and/or calls thought forth (into being and/or question)?
375
 Thought remains 
directed and "on the way"
376
 insofar as it has been called into thinking via Being’s own directive 
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(calling) and thus "directs us into thought and gives us directives for thinking."
377
 Heidegger's 
subsequent "pursuit of an "ontology of unconcealment"
378
 commits itself to the "being of 
language"
379
 and urges that rational thought must find its way back to language in order to 
undergo it. Specifically, our being-there must open itself to "the possibility of undergoing an 
experience with language. To undergo an experience with something — be it a thing, a person, 
or a god — means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and 
transforms us... the experience is not of our making; to undergo here means that we endure it, 
suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it…To undergo an experience with language, 
then, means to let ourselves be concerned by the claim of language by entering into it and 
submitting to it."
380
 The way to language therefore also involves foregoing any attempt to seize 
control of it via assertions and statements. Instead of "explaining language in terms of one thing 
or another, and thus running away from it, the way to language intends to let language be 
experienced as language. In the nature of language, to be sure, language itself is conceptually 
grasped – but grasped in the grasp of something other than itself. If we attend to language 
exclusively as language, however, then language requires us to put forward everything that 
belongs to language as language."
381
 Although Heidegger's questioning received its directives 
from the circle of understanding, the question remains: where was it directed? Specifically, what 
was its 'object' (the goal understood to be reachable and/or approachable in some way)? While 
the difference between Being and beings might have been "the central thought of Heideggerian 
philosophy",
382
 determining its "intentional horizon"
383
 remains an area of concern.
384
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even compares Heidegger to Humpty Dumpy (p.20). Sheehan also despairs that the house of Being 
 65 
Heidegger's central thought needs to be understood as being directed at, or about, the 'object' 
in question and so related to (moving within) a given intentional horizon. Witness the widespread 
difficulty in trying to determine the direction of Heidegger's movements. It has been argued, for 







 a hermeneutic thinker,
388
 a linguistic idealist
389
 and a mystic.
390
 It has also been 
suggested that interpretations can be generally divided into two competing tendencies – as 
either "bald aestheticism"
391




The difficulty in securing the intentional horizon of Heidegger's thinking has not prevented other 
thinkers from moving towards a given understanding. Appropriations of Heidegger can be found 







 and Derrida's deconstructionism.
396
 Part of 
the difficulty is that Heidegger appears to oscillate between conflicting movements towards 
'beings'. On the one hand, Heidegger insists on the "phenomenological conception of 
phenomenon"
397
 or as "that which shows itself"
398
 in the world of experience. Such a conception 
                                                
would ideally bear the sign 'abandon all hope ye who enter here' (p.20). In Sheehan, Thomas, "What, 
After All, Was Heidegger About"? Continental Philosophy Review, Vo.47, No. 2 , 2014, Sheehan 
goes so far as to encourage even the most sympathetic of interpreters to follow Virgil's advice to a 
distressed Dante when guiding him through the circles of hell in The Divine Comedy: by not speaking 
about the beings in question – to just look and move on (p.270). 
385
 Sheehan, Thomas. "What, After All, Was Heidegger About"? Continental Philosophy Review, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, 2014, p. 249. 
386
 Dahlstrom, Daniel. "Heidegger's Transcendentalism" Research in Phenomenology Vol.35, No.1, 
2005, pp.29-54.  
387
 Rorty, Richard. "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism" in Essays On Heidegger And Others 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.27-49. 
388
 Zaborowski, Holger. "Heidegger's Hermeneutics: Towards A New Practice of Understanding" in 
Dahlstrom, Daniel (ed.) Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), p.15.  
389
 Lafont, Cristina. Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p.xvii. 
390
 Magnus, Bernd. Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy (Berlin: Springer, 1970), p. 141. 
391
 Crowell, Steven. "Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy" in Malpas, Jeff (ed.) From Kant to 




 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (Pocket 
Books, 1978). 
394
 Gadamer, Hans–Georg. Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall,  
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1996). 
395
  Rorty, Richard. "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in Essays On Heidegger And Others (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
396
 Derrida, Jacques. "Implications" in Positions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
p.9. Derrida readily acknowledges that "what I have attempted to do would not have been possible 
without the opening of Heidegger's questions." 
397
 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 




directs itself "to the things themselves"
399
 and is "opposed to all free floating constructions and 
accidental findings."
400
 The concept of phenomenon therefore needs to be "understood from the 
beginning as that which shows itself in itself",
401
 and asks how "time itself manifests itself as the 
horizon of Being?"
402
 Heidegger initially purports to understand 'phenomenon' without 
presuppositions and thereby attempts to question the conditions of possibility for objects of 
experience via the distinction between Being and beings. Specifically, where 'beings' involves 
a self-showing or letting things be by way of (the question of) Being. The Being of entities occurs 
prior to the beings in question and distinguished from any given interpretation of them. 
Heidegger's presuppositionless approach questions 'beings' in their "ontological constitution"403, 
or the way beings are constituted throughout time. On the other hand, Heidegger insists that 
being-in-the-world is a thrown "projection"
404
 and that human beings always experience the 
world "as something interpreted."
405
 Consequently, whatever is understood there is "disclosed 
as possible significance"
406
 and so "throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it 
be as such."407 Heidegger's recourse to the "perfect tense a priori"408 of an always already 
meaningful world attempts to bridge the divide between the transcendent – what occurs prior to 
experience – and the immanent (what occurs within it). An always already world is possible 
because it "characterizes the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself."
409
 Factual existence and 
temporal occurrences (the ontical), however, are only possible because of the ontological 
difference insofar as Being is "no class or genus of entities, yet it pertains to every entity. Its 
'universality' is to be sought higher up…Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity 
and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and 
simple."
410
 As their condition of possibility, "Being can never be explained by entities but is 
already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity."
411
  Given this approach, an "aporia"
412
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remains within Heidegger's "transcendental hermeneutics"
413
 – namely, via an insistence on the 
"primacy of practice"
414
 when Heidegger's "ontologization of the ontical"
415
 attempts to "acquire 
a priori knowledge of being."416 Heidegger's transcendental hermeneutics pulls him in two 
different directions simultaneously – towards the absolute (limitless, unconditioned) and the 
contingent (limited, conditioned). Heidegger appears to have set out to secularise theological 
terms such as calling417 and falling418 and ended up moving towards the language of negative 
theology.
419
 There is also the critical question of whether Heidegger attempted to square the 
circle of understanding when answering the call of Nazism.
420
 While Heidegger's 'destructive' 
questioning and ‘risky’ (ontological) commitment to the "inner truth and greatness of this 
movement"
421
 might merely be a "contingent"
422
 event, the question remains: contingent upon 
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 The only possible answer is that it was contingent upon his being-in-the-world 
424
 and 
modes of address (way of speaking, place of dwelling).
425





 remains significant in that it is the "original wheel of time"
428
 and 
simultaneously "depicts time forward and time backward."
429
 And as Heidegger directs us, "a 
sign to mark something indicates what one is 'at' at any time. Signs always indicate primarily 
"wherein one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with 
something."
430
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 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: 
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time called for a philosophical question regarding its origin, meaning and movements.
433
  
Furthermore, there was an attempt to appropriate history via the "fourfold movement of the 
swastika,"
434
 and such an attempt coincided with the question of its proximity to an original 
culture or language.
435
 The swastika was directed towards the question of its turning (possibility) 
and turns towards life and death simultaneously.
436
 Specifically, the swastika signifies the back 
and forth movement of time itself and has two modes of being: by moving clockwise or anti-
clockwise
437
 it discloses the relationship between "being/non-being."
438
 Particularly significant is 
that the swastika's etymology indicates that it was always already related to the question of 
being and time. Swastika is derived from the Sanskrit svastika 439: it is primarily composed of 
‘su’ (good) and asti (being) and signifies the way the world turns. The swastika’s signifying 
structure has traditionally called on "being for itself"
440
 via "the revolution of the wheel of life."
441
 
In being "associated with well-being"
442
 its invocation turns on being’s movements in time and 
so re-turns to a transcendent yet immanent ground. 
443
 Either way, Heidegger's search for an 
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absolute beginning – groundless ground 
444
 – in time culminates in an eschatology, or salvation 
narrative calling for the end of times: in the beginning was the wor(l)d
445
 and only a god can 
save us now.
446
 Adorno approaches the logical impasse –  "or a warning signal"
447
 – best when 
he observes that Heidegger’s "transcendence is an absolutized immanence, obdurate against 
its own immanent character."
448
 Specifically, human beings are called on to "conceive Being as 
the absolute"
449
 because they "cannot conceive it"
450
 as an entity. Heidegger follows Plato's lead 
                                                
actually exists" into four different kinds of being that are in reality "one and many". The fourfold’s 
cosmology is reflective in the same way that microcosm and macrocosm reflect each other – i.e., as 
above (gods, sky), so below (mortals, earth). Not insignificantly, Heidegger’s attempt to historicize 
the Platonic dividing line by calling on a fourfold is mirrored in the Platonic recollection of Being as 
an ordered ("lawful") whole in the Gorgias (504d), where four parts collectively call forth a new "world 
order" (508a). The cosmos is said to be composed of "heaven and earth, gods and men" (ibid), and 
the fourfold turns on the question of the world's well-being (507e, 504b-c) or "what’s appropriate with 
respect to human beings" (507b). The movement of the fourfold therefore turns on the "type of care" 
(521a) to be called for (526e-527e) or back into question and/or Being. Or as Heidegger would go 
on to argue in Being and Time, from "the ontological point of view, we must as a general principle 
leave the primary discovery of the world to bare mood" (p.177) and the way 'mood' lays itself bare – 
discovers the world – is through "the meaning of care" (p.370). Indeed, mood – a particular 
disposition or affectedness – lays bare the ground of meaningful disclosure: it frames a "disclosive 
submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us" (ibid), and 
determines our being-in-the-world (in feeling our sense of place we may find our way in the circle of 
beings). In Building Dwelling Thinking, Heidegger goes on to argue that "the basic character of 
dwelling is to spare, to preserve…dwelling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as 
preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things" (pp.150-51). 
444
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 According to the latter Heidegger, the relation between word and world is grounded in the 
ontological difference and determines the way the world remains open to the possibility of an 
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(Heidegger, Martin, "The Way To Language" in On The Way To Language trans. Peter Hertz, (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982), p.129) and it appropriates beings by calling them "into the word" 
(Heidegger, Martin, “Language" in Poetry, Language, Thought trans. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: 
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(ibid) of continuing to be part of a greater whole. 
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 Heidegger, Martin. "Only A God Can Save Us Now" in Wolin, Richard (ed.) The Heidegger 
Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p.107. Specifically, the "sole possibility that is left for us 
is to prepare a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or 
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by attempting to "heal the concept of 'Being' of the wound of its conceptuality, of the split 
between thoughts and their contents."
451
 Heidegger's conception of the question of Being 
thereby asks temporal beings to fall into the Platonic trap of attempting to "conceive Being 
without entity."
452
 The conceptual "sleight of hand"
453
 is said to occur via Heidegger's 
'ontologization of the ontical', or throwing the being of entities into question via the temporal 
divide between Being and beings. Heidegger's goal is to arguably bring forth a "cult of Being"
454
 
by questioning the authenticity of cultural experience – and so retreat into the "old Platonic 
austerity"
455
 of the "one pure thought"
456
 in order to recall Being's "evaporating aura"
457
 within 
history. The logical impasse (and historical warning) results from Heidegger's attempt to move 
beyond every entity and every possible determination an entity may possess through 
interpretations (determinations) of the entities themselves. The question is whether it is possible 
to pursue a transcendental ontology through historical vagaries and/or contingencies. 
Specifically, if disclosedness as unconcealment is taken as a condition of possibility for the 
occurrence of truth, what can the projection of meaning refer to (uncover) other than its own 
capacity for disclosure (possibility for meaning)?  Put another way: how can we bypass our 
knowledge of the world of experience when it necessarily occurs within the context of 




Following Heidegger, we must thereby approach the question of Being in a roundabout way – 
via ‘the problem of the formal structure of the question of being’, and the corresponding ‘priority 
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 Perhaps the question is not so much methodological but adopting a questionable approach in 
the first place – i.e., one determined by obliqueness or misdirection. It is arguable whether Heidegger 
was ever really interested in being a rational philosopher, and concealed his true objectives within 
the question of Being. Specifically, Heidegger's philosophical questioning has its origins in 
"theological-speculative thinking" ("A Dialogue On Language", p.10) and "without this theological 
background I would never have come upon the path of thinking" (ibid). Further, Heidegger 
subsequently conceded that a "confrontation with Christianity reticently accompanied my entire path" 
insofar as "the most inwards experiences and decisions remain foundational" and would ideally 
"remain outside the domain of publicness." Despite Heidegger's attempt to cover his tracks, 
"subterranean quakes have been at work in the pathway of my inquiry" and his way-making 
movements have all circled "around the sole question: whether god is fleeing from us or not, and 
whether we…still experience this flight genuinely", Heidegger, Martin, "My Pathway Hitherto" in 
Mindfulness trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, (London: Continuum, 2008), p.368-9. 
Theological speculation was also Heidegger's introduction to hermeneutic inquiry in that it originally 
brought forth the question of the relation between (the) word and world. Heidegger was acutely 
aware, however, that approaching theology thorough philosophy was an "absolute square circle", 
Heidegger, Martin, "Phenomenology and Theology" in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p.53. Nonetheless, Heidegger re-calls a historical presupposition to bring 
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(possibility, necessity) of such questioning.’
459
 As Lawlor observes, "the question of being is the 
being of the question"
460
, and is made possible by the way human beings are always already 
moving within a given understanding. Unlike other beings – such as chairs and tables – human 
beings are ontologically distinct entities in that they can ask meaningful questions within a prior 
understanding (such as 'what is the time'? or 'what is the meaning of being'?). Questioning 
thereby becomes an inquiry into the conditions of its possibility and/or necessity. Heidegger, 
then, directs rational inquiry towards the circle that enables back and forth movement. 
Furthermore, any questioning finds itself "constantly moving in a circle"
461
, and every "attempt 
to argue away such circularity in philosophy leads it away from philosophy itself."
462
 It is not 
possible to "ask a question in a philosophical way"
463
 without "having entered the circle in the 
first place"
464
 and it is "the circular movement"
465
 of a given understanding that makes 
questioning both possible and necessary. Consequently, "what is decisive is not to get out of 
the circle but to get into it in the right way…The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which 
any kind of random kind of knowledge may move…It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious 
circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility 
of the most primordial kind of knowing."
466
 In order to understand the way the circle directs our 
                                                
forth the question of the truth of Being: concealed truth as kerygma. In Ontology: The Hermeneutics 
of Facticity trans. van Buren, John, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), it is possible to 
observe a through line between the 'early' and the 'latter' Heidegger by way of the "traditional concept 
of hermeneutics", p.6. As early as 1923, Heidegger notes that ‘hermeneutics’ initially referred to the 
process of making present or intelligible what was previously absent or unintelligible – namely, a 
cryptic message sent from one kind of being (the gods) to another (human beings) through poets. 
Heidegger provides a description of Plato's characterization of poets as the "herald of the gods" 
(p.6). Specifically, hermeneutics refers to "the announcement and making known of the being of a 
being in its being in relation to…me" (ibid, p. 7). Thirty-six years later, Heidegger goes on to ask the 
question of Being via the (kerygmatic) experience of the poet – a kerygma which may be ‘received’ 
through language. In "A Dialogue On Language" Heidegger returns to the traditional concept of 
hermeneutics, and re-calls that "Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message of destiny" 
(p.29) Further, "the relation of message and message-bearer (still) prevails." (ibid). The "message-
bearer must come from the message. But he must also have gone toward it" (ibid, p.51). Heidegger's 
attempt to uncover the concealed truth of Being is therefore a return to the idea that "hermeneutics 
means not just the interpretation, but even before it, the bearing of message and tidings" (ibid, 29), 
Heidegger, Martin, "A Dialogue On Language" in On The Way To Language trans. Peter Hertz, (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982). 
459
  ibid, pp. 24-28. 
460
 Lawlor, Leonard. Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), p.1. Lawlor succinctly puts it this way by observing that "when 
Heidegger re-opens the question of being, he defines being itself as a question: the question of 
being is the being of the question."  
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movements, we must therefore inquire into the being of the entity that finds itself meaningfully 
directed upon (moving within, relating to) the objects thrown (back) into question. Questioning 
opens a way to an understanding of being, and the requirement is to find our place within the 
question. Heidegger's conception of the circle thereby directs thought towards the following 
enabling presuppositions: by finding our place within the question, we can lay bare the grounds 
of questioning and inquire into our own mode of being-there.
467
 Questioning our mode of being 
becomes the question insofar as our "being-in-the-world"468 remains an integral part of the 
question of our "being-there."
469
 Presupposing the truth-value of the question in this way – and 
trying to determine the meaningfulness of the presuppositions thrown (back) into question – 
points the way back and forth since it " is ‘truth’ that makes it all possible ontologically for us to 
be able to be such that we ‘presuppose’ anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible 
anything like presupposing"
470
 and questioning. Heidegger directs thought towards the way 
interpretation becomes possible and/or questionable in language and thinking will invariably find 
itself entangled within a "web of relations"
471
 when moving through the circle in question. The 
circle of understanding "is meaningful because the direction and manner of the circular motion 
is determined by language itself, by a movement within language." 
472
 The being of the question 
does not so much direct thought into "circular reasoning"
473
 but moves towards a "remarkable 
relatedness backward or forward"
474
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Aims and Objectives: The aim of this chapter is to return to the concept of the hermeneutical 
circle. We follow Gadamer’s lead by turning towards his conception of the relation between part 
and whole. The main objective is to follow the pathways opened up by Gadamer's move towards 
language as a necessary precondition for critical thinking. While we follow Gadamer's lead, we 
invariably argue for the necessity to overturn Gadamer's conception of critical reason. 
Furthermore, it is only by critically engaging with Gadamer's idea of critical reasoning that we 
can find our way to language via the critical theories in question. Gadamer’s questioning is 
significant in that he directs us back towards Plato and Heidegger in distinct ways. Specifically, 
we shall observe Gadamer approach Heidegger’s ‘later’ movement – the way to language – via 
an earlier movement – the way of understanding. Given this return, we shall find ourselves on 
the way back to the historicity understanding, and enclosed within a linguistically determined 
intentional horizon. Gadamer moves beyond Heidegger, however, by also returning us to Plato's 
dialectic of question and answer. The question of Being is approached through a dialectical 
conception of questioning that emphasizes the linguistic structure and/or events of 
understanding. The beings in question turn on the way the being of the question is itself directed 
(moves) through language. Gadamer thereby proceeds from the following ontological standard: 
to be is to be understood (differently) within a universal horizon of Being. To make sense of 
Gadamer's ontological commitments, we turn towards the concepts structuring the event(s) of 
his understanding. Gadamer takes it as given that questions emerge within the context of 
presuppositions, and calls these presuppositions our prejudices. The question, then, is the 
rational status (legitimacy) of the given prejudices: in what way can they be overturned 
(questioned)? The historicity of understanding remains pivotal and requires us to circle around 
concepts directing the presuppositions of his questioning. We shall observe Gadamer 
attempting to distinguish between true and false prejudices via an elusive concept of truth. The 
main difficulties are that Gadamer cannot meaningfully determine the truth-value of the 
prejudices constituting our being-there or legitimate the being of his own questioning in a truth-
evaluative way. Given the untenability of Gadamer's approach, the question of the normativity 
of our being-there is brought forth via the dialectic between knowledge and power within the 
language game of argumentation. We introduce the distinction between motivating and 
justifying reasons to bring the idea of a critical theory full circle, or rather, to enable movement 
within the circle calling itself back into question. 
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Understanding Gadamer’s Relation to Plato and Heidegger.  
 
We begin by acknowledging Gadamer’s relationship to Plato and Heidegger. Although Gadamer 
primarily understood himself to be following Heidegger, the question of their relationship 
remains open to interpretation. Gadamer urges that his appropriation of the "term 
hermeneutics"
476
 follows the early Heidegger in order to bring forth the question of "the historicity 
of understanding."
477
 The overarching aim is to "blaze a trail to the latter Heidegger"
478
 so as to 
make the hermeneutical question "accessible in a new way."
479
  Gadamer renews Heidegger's 
conception of the circle of understanding by way of the philosophical discourse of antiquity. 
Although Heidegger's "existential grounding of the hermeneutical circle"
480
 is said to "constitute 
a decisive turning point,"
481
 Gadamer approaches Plato's questioning in a different way. Rather 
than attempting to critically dismantle traditional thought or practice, Gadamer's re-turn seeks 
out a more critical (truthful) reason via the question of our being-there. Specifically, the 
"philosophical stimuli I received from Heidegger led me more and more into the realm of 
dialectic"482 but "in the background was the continuous challenge posed for me by the path 
Heidegger's own thought took, and especially by his interpretation of Plato as the decisive step 
towards metaphysical thought's obliviousness to being."483 Gadamer concedes that the being 
of his own questioning may involve a "falling back into the dimensions of thought"
484
 that 
Heidegger sought to circumvent. Gadamer does "not deny that – among all the elements of 
understanding – I have emphasized the assimilation of what is past and of tradition"
485
 and that 
Heidegger "would probably feel a lack of radicality in the conclusions I draw."
486
 Nonetheless, 
Gadamer's overall aim is to argue that all "understanding is a process in the history of influence, 
and that it could be proven that it is in the linguistically belonging to all understanding that the 
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hermeneutical event makes its path."
487
 Following Heidegger, Gadamer insists that "language 
is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of 
the constitution of the world."
488
 Following Plato, Gadamer argues that the world is meaningfully 
constituted through the directed "openness"
489
 of questioning, or the way language "opens up 
the whole of our world orientation."
490
 Given Plato's and Heidegger's influence on Gadamer's 
own understanding, Gadamer sets out to prove that the dialectic of question and answer 
provides a "critical principle in relation to tradition"
491
 in that the "undeniable task of critical 
reason (is) to overcome"
492
 falling back into our "historical consciousness"
493
 without question. 
Consequently, we shall find ourselves directed towards two related questions: "how far does 
the province of understanding itself and its linguisticity reach?"
494
  and in what way can a 
historical consciousness move beyond its own limits through questioning? Caputo provides one 
answer by arguing that Gadamer's approach to the circle of understanding is a "reactionary 
gesture, an attempt to block off the radicalization of hermeneutics and turn it back to the fold of 
metaphysics."
495
 Such a re-turn allegedly occurred the moment "Plato took it upon himself to 
answer all of Socrates' questions, whereas the hermeneutic point was to keep them open, to let 
them waver and tremble a bit…making things difficult"
496
 for temporal beings. Consequently, 
the requirement is to restore our being-in-the-world towards its "original difficulty"
497
 of being in 
time. Davey counters, however, that while Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics might not be 
its "own best advocate"
498
, it is nonetheless "more radical than is often supposed"
499
 and its 
"subversive character"
500
 makes it increasingly difficult to bridge the (ontological) divide. 
Gadamer's concept of the historicity of understanding is said to restore Plato's original difficulty 
– namely, how to question the conditions of possibility of questioning itself. Consequently, 
philosophical hermeneutics is not a reactionary gesture but an act of subversion insofar as it 
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 within the immanent context of the hermeneutical circle. 
Philosophical hermeneutics may be seen as a radical gesture: determining the "quasi-
transcendental condition of possibility"
502
 of questioning is only possible (intelligible) within the 
historicity of understanding enabling such back and forth movements in the first place.
503
 Part 
of Gadamer’s avowed aim is to restore "the relation between language and world in order to 
attain the horizon adequate…to (having) an orientation towards the world."
504
 More 
appropriately, where the question of being-in-the-world can be linguistically "expressed in the 
understanding of historical tradition."
505
 Gadamer locates Heidegger’s ways of thinking within a 
tradition he seeks to preserve and extend, namely an understanding corresponding to "the rise 
of historical consciousness"
506
 through questioning. Gadamer would deny from the outset, then, 
Caputo's interpretation of Plato as an attempt to enclose human beings within a given 
understanding. "There's no such thing any more as a metaphysics that believes it has a truth 
that withstands everything — none of us has this kind of truth. We have to say that none of us 
knows anything, but we have (mistakenly) learned to believe otherwise."
507
  Plato's dialectical 
approach, however, can teach us how to question our being-in-the-world again. The question 
of "human existence"
508
 and the "intelligibility of Dasein"
509
  are "not in themselves treated as 
objects to be defined and held in safekeeping"
510
 but remain open to questioning. Plato's 
"philosophy is a dialectic not only because in conceiving and comprehending it keeps itself on 
the way to the concept, but also because as a philosophy that conceives and comprehends in 
that way, it knows man as a creature that is thus 'on the way' and 'between'."
511
   
Following Heidegger, Gadamer locates the "historicity of existence"
512
 within questioning's way-
making movement, and argues that "understanding is not suitably conceived at all as the 
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consciousness of something"513 but as constantly moving between conceiving and 
objectification. While human beings must continue to determine their place within the question, 
the question is "not simply that a nonobjectifying consciousness always accompanies the 
process of understanding, but rather…the whole process of understanding itself enters into an 
event, is brought about by it, and is permeated by it."
514
 Gadamer's questioning may be similarly 
seen as a historical effect that should be questioned in turn.
515
 The question, then, re-turns: 
what does it mean to understand historically when the event of understanding always involves 
a "return to (the) being"
516
 in question and raises the problem of "transcending"
517
 the limits of 
such questioning?  We can "never know what being is. It always seems to be a topos, an 
unattainable place that never becomes (completely) accessible"
518
 via the being of the question 
and so is "basically ungraspable, indeterminable."
519
 The historicity of understanding, however, 
will invariably call being (back) into question since history "already constitutes the horizon of the 
question of being and even appears as the meaning of being itself."
520
 The event of 
understanding can therefore never be completed because "being is precisely transcendence"
521
 
– i.e., the constitution of the very meaningful horizon in question. Not insignificantly, Gadamer’s 
own questioning is traditionally understood as inaugurating the "turn"
522
 towards hermeneutics 
in contemporary historical thought. The status of current hermeneutic theory is itself thought to 
be "almost entirely due to Gadamer’s influence."
523
 While Heidegger paved the way for 
Gadamer’s interpretive approach, it is the event of Gadamer’s understanding that has placed 
hermeneutics at the intersection of contemporary theory. In this historical sense, Gadamer may 
be understood as a revolutionary thinker, since he helped transform the "epistemic"
524
 
landscape on which contemporary thought moves.
525
 Although Gadamer's influence occurs 
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– he was careful to delimit his own area of concern.
529
 Truth and Method might have laid the 
foundations for philosophical hermeneutics, but Gadamer (ironically) does not primarily identify 
as a traditional philosopher. Specifically, "my field is the humanities: the classics, art and 
literature"
530
 and "it is only by studying poetry, the visual arts, architecture, and music I came to 
understand what Heidegger means by nearness of being."
531
 Truth and Method is Gadamer's 
way of enabling the study of the "being-there of the work of art"
532
, or the way art "sets up a 
world of its own"
533
, and so throws our own experience of the world back into question.
534
 
Gadamer is therefore critical of Meno's line of questioning on hermeneutic grounds. By refusing 
to "place himself in question"
535
 Meno resists opening up his being-in-the-world to further 
questioning.  Given art's "own possibilities of being,"
536
 the dialectic of question and answer 
does not require "a fixed criterion"
537
 for determining our place within the question anyway. 
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Gadamer’s Way To Language 
 
Perhaps the best way to approach Gadamer is via the understanding he is constantly moving 
with or speaking through other philosophers. In locating Gadamer's questioning, we thereby risk 
taking him out of the context of the very presuppositions in question. The challenge is that many 
of Gadamer's concepts are "developed as a dialogical form of thought" 
538
 and it is easy to 
mistake him for a "philosophical ventriloquist, one who articulates his thoughts through the 
prominent figures of the tradition"
539
 in question "rather than attempting to develop a system of 
his own."
540
 Nonetheless,  by appearing to throw his voice as if it were coming from somewhere 
else, Gadamer performs the act of thrown projection, or projects himself onto the possibilities 
that lie before him and/or remain hidden in the circle of understanding. By moving through this 
complex whole, Gadamer purports to offer a "criterion of correct understanding"
541
, since the 
task is to "expand the unity of the understood meaning centrifugally."
542
 Gadamer follows 
Heidegger by not developing a "procedure of understanding, but to clarify the conditions in 
which understanding takes place."
543
 Note the way Gadamer runs distinct concepts together. 
On the one hand, Gadamer wants to insist that there is a correct criterion for understanding and 
calls this rational standard the "principle of history of effect."
544
 Gadamer is acutely aware that 
"the problem of the criterion"
545
 emerges with the circle of understanding insofar as it is the 
circle's movements that throw our presuppositions back into question. Nonetheless, Gadamer 
also wants to argue that the problem can be resolved centrifugally – through the circle's own 
directives and movements. On the other hand, Gadamer wants to claim that the circle doesn't 
so much reintroduce or displace the problem of the criterion but directs it towards a self-
corrective – by expanding upon the unity of the meaning understood through "effective 
history"
546
 (the event of an understanding). In this way, Gadamer attempts to 'elevate the 
historicity of understanding to the status of a universal (or quasi-transcendental) hermeneutic 
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 Given Gadamer's approach, the hermeneutic phenomenon is "not a problem of 
method"
548
 and "is not concerned with a method of understanding."
549
  Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics "does not seek to elaborate a system of rules to decide, let alone direct, the 
methodical procedure."
550
 Gadamer's approach becomes quasi-transcendental insofar as it is 
"concerned to seek the experience of truth that transcends the domain of scientific method 
wherever that experience is to be found, and to inquire into its legitimacy."
551
 The real concern 
is "philosophic – not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above 
our wanting and doing."
552
  Gadamer, then, distinguishes between truth and method to clarify 
the conditions in which understanding occurs, and he seeks to legitimate the way in which 
experiences of truth may be brought forward and/or held back within a given understanding. 
The question, however, is: to what extent is Gadamer's approach a legitimate method of inquiry? 
Specifically, in what way is it legitimate to displace the problem of the criterion onto the historicity 
of understanding? Gadamer's positive conception of prejudice becomes integral here. 
According to Gadamer, it is possible to determine the truth-value (questionability) of our 
prejudices by moving between thought and language. Being intentionally related is to already 
find ourselves enclosed within a world of meaning, and to "have a world means to have an 
orientation toward it"
553
 insofar as any "experience of the world is bound to language."
554
 
Although Gadamer's concept of the circle tends to talk around the phenomenon of intentionality, 
he nonetheless makes the "essential connection"
555
 between the directedness of thought and 
the direction of language. Specifically, where the "hermeneutical phenomenon proves to be a 
special case of the general relationship between thinking and speaking, whose enigmatic 
intimacy conceals the role of language in thought."
556
 Being intentionally related to an object of 
experience is therefore specified via the way thought remains directed back towards itself within 
language. Consequently, it is the "intimate unity"
557
 between thought and language which 
bounds and encircles our being-in-the-world – by directing the way backward and/or forwards 
towards "understanding."
558
 Gadamer calls this directive the "dialectic of experience"
559
, where 
an "experiencing consciousness has reversed its direction—i.e., it has turned back on itself"
560
, 
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and enables another way forward. It is via this "inner reversal of intentionality"
561
 that an 
experienced consciousness may reorient itself. While the question of being-in-the-world 
remains directed by the historicity of existence,562 our understanding is "not suitably conceived 
as a consciousness of something, since the whole process of understanding itself enters into 
an event, is brought about by it, and is permeated by it."
563
 Given the event of a contradictory 
experience, the circle of understanding may thereby acquire the "structure of reflexivity."
564
 The 
hermeneutical question, then, is trying to understand the way experience is first directed (moves 
forward) in order to bring forth the way/s it may ‘turn’ back (identify and reflect) upon itself. 
 
Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutical circle: the happening of tradition. 
 
Gadamer follows the early Heidegger by urging that the "existential grounding of the 
hermeneutical circle"
565
 constitutes a "decisive turning point"
566
 in making sense of our "being-
in the-world."
567
 Consequently, Gadamer wants to argue that  "understanding is never a 
subjective relation to a given 'object', but to the history of its effect; in other words, understanding 
belongs to the being of that which is understood."
568
 Gadamer moves beyond Heidegger, 
however, by insisting that questioning our being-in-the-world "lets itself be addressed"569 by the 
"effect of a living tradition"
570
 and so "must constitute a unity of effect, the analysis of which 
would reveal only a texture of reciprocal effects."
571
 Being in the world continues to be 
understood as the "original form of the realization of our existence,"
572
 but Gadamer wishes to 
direct the historicity of understanding back towards "the horizon intentionality which constitutes 
the unity of the flow of experience."
573
 Gadamer calls this intentional flow "tradition"
574
, and 
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argues that when "the whole unified tradition"
575
 calls itself back into question the "ontological 
structure of understanding"
576
 becomes "the true hermeneutical object."
577
 The problem of "the 
unity of its meaning"
578
 thereby turns into "literary criticism writ large"
579
 in that it raises the 
problem of the existential relation between part and whole. The hermeneutical question is how 
to "determine anew the significance of what is examined. But the significance exists at the 
beginning of any such research as well as at the end."
580
 We merely gain a "new problematic"
581
 
when the historicity of understanding is thrown back into question. Specifically, questioning the 
existential grounding of the hermeneutical circle can never become "formal in nature. It is neither 
subjective or objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of 
tradition and the movement of the interpreter"
582
 moving back towards the question of the unity 
of meaning. Our "relation to tradition…is not a permanent precondition; rather, we produce it 
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further 
determine it ourselves Thus the circle of understanding is not a methodological circle, but 
describes an element of the ontological structure of understanding."
583
 The event of 
understanding turns on the axis of its movements, and the "true locus of hermeneutics"
584
 
remains caught "in between"
585
 the structuring (reciprocal effects) of its own events. 
 
Gadamer's concept of tradition operates on two levels simultaneously – as enabling the 
possibility of a meaningful understanding, and as questioning what can be possibly understood 
(or meant) there. The question is to what extent – or in what way – these two levels of 
understanding intersect. We’ll need to distinguish the history of effect(s), or the way the 
historicity of understanding is itself effected through tradition. On the one hand, tradition is the 
meaningful world we are all thrown into and is taken as given within cultural experience. 
Tradition transmits an understanding that occurs without question: against the background of 
shared practices and beliefs that enables us to move forward in history. On the other hand, 
traditional thought or practice can be taken aback. The historicity of understanding can be 
problematized when certain presuppositions move into the foreground and call themselves into 
(a) question when encountering an object of particular 'significance'. Gadamer maintains that 
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"history does not belong to us, we belong to it"
586
 and that consciousness of ourselves as 
individuals is a "distorting mirror"
587
 and merely a reflection of the "closed circuits of historical 
life."
588
 Gadamer's concept of a historically effected consciousness describe the way in which 
tradition encloses us within a given understanding and yet is also able to keep itself open to 
reversals in direction. Given that understanding remains caught within the reciprocal effects of 
history, "understanding is at once the consciousness effected in the course of history and 
determined by history, and the very consciousness of being thus effected and determined." 
589
  
Note again that there are two distinct claims being made here and that they need to be 
distinguished. While Gadamer claims that the effects of history determine our consciousness, 
this does not mean that we are necessarily conscious of the role history plays in our 
understanding. The task of hermeneutics is to bring these effects to consciousness – to become 
conscious of the role tradition plays in the historicity of understanding. Although Gadamer 
invokes the concept of consciousness here, conscious intentional states are not the historical 
source of meaning and truth. While the experience of consciousness is integral to understanding 
Gadamer’s account of history, Gadamer does not want us to understand the intentionality of 
such thoughts with respect to individual desires or beliefs. Nor does he want to objectify 
(methodize) the way we think about – move within – history. Gadamer is directing us to the 
question of what happens through one another's consciousness – effective history as our 
collective mode of being-there. A historically effected consciousness is built up and held in being 
within shared experiences and/or may break down and be thrown into question across 
experiences. Consequently, "understanding is to be thought less of as a subjective act than as 
participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are 
constantly mediated."590  
 
According to Gadamer, human consciousness is effective within history by virtue of being laid 
down and transmitted there. Correspondingly, history is simultaneously the place where human 
consciousness may be laid over or cut off from itself: it is also where human beings might not 
be conscious of themselves as having a consciousness effected by history. Tradition transmits 
human consciousness through the process of acculturation (by way of the "self-evident"
591
 
experience of family, society, state, etc.). The closed circuits of historical life provide pathways 
for movement within a given understanding, and help conceal the fact that the "prejudices of 
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the individual…constitute the historical reality of his being."
592
 If we are to question the role 
effective history plays in the constitution of our being-in-the-world, we need to understand that 
"all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice",
593
 and it is these "prejudices that 
constitute our being"
594
 there. Specifically, the "historicity of our existence entail that 
prejudices…constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience"
595
 a meaningful 
world. Our prejudices are therefore conditions of possibility in that they do not close us off from 
the world – or potentiality for being – but are "biases of our openness"
596
 to it in the first place. 
Prejudices are primarily the "conditions whereby we (can) experience something – whereby 
what we encounter says something to us"
597
 meaningfully and/or truthfully. Consciousness of 
being effected by history is said to be "consciousness of the hermeneutical situation" 598 and the 
requirement is to question the "prejudice against prejudice"
599
 that emerged within a given 
historical movement.
600
 The Enlightenment's prejudice to overturn all prejudices thereby needs 
to be turned around again, and "removing it opens the way to an appropriate understanding of 




Gadamer’s appeal to the concept of prejudice is an attempt to approach the "epistemological 
problem…in a fundamentally different way."
602
 Given this approach, we can "formulate the 
fundamental epistemological question"
603
 by questioning the "ground of the legitimacy of 
prejudices"
604
 and ask "what distinguishes legitimate prejudices from countless others which is 
the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome?"
605
 Note the way Gadamer does this – by 
following Heidegger in two related ways. On the one hand, he calls on the etymological 
significance of the Latin term praejudicium, and notes the way it is connected to words such as 
prejudice in English and prejuge in French.606  Gadamer does this in order to remind us that all 
claims to knowledge involve the "value of the provisional decision as a prejudgment, like that of 
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 Specifically, prejudices occur within the context of tacit presuppositions or 
unquestioned beliefs – and the problem is determining the way they can be legitimately 
questioned (distinguished and/or evaluated) with respect to each other.
608
 On the other hand, 
Gadamer attempts to make prejudices an integral part of the fore-structure of understanding 
and he attempts to determine the way they may be thrown (back) into question there. Our 
knowledge of the world of experience presupposes the constitutive role of 'presuppositions' 
(prejudgments), or the way we already relate to (move within) the historicity of our existence. 
The initial directedness of our ability to experience the world as meaningful and/or questionable 
therefore directs Gadamer's movements within the very tradition in question. Gadamer's appeal 
to the concept of prejudice, then, is his way of enacting and delimiting the circle of 
understanding. More appropriately, our prejudices reveal the ways in which understanding is 
enacted and delimited by their own "horizon."
609
 Understanding is determined by what we have 
in advance – "prejudices that we bring"
610
 to those situations we find ourselves in. If we are to 
question the way we think, we must first try to understand the situations that give rise to such 
prejudices. According to Gadamer, prejudices may be thought authoritative in that they can be 
rational, and their reason for being – rationality – is to be found within history. Since prejudices 
are the conditions in which we experience our being-in-the-world, their mode of being remain 
"closely connected"
611
 to the way they acquire their "authority"612 within tradition. The basis of 
historical experience remains "grounded on reasons"
613
 that lie beyond the rationality of any 
given individual's purported reason giving and what Gadamer calls tradition is effectively the 
"ground of their validity."
614
 The question of our being-in-prejudice is itself "in need of 
hermeneutical rehabilitation."
615
 The task, then, is to try and determine whether our reasons for 
being-there are valid in order to ask "what is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices?"616 
Tradition is prejudiced insofar as it predisposes historical beings to think and act in given ways: 
by situating and orientating their thinking across situations. Our prejudices direct the way we 
experience the world meaningfully, and determine the historicity of our understanding in 
accordance with their directives and movements. Specifically, being prejudiced does not 
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hermetically seal human beings off from their own knowledge of the world of experience. Rather, 
our prejudices effectively open us up to the possibility of what can be understood (experienced, 
known) in the first place. The enclosure of a given understanding is how we find our way into a 
world that remains open to interpretation and/or discloses the way we can become conscious 
of ourselves as prejudiced.  
 
We can now turn to the question of critical reason, or the way our prejudices may acquire an 
"appropriate historical tradition."
617
 According to Gadamer, "temporal distance"
618
 can typically 
"solve the question of critique."
619
 The relation between past and future makes it possible to 
"distinguish the true prejudices by which we understand from the false ones, by which we 
misunderstand."
620
 The question, of course, is how can temporal distance effectively do this? 
The answer is said to come by way of the being of the question since the "essence of the 
question is to open up possibilities and keep them open. If a prejudice becomes questionable"
621
 
it may help us question the "efficacy of history within understanding itself."
622
 A historically 
effected consciousness can therefore only be(come) truly effectual when "finding the right 
questions to ask."
623
 The relation between question and answer is a circular "intentional 
relation"
624
 since we cannot find our way within the world without "asking questions"
625
 already 
thought to be relevant or adequate. Being directed towards the world of experience is only 
possible within a "horizon intentionality"
626
, and experiencing the world can only be intelligible 
"within its own historical horizon."
627
 Being directed upon a given object is to invariably find 
ourselves within situations directing the movement of our own questioning. This sense of being 
directed reveals the very nature of an intentional horizon. Specifically, "the essence of the 
question is to have sense. Now sense involves a sense of direction. Hence the sense of the 
question is the only direction from which the answer can be given if it is to make sense. A 
question places what is questioned in a particular perspective. When a question arises, it breaks 
open the being of the object…(and) this opened-up being is an answer. Its sense lies in the 
sense of the question."
628
 Although Gadamer is careful to distinguish hermeneutics from 
methodology he nonetheless insists that understanding is itself directed by the "logical structure 
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 Following Heidegger, Gadamer understands the (presupposition of) the world 
to be structured around human concerns and/or potential meaning – via the way it formally 
addresses beings in that world. Questions exhibit a logical structure by opening up and 
trans/forming a given "horizon."
630
 The concept of a horizon is integral here – it is Gadamer's 
way of conceptualizing the historicity of understanding as both situated and moving. A horizon 
indicates the directedness of experience and delimits what can be meaningfully brought forth in 
a given understanding. Anyone who has "a horizon knows the relative significance of everything 
within the horizon"
631
 and "working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right 
horizon of the inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition."
632
 Consequently, 
historical understanding involves acquiring "an appropriate historical horizon, so that what we 
are trying to understand what can be seen in its true dimensions."
633
 This obviously begs the 
questions: how do beings acquire the most appropriate horizon, and from what perspective/s 
can the truth be seen on the horizontal plane of experience? The answers obviously depend on 
the logical structure of understanding itself, since history remains the site of appropriation (the 
bringing together of distinct boundaries and movements). Since the horizon is "something into 
which move and that moves with us"
634
, seeing an appropriate horizon involves moving 
"beyond"
635
 horizontal knowledge.  Such situations present themselves when an encountered 
object defies understanding and "our historical consciousness"
636
 invariably "transposes 
itself"
637
 into another "historical situation" 
638
 so as to try and see "better, within a larger whole 
and a truer proportion."
639
 Gadamer calls this movement a "fusion of horizons"
640
, and it involves 
relating distinct historical parts to a greater whole – (our consciousness of) history itself.  A 
historical consciousness may come to understand the "otherness of the other"
641
, and so, realize 
that its own ‘effectiveness’ is merely one understanding among many others. The fusion of 
horizons effectively structures the event/s of understanding, since it fuses distinct parts and 
movements into a relational whole. The dialectic of experience thereby becomes transformative: 
it opens up the possibility of other horizons, making it possible to approach the beings in 
question in different ways.  
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Language as Universal Horizon – Being that can be understood is language.  
 
Gadamer's conception of language as the way of being within an understanding has already 
been moving in the background and provided his own questioning with a given intentional 
horizon. Such an "all embracing world horizon"
642
 is said to be "constituted by a fundamentally 
anonymous intentionality –i.e., not achieved by anyone by name."
643
 Nonetheless, Gadamer 
intentionally moves his concept of language into the foreground, if only to bring forth the 
question of the linguistically of understanding. Gadamer's goal is to delimit "language as the 
(universal) horizon of a hermeneutic ontology"
644
 since "language is a medium where I and world 
meet, or rather, manifest their original belonging together."
645
 Within language "the structure of 
being is simply not reflected, rather, in language the order and structure of our experience itself 
is originally formed and constantly changed."
646
 Consequently, the "event of language 
corresponds to the finitude of man"
647
 and effectively becomes the record for the "finitude of our 
historical experience"
648
…it is from language as medium that our whole experience of the world, 
and especially hermeneutical experience, unfolds."
649
 Given this universal approach to the 
beings in question, Gadamer goes on to make the quasi-transcendental claim that "the coming 
into language of meaning points to a universal ontological structure, namely to the basic nature 
of everything toward which understanding can be directed. Being that can be understood is 
language. The hermeneutical phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the 
ontological constitution of what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language 
and determining its own relation to beings as interpretation." 650 The question we re-turn to, 
then, is: how is such questioning possible within language?  
 
Gadamer recalls the problem of One over many to bring forth the ontological structure of 
understanding. Language is conceived as a "speculative unity"
651
 that continually calls itself into 
question, and the problem is the way language mediates (unites and divides) the totality of 
meaningful beings called into (a) question. The problem of the one and the many relates to the 
"being of beings…gathering within itself the being of all beings."
652
 Gadamer asks us to recall 
Plato's dialogical conception of the dialectic between question and answer since the "critical 
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distinction between authentic and inauthentic dialogue"
653
 is said to dwell within our experience 
of language's way-making movements. The question of a discourse's authenticity is understood 
to be critical because it directs the "dialectical puzzle of the one and the many,"654 and reminds 
us that the "one is necessarily many and the many one."
655
 The dialectic remains integral 
because it indicates the way question and answer necessarily relate to each other within 
language and directs thought (back) towards questioning the limits of its own understanding. 
The "path of all knowledge leads through the question"
656
, and the pathway is made available 
and/or questionable within our experience of language. The question of a discourse's 
authenticity thereby becomes possible because it attempts to authenticate its own pathways 
through the linguisticality of questioning. Consequently, language is where "the structure of our 
experience"
657
 is trans/formed into a meaningful horizon "that moves with one and invites one 
to advance further."
658
 The "reciprocal relationship"
659
 between question and answer determines 
the way we approach the beings in question and may transform the horizon of its own 
questionability (potentiality for meaning). Plato's dialogues thereby recognize the "priority of the 
question in all knowledge"
660
 and knowledge of the world of experience remains limited by the 
"horizon of the question."
661
 Following Plato, "the significance of questioning consists in 
revealing the questionabilty of what is questioned"
662
 and any resulting understanding would 
ideally be brought into a constant "state of indeterminacy."
663
  While beings remain in "a circle 
closed by the dialectic of question and answer"
664
 the possibility of trans/formation itself 
presupposes "an orientation toward an area of openness."
665
 Asking questions "implies the 
explicit establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains 
open."
666
 Gadamer claims that the objective of experience is not so much objects or "events but 
their significance."
667
 Reversals in direction are said to occur by way of a fore-conception guiding 
all our questions – namely, the "prejudice of completeness."
668
 This prejudicial movement – the 
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attempt to close a circle that effectively remains open – effects the understanding that a given 
being "completely expresses its meaning" and that "what it says be the complete truth."
669
 The 
relation between meaning and truth forms a complex whole, where the relationship between 
part (meaning) and whole (truth) cannot itself be completed (directed) in an effected historical 
consciousness. The circle of understanding will nonetheless try to complete (close) itself in 
another way, and invariably open itself up to the possibility of further questioning (reversals in 
direction). The attempt to stabilize the circle's directives and movements addresses our "moral 
being"
670
 insofar as thought remains "wholly bound"
671
 by the being/s in question. Conscious 
beings will find themselves obliged to determine the boundaries of their own directives by 
"aiming"
672
 their questions accordingly. Such a determination involves throwing into question 
the "application of knowledge"
673
 across meaningfully directed experiences. Specifically, we 
apply our knowledge of the world of experience by directing ourselves towards – or being 
directed by – the being in question. The dialectic of experience seeks to determine the way we 
should move and/or the role our prejudices effectively play in directing our questioning. The 
question, then, is "not about knowledge in general but its concretion at a particular moment"
674
 
– i.e., requires determining the relevance or adequacy of the criteria in question. Understanding 
can only be truly effective when it is brought about (effected) through an interpretation, and such 
interpretations are only possible when applying (effecting) a given understanding. 
Consequently, distinguishing between "cognitive, normative and reproductive interpretation has 
no fundamental validity, but all three constitute one unitary phenomenon."
675
 Such a unity 
returns us to the problem of the one and the many, or the "relationship between the universal 
and the particular"
676
 within the language continually calling itself back into question. 
Understanding is "a special case of applying something universal to a particular situation"
677
 
since it involves determining the uniformity of our question's movements. The dialectic between 
question and answer becomes particularly applicable because language remains a speculative 
unity concerned with understanding its own directives.  Gadamer urges that "we understand in 
a different way, if we understand at all"
678
 since "experience stands in an ineluctable opposition 
to knowledge."
679
 The dialectic of experience provides the true answer to our questions in that 
it remains answerable for our reasons for thinking and acting. A given "experience, worthy of 
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the name, thwarts an expectation"
680
 and so becomes questionable in turn when being called 
to answer for itself. Once an understanding unexpectedly reverses its direction and becomes 
conscious of its own thinking, the "experiencer has become aware of his experience; he is 
experienced. He has acquired a new horizon within which something can become an 
experience for him."
681
 The potentiality for meaning reveals the truth of all experience – namely, 
the finitude of experience. Consequently, the "dialectic of experience has its proper fulfilment 
not in definite knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience 
itself."
682
 The relation of question to answer indicates the "primacy of dialogue"
683
 insofar as 
beings belong to an effected consciousness that speaks to and through them.  
 
The circle closed by the dialectic of question of answer is "always already enclosed within the 
world horizon of language."
684
 The dialectical relationship itself derives from the way "language 
and thinking" remain "bound together"
685
 in a world horizon open to experience. Historical 
beings "fall"
686
 into a world of meaning, and being in the world involves being related to it thus 
meaningfully. Language therefore not only "presupposes a common world"
687
, it makes our 
presuppositions – or "worldview"
688
 – possible. The world presupposed is "world only insofar as 
it comes into language, but language, too, has its real being only in the fact that the world is 
presented in it…being-in-the-world is primordially linguistic."
689
 Understanding is determined by 
our relation to language – by being in it – and our being-in-the-world constitutes the way we 
invariably find ourselves thrown there (projected towards a possible future and the potentiality 
for meaning). The horizon encountered, then, is effectively trans/formed by our relation to – and 
movement within – language. The beings that can be understood are brought forward (into 
being or effected) by language’s own mode of being. Gadamer urges that language’s sense of 
direction is "universal"
690
: it speaks across worlds in that each horizon similarly communicates 
the "language of reason itself"
691
 when questioning the "rational grounding"
692
 of the reasons 
language asks of itself. While every understanding falls back upon and arises out of the 
particularities of a given situation, whatever can be understood is universally bound by 
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language’s own "responding and summoning"
693
 into being. The relation between the one (unity 
of being) and the many (division and multiplicity of beings) therefore calls back into question 
language’s own horizon intentionality. The "speculative structure of language"
694
 is determined 
by the being of the question insofar as "being that can be understood is language."
695
 
Nonetheless, to "come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired. Rather, 
what something presents itself as belongs to its own being. Thus, everything that is language 
has a speculative unity: it contains a distinction, that between its being and its presentations of 
itself, but this is a distinction that is not really a distinction at all."
696
 The closed circle determines 
our knowledge of "truth"
697
 by permitting an open dialogue to "emerge"
698
 within the historicity 
of understanding. In this way, questioning beings may come to a "mutual agreement"
699
 about 
the objects in question through the language "continually underway to change itself."
700
 Put 
another way: being in understanding entails being in agreement as "language constitutes itself 
in the with-one-another."
701
 Gadamer's conception of meaningful interpretation claims that 
"agreement in understanding is more primordial than misunderstanding"
702
 and the possibility 
of an "understanding leads us back into a reconstruction of agreement in understanding."
703
 The 
possibility of reaching an understanding through agreement "legitimates the universal character 
of understanding."
704
 The historicity of understanding is legitimated in such a way because 
"language is what is constantly building up and bearing within itself this commonality of world 
orientation"
705
 and so "involves the shared interpretation of the world which makes moral and 
social solidarity possible."
706
 In order to be meaningfully orientated towards an interpreted world, 
understanding necessarily "unfolds in speaking and in speaking with"
707
 others invariably placed 
in question. The critical question, then, is the way questioning can meaningfully determine our 
mutual orientation or being-with. According to Gadamer, tradition is primarily "deposited in the 
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, and what can be uncovered emerges in the "public sphere of meaning."
709
  
An interpretation brought forth thereby moves towards another horizon by entering "into the 
content of what is understood."
710
 Language determines a historically effected consciousness 
by preserving and extending the truth of what can be meaningfully understood and/or 
questioned. Given that "being is language – i.e., self-presentation – as revealed to us by the 
hermeneutical experience of being,"
711
 a "genuine experience"
712
 reveals itself to be an 
"encounter with something that asserts itself as truth."
713
 The relation between the one and the 
many is therefore continuously caught up within – and transformed by – the dialectical 
movement between part and whole. The question of the finitude of human existence is invariably 
thrown (back) into question by the infinity of potential meaning. The interplay between 
meaningful part and whole helps explains Gadamer's conception of truth. The event of truth is 
articulated via the related notions of play and language games714 and it is the "knower's own 
being"
715
 that "comes into play"
716
 within language's way-making movements (rulings).  
Specifically, the "things we encounter in understanding plays itself out in a linguistic event, a 
play of words playing around and about what is meant. Language games exist where we as 
learners – and when do we cease to be that? – rise to the understanding of the world"
717
 and 
we merely participate "in the play of language itself, which addresses us, proposes and 




Critical Discussion  
 
Aims and Objectives: The aim of this section is to critically discuss Gadamer's conception of 
the circle of understanding. We shall do this by questioning the rationality of Gadamer’s 
approach and its relation to critical reason. The goal is to bridge the divide between truth and 
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 The concept of language game, of course, derives from Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, Gadamer 
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method, and enable the possibility of movement between them. The main problem is that the 
ground on which reason moves cannot direct rational criticisms in a truth-evaluative way, and 
permits competing claims to be equally true (or false) without contradiction. The objective is  
two-fold – to render Gadamer's questioning more rational (truthful, valid), and to direct the circle 
back towards the problem of the criterion via the question of the rationality of reason. We shall 
argue that Gadamer cannot circumvent the problem of validating his approach, and the 
requirement is to turn (back) towards the circle in a different way. Gadamer's use of 
Wittgenstein's term language game will prove to be instrumental here. Specifically, we invoke 
the concept of the language game of argumentation to make better sense of Gadamer's overall 
movements. Such an invocation will permit us to arbitrate – move between, judge – conflicting 
interpretations within the circle of understanding. We proceed in interdependent ways, and each 
part forms a complex whole. In the first part, we direct ourselves to the question of the rationality 
of Gadamer's questioning and provide an overview of conflicting interpretations to orientate 
ourselves. In the second part, we question Gadamer's elusive concept of 'truth', and argue that 
philosophical hermeneutics presupposes Heidegger's distinction between ready-to-hand and 
present-to hand to meaningfully distinguish between true and false prejudices. In the third part, 
we argue that the dialectic of question and answer is not only thus intelligible but questionable 
in re-turn. In the final part, we introduce the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons 
to direct the question of the rationality of reason, permitting us to distinguish and/or move 
between (overturn) the prejudices in question. 
 
The Rationality of Gadamer's Questioning: We begin by questioning the rational status of 
Gadamer's approach to the circle of understanding. Such questioning will direct us back towards 
the circle in question, and so returns us to the nature of the relation between 'truth' and 'method'. 
Our re-turn is an effect of Gadamer’s emphasis upon the historicity of understanding, and 
endeavours to move within the horizon of his questioning. Given that the historicity of 
understanding invariably throws our being-there into question, the question is: to what extent 
can Gadamer's approach to the circle of understanding be understood as 'true'? If historicity is 
a condition of understanding, the question of truth and/or method emerges as a problem in that 
Gadamer’s effected consciousness raises the related questions: how far can the linguistic event 
of Gadamer's understanding reach, and in what way can Gadamer's effected consciousness 
transcend its questioning? Gadamer's claims regarding the universality of understanding and 
effective history as the criterion of correct understanding remain integral. We need to distinguish 
two interdependent issues here. The first problem concerns the 'effectiveness' – truth-value – 
of Gadamer's questioning. Gadamer appears to move against his own principle of the history of 
effect in order to direct his approach towards the historicity of understanding. Such a manoeuvre 
– or overreach – threatens to falsify the truth claim that effective history has universal validity 
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(truthfulness) insofar as the claim to universal validity can only itself be the effect of a given 
understanding. The second problem concerns the 'effectiveness' – validity – of the criterion of 
correct understanding. Since Gadamer cannot provide a criterion for truth – other than 
understanding as a self-corrective and/or directive by way of coherence between part and whole 
– he remains incapable of directing and/or correcting conflicting interpretations within the circle 
of understanding. The question of the legitimacy of our prejudices, therefore, turns on the way 
the circle of understanding directs and/or corrects its interpretations throughout time: effective 
history can only be thus effective (truly historical) via the relation between past and future. The 
problem of the legitimacy of our prejudices is displaced back onto history taken as a complex 
whole: the truth-value of competing interpretations can only be meaningfully determined within 
a unity constituted by a historically situated reason. The question, however, is whether it is 
legitimate to interpret the historicity of understanding as a unitary phenomenon in the first place: 
does Gadamer's concept of effective history interpret away the truth of history itself when 
maintaining that temporal distance is the historical source of normativity and/or legitimacy? 
Either way, understanding is supposed to be a historically effected event and so remains relative 
to (conditional upon, moves within) the history of its effects. The problem of the criterion, then, 
returns in a contradictory way – the claim to universality inadvertently raises the spectre of 
relativism. If the event of understanding moves within a fusion of horizons, by what criteria can 
we stabilize (know, determine) the truth-value of Gadamer's own questioning?  
 
According to Gadamer, the truth or falsity of our prejudices remains context-bound and/or 
determined. Questioning their legitimacy is therefore only intelligible within the contexts giving 
rise to them or bringing them into question. If the question of their legitimacy is relative to the 
horizon in which they move, we need to ask two related questions: how can we legitimate 
Gadamer's questioning and/or legitimately question Gadamer's prejudices across intentional 
horizons? We would need to confuse horizons to make sense of Gadamer's quasi-
transcendental approach – i.e., move beyond what can be meaningfully understood or truthfully 
determined. Gadamer's concept of effective history appears caught within a vicious circle: it 
effectively falsifies its criterion for truth when making a claim to its own universality. On the one 
hand, there is the problem of interpreting (bringing forth) Gadamer's quasi-transcendental 
approach within the historicity of understanding. Although Gadamer insists that understanding 
can only be truthful (truly possible) if and when we understand differently, philosophical 
hermeneutics nonetheless offers itself as the corrective to previous understandings. The event 
of Gadamer's understanding thereby exhibits a teleological structure antithetical to his avowed 
approach. Gadamer's questioning is directed towards the end of the most truthful understanding 
of our place within effective history. Witness the way Gadamer turns towards Plato and 
Heidegger to move beyond them. Gadamer effectively works his way through a history of 
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philosophy by re-turning towards the development of our effective historical consciousness. 
Gadamer's questioning comes full circle and thereby contradictorily understands itself to be a 
relatively 'final' understanding: as being the true culmination of the very historically effected 
consciousness in question. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is the end of a goal-directed 
process insofar as it directs itself towards the truth of understanding. Such an approach purports 
to expand upon the historicity of understanding by acting as the corrective and/or directive to its 
overall movements. On the other hand, there is the problem of determining the legitimacy of the 
conflicting interpretations of Gadamer's approach within the circle of understanding. 
Interpretations of Gadamer remain in irreconcilable conflict, and the conflict of interpretations 
directs the event of understanding along distinct pathways. Specifically, Gadamer’s 







                                                
719
 Betti, Emilio. "Hermeneutics as a General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften" in  
Bleicher, Josef (ed.) Hermeneutics as Philosophy, Method and Critique (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1980). Betti objects to Gadamer’s emphasis upon the historicity of understanding from 
a methodological point of view, and interprets philosophical hermeneutics as being "destructive" of 
"objectivity." Specifically, Gadamer’s failure to provide a criterion for interpretation plunges 
understanding "into a standardless morass of relativity", p.79. Betti is by no means alone in levelling 
the charge of relativism against Gadamer via methodological considerations. See, for example Apel, 
Karl-Otto. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and Davis Frisby, (London: 
Routlegde and Kegan Paul, 1980). Apel complains that Gadamer surrenders "normative 
hermeneutics to a relative historicism", p.124.  
720
 Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Hermeneutics and Universal History" in History and Hermeneutic (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1968). Pannenberg urges the connection between the historicity of 
understanding and the understanding of history. According to Pannennberg, distinct events can only 
be connected in an understanding if and when what can be understood is projected (back) into the 
structure of universal history. Specifically, "only within the context of universal history" can 
understanding be thought conditional or conditioned as such. The historicity of understanding – and 
differences in understanding – can only be preserved within a projection that con/fuses them within 
the event of an understanding. Indeed, only "the unity of the totality of tradition provides the horizon" 
in which understanding effectively occurs and can be questioned accordingly, pp.148 and 150 
respectively. 
721
 Wolin, Richard. The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance With Fascism from 
Nietzsche to Postmodernism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004). According to Wolin, 
Gadamer’s "stress on the happening of tradition" exhibits a "traditionalist orientation" in 
hermeneutics’ approach to the historicity of understanding. As such, the "chief defect" of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics is its "uncritical veneration of the power of tradition", pp.18 and 104 respectively. 
Elsewhere, Wolin is particularly critical of Gadamer’s alleged veneration. Specifically, Gadamer "was 
an inveterate traditionalist. He believed that one of the great failings of the modern age was that it 
had lost touch with the classical sources of wisdom and authority. Only by re-establishing contact 
with the traditional repositories of knowledge—the 'great texts' of Western literature and 
philosophy—could humanity save itself from a fate of permanent disorientation and soullessness." 
Richard Wolin, "Socratic Apology: A Wonderful, Horrible Life of Hans-Georg Gadamer" Book Forum, 













  Correspondingly, it has been understood as either an apology
727
 for historical 
knowledge or as being unapologetically sceptical
728
 about the possibility of knowing anything 
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within history. While philosophical hermeneutics is arguably a thoroughgoing "humanism"
729
 it 
is also argued that it remains "deeply hostile"
730
 to half of the human race because of its 
"profoundly anti-feminist" viewpoint.
731
 The way interpreters understand the relationship 
between truth and method also affects the way the historicity of understanding is understood.
732
 
Gadamer has been interpreted as committing the is-ought fallacy
733
  (mistaking description for 
prescription) and for failing to derive historically prescriptive statements from his own description 
of history.
734
 Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is also said to be the effect of a complete  
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 – and may be interpreted as insufficiently philosophical
736
 as a result. 
This conflict of interpretations goes to the heart of his account of interpretation, and to the 
indeterminacy of the relation between truth and method within any given understanding.  
 
Part of the difficulty is determining which way to turn. We have immediately found ourselves 
caught between conflicting movements, and remain directed towards the problem of directing 
our own understanding. Following Gadamer, we shall try to locate ourselves within the problem 
of such an in between.  Our understanding will, therefore, turn on an answer to the question of 
the appropriateness of the corresponding directive. While it is true that Gadamer does not 
develop the notions of ‘truth’ or ‘method’, a methodological concept nonetheless directs his 
questioning – the dialectic between question and answer. Specifically, our questions specify the 
nature of their intentional relationship and/or the way language may be directed (back) upon 
itself. If understanding is to be interpreted by the way thought may question its direction, then 
the problem remains the movement of the hermeneutical circle. The question of prejudice goes 
to the heart of the problem of understanding – it reveals the limits of our "ontological 
commitments."
737
 Although Gadamer appeals to tradition to legitimate the circle of 
understanding, the conflict of interpretations throws into question the very intelligibility of its 
presupposed authority and unity. Gadamer's principle of the history of effect either remains 
divided against itself or effective history cannot resolve the conflict in accordance with its  
directives. The questionable relation between part and whole remains integral here – it 
effectively throws into question the nature of the 'truth' directing and/or correcting the circle's 
overall movements. We therefore need to turn to Gadamer's conception of 'truth' if we are to 
determine its role in the historicity of understanding. While it's true, of course, that "the 
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methodological craving for certainty and assurance"
738
 contradicts the historical presuppositions 
of Gadamer's questioning, the question remains: in what way can it be so certain about – and 
assure us – of its truth-claims? All said and done, philosophical hermeneutics remains 
ontologically committed "to what truth means for finite beings"
739
 and is therefore "sceptical 
about any methodological claim to definitive truth and the very idea of methodological 
foundations."
740
 Nonetheless, Gadamer purports to direct us to a "concept of knowledge and 
truth which corresponds to the whole of hermeneutic experience"
741
, and his attempt to locate 
thought within an in between invariably circles around its two corresponding parts: the relation 
between hermeneutical truth and philosophical method. 
 
Gadamer's questionable concept of truth. The concern, then, is that we cannot arbitrate – 
move between, adjudicate – the question of the legitimacy of conflicting interpretations via 
Gadamer’s approach to the historicity of understanding. We cannot assign a truth-value to 
Gadamer's questioning without presupposing the beings in question or projecting the problem 
of its rational status back onto the historically effected consciousness brought into question. 
Part of the problem is Gadamer's prejudice towards aesthetic consciousness within his  
questioning. Gadamer is primarily interested in legitimating the way a "work of art truly takes 
hold of us"
742
 as "an event that 'appropriates us' to itself."
743
 Gadamer privileges art because of 
the way it can transform our knowledge of the world of experience. It "is in the sheer being-there 
(Dasein) of the work of art that our understanding experiences the depths and the 
unfathomability of its meaning."
744
 As Gjesdal argues, Gadamer's 'prejudicial' approach 
attempts to "transform the very notion of truth in understanding into a notion of authenticity."
745
 
Gadamer directs us towards the possibility of a "deeper, more existential engagement"
746
 within 
the circle of understanding – one directed towards "a more authentic existence"
747
 than being 
(completely) rational. Warnke observes that Gadamer’s ontological commitment to tradition 
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thereby exhibits a "peculiar oscillation"
748
 around the "normative authority"
749
 of the beings in 
question – and such an oscillating movement problematizes the very being (normativity) of the 
question itself. Gadamer's back and forth movements may be characterised by a tension in the 
question of which way to turn within understanding: towards ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’. The problem is 
that if the latter (meaningfulness) invariably turns into the former (truthfulness) we still require 
an ontologically prior concept of 'truth' to understand the depths and the unfathomability of an 
object's potential meaning. Gadamer’s movements appear to turn on a "dilemma"
750
 when 
caught between the content and referent of questioning. On the one hand, Gadamer points "to 
the need to anticipate the truth or completeness of the object in question."
751
 Gadamer insists 
on the ontological primacy of the referential in order to move thought towards questioning the 
truth-value of a given intentional horizon. On the other hand, Gadamer’s refusal to "provide any 
criteria for"
752
 distinguishing between the legitimacy of our prejudices emphasizes the 
multiplicity and/or division of beings across intentional horizons. Gadamer effectively introduces 
a divide between truth and meaning, and the circle of understanding acts a bridge between 
them. On one side, Gadamer’s hermeneutics moves the problematic of understanding towards 
the transmission and maintenance of traditional beliefs and practices: it is an ontology of 
conservation without any need for (further) justification. On the other side, Gadamer directs 
hermeneutic movement towards potentially arbitrary interpretations – it turns into an "ontology 
of the possible"
753
 insofar as interpretations can go either way and become their own 
justification. The dialectic between question and answer is, of course, supposed to stabilize the 
relation between meaning and truth. It bridges the divide by bringing content and referent 
together while continuing to hold beings apart. The dialectical movement thereby permits 
questions to cross from one side (back) to the other in understanding. Specifically, once thought 
finds itself caught between meaning and truth, the "process of integration and appropriation" 
754
 
can move questioning back and forth accordingly. 
 
Consequently, the only truth criterion that seems to be available to interpreters is that of course 
correction – i.e., being put back on the correct course (path, trajectory) of effective history. Given 
that the authority of tradition is what is being brought into (a) question, the criterion of correct 
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understanding merely presupposes the very direction and/or unity of the effects of the history in 
question. Specifically, conflicting interpretations can only be understood to be 'true' "if they stand 
their ground in the course of the history of effect. If effective success is the only criterion, radical 
relativism"
755
 appears to be effective history's true standard bearer. Gadamer is certainly aware 
of the "inner contradictions"
756
 of arguments questioning the limits of a given understanding. 
Gadamer takes such a contradictory movement as a given: the finitude of our being is 
interpreted dialectically from the outset and internalized with respect to the circle's own 
performativity. While it has been claimed that Gadamer is caught in a performative 
contradiction757 – i.e., where the act of stating contradicts the rational content of its own 
statements
758
 – we need to be more mindful. Gadamer moves within the question of the 
performativity of understanding, and specifically asks: to what extent does language perform 
thought?
759
 The answer, of course, is that language and thought necessarily move within the 
circle in question, and so are directed (back) towards each other. Specifically, "if anything does 
characterize human thought, it is this infinite dialogue with ourselves which never leads 
anywhere definitively."
760
 Consequently, the question is not whether Gadamer is caught in a 
performative contradiction – it is the way in which the circle of understanding itself performs the 
contradictory nature of our questioning. Any attempt to question the "truth-value"
761
 of effective 
history in a relatively logical (or straightforward) way will therefore get us nowhere and prove 
ineffective.
762
 In what way, however, can the claim to universality be unconditionally true when 
the very concept of truth is what is in question here? Put another way: what can 'truth' mean 
(be) when the concept of 'truth' remains relative to (or conditional upon) the history of its effects?  
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 ibid. Specifically, "the thesis of scepticism or relativism refutes itself to the extent that it claims to 
be true is an irrefutable argument. But what does it achieve? The reflective argument that proves 
successful here rebounds against the arguer, for it renders the truth-value of reflection suspect. It is 
not the reality of scepticism or of truth-dissolving relativism but the truth claim of all formal argument 
that is affected." Nonetheless, Gadamer goes on to question whether "the two propositions—"all 
knowledge is historically conditioned" and "this piece of knowledge is true unconditionally"— areon 
the same level, so that they could contradict each other. For the thesis is not that this proposition 
will always be considered true, any more than that it has always been so considered", p.534. 
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According to Gadamer's line of questioning, historically effected beings would ideally distinguish 
between truth and (scientific) method. Such a distinction is said to be ideal because only the 
"discipline of questioning and inquiry…guarantees truth."
763
 Gadamer effectively ends Truth and 
Method with a valorisation of the very concept in question, and prioritizes one mode of inquiry 
(understanding) over another (explanation). The human sciences are therefore to be 
distinguished from the natural sciences and their modes of inquiry approached in different 
ways.
764
 Gadamer moves towards this knowledge claim from a given direction – he argues that 
only the interpretive sciences can 'guarantee truth' because of the way they actively bring "the 
knowers own being…into play"
765
 and question. The questions, however, are: what is 'truth' and 
how do interpreters 'know' when the claim of truth comes into play and/or question?
766
 As 
Bernstein notes, Gadamer asks us to presuppose the very concept in question. While such a 
presupposition might remain "elusive"
767





the requirement is to determine the "meaning of truth"
770
 within Gadamer's questioning. 
According to Bernstein, Gadamer implicitly appeals to a concept of truth that "can be 
argumentatively validated by the community of interpreters who open themselves to what 
tradition says to us."
771
 Interpreters are capable of doing this by constructing arguments through 
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concipio” (I conceive in my mind, or project a natural object mathematically), p.24.  Gadamer 
nonetheless maintains that (unlike scientific method) it is the "fundamental linguisticality of human 
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language. We may therefore "judge and evaluate such claims by the standards and practices 




There are a couple of things to note here. While Gadamer's concept of truth remains open 
ended, it may nonetheless be brought forth within the circle of understanding: it presupposes 
the possibility of opening ourselves up to what can be meaningfully understood or called (back) 
into question. Gadamer's emphasis on mutual understanding through agreement, however, 
appears to be makeshift and/or argumentative. The claim of truth occurs with respect to the way 
it is done or made – via the way our standards and practices are brought into question through 
back and forth movements. Consequently, Gadamer's concept of truth exhibits a Janus face. 
On the one side, Gadamer claims that mutual understanding is only possible through 
agreements shaped and handed down within tradition. On the other side, Gadamer claims that 
the claim of truth is only possible when a meaningful encounter actively brings about 
disagreements with the tradition in question. Given that the circle of understanding turns on the 
back and forth movements within language, we need to determine the way 'truth' may be 
brought forward or held back. Bernstein's use of the term hammer is particularly forceful here. 
We can only determine the truth-value of competing claims to knowledge within the context of 
the standards and practices 'hammering' them out in the first place.  
 
Gadamer would resist, of course, any attempt to philosophize – hit upon the 'truth' – with a 
hammer.
773
  Effective history conceived as the act of pounding – of repeatedly delivering heavy 
blows upon our understanding – is directed the wrong way. Following Heidegger, the reverse is 
arguably ‘truer’: it is the subtle back and forth movements of the "linguistic construction"774 of 
art that is said to be particularly effective (truthful) since "language is more than just a tool or 
just a sign system for the purpose of communication… The possibilities which language allows 
us humans, the possibilities of language which we all use, surpass the possibilities of a tool and 
the use of tools. Language signifies memory."
775
 If we recall, however, Heidegger originally 
appealed to a specific tool – a hammer – to distinguish the ways we meaningfully relate to the 




 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols, Or How to Philosophize With a Hammer trans. Duncan 
Large (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.118.  Nietzsche, of course, coined this famous 
turn of phrase. In the "Foreword", he claims that we need to "sound out (false) idols" and must "ask 
questions with a hammer and, perhaps, to hear in response that famous hollow sound which speaks 
of swollen innards." 
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 According to early Heidegger, a hammer can be approached in two main ways. We 
can pick it up and apply it without thinking or we can bring it into conscious thought. Heidegger 
is obviously not talking about temporal distance or language here – he is distinguishing the ways 
in which a hammer can be understood within the immediate circle of beings. We would only 
(typically) question a hammer's mode of being when it might not be up to the task at hand and 
there is a literal breakdown in understanding. Specifically, when the ready-to-hand disagrees 
with our background knowledge (prior experiences) and moves into the foreground as an object 
of reflection. Although Gadamer would argue that the distinction between ready-to-hand and 
present-to-hand plays no role in his elusive concept of 'truth', it seems to presuppose it in some 
way. Witness the way Gadamer consciously uses Wittgenstein's term language game to 
linguistically construct his own argument and argues that "the goal of all communication and all 
understanding is agreement in the matter at hand."
777
 Such a possibility (metaphorically 
speaking) requires us to presuppose movement from one mode of being (back) to another in 
order to bring about a difference in understanding.
778
 Following the later Heidegger, however, 
language can only be truly understood via the way it brings our being into question and/or play. 
Language therefore needs to be approached the other way around. Unlike the proverbial 
hammer, language takes hold of us and may transform our being-there in distinct ways. 
Nonetheless, Gadamer's use of Wittgenstein remains significant. Wittgenstein's inquiry into 
language begins with a description of two builders literally "building"
779
 an understanding 
through mutual agreement about the function of their words. Wittgenstein constructs the term 
language game "to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life."
780
 Language is therefore said to form a complex whole in which the 
use of words play an integral part, and Wittgenstein calls "the whole, consisting of language and 
the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'."781 Wittgenstein's aim, however, is not 
so much to treat language as a construction site – it is to argue that language can only be truly 
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 Consequently, language games must be identified 
and distinguished via their own criteria of relevance or adequacy. The paradox is that the criteria 
for rule-following occur without rhyme or reason anyway: rules could conceivably go either way. 
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with 
the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict 
here. 784  
 
The Dialectic between Knowledge and Power.   
 
The paradox – which recurs in Gadamer's inquiry
785
 – is whether questioning can truly answer 
for itself: do questions refer to anything other than their being-there (rulings, practices, etc.)? 
Approached another way: what is the rule for following rules? Suppose, for example, that 
religious practice is a language game and the texts speak for themselves.
786
 Gadamer calls this 
way of speaking myth787, and specifically aligns the poetic with the mythical "in the sense that 
myth requires no confirmation from anything beyond itself… therein lies its unique (truth) 
value."
788
 Gadamer goes so far as to question whether religion and art speak different dialects 
of the same language
789
 – and argues that the dialectic of experience ideally occurs by way of 
related modes of being.790 As Cesare observes, Gadamer "explicitly insists on the proximity 
between art and religion – indeed, even on the religious dimensions of art (and) this religious 
dimension can be traced back to myth."
791
  The mythical moves towards the beyond via its 
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attempt to "bridge the chasm between the ideal and the real."
792
 Suppose now that there are 
competing religions questioning the truth-value of given religious experiences. Does it matter 
whether God truly exists or if worshippers might be existentially related (praying to, following) 
either a non-existent or false God? Within the context of religious practice, these appear to be 
meaningless questions: the practice becomes its own justification. If "religious language games 
do not require further justification"
793
 they effectively become "invulnerable to external 
critique."
794
 It therefore becomes irrelevant if we can't even ask whether religious – and by 
extension, aesthetic – experience is "disguised nonsense that believers are unable to 
recognize"
795
 or whether religious – and aesthetic – disputes can be meaningfully resolved or 
questioned.
796
 The only justification they'll ever need is their relationship to the relevant texts.  
Gadamer urges that "the technical term for the form in which religious texts speak is myth. The 
word mythologein, indeed, has to do with the act of speaking. Myth means a tale to be conveyed 
and to be verified by nothing else than the act of telling it. Thus the only good definition of myth 
is that myth neither requires nor includes any possible verification of itself."797 While Gadamer's 
use of the term language game might move beyond Wittgenstein, it nonetheless returns us to 
the problem of the criterion. Specifically, is the rationality of reason a myth brought forth in the 
very act of its telling (questioning itself)? The "myth of reason"
798
 may be questioned by its own 
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presupposing the very standards in question. Gadamer's concept of beauty, for example, becomes 
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history, namely whether an "advancement of thought"799 permits us to distinguish – or move 




Although Gadamer approves of Wittgenstein's attempt to lead "all speaking back to the context 
of life praxis"
801
, historical practice is contextualized within the "linguistic constitution of our 
being-in-the-world."
802
 Our knowledge of the world of experience remains answerable through 
the circle calling our being-there into question. Gadamer agrees with Wittgenstein that 
"conceptual thinking always has unsharp edges"
803
 but questions the way language can be 
meaningfully used. 
  
Thinking in concepts is not fundamentally different from thinking as it happens in the ordinary use of 
language. Indeed, nobody can simply introduce a usage into language. Rather, the language usage 
introduces itself; it takes shape in the life-process of language, until finally it has won for itself a firm 
standing.804  
  
Note the way Gadamer uses the term won when discussing the matter in hand. The question 
before us is the same as the one behind us: how do we move from one horizon to another 
without trying to win an argument that remains open to questioning and/or is potentially self-
defeating in turn? While it might be true that no one can simply introduce a usage into language, 
language nonetheless introduces itself through its usage – i.e., through questioning that 
transforms the nature of mutual understanding and agreement. If reasons are advanced for or 
against the truth of a given position, there can be no back and forth movement without moving 
– making the transition between – practical (ready-to-hand) and theoretical (present-to-hand) 
thinking. Hall provides a useful summation of this back and forth movement when he observes 
the way the language game of argumentation has traditionally been played.  
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In serious critical intellectual work, there are no absolute beginnings and few unbroken continuities…old 
lines of thought are (merely) disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements old and new, are 
regrouped around a different set of premises and themes. Changes in a problematic do significantly 
transform the nature of the questions asked, the forms in which they are proposed and the manner in 
which they can be adequately answered. Such shifts in perspective reflect, not only the results of an 
internal intellectual labour, but the manner in which real historical developments and transformations are 
appropriated in thought, and provide Thought, not with its guarantee of 'correctness', but with its 
fundamental orientations,  its conditions of existence….this complex articulation between thinking and 
historical reality, reflected in the social categories of thought…(embody)…the continuous dialectic 
between knowledge and power… 805   
 
Gadamer's emphasis upon mutual understanding through agreement downplays a critical 
feature of the gaming analogy he takes from Wittgenstein – competitive (language) games 
typically involve power plays. Power differentials are built into the language game of 
argumentation: we play them to win via our intellectual labours. Competitive games might have 
many different stakes and objectives – but a recurring feature is that they are directed towards 
the holding onto or transfer of power. The question, however, is whether anyone ever truly wins 
or loses a given argument – the dialectic between knowledge and power effectively remains in 
play indefinitely. The play of language ensures that any attempt to hold onto or transfer power 
through argumentation is self-defeating: the "linguistic game of giving and asking for reasons"
806
  
brings the dialectic (back) into play by continually re-enacting it throughout effective history and 
so remains a "fundamentally paradoxical undertaking."
807
  If a game's intrinsic features turn on 
their reason for being-there, we must question the way they are traditionally played and we can 
only do this by questioning the dialectic between knowledge and power within the language 
game in question. Following Gadamer, the requirement is to follow the lead of the dialectic of 
question and answer in effective history, and question history's 'effectiveness' at reaching the 
'truth'. If the goal of truth remains open-ended or elusive, the question is: why pursue it in the 
first place? In other words, to what end (other than to bring the dialectic between knowledge 
and power into question or play)? Moving the goal posts – or discovering that the posts move 
of their own accord – invariably returns us to the problem of the criterion. Specifically, if "truth is 
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 of rational inquiry, how is "hitting the target"
809
 possible when the criteria for truth 
threatens to change as the language game of argumentation remains in progress. The very 
rules of the language game throw its rationality (back) into question: the giving and taking of 
reasons have reason moving in circles and involves the chasing of its own tail (or tale). 
Specifically, moving on the grounds of rationality presupposes being directed towards 
questioning and/or argumentation to be meaningfully effective. While the giving and taking of 
reasons might be pursued for its own end (for the sake of argument), the practice of arguing 
simultaneously occurs for related reasons (enabling the dialectic between knowledge and power 
that remains conditional upon the historicity of understanding). The concept of 'power' might 
seem pejorative within the context of the language game of argumentation – it suggests the 
possibility of illicitly establishing social dominance through the misuse of language. By 'power', 
however, we provisionally mean controlling influence or rational authority – as in the power of 
reason or the force of an argument. The critical question, then, is trying to legitimate social 
influence through competing knowledge claims: in what way do we hold onto or transfer 'power' 
in such a language game? The power of reason is effectively brought into play and/or question 
within the language game of argumentation itself. Specifically, via the way people try to 
manoeuvre around each other to score
810
 an equally elusive or mobile goal. While we might 
already believe that the truth or falsity of a given position is self-evident, the requirement is to 
convince others with linguistically constructed arguments. We attempt to do this by either 
establishing or blocking the way for the reasons put forth. Arguments are thereby directed 
towards the question of establishing the legitimacy of their moves through the very act of making 
them.  
 
As the dialectic of question and answer indicates, however, there is the problem of making such 
a contradictory move in the first place. If the legitimacy of our questioning remains determined 
via the way we argue – and our arguments remain open to questioning and/or reversals in 
direction (rulings) – the problem is justifying the language game of argumentation. Specifically, 
if the rules place restrictions on the way we move or what can be brought into view, the problem 
of the criterion throws into question the legitimacy of any given directive or movement. While it 
might be true that arguments appear to be 'won' at a specific time, the question remains: why 
play a game that limits our moves in a potentially self-defeating way? To some extent, the 
answer should be self-evident: for the sake of argument. Arguing provides the grounds for 
rational criticism: it determines the rationality of our reasons for believing and acting. Our belief 
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in "rationality is thus at the heart of argumentation, and…should be understood as being 
concerned with the ability of arguments to render beliefs rational."
811
 Arguing for its own sake, 
however, need not commit us to the truth or evidence, and threatens to turn the question of the 
rationality of our beliefs into a mere language 'game'. Significantly, the imperative to 'follow the 
argument where it may lead' has its origins in Plato's conception of the dialectic of question and 
answer, and offers no guarantee that rational pursuits (or the pursuit of rationality) will lead us 
to the 'truth' or agreement.
812
 Nonetheless, every argument labours under the assumption that 
it is potentially defeasible or can be turned on its head at any given time. As Hall reminds us, 
arguments aren't so much won but are played out or transform the state of play: it's never game 
over because the history of thought invariably finds itself directed back towards itself in some 
way. Consequently, it's not the content of an argument that is thrown into question but the 
content of our characters. Specifically, we don't just argue for the sake of an argument: we also 
argue for our own sakes and direct our questioning accordingly. As Gadamer might argue, the 
language game of argumentation turns on the question of the "role knowledge…plays in the 
moral being"
813
 of rational beings. The "practice of argumentation"
814
 plays a critical (if 
paradoxical) role within other social practices when directing us to the question of their 
normative content and/or truth-value. Johnson sums up the question of normativity by 
acknowledging the way rationality remains caught within a circle of its own making. 
 
By 'the practice of argumentation,' I understand the sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, 
interpreting, criticizing, and revising arguments. This activity cannot be understood as the activity of any 
individual or group of individuals but rather must be understood within the network of customs, habits, 
and activities of the broader society that gives birth to it, that continues to maintain it and that the practice 
serves.815  
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Locating the rationality of argumentation within such a complex whole requires us to make the 
parallel between epistemology and ethics, or the "normative web" 
816
 in which the question of 
the rational evaluation of our beliefs and actions is already interwoven and moves. The "parallel 
between epistemic and ethical normativity"
817
 can, of course, be traced back to the philosophical 
discourse of antiquity
818
 and concerns the ethics of belief.
819
 If there are matters of fact by virtue 
of which our beliefs are either true or false, the parallel between epistemic and ethical 
normativity moves reason (back) towards the problem of rationally evaluating competing 
reasons for thinking and acting. Consequently, we find ourselves returning to our original 
problem of rationally evaluating the standards for rational evaluation: by what standards can we 
rationally evaluate the very activities and beliefs in question? Whichever way we turn, the 
problem returns in the language game of argumentation: how should we follow reason and/or 
in what way can we open ourselves up to the legitimacy of (a) critical reason? Witness the way 
Gadamer is ontologically committed to the methodological (linguistic) truth of his own 
questioning. Specifically, Gadamer's conception of critical reason tacitly appeals to a criterion 
of relevance or adequacy when directing the question of the rationality of his linguistic 
interactions in effective history. Gadamer's questioning remains a condition of its own being-
there: it is directed towards the presupposition of 'truth' constituting (enabling, directing) the 
dialectic of question and answer in the first place. Gadamer thereby cannot truly believe that he 
is merely offering us a difference in understanding or a legitimation of understanding as 
difference. Philosophical hermeneutics understands itself to be committed to a truer 
understanding – one that speaks to the question of the universality of a reachable unconditional 
'truth'. If the question of the conditions of possibility for legitimate understanding is itself to be 
legitimated as unconditionally true, we need to answer (approach) it in a different way. Following 
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Apel, we may call such an enabling presupposition the regulative ideal of truth,820 and it permits 
rationality to accommodate itself to the possibility that all questioning – including Gadamer's – 
seeks to transcend the (immediate) context of its occurrence. As importantly, reason can only 
perform such a contradictory move by implicitly calling on the "regulative idea of (a) better and 
deeper understanding."
821
 While it’s true that Gadamer remains caught in a performative 
contradiction, the question is not whether Gadamer's linguistic movements invalidate his  
questioning. The critical question, rather, is the way the circle of understanding itself performs 
(enables, directs) such contradictory movements and calls itself into being and/or question. Put 
another way: only the circle can truly 'keep score' and/or act as referee within the language 
game of argumentation – by throwing the rationality of reason (back) into question it determines 
the ways reason re-turns to itself. 
 
The Distinction between Motivating and Justifying Reasons: We now turn towards 
Gadamer's concept of tradition as the ground of validity, and argue against the claim that 
"tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational grounding."
822
 Unlike Gadamer, we will 
need to introduce a distinction between motivating and justifying reasons if we are to legitimate 
a hermeneutic conception of critical reason. We shall call this the problem of questioning 
(distinguishing, moving between) our reasons for believing and/or acting in effective history. 
Specifically, if tradition is to be justified, it must be brought within the realm of rational criticism 
and evaluation. The problem is determining the rationality of the ground on which it moves and 
may be criticized. The role practical reason plays in the language game of argumentation 
remains integral. If practical reason involves the capacity to ask questions meaningfully and/or 
determine norms of conduct, the question is: in what way can we evaluate our reasons for being-
there? Or as Gadamer might ask: "what is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices? What 
distinguishes legitimate prejudices from the countless others which it is the undeniable task of 
critical reason to overcome?"
823
 If prejudices are the conditions of understanding, two questions 
invariably turn back towards each other: how can we determine the question of their legitimacy 
(move between and overturn them) and in what way should such a turning itself be understood 
to be legitimate? The problem is that Gadamer's conception of the circle of understanding 
cannot meaningfully delimit the legitimacy – truth-value – of the prejudices in question. Part of 
the problem is that Gadamer's teleological conception of the historicity of understanding equates 
conditions of understanding with normative constraints and/or principles. The circle acts as its 
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own truth-bearer in the teleological form of a corrective and/or directive – by making it possible 
to question our being-there. The difficulty, however, is questioning the rational status of the 
historicity of understanding without presupposing the very being in question – namely, the 
rationality (normative authority, correctness) of effective history. The question of which way to 
turn – or whether such a turning can legitimate itself – merely returns us to the problem of 
justifying our reason's for being-there. Witness the way Gadamer's turn towards 
"traditionalism"
824
 paves the way back and forth. Such an ontological commitment is not just an 
effect of history; it is effectively a directive (back) towards a normative conception of our correct 
place in history. Gadamer's prejudice towards the past is traditionalist in that it "addresses itself 
to the truth of the tradition and seeks to renew it." 
825
 Gadamer is thereby making a truth claim 
about the 'natural' order of things: an inherently826 meaningful world becomes questionable 
when it "prescribes a specific comportment that is appropriate to it"
827
 in the "language of things, 
which wants to be heard in the way in which things bring themselves to expression in 
language."
828
  Gadamer moves to turn of events to return to them in another way insofar as it is 
"tradition that opens and delimits our historical horizon."
829
 While Gadamer might not be guilty 
of the naturalistic fallacy
830
 in the traditional sense, his traditionalism nonetheless has an 
unintended effect: the naturalization (or normalization) of the very contingencies in question. 
McCarthy observes that Gadamer thereby (ontologically) commits the "fallacy of treating 
ontological conditions as normative principles"
831
, and so, attempts to derive an ought from an 
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is. While it might be true that any attempt to move "beyond prejudice, tradition and convention 
is a false consciousness"
832
 it does not follow that we should remain ontologically committed to 
the prejudices and/or conventions in question. If prejudice is a condition of understanding, such 
an "ontological insight"
833
 does not direct us to draw "normative conclusions"
834
 about the 
question of our being-there. The circle of understanding merely acts as a "corrective to false 
consciousness – the sense of being outside of or above history and tradition – and not as a 
prescription for belief and action."
835
 We traverse Gadamer's prejudice towards the past via his 
teleological conception of the hermeneutical circle – the historicity of understanding is effectively 
reason writ large and/or in action. It is true, of course, that Gadamer's teleological concept of 
rationality is predicated upon reversals in direction and is not directed towards the end of 
completing our understanding. Nonetheless, Gadamer argues as if the circle is motivated and/or 
directed towards the goal of correcting itself to re-establish its sense of well-being (direction). 
The question of its rational harmony is ideally "experienced as a constant movement between 
a loss of equilibrium and the search for a new point of stability."
836
 Specifically, the "chief task 
of philosophy is to justify this way of reason"
837
 and it "corrects the peculiar falsehood of modern 
consciousness, the idolatry of scientific method and the anonymous authority of the 
sciences."
838
 Gadamer calls this corrective and/or directive "decision making, according to one’s 
own responsibility"
839
 since this way of practical reason "vindicates again the noblest task of the 
citizen…instead of conceding that task"
840
 to science and/or technology. The difficulty, however, 
is the way Gadamer attempts to bring two distinct issues together – the question of 
understanding ourselves as historically effected, and the question of the effectiveness of our 
understanding in history. Gadamer’s approach fails to adequately address the problem of the 
"equivocal nature of hermeneutical experience"
841
, or the way in which a situated reason 
attempts to regain its equilibrium and/or stabilise inherently questionable movements. As Culler 
notes, the "appeal to consensus and convention – truth as what is validated by our accepted 
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methods of validation – works to treat the norm as foundation"
842
 – and yet it is the normativity 
of Gadamer's own treatment (methodological approach, type of care) that remains in question.  
 
We have observed that reasons are the way in which our thought and actions are called 
'rational'. We have also observed that the rationally of our reasons may also be called back into 
question. The distinction between motivating and justifying reasons thereby converges around 
the problem of explaining a reason for thinking or acting843 in a particularly rational way. 
Specifically, it presupposes two related questions: for what reason does a thought or action 
occur – in what way is it rational – and is that reason enough – an adequate reason – to think 
and act? Conceptions of the distinction occur in the domains of theoretical and practical reason, 
and similarly turn on the problem of justifying ourselves as rational beings in the first place.844 
While the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons presupposes the possibility of 
thinking and acting for conflicting reasons, the distinction attempts to resolve the conflict by 
turning back on itself. If and when someone has a reason to think or act, their rational motivation 
would also ideally become rationally justified – i.e., occur for the one and same reason.845 To 
be rationally motivated is to have a reason for thinking and acting insofar as it is "the acceptance 
of reasons which causes such beliefs and actions."
846
 To be rationally justified "requires 
believing and acting on the basis of reasons"
847
 which may be thought rationally acceptable. 
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Consequently, it is the relationship between motivation and justification that directs us back 
towards the original question of our rationality. If "to be rational is to respond to reasons"
848
, the 
question becomes: how should we rationally respond to (evaluate) reasons for thinking and 
acting? The explanation, then, would be composed of two parts, and form a complex whole. 
Specifically, reasons must be causally efficacious (directly motivate our thoughts and actions) 
and normatively constraining or obligating (justify our thoughts and actions by directing them). 
We must, therefore, contextualize 'reasons' within the relevant intentional horizon, and specify 
the way they move (back) towards each other. If reasons emerge within the context of 
intentional states – within beliefs and desires – reasons for thinking or acting enter reasoning 
as the content of a more rational (valuable) belief or desire. It's for this reason that there is a 
distinction between motivating and justifying reasons – so we can determine what we truly value 
or believe is more rational.  
 
We will need to consider a real-life example if we are to determine the relationship between 
motivating and justifying reasons in effective history. Suppose, for instance, that a classically 
trained philosopher was struggling to find employment during the Nazi era. Suppose, further, 
that university positions became vacant when Jewish academics lost their posts during this 
unstable period. If the trained philosopher wanted to be gainfully employed in his chosen 
profession – and survive the gathering storm without a fight – he would have needed to follow 
orders and tacitly defer to the authority of an increasingly totalitarian state. In "weathering the 
storm and getting along himself"
849
, this rational person voluntarily entered a Nazi indoctrination 
program, joined the Nazi teachers’ union, opened classes with the Nazi salute, finished letters 
with the salutation 'Heil Hitler', attended Nazi conferences, and signed a "mandatory loyalty 
oath"
850
 as a public show of support. The intelligentsia's declaration of faith was subsequently 
published and circulated around the world to help legitimate "the logic of evil."
851
 We are, of 
course, referring to Gadamer who (unfortunately) found himself in this very hermeneutical 
situation. Gadamer was forced to make a troubling decision as a responsible citizen: should he 
occupy the jobs suddenly available to him and/or could he responsibly teach philosophy under 
such compromising circumstances? Suffice to say, Gadamer rationally accommodated himself 
by deciding to follow the rule of the Nazis and "obeyed the law of self-preservation."
852
 Instead 
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of offering principled resistance or fleeing the country, Gadamer took on the role of tacit 
spokesperson. When Germany lost its sense of equilibrium, he was able to find a point of 
relative stability. It should be stressed that (unlike Heidegger) Gadamer never joined the Nazi 
party or explicitly aligned philosophy with Nazism.853 Gadamer appears to have ventured on an 
'inner immigration' or turned a blind eye to escape adverse attention. Consequently, the 
philosopher inadvertently benefited from the misfortune of others while publicly retreating into 
the past.
854
 Given the circumstances, however, what else was he supposed to do?
855
 We shall 
not presume to answer this question
856
, and merely note its corollary: would we have acted any 
differently in the same circumstances? We would all like to think that the answer is yes but – 
truth be told – it is temporal distance which (ironically) makes such a response all too ready-to-
hand. As the question presupposes, though, there is a distinction between motivating and 
justifying reasons to consider – and the question is the direction of fit between motivation and 
justification. Gadamer was clearly motivated to act in his best interests here – following the rule 
of self-preservation and/or career advancement requires little justification. It is difficult to 
imagine Socrates, however, making the same decision – he would have been among the first 
to raise objections or be killed on moral grounds. While it might be true that few could have 
foreseen the horrors to come, the question remains: how could any rational philosopher justify 
their relationship to the instrument (or march) of unreason? While Gadamer's involvement with 
Nazism might justify the hermeneutical claim that we belong to history (rather than history 
belonging to us), effective history is also the source of our moral disquiet here: it is our collective 
belonging to history that raises the question of rationally justifying anyone's motivating reason 
in such circumstances. Wolin argues that Gadamer was complicit with Nazism because 
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"philosophy's distinctiveness as a vocation"
857
 is that it should "act on principle rather than self-
interest or survival."
858
 While Gadamer had reason to be rationally motivated, his actions are 
arguably without (adequate) rational justification because he appears to have acted against 
reason itself.  
 
Such questioning is only possible, however, within the context of moving towards the horizon of 
our "practical identities"
859
 in the first place. The distinction between motivating and justifying 
reasons can only be intelligible – or itself justified – if we are always already motivated to have 
a normative conception of ourselves that can be called into question and/or be made to answer 
for itself. As Korsgaard observes, if we "had no normative conception of our identity"
860
, we 
"could have no reasons"
861
 for thought or action. We would even have less reason to call such 
identities into question and/or be answerable for ourselves. To call a practical identity normative 
is to acknowledge the way reasons "make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend, 
or guide. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make claims on one another."
862
 It is for this 
reason that we ask whether our beliefs are true or false and our actions right or wrong – we 
remain orientated towards (questioning) the normative conception of ourselves. Code 
elaborates by observing that the question of our practical identity remains "a matter of 
orientation toward the world, toward one's knowledge-seeking self, and toward other such 
selves as part of the world."
863
 Such an orientation strives "to do justice to the object"
864
 insofar 
as it may direct the normative conception of our being-there. This returns us, however, to the 
problem of the criterion: how do we question the normative conception of our identities without 
presupposing the very normativity (directive, movement) in question? 
 
 
Gadamer, of course, attempts to provide an answer to this question by locating a historically 
situated reason within an in-between.  Specifically, where an effected consciousness remains 
caught "between the identity of the common object and the changing situation in which it must 
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 It is the circle of understanding which acts upon rational thinkers, and they 
react to its movements in turn. The question of our practical identity requires us to understand 
those "justified prejudices productive of knowledge,"
866
 and the requirement is to "distinguish 
the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones, by which we 
misunderstand."867 The question, however, is why we should distinguish between true and false 
prejudices in the first place – i.e., on what grounds should we justify our prejudices concerning 
their presupposed 'truth' or 'falsity'? Put another way: if effective history can motivate rational 
thinkers to (potentially) understand that all understanding remains questionable, why should 
they have to justify historical thought or practice any-way?  Given that our prejudices remain 
questionable, the way we understand – or stand in relation to them – remains subject to the 
possibility of change and/or movement. The real question is not whether they are 'true' or 'false' 
– it is whether it is rational to question (approach, distinguish) our prejudices in a truth-
evaluative way. If prejudices effectively remain caught between 'truth' and 'falsity' in the circle 
of understanding, the question must therefore be directed towards a paradoxical undertaking: 
in what way can they be meaningfully legitimated (questioned, distinguished) anyway? If our 
reasons for thinking and acting are to remain rational, we will need to approach the circle of 
understanding in another way – through linguistically constructed arguments that may either 
break down or rationally reconstruct its normative authority. Questioning the rationality of 
conflicting interpretations – or bringing different reasons into conflict – thereby enables the 
possibility of meaningfully distinguishing between true and false prejudices, or our reasons for 
being-there. While the focus of subjectivity might remain a distorting mirror, the distinction 
between motivating and justifying reasons may nonetheless permit subjects to see one another 
more clearly (truthfully) on rational grounds. The language game of argumentation may thereby 
be called the "logical space of reasons"
868
 insofar as it is where motivating reasons necessarily 
stand in a normative or justificatory relation to each other. Specifically, such a traditional 
practice is where our mode of being-there can be called into question and questioned in re-
turn. 
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Witness the way two authoritative thinkers (Gadamer and Derrida) spoke at cross-purposes 
during their famous "non dialogue."
869
 Derrida called their encounter an inquiry into “unfindable 
objects of thought”
870
 and Gadamer's attempt to find a common ground "did not accomplish 
their objective."
871
 The encounter therefore became an occasion for conflicting interpretations 
as to how to best make sense872 of their lack of understanding or the impossibility of mutual 
agreement.
873
 The conflicting interpretations moved within their own circles
874
, and circled 
around one another accordingly. Nonetheless, the distinct circles of thought converged around 
the question of the normative status of motivation in understanding, and answered in 
accordance with the given intentional horizons. Specifically, the conflict of interpretations was 
structured around the meaning of the "good will" 
875
 to understand, and the resulting 
"misunderstanding"
876
 generated a corresponding bad will (or conflicting interpretations) that 
continues to this day.
877
 The encounters may be thought equivocal insofar as the thinkers were 
motivated by different reasons for thinking about understanding, and sought to justify their 
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differences through equivocations (corresponding movements reflecting different 
presuppositions and reasoning).
878
 Gadamer opened the exchange by talking about text and 
interpretation
879
, and one of Derrida's texts responded by changing the context of 
interpretation.
880
 Derrida subsequently urged that in "speaking of dialogue"
881
, interpreters use 
a word that "for a thousand reasons, “good or bad" is  "foreign to my lexicon"
882
. This 
foreignness didn’t prevent Derrida from "indirectly"
883
 speaking to Gadamer – by paying him 
“the homage”
884
 of asking questions that he did not "understand"
885
. Gadamer’s failure to 
understand Derrida’s questions is quite understandable – they do not appear to be directed 
towards the goal of understanding one another.  Derrida's three questions somehow turn into 
fifteen questions, and multiply without apparent rhyme or reason. Nonetheless, Gadamer 
attempts to understand the questions directed at him, as "anyone would do who wants another 
person or be understood by the other."
886
 Significantly, Derrida’s questions concern the 
appropriateness of justifying the attempt to understand in the first place, where a "willing 
subjectivity"
887
 seeks to appropriate objects of thought into desired and/or intelligible objectives. 
The desire for intelligibility is thought to correspond to a "will to power as knowledge"
888
 and so 
remains orientated towards questionable ends ("the determination of the being of beings as 
will").
889
 In short, Derrida wants to question the motives behind understanding whilst Gadamer 
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is motivated to understand Derrida’s seemingly "misplaced and nonsensical"
890
 questioning. 
Perhaps what is most telling about their exchange is the way Gadamer and Derrida speak at 
cross-purposes or endeavor to move past each other. Specifically, the misunderstanding 
between them has its basis in rationally motivated beliefs about the limits of understanding 
and/or how to meaningfully delimit the circle in question. Gadamer's approach to Derrida 
presupposes the very thing at issue (the rational status of the good will to understand) and such 
an enabling "presupposition"
891
 becomes the "means of making one's own understanding 
prevail"
892
 in their resulting encounter. Derrida seems intent on overturning Gadamer's 
presupposition and directing it back towards his own presuppositions in order to ensure that 
such a questionable approach prevails. Derrida's questioning appears to be an intentionally 
subversive act, and so willfully enacts its own moral standing from the higher ground of willful 
obscurantism.
893
  Derrida arguably reverts to an instance of 'bad' "will to overpower Gadamer 
through deliberate misunderstanding",
894
 and may be suspected of "willfully undermining and 
marginalizing Gadamer's (con)texts to ensure a hermeneutic failure."
895
  As a consequence, 
Gadamer and Derrida end up bringing forth the other's understanding in a roundabout way. 
Gadamer's failure to understand Derrida indicates a lack of common ground between distinctly 
motivated thinkers, and throws into question the possibility of mutual understanding through 
agreement. Derrida appears to prohibit the possibility of an understanding by confusing the 
issue about motivating reasons in order to indicate his disagreement with him – and he does 
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this by moving back towards a horizon of inquiry that restricts forward movement and/or our 
range of vision. Either way, the movements remain rationally motivated to call into question the 
others thought, and justify their approach through their own questioning. 
 
We find ourselves directed back to the distinction between motivating and justifying reasons. 
Following Gadamer, the requirement is to distinguish between true and false prejudices in order 
to question our sense of direction: how do we arbitrate between conflicting interpretations 
and/or prevent our understanding from being arbitrary?  Whichever way we turn, the normative 
conception of our practical identities will return via the circle of understanding. We are therefore 
obliged to ask in turn: what calls forth or justifies the relationship between the structure and 
event of a given understanding – i.e., the way rational thinkers direct their thoughts to objects 
through one another's questions and arguments? In emphasizing the priority or explanatory 
relevance of the linguistic whole over its parts, the linguisticality of a 'partial' (incomplete, 
prejudicial) understanding can only be meaningfully determined via the "universal ontological 
structure"
896
 speaking through historicized beings. Methodologically speaking, Gadamer's 
argument urges that historical determinants and relations are what is explanatory relevant in 
describing the determination and effectiveness of ourselves as rationally questioning beings. 
Intentional contents are therefore conceived holistically, not only in the sense of being relative 
to the events of their structuring, but as being irreducibly structured through the linguisticality 
(partiality) of understanding. Ontologically speaking, Gadamer's hermeneutics excludes 
specification to the subjective level while simultaneously purporting to describe understanding 
as a linguistic event within intersubjective experience. If historical relations are what is 
methodologically and ontologically relevant to the specification of a given intentional horizon, 
history remains the way an effected consciousness relates to and/or moves between objects of 
thought. However, if all prejudices are historically determined, from where can rational beings 
identify and critically evaluate their normative status? Following Gadamer's conception, it is not 
possible to come to knowledge independent of the concepts and practices that meaningfully 
effect our consciousness.  We cannot just look over our shoulders and compare one prejudice 
(or set of prejudices) with another, and claim that one understanding is more true or false than 
the other. Questioning beings cannot move outside the context of their thoughts and evaluate 
the rationality of its contents: their reasons remain linguistically determined, bound and 
mediated. Specifically, rational thinkers cannot compare and evaluate the content of their 
thoughts and practices with the objects of a world understood by means other than the content 
of the thoughts and practices remaining in question. To some extent, of course, that is the whole 
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point of Gadamer's hermeneutics: to recognize that we can never really be in a position to 
completely understand our prejudices or direct the circle of understanding in which reason 
invariably moves. The dialectical relation between the content and referent of our questioning 
acts as a corrective insofar as it purports to be a criterion of correct understanding – by 
expanding upon and/or turning back towards what can be understood centrifugally. The 
difficulty is why rational thinkers should think a hermeneutic consciousness offers a corrective 
in the form of a truth directive – i.e., can truthfully correct our beliefs or direct our actions via 
the prejudice towards historical (re)integration. We still need to distinguish between a motivating 
and justifying reason in that the criteria for thinking and acting must continually be subjected to 
questioning and rational evaluation. Specifically, if a criterion is an attempt to determine what 
is relevant or adequate to any given inquiry, we would ideally inquire into the relevance or 
adequacy of the criterion itself. While all questioning invariably appeals to historical standards 
or norms, the task is to question those standards attempting to give tradition its putative 
normative authority or sense of direction. As we've argued, we can only meaningfully do this by 
bringing rationally motivated reasons into conflict, and attempt to rationally justify these reasons 
through conflicting interpretations. Our being-in-the-world remains a directive insofar as we still 
need to question the kind of being for whom its being remains an area of concern. Reason may 
effectively do this by moving within a contested space of reasons that remains open to 
questioning the rationality of its own linguistic constructions and movements. 
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Chapter 3:  
        Derrida and the Deconstruction of 
Understanding   
 
Aims and objectives: The aim of this chapter is to move beyond Gadamer’s conception of the 
hermeneutical circle. The objective is to find our way to language via the question of being and 
its relation to the problem of the criterion.  We inaugurate this movement by turning towards 
Derrida's conception of the circle of understanding. Such a re-turn finds us indirectly moving 
through Heidegger again insofar as the ontological difference is approached in a different way 
– via a differential ontology in an irreducible state of flux and displacement. Derrida's questioning 
ontologically commits itself to syntactical relations within contexts of interpretation, and the 
question is: to what extent is it possible to delimit (follow, approach) the structural relation 
between signs within any given understanding. The problem of the criterion – and its relation to 
the question of being – occurs by way of the concept of undecidability (the impossibility of 
deciding and/or moving either way). We shall observe Derrida's moving within the circle via the 
question of the relation between part and whole, and follow the way(s) such a complex whole 
motions against (deconstructs) the possibility of its Being-there. Derrida’s overall approach 
thereby proceeds from the following ontological standard: to be is not to be on a horizontal axis 
or plane of non-Being. The following, then, is divided into distinct but interdependent parts 
forming a complex whole. In the first part, we note the difficulty in understanding Derrida, and 
situate this problem within the context of Derrida's presuppositions. Derrida follows Heidegger 
insofar as he attempts to move past the language of metaphysics, and we approach the being 
of his questioning accordingly. In the second part, we acknowledge the difficulty in following an 
arguably unapproachable thinker. We follow Derrida's lead, however, by observing that it is the 
question of language that renders his overall approach questionable (possible and/or 
impossible). In the final part, we enact this understanding through Derrida's interpretation of an 
undecidable within Plato. Specifically, where Plato attempts to determine the rationality of 
reason via the pharmakon of writing. The pharmakon is said to reproduce undecidability in that 
it brings forth a differential ontology incapable of meaningfully presentation.   
 
Understanding Derrida: Derrida’s Ways (Not Works).  
 
We begin by acknowledging the problem of understanding Derrida, and locate this problematic 
within the question of understanding itself. The problem of "understanding Derrida"897 moves us 
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in the direction of interpretation, or the ways in which parts can be meaningfully understood 
within a complex whole. This challenge is particularly acute when we acknowledge that Derrida 
understands himself to be engaged in interpretations of interpretations
898
 that do not form a 
"natural totality."
899
  Derrida understands his interpretive approach as "deconstructing"
900
 
interpretations that seek to construct (integrate) understanding. Derrida purports to follow 
Heidegger's lead insofar as the term deconstruction is taken from Heidegger's attempted 
'destruction' of the circle of understanding. Specifically, Derrida "wished to translate and adopt 
to my own ends the Heideggerian word Destruktion"
901
 and the term deconstruction signifies a 
more positive "operation on the structure or traditional architecture of the fundamental concepts 
of ontology."
902
 Derrida's "endless debate with Heidegger concerns the meaning to be given to 
deconstruction, the usage of this word. What concept corresponds to this word?"
903
 Given the 
‘disintegrative’ nature of Derrida's interpretations, Derrida hesitates to say what 
"deconstruction"
904
 is or might be – especially since deconstruction understands itself to be 
deconstructing any given ‘is’ of attribution or identity.
905
 Despite the fact that the term has been 
"reappropriated and domesticated by academic institutions"
906
, Derrida maintains that 
"deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one…(although) it is true that 
in certain circles…the technical and methodological 'metaphor' that seems necessarily attached 
to the very word deconstruction has been able to seduce or lead astray."
907
 There are (at 
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 three related reasons for Derrida's reluctance to specify the "procedural significations 
of the word"
909
 and/or its reason for being-there. The first is that the meaning of deconstruction 
cannot be decided in advance – its approach remains contingent upon the context(s) in 
question, and moves towards "possibilities that arise at the limits of the authority and power of 
the principle of reason."
910
  Consequently, deconstruction is not "a critique in a general sense" 
and "the instance of krinein or krisis (decision, choice, judgment, discernment) is itself…one of 
the essential themes or 'objects' of deconstruction."
911
 The second reason is that deconstruction 
remains directed towards the question of the "undecidability of meaning"
912
 and is predicated 
upon the impossibility of deciding (pursuing, securing) contexts of interpretation. Derrida 
recognizes that "reason is only one species of thinking"
913
 and he interrogates the very "essence 
of reason"
914
 by bringing "out all the possible consequence of this questioning."
915
 The third 
reason is that deconstructive questioning thereby emphasizes the "dimension of performative 
interpretation"
916
 – language that brings about or incites action – and so directs rational thought 





of such questioning, however, remains caught in the circle of understanding and moves back 
towards language's constative dimensions, or the way meaningful statements claim to truthfully 
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describe the very thing being interpreted and/or transformed through questioning. The ways the 
circle acts upon interpreters continues "to play an indispensable role"
919
 in Derrida's questioning 
since the question is "what remains to be done."
920
  Consequently, "what remains irreducible to 
the constative, to knowledge…is the coming of an event"
921
 that returns us to the problem of the 
undecidability of meaning via the route of "textuality"
922
 (the way the world is represented 
meaningfully – (de)constructed – across the texts in question). Derrida calls for the "eradication 
of the hermeneutic principle"
923
 that seeks to stabilize and/or decide upon the meaning of given 







Derrida has nonetheless been led to decisively say that "deconstruction is justice"
926
 – whatever 
that is or can possibly mean across the contexts in question. Indeed, all of Derrida’s 
interpretations are understood to be "attempts to have it out with this formidable question."
927
 
Derrida's concept of justice and/or deconstruction – insofar as either can be meaningfully 
conceived or questioned – remains directed towards the "sense of a responsibility without 
limits."
928
 Furthermore,  such a direct response is a "responsibility that regulates the justice and 
appropriateness of our behaviour, of our theoretical, practical, ethico-political decisions."
929
 
While there are recurring themes or questions, Derrida approaches them in different ways and 
through distinct parts. Such interpretations resist understanding via schematization, and places 
a constraint upon securing a given intentional horizon. The "difficulty of interpretation"
930
 occurs 
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across philosophical traditions or discourses
931
 and raises the problem of delimiting (the event) 
of understanding. Any "discourse that has called itself philosophy…has always meant to say its 
limit…assuring itself the mastery of the limit."
932
  The question remains, however, in what 
direction or way/s is it possible to ‘follow’ interpretations that are difficult to ‘master’ (secure or 
determine) understanding. The problem becomes one of delimitation insofar as it directs us 
towards saying the limit of understanding. Part of the difficulty in approaching Derrida, then, is 
attempting "to be all encompassing or definitive"
933
 since Derrida simultaneously moves towards 
"a large number of multiple fronts that are not only complex, but in a state of strategic 
incompletion or suspension."
934
 Given this difficulty, the requirement is trying to delimit Derrida 
in meaningful ways via select (con)texts. Any attempt to understand Derrida is faced with the 
problem of doing justice to Derrida’s thinking insofar as it remains limited and must be justified 
(thought proper or fitting) in turn. We shall argue that Derrida’s writings move us towards such 
a limit by trying "to write the question: (what is) meaning to say"?
935
 And the way Derrida 
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attempts to answer this question meaningfully is through questioning’s own directives. 
Specifically, Derrida’s guiding "question is: from what site or non-site can philosophy as such 
appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original 
manner?"
936
 The difficulty in approaching Derrida turns on a reluctance to position or situate his 
own contexts of interpretation. Although we will frequently encounter Derridean terms of 
reference at the limit of understanding, they cannot be understood as a "master word or a master 
concept"
937
 – merely as something (interpreted or moving) "through a chain of other concepts, 
other words, other textual configurations."
938
 Derrida’s approach might occur by way 
‘deconstruction’, but an understanding of such interpretations merely occurs in relation to their 
way-making movements (contexts of occurrence remaining in a constant state of flux). 
Whichever way we approach Derrida – or however Derrida directs our questioning – the only 
lasting element in his thinking is the way. Given the multiplicity and/or singularity of Derrida’s 
interpretations, it is therefore important to understand that a part/whole problematic occurs 
across Derrida’s way-making movements. While it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce 
Derrida’s thought to a given interpretation or theory, ‘deconstruction’ nonetheless enables 
interpreters to understand the problematic relation between part and whole. Consequently, 
Derrida's "quasi-transcendental"
939
 questioning is not without rational motivation and/or 
justification. Specifically, Derrida's interpretations of interpretations raise questions about the 
"conditions of possibility"
940
 for meaningful understanding across contexts of interpretation. In 
this way, Derrida can "pose the (general) question: what must be the necessary presuppositions 
about language if language is to make any kind of coherent or intelligible sense?"
941
 The 
problem of the rational status of Derrida's interpretations thereby emerges within the "theoretical 
matrix"
942
 in question and "indicates certain significant historical moments and proposes certain 
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 about the general "problem of language."
944
 It is the 'certainty' of these 
'critical concepts' that becomes the question: to what extent can we be certain of them (i.e., how 
can they bring us rational assurance and/or in what way do they inevitably recur)? It is important 
to stress, then, that the "question of method"
945
 emerges within Derrida's own questioning, and 
the problem is determining the meaningful limits of deconstruction's 'methodology' (the way it 




As Derrida's relatively decisive (stable) term presupposes, deconstruction primarily directs itself 
towards the problem of the structure(s) of language, or the way a linguistic construction 
invariably turns against (deconstructs) the given internal logic. Deconstruction takes the 
problem of the criterion as given within the context(s) in question: by consistently arguing that 
any given criteria of relevancy or adequacy will prove itself to be completely inadequate and/or 
irrelevant in language. Derrida's choice of term is decisive insofar as deconstruction indicates 
certain movements or determinations in advance of its questioning: it thereby re-turns to a 
determination about inevitable outcomes concerning the meaningful possibility of "logic in 
general."
947
 The rationality of reason is questioned via the way language destabilizes the 
"possibility of every logical proposition"
948
 or "any rule of a logical order."
949
 Derrida is 
ontologically committed to the "formal or syntactical praxis that composes and decomposes"
950
 
meaningful understanding, and insists on the way language "advances according to the 
irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic."
951
 By following the lead of language in 
an "infrastructural sense"
952
 Derrida aims to reproduce the "syntactical resources of 
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 Derrida, Jacques. "Double Session" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p.220. 
951
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trans. David B Allison and Newton Garver (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p.99, 
let's take the sentence the circle is square. While semantically meaningful via the relation between 
words, the sentence composes and decomposes itself in the same way in language: its syntactical 
relations exceed (override) its semantic properties, calling into question its very meaningfulness 
there. Specifically, "this proposition makes sense only because another content, put in this form (S 
is P), would be able to let us know and see an object. 'The circle is square', an expression that has 
sense and no possible object, but it makes sense only insofar as its grammatical form tolerates the 
possibility of a relation with the object" indicating an "initial limitation of sense to knowledge, of logos 
to objectivity, of language to reason." 
952
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 already in play within a linguistically constructed understanding. In "privileging 
the syntactical,"
954
 Derrida thereby throws into question the "prelogical conditions of logic, thus 
reinscribing (that) logic…into a series of linguistic functions of which the logical is only one 
among others."
955
   
 
Derrida's general "principles"956 of interpretation therefore defer to a "double reading"957 within 
a "determined textual system"
958
 always already in question. Specifically, a deconstructive 
interpretation purports to faithfully reproduce the way meaning is constructed within given 
linguistic (con)texts, and attempts to "produce"
959
 a "critical reading"
960
 by way of the "signifying 
structure"
961
 making contexts of interpretation possible and/or undecidable (questionable) in re-
turn. Furthermore, Derrida's interpretive approach can "sustain itself only by the strength of the 
question. The opening of the question, the departure from the closure of a self-evidence, the 
putting into doubt"
962
 of the logic in question is itself understood to signify the way knowledge 
remains "ordered around its own blind spot."
963
 In maintaining the openness of the question, we 
follow the lead of deconstruction and "speak several languages (contexts)
964
 and produce 
several texts at once." 
965
  Such a questionable approach to language – i.e., as productive as it 
is problematic in turn – is arguably possible if we "weave and interlace two motifs."
966
 
Questioning can "attempt an exit and a deconstruction without changing terrain, by repeating 
what is implicit in the founding concepts and original problematic"
967
 and/or deconstruction can 
try "to change the terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion"
968
 and move back towards 
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the problem of the "conception of the concept"
969
 in question.  In other words, there is no 
escaping the circle of understanding – deconstruction can only attempt a "reversal"
970
 in 
direction and move itself "further"
971
 onto new conceptual terrain(s) in equally questionable 
ways. Deconstruction brings understanding into question and/or play through the circle's 
constitutive moving parts (possible ways of interpreting), and these interpretations of 
interpretations invariably form a complex whole (the impossibility of completing or stabilizing an 
understanding). We may therefore ‘follow’ (understand) Derrida insofar as he points the way 
through various paths that run parallel to or move across one another. Derrida's text-based 
interpretations signify the complexity of this linguistic whole insofar as it is possible to mis/take 
part for whole, or textually distinct moving parts for the whole (language) in question. Such a 
meaningful whole is understood to be so complex that Derrida refuses to provide the criterion 
for understanding his movements within it. Deconstruction merely interprets itself to be 
"inscribed, undertaken and understood in the very element of the language it calls into 
question"
972
, and so, constantly grants "privilege…to aporetic thought"
973
 (logical impasses or 
paradoxes occurring within the question of language). The problem of the criterion, then, occurs 
within Derrida's questioning in two distinct but related ways. On the one hand, there is the 
problem of selecting texts relevant and/or adequate to understanding Derrida's way-making 
movements. Any attempt to understand Derrida rationally necessarily involves a 'selective' 
reading of representative texts – it is an interpretation determined by deliberate choices or 
decisions that may be called (back) into question. On the other hand, it is the rational status of 
contexts of interpretations that becomes – and remains – the question. Derrida's questioning 
limits itself to interpretations of interpretation in the form of selected texts. Such an approach is 
itself 'selective' (decisive, questioning) in that it conceives all linguistic contexts – the very being 
in question – as a text that cannot be decided (delimited) either way. Specifically, there is 
"nothing but text, there is nothing but extratext, in sum an unceasing preface that undoes the 
philosophical representation of the text, the received opposition between the text and what 
exceeds it."
974
 Contexts of interpretation are therefore "marked by the undecidable syntax of 
more"975: contexts cannot be interpreted away via a given linguistic boundary or move towards 
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an "absolute outside of the text."
976
 Derrida's questioning purports to take place in "the 
displacement of a question, a certain system somewhere open to the undecidable resource that 
sets the system in motion."
977
 Furthermore, "if there is nothing outside the text, this implies, with 
the transformation of the concept of text in general, that the text is no longer the snug airtight 





A related difficulty in understanding Derrida is that he is typically understood to "employ a written 
style that defies comprehension", and that the way/s he thinks do not "meet accepted standards 
of clarity and rigor."
979
 Derrida’s "somewhat impenetrable"
980
 interpretations require 
considerable thought to understand – insofar as they can be understood. Derrida is among the 
first to agree that he attempts to think a question of "greatest obscurity"
981
, one that seeks to 
interpret the "very enigma"
982
 between thought and language. Following Heidegger
983
, Derrida’s 
understands this enigmatic relation by way of conceiving an inconceivable. Unlike Heidegger, 
however, Derrida questions the intelligibility of the ontological difference, or the way difference 
is "determined, in the language of the West, as the difference between Being and beings."
984
 
Nonetheless, Derrida follows Heidegger by asking "the question of the question"
985
, and urges 
that an interrogation of Heidegger's question is "set forth in all my texts."
986
 Derrida differs from 
Heidegger in that he does not similarly privilege the "piety of thinking"
987
 and is ontologically 
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committed to questioning the free "play of difference"
988
 as the "condition of possibility"
989
 for 
meaning. While "such a question could not arise and be understood without the difference 
between Being and beings opening up somewhere"
990
, Derrida argues that "difference 
conceived within the horizon of the question of Being"
991
 needs to be approached in a different 
way – through the "unheard of thought"
992
 of differance. The thought of differance is so enigmatic 
and obscure that it can be "neither a word nor a concept"
993
 and presupposes a conceptual 
sleight of hand that can   
 
… however, be thought of in the closest proximity to itself only on one condition: that one begins by 
determining it as the ontico-ontological difference before erasing that determination. The necessity of 
passing through that erased determination, the necessity of that trick of writing is irreducible. An 
unemphatic and difficult thought that, through much unperceived mediation, must carry the burden of our 
question.994 
 
Such a heavy burden is arguably obscured or reduced through the very act of clear and rigidly 
accurate thinking. Although Derrida concedes that his questioning does not lead to clear-cut or 
straightforward answers, he denies that his arguments lack the appropriate philosophical rigor. 
Following Heidegger, it is the issue of logical validity or procedural analysis that is in question, 
and remaining "actively perplexed"
995
 is the most thoroughgoing approach. We therefore need 
to approach a question of great obscurity – an enigmatic relation resisting rigid thought or 
rational penetration – in similarly myriad ways. Specifically, no truly "rigorous philosopher"
996
 
should be "able to avoid"
997
 plumbing the depths of Heidegger's questioning in that it remains 
"multiple… provocative, enigmatic, still to be read."
998
 Consequently, the requirement is to follow 
Heidegger to try to "understand"
999
 the difference between Being and beings opened up through 
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 ibid, p.130. We shall return to this unheard of thought in language, and merely introduce it by way 
of preliminary analysis. 
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 Derrida claims that the difficulty in understanding (following) Heidegger is one of the main tasks 
of his thinking. Specifically, "I am still trying to understand Heidegger…He is one of the thinkers who 
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questioning. Despite the imputation of the impenetrability of such thinking, the multiplicity of 
Derrida’s own interpretations have nonetheless been interpreted (understood) as "semi-
intelligible attacks on the values of reason, truth and scholarship…(and)  when the effort is made 
to penetrate" them it "becomes clear that, where coherent assertions are being made at all, 
these are either false or trivial."
1000
  The intelligibility of Derrida’s approach is thereby caught in 
a vicious circle, one disabled by the movement of understanding itself. Habermas claims that 
Derrida's interpretations incoherently or falsely argue that "any interpretation is inevitably a false 
interpretation, and any understanding a misunderstanding."
1001
 Derrida stands accused of 
wilfully obscuring his movements – by employing a language or style that resists understanding 
to cover his tracks and leading interpreters into an impenetrable abyss. Searle urges that 
readers "can hardly misread him, because he is so obscure"
1002
, and trying to determine the 
"correct interpretation"
1003
 typically results in misunderstandings. The conflict – and conflicting 
– interpretations is thought to be the consequence of Derrida deploying "the method of 
obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism)."1004 To some extent, the accusation of 
intellectual terrorism coincides with Derrida’s thinking regarding the "delimiting of ontology."
1005
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 ibid. Searle claims to be quoting Foucault’s characterization here. Specifically, "Foucault said 
that Derrida practiced the method of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism). We were 
speaking French. And I said, "What the hell do you mean by that?" And he said, "He writes so 
obscurely you can't tell what he's saying, that's the obscurantism part, and then when you criticize 
him, he can always say, 'You didn't understand me; you're an idiot.' That's the terrorism part." And I 
like that.’’ Derrida complains in Points, Interviews: 1974-1994 that Habermas is amongst the many 
who misunderstand him – and such a misunderstanding occurs because Habermas "visibly and 
carefully avoided reading me", p.218. In "Marx and Sons" Derrida complains about the general 
tendency to misread (locate) him as postmodern a "facile and demagogic, grave error of confusing 
my work (or even deconstruction in general)." Further, such misinterpretations are merely indicative 
"of a massive failure to read and analyse" his thought correctly. Sprinker, Michael (ed.) "Marx and 
Sons" in Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Derrida’s Specters of Marx (London: Verso, 1999), 
pp.263-264. And in the "Afterword" to Limited INC, Derrida talks of being "interpreted 
…inadequately" by Searle, who had "read me, or rather avoided reading me and trying to 
understand" through the "brutality" of such an avoidance or misreading. Indeed, like many 
interpreters before and after Searle, they are not willing or "able to read me" correctly. Such 
misinterpretations or "inability" remains generally "exemplary and symptomatic" of the attempt to 
wilfully obscure his thought (amongst many other thinkers) through "certain practices of academic 
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Derrida, Limited INC (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.113 
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 for clarity and rigor is itself said to be the result of calculated acts of 
linguistic "violence"
1007
  and needs to be "understood"
1008
 (deconstructed) via a "strategic device, 
opening onto its own abyss."
1009
 It is constructive discourse which seeks to obscure the terrorism 
of rational thought via an attempt to "interiorize every limit as being and as being its own 
proper."1010 Following language’s lead, deconstructive thought "can only tend toward justice by 
acknowledging and practicing the violence within it."
1011
 Despite such territorial conflicts or 
markings, Derrida urges that deconstruction remains "affirmative"
1012
 insofar as it requires "a 
thinking of Being"
1013
 and the way thought seeks to interiorize and authorize every limit as being. 
In this way, we may question "the authority… of the thinking of what is...and give it the possibility 
of being thought."
1014
 It is for this reason that Derrida questions the ways in which rational 
thought has reason to be or a "reason for being"1015 rational. By being thought (marked) via 
differance, thinking will in some way be able to "mark non-being"
1016
, moving us "to the beyond 
of beingness"
1017
 and reasoning. 
 
While Derrida might sympathetically be called a philosopher "of hesitation,"
1018
 few have also 
hesitated to ‘understand’ (appropriate) him. This notoriously impenetrable thinker has somehow 
managed to penetrate a range of disciplines or territories. According to one sympathetic 
interpretation, Derrida’s thought has come to shape "many debates and reflections"
1019
 in 
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University Press, 1999) p. 42, 
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contemporary thought because of its continued preoccupation with an "experience of the 
question."
1020
 Nonetheless, deconstruction has inadvertently found its way into the 
unquestioning experiences of popular culture – it has given its name to a 1997 Woody Allen 
comedy, a British record label, a 2018 indie rock album and restaurant menu items.
1021
 The term 
deconstructive criticism has also become a recent 'achievement' in an open world third-person 
shooter video game (2016's Tom Clancy's The Division).1022 The Trump administration has even 
appropriated Derrida's term for its own reasons when calling for a "deconstruction of the 
administrative state."
1023
  The irony is that the "most famous philosopher in the world"
1024
 has 
primarily marked "fields outside philosophy"
1025
, enabling a range of interpretations in various 
fields of knowledge. 'Deconstruction' marks the place where contemporary thought has taken 
up residence and continues to dwell. Specifically, deconstruction is said to be "the house that 
Jacques built"
1026
 and its being-in-the-world has laid the foundations for a "pretentious and 
obfuscatory blight on the intellectual landscape."
1027
 Derrida's presence – or omnipresence – 




 See Deconstructing Harry, Deconstruction Records and the Eel’s The Deconstruction 
respectively. Restaurants may also serve ‘deconstructed food’ in the culinary form of the sums of 
their parts – like the deconstructed Caesar salad (stacked romaine lettuce, an anchovy, an egg yolk, 
and some shaved Parmesan, in separate heaps on a plate), the deconstructed martini (separate 
shot glasses of gin, vermouth, and olives), etc. 
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 The Division is a popular online videogame combining role-playing and third-person shooting 
elements. The deconstructive criticism 'achievement' (or trophy) is awarded when players break 
down ('deconstruct') 100 items -– weapons, armour, etc. – into parts that can be used to rebuild 
other items. One of the ironies of this achievement is that it is awarded in a notoriously unstable 
system. Despite The Division's increasing popularity – app. 10 million registered players at the time 
of writing – the game itself is frequently breaking down (missions fail to start and/or complete, players 
keep finding 'exploits' and turn the game against itself for their own ends, etc.,).  
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 We are now quoting episode 4 of the BBC comedy Knowing Me, Knowing You (1994).  Mock 
French chef Phillip Lambert cites Derrida as the patron saint of his Restaurant With No Name to the 
talk show’s know nothing host (Steve Coogan’s Alan Partridge, who laughably counters that Peter 
Ustinov is the world’s most renowned philosopher). Knowing Me, Knowing You appears to be 
mocking two different things simultaneously here – the provinciality of the British and the 
pretentiousness of the French.  
1025
 Smith, Barry, et al.  "Letter to London Times", Cambridge Review, 113, October 1992, p.138-
139. The philosophers claim that since many other philosophers don’t take Derrida seriously, Derrida 
cannot be thought a serious philosopher – his false and trivial claims have merely acquired 
intellectual currency amongst people who obviously wouldn’t know the difference or any better (like 
literary critics).  
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Stich might be hostile to the "heaps of badly written blather produced by people who call themselves 
deconstructionists", that does not prevent him from wanting to call his own mental activity 
‘deconstructing’. Nonetheless, it is a testament to the ubiquity (and indeterminacy) of Derrida’s term 
that an analytical philosopher of an eliminativist or materialist bent like Stitch will write a critique of 
consciousness under that heading. As Kirk Hagen complains in "The Death of Philosophy", however, 
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across the cultural landscape has resulted in conflicting interpretations about the meaning of 
his "cult following."
1028
 It has been alleged that Derrida was either an "intellectual demigod"
1029
 
who exerted "immeasurable influence"
1030
 on other rational thinkers or an "intellectual con 
artist"
1031
 who had "duped"
1032
 other impostures. While it is true that deconstruction is no longer 
the force it once was,
1033
 the rational status of Derrida's questioning goes beyond any given 
intellectual trend or fashion statements – deconstruction moves us back towards the question 
of the historicity of understanding. Consequently, it is difficult to "calculate the age of 
deconstruction"
1034
 since the "provocation of the Derrida text"
1035
 continues to move across the 
contexts in question. Either way, the possibility of interpreting Derrida's interpretations is not 
without historical irony or significance. It highlights the impossibility of a philosopher to master 
his own limits. Particularly ironical is the way context has played a part in determining the 
rational status of Derrida's 'texts'.
1036
 Nonetheless, Derrida himself acknowledges that his claims 
to understanding remain "impossible"
1037
, and that he can only direct us towards "a certain 
                                                
Derrida was "unforgivably reckless in his exposition"
1027
, and "never made any effort to improve his 
prose. And yet… hordes of converts took to aping his impenetrable rodomontades in article after 
article, dissertation after dissertation, book after book." Skeptic, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2005, p.18 and p.20 
(dis)respectively. 
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 Johnson, Barbara. The Wake of Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). By 1994, Johnson 
was asking whether we should have a wake for deconstruction because its time appeared to have 
past. She argues, however, that rumours of its demise had been greatly exaggerated, and that 
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p.1. As Bates observes, deconstruction has generally "thus far resisted historicization," and any 
attempt to adequately contextualize Derrida's questioning – to do justice to it – is still to come. 
Edward Baring's Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) is a more recent attempt to do just this. Baring provides a relatively 
infrequent attempt to contextualize Derrida's philosophical development. Baring questions Derrida's 
outsider status – that one of the world's most controversial and influential philosophers appeared to 
suddenly come out of nowhere and/or that he should somehow go back to where he came from. 
The "search for thick and dense philosophical ties" is therefore best approached via the 
"philosophically and socially proximate", pp.1-2. Specifically, Derrida's seemingly 'out-there' thought 
(amongst other French philosophers) was "formed in the philosophical crucible of the preceding 
century", and intellectual pathways can be readily traced or followed. The allegedly unintelligible 
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experience of the impossible."
1038
 Derrida's avowed approach to questions remains besieged 
by the possibility of "becoming an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, 
accessible practices."
1039
 Given Derrida’s reluctance to formalize or clarify his philosophical 
position, we should not "settle for methodological procedures"
1040
 when trying to locate him 
within the problem of understanding. Following his lead, we can merely open "up a 
passageway"
1041
 by way of interpretation and move "ahead"
1042
 to mark a "trail"
1043
 in our 
understanding. The conflict and multiplicity of interpretations have nonetheless resulted in 
attempts to secure or determine Derrida’s movements – via endeavouring to move Derrida back 
into the field of philosophy.
1044
 Such a backward movement urges that there is a correct way to 
interpret and understand Derrida – by situating his questioning within "the tradition of 
philosophical thought."
1045
 In placing the being of Derrida’s questioning within such a 




Derrida observes that "the question of knowing what can be called philosophy has always been 
the very question of philosophy."1047 Philosophers have traditionally asked how thinking can be 
identified or distinguished to delimit the horizon of questioning. It is this sense of direction that 
legislates a given "tradition and style"
1048
 of questioning. By following its directives, thought 
seeks to circumscribe its own limits and legislations. Philosophical practice remains primarily 
directed towards "being a tradition producing tradition out of itself."
1049
 However, if we consider 
the "history of philosophy as one great discourse"
1050
, how can thought decide to move around 
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the circle of its own "autodetermination"
1051
? Since "the object of" knowledge is directed by the 
movement of thought, its contents remain bound by an "experience of circular closure"
1052
 – that 
is, structured by "that which knows"
1053
 and is determined by "the knowledge"
1054
 of its  
movements. If we chose to follow Heidegger, we already know that moving within such a "circle 
is unique"
1055
 in that philosophy needs "the concepts of" 
1056
 thought to question the direction of 
its own thinking. While we "have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to 
this history"
1057
 "there are many ways of being caught in the circle"
1058
 in which "tradition (or 
transmission) and language, thought and language, society and language, each precede the 




Derrida thereby follows Heidegger by placing himself at the "limit of philosophical discourse"
1060
 
in order to question the "legality of the decision"
1061
 delimiting (moving) thought either way. 
Derrida urges that his own approach "would not have been possible without the opening of 
Heidegger's questions"
1062
 regarding the "unthought by philosophy,"
1063
 and the goal is to rethink 
the circle in such a way as to keep the question of the "difference between being and the 
entity"
1064
 open through questioning. Derrida follows Heidegger’s lead by reopening the 
"question of being"1065, and understands "being itself as the question: the question of being is 
the being of the question."
1066
  Derrida will attempt a "departure from the Heideggarian 
problematic"
1067
 insofar as one can move away from (rethink) "the concepts of origin and fall."
1068
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Nonetheless, Derrida's way-making movement is brought forth via his appropriation of the 
Heideggarian conception of the ‘destruction’ of traditional concepts for "my own ends."
1069
 
Heidegger creates an opening through the very act of questioning traditional thought or practice, 
or that "community of the question"…(where) the question of being cannot be determined or 
directed "through the hypocrisy of an answer."
1070
 Consequently, the nature of Heidegger's 
destructive question "had to be reconstructed in some way"
1071
, if only so the event of 
understanding can itself be "submitted to a deconstructive questioning"
1072
 across distinct 
contexts of interpretation. Derrida's questioning thereby occurs as a "contextual strategy"
1073
 
that desires "to be faithful to the themes and audacities of thinking."
1074
  Derrida purports to be 
faithful by following the game of language through contexts caught within interplay between 
thought and language. If we are to remain faithful to thought, we "must think" of con/texts as a 
"game within language,"
1075
  and understand that variability is "the constant of the game."1076 
Specifically, language plays by its own rules and "the concept of variability"
1077
 is the "very 
concept of the game."
1078
  It is "a rule of the game which does not govern the game, it is a rule 
of the game which does not dominate the game…(and)… when the rule of the game is displaced 
by the game,  we must find something other than the word rule…to describe that game."
1079
 
Derrida approaches Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world in a different way. It is the "game 
of the world (which) must first be thought, before attempting to understand all forms of play in 
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 Given Derrida's interpretations of (contexts of) interpretations, we cannot "break 
the circle violently (it would avenge itself), but would seek to understand it more "resolutely, 
authentically."
1081
  The way thought can do this is by following "the law of the circle"1082 and 
place our trust in its deconstructive movements. And "of this trust would thought consist."
1083
 
According to Derrida, there are "two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of 
freeplay."
1084
 The one (false) interpretation "seeks to decipher… a (final) truth or (first) origin"
1085
 
of meaning, and is brought forth via traditional conceptions of hermeneutics. The other (more 
truthful or faithful) interpretation attempts to move "beyond" a "reassuring foundation… the 
origin and the end" of meaningful thought
1086
 by moving with the structure of understanding 
already always deconstructing itself. While it’s true that interpreters find themselves presented 
with a choice as to which way they should approach contexts of interpretation, it is never really 
a "question of choosing"
1087
 how (con)texts should be answered and/or interpreted. Specifically, 
thought invariably calls itself into being and/or back into question via language and such 
questioning "would withdraw it from any assured horizon of a hermeneutic question."
1088
  The 
more truthful interpretation of interpretations would therefore "perforate such a horizon or the 
hermeneutic veil" 
1089
 and think about language in a more questionable (equivocal, undecidable) 
way. Such an approach "directs itself towards an irreducible remainder or excess"
1090
 and the 




Derrida's Way to Language. 
 
The way thinking calls itself into question is through language. Specifically, it is via "the 
movement of signification"
1092
 that "language bears within itself the necessity of its own 
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 Language invariably "finds itself erased or questioned"
1094
 by the ways it cannot be 
"thought"
1095
 (signified) across contexts of interpretation. The question of language’s 
movements raises the problem of having to think (signify) "the unthinkable itself"
1096
 any-way. 
The question of language's elusiveness is significant insofar as we still need to think about 
language’s directives and movements – and we can only do this by allowing the constative to 
be caught up in the "overflowing of the performative."
1097
  Given the way language moves and/or 
is directed, it will remain in a constant state of flux
1098
 as it rushes past and overcomes thought. 
Derrida maintains that its "equivocity is in fact always irreducible"
1099
 because "words and 
language in general are not and can never be absolute objects"1100 of thought. Derrida's 
questioning thereby places emphasis on the "meaningfulness"1101 or "plentitude"1102 of language 
– it cannot be reduced to a "complete and original intentionality of its meaning"
1103
 and a 
"thousand possibilities will always remain open even if one understands something…that makes 
sense."
1104
 While there might be many ways Derrida interprets interpretations, there is one 
question that tends to direct his thoughts: the impossibility of stemming language's flow through 
interpretations attempting to take hold of what remains in a constant state of flux.  Specifically, 
Derrida questions the ways in which the circle of language and thought seek to become 
reciprocally related and mutually attuned. The question of their reciprocity or attunement is 
problematized in that language passes through thought and returns to it from different directions 
or in different ways.  Thought might always understand itself to be "guided by an intention of 
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, but it can only find a "reference without a referent, without any first or last unit."
1106
 
The movement of language can therefore only be appropriated by way of an impasse. The law 
of the circle cannot "escape the law of reappropriation"
1107
 in that it "always reappropriates for 
itself the discourse that delimits it."
1108
 Any attempt to question language "involves a 
decision"
1109
 regarding the appropriateness of given criteria. These way-making movements 
delimit the way language is to be appropriated – by deciding what is to be thought most fitting 
or suitable to its movements in the first place or last instance.  The question of how to approach 
and/or which way to move within a horizon of being is said to be "metaphysics in its most 
traditional form."
1110
 It is where "the deciding agency"
1111
 attempts to master the limit of its 
discourse through the very act of thinking or saying so. While the "constant"
1112
 attempt to 
determine the direction of fit between language and thought is understood to be "the 
metaphysical exigency"
1113
 at its most "profound and potent"
1114
, it is also when thought 
becomes superficial and powerless. Traditional ways of thinking involve a metaphysics of 
presence insofar as thought attempts to rationally order moving parts into a stable whole. The 
horizon of being is administers itself via a "hierarchal axiology"
1115
, or "ethical ontological 
distinctions" that "setup value-oppositions clustered around an ideal and undefinable limit."
1116
 
By administering beings that "subordinate these values to each other,"
1117
 thought attempts to 
return "to an origin, or a priority held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical 
in order to then think in terms of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc."1118 
Nonetheless, the given intentional horizon will continue to be determined by an "undecidability" 
1119
 of meaning: whichever way thought turns it remains in an unstable position and may be 
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overturned. Conflicting movements "between two determined possibilities or options"
1120
 
"continues to inhabit the decision."
1121
 Consequently, thought will invariably find itself directed 
back to those "aporias"
1122





directives. The law of the circle will find itself on "trial"
1125




Perhaps there is no better way to experience this aporia than through "the being of intention: 
intentionality itself"
1127
. The question of language becomes 'critical' because it will invariably 
encounter its "peculiar inability to emerge from itself in order to articulate its origin"
1128
 or direct 
its ends. The directedness of thought – the way it thinks it can direct itself and/or bypass 
language – merely puts us back on the path of a "non-road"
1129
 or at the intersection of a "blind 
spot"
1130
 where its "condition of possibility turns into a condition of impossibility."
1131
 Intentionality 
is where language directs thought through an "interminable experience"
1132
 that can only be 
"endured"
1133




 This risk coincides with the problem of the criterion, 
and its relation to the question of being. It raises the question of deciding which way to move or 
direct our thought within language. Any attempt to disentangle thought from language involves 
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an ontological commitment, or a "re-instituting act of interpretation."
1136
 In order to make a 
decision (ontologically commit ourselves) within a context of interpretation, interpreters must 
move through "the ordeal of an undecidable"
1137
 – by way of acknowledging the problem of 
knowing which direction to come from and/or go to. Whichever path we chose, the ordering of 
beings remains caught in a unique circular movement, where "any certitude or supposed 
criteriology that would assure us"
1138
 what to think turns thought and language back into each 
other. Intentionality merely directs thought to "the structural limit"
1139
 of experience, since the 
being of language can never be directed (intended) towards "the telos (the end)" or the "arche 
(beginning or commandment)."
1140
 While the force of Derrida's arguments "irreducibly 
belongs"
1141
 to the logic of "metaphysical oppositions,"
1142
 a deconstructive interpretation "uses 
the strength of the field to turn its own stratagems against it, producing a force of dislocation 
that spreads itself throughout the entire system, fissuring it in every direction and thoroughly 
delimiting it"1143 as an open question. 
 
We began with the understanding that Derrida is a difficult thinker to understand (position, 
follow, etc.) Part of this difficulty remains Derrida's principled reluctance to provide criteria for a 
deconstructive approach. Derrida hesitates to reassure us with any presupposed criteriology or 
certitude, and directs us away from thinking the possibility of determinate criteria by way of his 
own questioning of the circle of understanding. Given the undecidability of meaning, it was not 
possible to know (decide in advance) which way the circle would turn or move. A related difficulty 
was the way Derrida approaches the circle in question. Derrida does not use straightforward 
language to clear the way, and attempts to follow language's lead by moving in different 
directions throughout such questioning. The problem of understanding Derrida is exemplified 
by his own interpretation of a traditional problematic: the delimiting of being by way of thinking 
(approaching, directing) the question of language. Following Derrida's lead, however, we have 
attempted to find our way by moving across a range of texts or passages that form a complex 
whole. Specifically, we have tried to open up a passageway by bringing forth a part/whole 
problematic regarding the movement of differance and/or the trial of the undecidability of 
                                                
1136
 Derrida, Jacques. "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority" in Cornell, Drucilla, 
Rosenfeld, Michel and Carlson, David (eds.)  Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p.23.   
1137
 ibid, p.24 
1138
 ibid, p.25. 
1139





 Derrida, Jacques. "Force and Signification" in Writing and Difference trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 






meaning. We moved through these openings to mark a trail in our understanding. We have 
marked this linguistic trail – and trial – by following pathways that recur throughout Derrida's 
thinking. In this way, we've emphasized the question of the direction of fit between thought and 
language. We thereby found an opening within Derrida's interpretations by placing ourselves in 
a meaningful circle that does not admit of entry or exit points.   
 
The Pharmakon: Derrida's Interpretation of Plato's (Con)text 
 
We are finally in a position where we can direct ourselves back and forth. The following is a 
brief attempt to look at the way/s Derrida performs the question of the directedness of thought, 
and its relation to the directives of language. We shall primarily direct our thought to Derrida's 
deconstruction of Plato's own attempt to say (perform) the limit of being/s via the pharmakon of 
writing. The goal is to follow the way Derrida uses Plato's text to question the delimiting of 
meaningful linguistic contexts. We will examine the ways Platonism – understood here as the 
history of thought – has traditionally performed the question of delimitation through Derrida's 
interpretation of language in action. Such an approach highlights the way the constative 
(statements describing the reality in question by way of given truth-values) and the performative 





According to Derrida, the history of thought is to be meaningfully understood contextually, and 
it is the "philosophical, epistemic order of logos as an antidote"1145 to the "headache"1146 of the 
unthought that remains in question. Specifically, "Platonism"
1147
 provides both the historical and 
discursive context insofar as philosophical texts have traditionally sought to enact "the whole of 
Western metaphysics in its conceptuality."
1148
 The way thought chooses to identify and reflect 
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upon its concepts remain context-bound or specific, and "its interpretive"
1149
 contexts may be 
presented as a "pharmaceutical operation"
1150
 seeking to administer (conceive, prescribe) its 
limits. The epistemic order of the logos is therefore best approached as a "pharmaceutical 
enclosure"
1151
  – as "being therapeutic in nature"
1152
 in that it involves a rational 'treatment' of 
the very beings in question. Plato's inaugural movements "raises the problem of context"
1153
 
across a range of philosophical (con)texts and/or concepts. The intentionality of thought "has 
the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing"
1154
, that remains "woven"
1155
 into a "web"
1156
 
of relations that problematizes the very notions of contextual boundaries or context specificity. 
Interpretations – and the interpretation of interpretations – remain "highly determined in strictly 
defined situations"
1157
, and can only be understood "pragmatically"
1158
 (within the context of their 
occurrence). Given these pragmatically determined situations, contexts move through one 
another and become interwoven. The activity of thinking inaugurates a part/whole problematic 
concerning its "syntactical praxis."
1159
 The move towards conceptuality is invariably directed 
back to "the problematic of the performative."
1160
 The very constructive nature of thought will 
inadvertently find itself deconstructed across a given linguistic context – by way of language's 
displacements and equivocations (passage through and to other concepts). The order of 
conceptuality – the way concepts prescribe and administer themselves via rational treatments 
– simultaneously undermines their claims to legality or prescriptiveness. Whenever a context 
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attempts to "decide and maintain"
1161
 the order of beings, language's way-making movements 
performs (enacts) something other than what can be decided or maintained. The movement of 
beings thereby remain directed by the "ricochet of the moment"
1162
 across the contexts in 
question. If and when thinking decides to move one way rather than another, every meaningful 
being "appearing on the scene of presence"
1163
 becomes "related to something other than 
itself."
1164
 The part/whole relation can only be meaningfully presented (constructed) "by means 
of this very relation to what it is not."
1165
 The very act of thinking moves being/s (back) towards 
or through "the displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to other, from one term 
of an opposition to another."
1166
 Nothing – no concept or conception of being – can ever be 
presented (identified) with respect to itself, "in a sufficient presence that would refer only to 
itself."
1167
  Everything – every concept or conception of being – "lawfully"
1168
 remains an integral 
part of the complex signifying whole to which they belong and/or differentiate themselves. Every 
concept of being thereby moves through a chain linked to the condition of their possibility for 
displacement and equivocation. Derrida calls this process "non-synonymous substitutions"
1169
 
and it is related by "the necessity of the context."
1170
 The context remains questionable 
(necessarily open and/or related to other contexts) because it is conditioned through meaningful 
displacements and equivocations – meaningful contexts remain the place where non-
synonymous substitutions result in the determination and alteration of given truth-values.  The 
beings in question invariably move back and forth within (ricochet across) a given intentional 
horizon, and so remain caught in "between"1171 one another.  Identity relations can therefore 
only occur as a "weave of differences"
1172
 within "the circle"
1173
 that distinguishes and relates 
different beings from within "the spacing" of an "in-between-ness."
1174
 It is the differing relation 
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between beings that enables "the transcription and inscription of things"
1175
, if only "because 
there is no thing itself."
1176
 And these beings differ (signify) insofar as they defer to other beings 
throughout time and/or across contexts – by simultaneously moving towards and away from 
each other. It is within such a differential context that language and intentionality can never 
identify or locate one another according to a fixed homological relation. Neither can retain the 
quality of being identical nor meaningfully correspond by way of a given structural position or 
functional value.  Their mutually generating movement encloses language and thought within a 
constantly deferred and differential relationship. Consciousness can never be fully present to 
itself as such – it is always already caught between thought and language. Any attempt to 
"gather itself into its presence"
1177
 is simply a form of self-privilege or a way of putting one before 
the other via the privileging of Self. It is where "consciousness offers itself to thought as self-
presence, as the perception of self in presence."
1178
 Indeed, every attempt to put thought before 
language or language before thought "is the ether of metaphysics, the element of our thought 
caught in the language of metaphysics."
1179
 Despite our best intentions, the whole of 
metaphysics in its conceptuality (enactment) will call itself back into question – by way of the 
"thought of differance."
1180
 Derrida asks us to think the thought of differance in order to ‘hear’ 
the way language silently speaks and/or moves. Differance – that movement which differs and 
defers beings – raises the "question"
1181
 of the nature of relation between part and whole in that 
we "must attempt to think this unheard thought….Since Being has never had a 'meaning', has 
never being thought or said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then differance, in 
a certain and very strange way, (is) 'older' than the ontological difference or than the truth of 
Being."
1182
  The enigma of language may nonetheless be thought when attempting to approach 
language through that unheard thought rendered (barely) audible via a trick of spelling.  
Differance differs by articulating a space between concept and object, and defers by locating 
their differences (openings, passageways) within a temporal chain. Its activity throws thought 
(back) into question by making language’s constituent parts "shake as a whole" or "tremble in 
(their) entirety."
1183
  While the intentionality of any questioning can "never be through and 
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through present to itself and to its content"
1184
, we can still deconstruct the way/s thought in 
action might occur. Given such activity in context, "the category of intention will not disappear; 





Derrida provides an interpretation of a Platonic text that attempts to govern the entire scene of 
understanding (the whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality). This metaphysical 
context extends beyond Plato's immediate text and moves thought across the many places that 
'Platonism' has sought to occupy and regulate.  Plato's Phaedrus – among many other texts 
across traditional thought or practice – attempts to address the question of language from within 
a place in language. Derrida questions the way Plato thinks he can answer (speak to or for) 
language from within a specific space of reasons, and he does this by positioning himself within 
the context of Plato's own text/s. The question of 'Platonism' remains an open text (context) in 
that any attempt to "decide and maintain"
1186
 refers to "the whole of Western philosophy, 
including the anti-Platonisms that regularly feed into it."
1187
 As Derrida maintains, "we do not 
believe that there exists, in all rigor, a Platonic text, closed upon itself, complete with its inside 
and its of outside."
1188
 Despite philosophy’s best or avowed intentions, Derrida argues that 
philosophical questioning has never been able to decide or maintain the limit of understanding. 
The horizon of language continues to move rational thought beyond whatever is decided and 
the undecidability of meaning ensures that meaningful contexts can never be "certain or 
saturated"
1189
 whichever way reason approaches – writes or speak about – them. Consequently, 
"we must set back in place"
1190
 the "textual chain"
1191
 always already in play and move beyond 
Plato's immediate text – towards the way language itself performs the contexts in question. 
Derrida remains "less interested in breaking through certain limits… than putting in doubt the 
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right to posit such limits in the first place."
1192
 Derrida casts doubt on the limits of understanding 
via the inherent undecidability of the meaning of the pharmakon of writing in Plato's dialogue. 
Plato's Phaedrus is said to introduce a hierarchical opposition between speech and writing via 
the word in question. The difficulty, however, is that such a hierarchical axiology – Plato's  
treatment of the problem via the meaningful delimitation of beings – remains undecidable. The 
meaning of the pharmakon cannot be decided either way:  pharmakon can either be a remedy 
or a poison, and the pharmakon's very presence in the text actively deconstructs the logic of 
Plato's own argument in different ways. Plato's text – a written dialogue – undermines the very 
context of its presuppositions. Plato's argument presupposes, of course, knowledge as 
recollection of an immutable truth imprinted on the soul recollected through therapeutic speech 
in the form of philosophical discourse. The logical problem is that Plato's dialogue inadvertently 
'forgets' or displaces the role of this more originary 'writing' to make the privileging of speech 
intelligible (possible, meaningful). Derrida argues that the meaning of the pharmakon remains 
"ambivalent"
1193
 and the pharmakon's "ambivalence"
1194
 remains part of its whole meaning. The 
traditional difficulty (for translators and interpreters) was deciding on – arbitrating between – the 
intended meaning within the context of Plato's argument. Derrida's "critical reading"
1195
 of the 
Phaedrus argues, however, that the pharmakon is "already inhabited by differance"1196 that 
"precedes the opposition between different effects"
1197
: the pharmakon remains meaningfully 
constituted through its ambivalence, or reason(s) for being-there. 
 
Derrida’s interpretation of Plato’s text proceeds in two directions. On the one hand, he examines 
the way Plato attempts to move forward, towards saying the "ontological: the presumed 
possibility of a discourse about what is."
1198
 This speaking corresponds to the way beings are 
presented – decided upon – within a given intentional horizon. On the other hand, Derrida’s  
thinking involves a "reversal"
1199
 and deferral of what can be meaningfully presented and/or 
thought decisive in language. Derrida’s interpretation presumes to throw into question whatever 
is "decided and maintained in the field of ontology or dialectics throughout all the mutations or 
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revolutions that are entailed."
1200
 Such a questioning renders impossible a discourse about what 
is there. Derrida aims to show how thinking remains caught between the "circle"1201 and an 
"abyss"
1202
, or an unfathomable chasm between thought and language. This in-between is 
"syntactical"
1203
 insofar as it opens up a "spacing and articulation"
1204
 between "pairs of 
opposing terms, the ground of its presuppositions, the entirety of the discourse in which one 
could articulate the question of the ‘entire-field’ (as a question, and hence as a discourse)."
1205
 
According to Derrida, thought remains groundless because "non-truth is the truth"
1206
 within the 
presuppositions of meaningful discourse. Any pharmaceutical operation will result in an 
"uncritical…treatment"
1207
 insofar as rational thought will invariably take "from the order of the 
very thing"
1208
 it is "trying to exclude from it."
1209
 Given that truthful discourse moves within non-
truth (what is unthought or excluded from rational thinking), "nonpresence is presence. 
Differance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the condition of possibility 
and the condition of impossibility of truth."1210 Consequently, any attempt to distinguish between 
the constative and the performative remains caught between their respective directives and/or 
movements.
1211
 The activity of the pharmakon indicates that there can be no context-
independent criterion for distinguishing between what might be thought constant – truth-values 
that occur independent of their stating – and statements that perform (bring about) the scene of 
their occurrence. Such a trans/formation determines a scene’s own de/construction – i.e., 
stages its performance through the act of stating. Derrida urges that a text’s ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ 
remains inextricably interwoven with the ways a context performs its statements – it is where 
language directs thought towards the staging of such repeat performances. Derrida leads us to 
this question by asking us to follow the ways the pharmakon performs on the stage of Plato's 
dialogue, and becomes subject to the "logic of play."
1212
 The pharmakon prescribes its own rules 
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 of language. The pharmakon may therefore be thought to be  undecidable 
because it plays within any presumed opposition or decision, and deconstructs language via its 
own interplay and "crossed connection making."
1214
 Generally understood as either a poison or 
remedy, Derrida urges that the pharmakon exhibits the "structure of iteration"1215 (the movement 
between an identity and difference) and so "makes one side cross over into the other (soul/body, 
good/evil, inside/outside, speech/writing, etc.)."
1216
 The iterability of the pharmakon "divides its 
own identity a priori…while constituting it."
1217
  Its very occurrence "constitutes the medium in 
which opposites are opposed"
1218
 insofar as its movements involve "the production of difference. 
It is the differance of difference."
1219
 The way the pharmakon produces oppositions and 
differences is through differential and deferring movements. From the outset – and across 
contexts of interpretation – the pharmakon enacts a "going or leading astray"
1220
 via the 
condition of its possibility – i.e., possible and/or alternate routes of meaning.  Derrida follows 
the pharmakon’s lead by noting the way its contradictory meanings cannot be determined from 
whichever direction it comes or goes. Despite the one and same spelling, the pharmakon's 
signification "acts"
1221
 as both remedy and poison and "introduces itself into the body of 
discourse with all its ambivalence."
1222
  Such movement indicates that identity and difference 
need no formal introduction and are cast in one another’s "spell"
1223
– they have already "been 
beckoning to each other from afar"
1224
 by way of a "hidden mediation"
1225
 and "secret 
argumentation."
1226
  Although "Plato decides in favour of a logic that does not tolerate ... 
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 ibid, Derrida uses the term "spellbinding", where the term works like a "charm" and explicitly 
uses the term spell elsewhere- i.e., p.124. It goes without saying, of course, that it is the spelling of 
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 ibid. We quote Derrida slightly out of context here in that his interpretation of Plato's text actually 
says "this time" the activity of the pharmakon occurs "without hidden mediation, without secret 
argumentation."  We defend our removal of the term "without" here because "up till this point in the 
dialogue" (ibid) Derrida deconstructs the wayward movements of the pharmakon by way of a hidden 
mediation and secret argumentation. Indeed, the pharmakon's activities "have been beckoning to 
each other from afar, indirectly sending back to each other, and as if by chance, appearing and 
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passages between opposing senses of the same word"
1227
, it is still possible to "watch it infinitely 
promise itself and endlessly vanish through concealed doorways that shine like mirrors and 
open onto the labyrinth"
1228
 in question. Identity and difference are thereby spellbound (drawn 
and held to one another) through the linguistic act of thinking. While it might be possible to 
determine what Plato intends to say in the relevant passages (text, opening that connects one 
space of reasons to another rational space) the context cannot be determined either way. The 
activity of the pharmakon moves through or opens up its passageways. The pharmakon's 
differential movements enact the passing from one state or place to other, and determines the 
way/s there. Derrida notes the way Plato's dialogue linguistically constructs its argument – 
through oppositions intended to administer its order of subordination and movement. While the 
Phaedrus covers much ground, it is noteworthy for the way it moves along pathways. The 
dialogue attempts to legitimate thought through lineage (via kinship relations from which thinking 
about language directly descends). Plato's dialogue attempts to distinguish and oppose 
categories of thought, but these linguistic distinctions become undermined by the very act of 
thinking them. Specifically, the signification pharmakon throws (back) into question self-
administered prescriptions like mythos/logos, speaking/writing, original/copy, good/bad, 
memory/forgetfulness, inside/outside, true/false, etc. Witness the way the written text attempts 
to privilege speech over writing via "the original medium of that decision, the element that 
precedes it, comprehends it, goes beyond it, can never be reduced to it, and is not separated 





Plato's text is structured around knowing the difference "between good and evil" and the role of 
knowledge within "public morals and social conventions."
1230
 Tradition is thought to play the 
decisive role in that Plato's dialogue typically "assigns the origin and power of speech, precisely 
of logos, to the paternal position."
1231
. That is to say, where the problem of language becomes 
a "question of morality"
1232
 through relations of order and transmission. Without irony, logos – 
via the father figure of Socrates – calls upon mythos to legitimate its position and lineage.  
Socrates tells a story where the god of invention presents the gift of writing to Egypt’s King 
Thamus. Writing is presented as a remedy or corrective to ignorance and forgetfulness, and  
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offered to the king as the jewel in his crown. The King, however, rejects the present of writing 
as a poison –  its presence will merely create false (incorrect) knowledge or memories.  Since 
writing cannot literally speak for itself and occurs in the absence of an original speaker, readers 
can never really know the true intentions or intended referent of a written text. Writing can only 
act as a supplement to speaking – by supplementing inner knowledge with a copy of what was 
originally said to be true. Such a supplement merely acts as an external reminder, and can only 
occur in addition to speech through replacing it. Note that Socrates aligns himself with a father 
figure from mythos: he privileges speech over writing in a dialogue that will be subsequently 
written down by Plato. While the pharmakon of writing occurs as a supplement to – or the 
illegitimate offspring of – speaking, it somehow becomes integral to the question of language’s 
well-being. This "dialectical inversion"
1233
 is something that logos prescribes or administers to 
itself to legitimate and delimit philosophical inquiry. The dialogues thereby find themselves 
morally obliged to enact a distinction between good and bad writing. The prescribed activity, 
however, threatens to go from bad to worse and encounters an unintended moral dilemma –  
the dialogue finds itself talking in circles. The question of language as moral prescription is 
forced to swallow a bitter pill regarding the direction or fit between what is thought to be originary 
and/or derivative. In order to make sense of the origin and power of philosophical questions, 
Socrates finds himself talking of the "unquestioned legitimacy"
1234
  of writing. Such talk threatens 
to make the cure worse than the disease, and throws into question the legitimacy of determining 
any value distinctions in the first place. Socrates speaks about knowledge originally "written 
down in the soul of the learner, that can defend itself, and know to whom (of what and when) it 
should speak."
1235
 In other words, the dialogue displaces the linguistic order of its own 
conceptuality, and finds itself speaking about concepts other than originally intended. This 
metaphorical displacement or 'poisoning' (borrowing, inheritance) means that philosophy 
cannot literally know what it should speak of and remains haunted by its spectre. The written 
dialogue inadvertently privileges the very order it intended to subordinate through an act of 
expiation and exclusion. Derrida's interpretation similarly moves beyond Plato's text to 
determine its meaningful limits. This movement is intended to indicate that there is no ‘outside’ 
this text – where the activity of the pharmakon remains saturated by the weave of context. 
Derrida notes that whilst the term pharmakos (sorcerer and scapegoat) is nowhere to be found 
in Plato's text, its absence is woven into the differential movements of the pharmakon anyway. 
The movement between part and whole ensures that "certain forces of association unite – at 
diverse distances, with different strengths and according to different paths"
1236
 and  
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"communicate with the totality of the lexicon through their syntactic play"
1237
 and "all the words 
from the same family."
1238
 For "all its hiddenness, for all it might escape Plato's notice"
1239
  
pharmakos nonetheless "passes through discoverable points of presence that can be seen in 
the text."
1240
 Scapegoats highlight the problem of borderlines – they’re an attempt to locate the 
source of misfortune through acts of transference. In locating perceived moral failings or social 
disorder, scapegoats become a necessary evil by virtue of being an aid to recovery. Scapegoats 
are found within borders to expiate and banish the evil of (say) ‘sorcerery’.  Witness the way 
Plato attempts to make the pharmakon of writing the scapegoat of philosophy when passing 
through the trial of his own writings. Despite Plato’s best or avowed intentions, he remained 
under the pharmakon's 'spell’ (undecidable spelling, magical thinking). Philosophy's original 
moral physician was also eventually put on trial for practicing sorcery with speech that 
(allegedly) poisoned the souls of others. Derrida traces the movements between pharmakon 
and pharmakos through the spellbinding effects of Socrates speech acts: Socrates' questioning 
culminated in the attempt to silence him through execution by poisoning. The therapeutic effects 
of Socrates' poisoning, however, speak for themselves. Socrates invariably became immortal 
and continues to live on through Plato's dialogues.  Despite the attempt to legislate the 
movements of the pharmakon, it continues on its ways – by passing through the trial of 
undecidability across cultural thought or practice. The pharmakon goes on to reintroduce itself 
into historical discourse to reiterate the differance. Specifically, where the movement of 
language continues to beckon thought through its hidden mediations and secret 
argumentations. 
 
Critical Discussion  (part 1) 
 
Aims and Objectives  
The aim of the following is to begin critically evaluating Derrida's conception of language. It is 
the first of two related parts displaced across logically distinct spaces of reasons. We thereby 
approach the question of the relation between part and whole via Lyotard and Habermas 
respectively. Following Derrida's lead, such an interrogation directs itself towards an 
interpretation of interpretations and primarily occurs as a contextual strategy. Specifically, we 
shall question the ways in which intentional relations – relatedness to a content, directedness 
upon an object, etc. – contextualizes the relationship between thought and language. If 
intentionality provides the horizon for any given movement, we must determine the ways in 










which thought and language are directed (back) towards each other. The question we shall find 
ourselves re-turning to, then, is the nature of the relation between meaning and truth within 
Derrida's questioning. We are immediately faced, of course, with the difficulty of following 
(making sense of) such an elusive thinker in the first place. The possibility of conflicting or 
multiple interpretations therefore directly moves us towards the philosophical problem of 
delimiting understanding itself.
1241
 Given Derrida’s ontological commitment – namely, that there 
are no objective facts and only interpretations1242 in a constant state of flux or transition – we 
are required to ask what such a fluctuating and/or transitional ontology commits us to. 
Specifically, there appears to be at least one objective fact and/or truth (that of interpretation), 
and the requirement is to ask what kind of fact an interpretation might be – especially if 
interpretations may come into conflict or be multiplied indefinitely. The underlying question for 
our purposes, then, is whether Derrida’s thinking should be understood as "anti-
hermeneutics…in all its radicality"
1243
 or whether it best exemplifies hermeneutical thought when 
moving the problem of understanding "into its most extreme and radical formulation."
1244
 Caught 
between these extremes is whether deconstructive thought should be interpreted as an instance 
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 Despite the possibility of multiple or conflicting 
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"Jewish mysticism" that seeks to retrace the invisible steps of God through the imprint of (re)writing, 
p.167. Specifically, "it is useful to recall the metaphor of the book of nature or the book of the world, 
which points to the hard to read, painstakingly to be deciphered handwriting of God…there are only 
books in the plural because the original text has been lost", p. 164. Consequently, our relationship 
to God's forgotten or missing text(s) need to be recovered (followed, reread, rewritten) through acts 
of interpretation that brings what is hidden and/or absent back "into play" so as to renew the "mystical 
concept of tradition as an ever delayed event of revelation" pp.173. and 183 respectively. 
1249
 Stack, George and DiMaria, Mary. "Emerson and Postmodernism" in Tharaud, Barry (ed.) 
Emerson for the Twenty-first Century: Global Perspectives (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 
2010). According to DiMaria and Stack, "in Derrida's interpretation of language and language use, 
we can discern a form of linguistic idealism: a reduction of language to a complex interrelationship 
of signs in an open-ended process that is divorced from concrete actuality and denuded of any 
naturalistic, empirical references…In Derrida's theoretical domain there is no exit from the labyrinth 
of language leading to the actual world in which we live and act", p. 424. See also Mander, William 
Idealistic Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) which counters – or supplements – such a 
philosophically naïve concept of idealism and/or of our being-in-the-world. As Mander notes, 
idealism is the thesis that "the being of the world can never be separated from the conceptualization 
of it", and linguistic idealism – a related thesis widely attributed "to Derrida" (amongst others) is the 
"notion that any world in which we live can only be understood as a function of our linguistic practices. 
If there can be no access to reality – no thought of reality – except through a language which we 
fashion ourselves, the world itself becomes a linguistic creation", pp. 8 and 9 respectively.  
1250
 Plank, William. The Quantum Nietzsche: The Will to Power and the Nature of Dissipative 
Systems (Lincoln: IUniverse, 1998). According to Plank, "deconstruction is, in fact, another name for 
perspectivism" , and Derrida merely develops Nietzsche's views on "interpretation and textual 
commentary", in other contexts, p.471. Perspectivism is idealism taken further, and (following 
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interpretations, Derrida directs us towards one guiding question. Specifically, Derrida's thinking 
is rationally motivated by the general question: what is meaning to say? Furthermore, Derrida 
attempts to justify his answers via the meaningfulness of the very language in question. While 
it is true that Derrida throws ‘truth’ and ‘method’ into question, there is no getting around the 
problem of the truth-value of deconstruction's own 'methodology' at any given time and/or place. 
We must similarly attempt to do justice to those 'beings' caught moving across contexts of 
interpretation. The circle of understanding remains a directive insofar as Derrida continually 
questions the legal status of the circle's movements via the problem of justification – i.e., to what 
extent may the law of the circle be thought justified? If we are to do justice to Derrida's 
questioning, we must also determine its legal standing within the circle in question. We are 
therefore ‘legally’ obliged to situate his way-making movements within the context of their 
occurrence, and direct ourselves back towards the question of the relation between thought and 
language. By questioning meaningful thought in action, we shall be able to determine the ways 
in thought and language form a complex whole. The problematic of the performative will be 
brought forth insofar as it raises the question of meaningful context and its relationship to the 
determination (enabling, questioning) of truth. The circle of understanding, then, remains the 
                                                
Nietzsche) claims that all ideations (meaningful conceptions of objects) arise within given 
perspectives. In other words, there is no objective reality or matters of fact – there are merely 
competing points of view (or interpretations) of objects thus conceived. Nietzsche's point of view 
was anticipated in Plato's Protagoras and Theaetetus insofar as the dialogues interrogate the 
relativistic notion that man is "the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and 
the non-existence of the things that are not." (Theaetetus 152a). See, also, Diethe, Carol Historical 
Dictionary of Nietzscheanism (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2014). Diethe argues that "following 
Nietzsche, Derrida criticized traditional hermeneutics that purports to reveal "the truth," preferring to 
accentuate perspectivism", p.119. Consequently, deconstruction may be viewed as ''Neo- 
Nietzscheanism and the new Nietzsche", p.261. 
1251
 Vandevelde, Pol. "Derrida's Intentional Skepticism: A Husserlian Response"  Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 36. No. 2, 1995. Vandevelde questions Derrida's "attack on 
the very notion of intentionality", and its relationship to the possibility (intelligibility, truthfulness) of 
related knowledge claims. Specifically, Derrida is considered a skeptic about intentional states 
(rational beliefs and desires) because of Derrida's "attempt to undermine two notions crucial for 
intentionality: the possibility to repeat a meaning in its self identity, which guarantees the stability 
and availability of intentional states, and the possibility for subjects to be present to their intentional 
states, which guarantees the link between consciousness and its object. The first notion concerns 
the possibility for ideality, and the second concerns the possibility for a subject to have access to an 
ideality", p.160.    
1252
 Rorty, Richard. "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in Essays on Heidegger and Others 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). While Rorty asks this question, he does not answer 
it in the affirmative. Nonetheless, he raises the question to acknowledge and contest interpretations 
sympathetic to such a view. Rorty therefore provides a useful survey of thinkers who have interpreted 
Derrida as a transcendental philosopher, including Christopher Norris, Jonathan Culler and 
Rodolphe Gasche.  Note that we have just observed that Norris has also interpreted Derrida as a 
relativist, and there remains the problem of reconciling such interpretations. Specifically, Norris 
argues elsewhere that Derrida "is broaching something like a Kantian transcendental deduction, an 
argument to demonstrate (perversely enough) that a priori notions of logical truth are a priori ruled 
out of court by rigorous reflection on the powers and limits of textual critique", Norris, Christopher, 
Derrida (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p.183. 
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context of our inquiry, and directs us to raise two related questions: to what extent does the 
circle make deconstruction possible and/or in what ways can it do justice – be truthful – to it? 




  and Habermas
1255
  
call a performative contradiction. Searle and Vanderveken provide a preliminary 
characterization when arguing that a linguistic act appears to be "self-defeating if its conditions 
of success cannot possibly obtain"
1256 and "since a set of illocutionary acts is consistent if it is 
performable, no self-defeating illocutionary act is consistent." 1257 Derrida is certainly aware that 
he stands accused of being "never far from lying…and (giving) false evidence...(or) perjury 
within the statement."
1258
 Truth be told, it is performatively contradictory to contest "the 
possibility of truth"
1259
 when it is the presupposition of truth that makes such contesting possible, 
"beginning with your so-called questions."
1260
 The immediate question, then, is whether the 
"reproach of performative contradiction"
1261
 directed towards Derrida's questioning is an 
"unanswerable strategy"
1262
 or the very condition of its possibility. 
                                                
1253
 Hintikka, Jaakko. "Cogito Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?" The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
71, No. 1, 1962, p.11. While this concept is typically attributed to Habermas (who originally 
appropriated it from Apel), Hintikka anticipated both philosophers by examining the way Descartes 
must perform the cogito in order for it to be (thought) consistent. Hintikka introduces the term 
"existential inconsistency", and argues "the inconsistency (absurdity) of an existentially inconsistent 
statement can in a sense be said to be of performatory (performative) character. It depends on an 
act or ‘performance,’ namely on a certain person’s act of uttering a sentence (or of otherwise making 
a statement); it does not depend solely on the means used for the purpose, that is on the sentence 
which is being uttered. The sentence is perfectly correct as a sentence, but the attempt of a certain 
man to utter it assertively is curiously pointless": it doesn't prove anything other than it is self 
defeating to make such assertions, p.12.  
1254
 Apel, Karl- Otto. "The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in Light of a Transcendental 
Pragmatics of Language" in Baynes, Kenneth, Bohman, James and McCarthy, Thomas (eds.) After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation (London: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 275. Apel uses the term 
performative self-contradiction. 
1255
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification" in 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen, (Cambridge: MIT, 1990), p. 80. 
1256
 Searle, John and Vanderveken, Daniel. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.151. 
1257
 ibid. Although the explicit term performative contradiction is usually attributed to German 
philosophers like Apel and Habermas, it has its origins in the Anglo-American philosophy of Austin 
and Searle. It is also important to stress that all these philosophers differ from each other in 
significant ways, and so, the theory laden term performative contradiction is by no means self-
validating or without conflicting interpretations.  
1258
 Derrida, Jacques. Monolingualism of the Other: or, The Prosthesis of Origin trans. Patrick 








 ibid. We've understated Derrida's ridicule here – he goes so far as to say that the "weapon" 
typically used against him by "certain German or Anglo-American theorists" is "puerile" and 
"childish." Consequently, any attempt to move the so-called "French philosopher" from "the 
department of rhetoric and literature" back into the "department of sophistry" is equally ridiculous 
(beyond reason and/or a joke), pp.3-5. 
 165 
Problematic of the Performative 
 
In the following, we critically evaluate the rational status of Derrida's approach to language. We 
do this in three related parts. In the first part, we provide a brief overview of the concept of the 
performativity of language, and trace the corresponding notion of performative contradiction 
back to the philosophical discourse of antiquity. In the second part, we turn to Derrida's 
conception of truth in order to move back towards the performative contradiction of Derrida's 
questioning. In the final part, we locate Derrida's performative contradiction within the 
linguisticality of understanding, and move back towards a conception of language as a universal 
horizon directing such contradictory way-making movements.   
 
The notion of a performative can be explicitly traced back to Wittgenstein's treatment of 
language games.
1263
 Specifically, where the whole of language is said to consist of the "actions 
in which it is woven."
1264
 Wittgenstein goes on to provide examples of the "multiplicity of 
language games"
1265
 and these actions include: asking questions, giving orders, telling jokes, 
stating facts, etc.
1266
 Wittgenstein's therapeutic approach purports to be able to treat (carefully 
act toward or deal with) language via the notion of distinct constitutive rules identifying and 
distinguishing them as actions. Wittgenstein's actions invariably gave rise to more systematic 
approaches across philosophical investigations
1267
 and conflicting interpretations regarding the 
rational status of the activities in question continue to multiply indefinitely.
1268
 As Searle notes, 
                                                
1263
 Harris, Daniel, and Unnsteinson, Elmar. "Wittgenstein’s Influence on Austin’s Philosophy of 
Language", British Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol.26, No.2, 2018, pp.371-395. 
Wittgenstein’s influence on Austin’s approach to language almost goes without saying. As Harris 
and Unnsteinson recently observe, however, the issue of Wittgenstein’s influence is simply taken as 
given and typically occurs without argument or question - and (ironically) is something that Austin 
and his many followers have frequently taken issue with. Harris and Unnsteinson, then, raise the 
question of Wittgenstein’s influence on Austin, and arguably provide a needless argument.  
1264
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), No.7, p.5. 
1265
 ibid, No. 23, p.11 
1266
 ibid. Wittgenstein provides a list of at least 19 language games, and the implication is that his 
examples could be multiplied indefinitely. 
1267
 We have already encountered Wittgenstein's concept of language game via Gadamer. As we 
shall see, it recurs in both Habermas and Lyotard in very distinct ways, and Derrida indirectly 
references Wittgenstein's investigations via Austin (who introduces the concepts of constative and 
performative into Anglo- American and European philosophy). Searle, in turn, uses Austin's inquiry 
into ordinary language as a springboard for speech act theory. Searle and Derrida famously came 
into conflict over their interpretation of Austin – while Habermas and Apel turn back towards 
Wittgenstein (amongst other philosophers) to reorient Searle's theory of speech acts. 
1268
 Biletzki, Andrei. (Over) Interpreting Wittgenstein (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2003). Biletzki's overview goes so far as to claim that Wittgenstein has been over interpreted and 
attempts to reclaim a more truthful approach via a narrative with a distinct moral or truth-value. While 
her attempt to turn the many interpreters into distinct heroes and villains is highly questionable (to 
say the least), it remains a remarkable overview of Wittgenstein's place in both Anglo-American and 
European philosophy. 
 166 
the overarching goal is to make the performativity of language an integral "part of the general 
theory of rationality."
1269
 Distinct linguistic actions would therefore become subject to the same 
rational standards of coherence and consistency. Drozdowicz reminds us, however, that making 
a ruling about the rationality of our standards (rulings) has always been the question of reason, 
and so, general theories of rationality remain predicated upon the contradiction of an 
unanswerable strategy (inability to determine the rationality of their own rules).
1270
 Witness 
Austin's famed distinction between the constative and the performative. While Austin's inquiry 
is an attempt to determine the rationality of actions woven into language, the strands begin to 
unravel as he pulls on the threads of his own argument. The proposed "antithesis"
1271
 between 
words making true or false statements about the world (constative) and words bringing about 
meaningful changes in that world (performative) "will scarcely survive"
1272
 rational scrutiny and 
invariably "breaks down…in its original form."
1273
 Although Austin goes so far as to make the 
statement that "stating is performing an act"
1274
, the question is whether it is possible to restate 
Austin's distinction without circularity and/or in a non-contradictory (truth evaluative) way.
1275
 
Austin is certainly aware of the problem of the rational status of the performativity of language 
– he anticipates the concept of performative contradiction by observing that "We cannot say the 
cat is on the mat, but I do not believe it is"
1276
 or "I promise but do not intend."
1277
 Such actions 
are inconsistent with the corresponding relations of presuppositions and similarly direct 
themselves towards a "self-stultifying procedure."
1278
  The question of the rational status of 
                                                
1269
 Searle, John. "An Interview" Versus No. 26-27, 1980, p.23. It is not insignificant that Searle 
generally uses an analysis of promising in Speech Acts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1969) to illustrate the rationality of communicative acts. Such an analysis "should carry over into 
other types of illocutionary acts", p.64 and so deliver on the promise of being part of a greater whole 
– the general theory of rationality. 
1270
 Drozdowicz, Zbigniew. Standards of Philosophical Rationality: Traditions and Modern Times 
(Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2013), pp.8-9. Drozdowicz provides a historical overview of philosophical 
attempts to provide a general theory of rationality, beginning with Plato and culminating in Popper. 
1271
 Austin, J. L. "Performative-Constative" in Searle, John (ed.) The Philosophy of Language 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1972), p.20.  
1272
 Austin, J. L. "Performative Utterances", in J. L. Austin: Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1970), p.251. 
1273
 Ibid, p.247. 
1274
 Austin, J. L. How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)., p.139 
1275
 Searle's speech act theory, Apel's transcendental pragmatics and Habermas's theory of 
communicative action all attempt to privilege the performative via the question of the rationality of 
the constative (or truth evaluative language) in different ways. 
1276




 ibid, p.51. Austin prefers to talk about the lack of 'happiness' (or harmony) of performatives when 
making such statements, and goes on to speak about infelicities, which is "the doctrine of the things 
that can be and go wrong on occasion”, p.166. An infelicitous use of language is said to occur when 
a performative fails to function as the action described and Austin divides infelicities into two kinds: 
misfires and abuses. A misfire is said to occur when "the procedure which we purport to invoke is 
disallowed or is botched", p.167 and an abuse is an "act professed but hollow", p.168. 
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performatives, then, seeks to determine the "direction of fit"
1279
 between word and world. If we 
are to determine the performative status of linguistic acts, we would therefore need to question 
whether – or in what way – what is being stated corresponds to the presuppositions and/or 
consequences of meaningful actions. It is important to stress that performatives are actions, 
which, in the very act of stating, bring about the corresponding actions. Statements perform 
meaningful acts – not describe the performance of actions. Take, for example, the statement "I 
think." The very stating constitutes thinking here – the statement does not describe an 
antecedent state of thinking, but actively brings the thought into being (action) and/or (possible) 
question. The constative and the performative thereby remain directed to each other: it remains 
possible to meaningful ask whether it is true or false that "I think" and it is performatively 
contradictory (meaningless) to say "I do not think." Consequently, it is important to provisionally 
distinguish between the truth evaluative content of statements and the act of meaningfully 
stating – if only to determine how the meaningful enters into the occurrence of the truthful. Austin 
introduces the notion of illocutionary act1280 to clarify the performative status of statements, and 
such actions are generally divided into two parts – illocutionary point (the reason for acting), 
and illocutionary force (the intended effects of the action taken).1281 Underlying the performative 
status of statements, then, are those pragmatic considerations that include the context and 
purpose of the performance, their presuppositions, structure, implications and effects. 
Nonetheless, Austin recognized that the problem of the "criterion"
1282
 threatened to stultify the 
rationality of his overall procedure. It was "not possible to lay down even a list of all possible 
criteria"
1283
 to distinguish statements from actions – the one and same language "can be used 
on different occasions, in both ways, performative and constative"
1284
 and each may "infect"
1285
 
the other's condition of possibility.  
 
The implicit concept of performative contradiction, however, can be traced back to paradoxes 
originally encountered in the philosophical discourse of antiquity. We continue to be taken 
aback, for example, by (variants of) the liar's paradox. Take the statement spoken by 
Epimenides the Cretan that "all Cretans are liars" or the written statement this sentence is 
false.1286  The paradox emerges via the contradiction between the meaning of these sentences 
                                                
1279
 Austin, J.L. "How to Talk: Some Simple Ways" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,  Vol. 53, 
No.1, 1953, p.234. 
1280
 Austin, J.L. How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p.98. 
1281
 Searle, John and Vanderveken, Daniel. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.13-15, pp.20-21.  
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 Etchemendy, John and Barwise, Jon. The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p.3. 
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and their corresponding truth-values. Is the Cretan telling the truth about lying? Alternatively, 
can this false sentence also be true? Given the contradiction between what is meaningfully said 
or done and the truth or falsity of the statements in question, our linguistic actions appear to 
come apart at the seams in which they remain interwoven. If we are to presuppose that the 
spoken statement – or written sentence – is stating the truth when claiming to be lying and/or 
false, then the speaker is also lying when speaking truthfully and/or writing a falsehood. We 
therefore can only presuppose that they are lying when claiming to be a liar, and so they also 
appear to be speaking the truth when lying and/or writing false sentences. The liar's paradox 
contradicts what Aristotle called the law of thought1287 – namely, the principle of non–
contradiction. This "most certain of all principles"
1288
 presupposes that "contradictory statements 
cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time"
1289
 , and is thought to be so 
fundamental that it stabilizes the very ground on which reason moves. Specifically, it is 
"impossible to hold the same thing to be and not to be."
1290
 'To be or not to be' (say) a 'circle'  or 
a 'hammer' can never really be a question if we are to be rational. The only difficulty, however, 
is that the principle of non-contradiction appears to be contradictory: it can be neither true or 
false via Aristotle's conception of reason as rational inference. As Cohen notes, if all knowledge 
is supposed to be demonstrative through reason, it should follow that "a knowable first principle 
would have to be a demonstrable first principle."
1291
 There appears to be a contradiction 
"between the knowability and the unprovability"
1292
 of this first principle, and the law of rational 
thought can't even establish its own jurisdiction. Aristotle’s performative contradiction moves 
rational thought in two different directions simultaneously. On the one hand, a denial of the 
principle appears to be self-defeating (or false) because it presupposes the truth of the law to 
contradict (falsify) it. In order to say that the law of non-contradiction is false we must therefore 
also be saying that it is true – and so performing the contradiction in question. On the other 
hand, the law's unknowability and/or inability to rationally derive its own 'truth' or 'falsity' calls 
into question the very legal standing of the straightforward opposition between 'true' and 'false'. 
The question of its rational status remains inherently circular insofar as we cannot presuppose 
and/or say whether it is true or false without contradicting ourselves – i.e., performing a 
contradiction in terms (or thought). To either affirm or deny the principle of non-contradiction is 
therefore contradictory in that it presupposes the possibility of contradictory truth-values in the 
                                                
1287




 Tzamalikos, Panayiotis. "Aristotle As Critic" in Anaxagoras, Origen, and Neoplatonism: The 
Legacy of Anaxagoras to Classical and Late Antiquity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), p.230. 
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 Cohen, Mark. "Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction" Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 




first place. While Aristotle concedes the circular nature of rationally grounding the principle of 
non-contradiction, he argues that contradicting it leads to an abyss anyway.
1293
 The law of non-
contradiction must be inarguably or unquestionably true: built into the very activity of reason, 
the rationality of reason enacts itself via the (performative) contradiction in question.  
 
Derrida On The Abysmal Truth 
 
We now turn to the role "truth's abyss as non-truth"
1294
 plays within Derrida's questioning of "the 
game of the world." 
1295
 Specifically, how can Derrida approach the question of 'truth' when the 
'truth' remains abysmal (so deep as to be unfathomable and/or awful). Given that Derrida's 
interpretations problematize a hierarchical logic of opposition – oppositional values that include 
'truth' and 'falsity', 'speech' and 'writing', 'good' and 'bad', etc. – can deconstruction be 
understood to be either 'true' or 'false'?  Supposing that it is possible to assign a truth-value to 
Derrida's questioning – i.e., argue that it is 'true' as opposed to 'false' – in what way is it 
meaningful to privilege one value over the other within the context of his own questioning? While 
Derrida's questioning insists on the reversal and displacement of the logic in question, the 
question remains: why should we value (positively determine the relative worth or position) of 
such a contradictory movement anyway? Derrida's own interpretation(s) of the delimitation of 
being acknowledges that there is no escaping the circle in question.  
 
We have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single 
deconstructive proposition which has already slipped into the form, the logic and the implicit postulations 
of precisely what it seeks to contest. 1296 
 
Nonetheless, Derrida claims a privileged position for deconstructive questioning: the circle's 
own movements always already displace the logic "inscribed in a system"
1297
 in which truth can 
only act as a "function and a locus."
1298
  
                                                
1293
 1008b. Aristotle argues that while the attempt to prove this most certain of all principles results 
in an infinite regress, we need to think it’s true regardless – otherwise we'd fall into wells or off cliffs 
(our beliefs require firm ground otherwise it would not be possible to orient our beliefs and actions).  
1294
 Derrida, Jacques. Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles trans. Barbara Harlow, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), p.119. 
1295
 Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkin Press, 
1997), p.50. 
1296
 Derrida, Jacques. "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences" in Writing and Difference 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.280. 
1297
 Derrida, Jacques. "Ellipsis" in Writing and Difference trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), pp.295-6. 
1298
 Ibid. Specifically, "once the circle turns…(and)…is repeated, its identification with itself gathers 
an imperceptible difference which permits us efficaciously, rigorously, that is, discretely to exit from 
closure…The return, at this point, does not retake possession of something. It does not 
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Derrida’s questioning, however, continues to be in question. The problem of its truth-value – of 
whether it’s possible to ground deconstructive thought in logic and/or determine whether the 
related possibility of it being true is more valuable (has rational force or validity) over the 
possibility of it being false – remains questionable in re-turn. Wood expresses the performative 
contradiction in the following way.  
 
The paradox lies in the status of what he writes, and the fact that he too is writing. If what Derrida writes 
is true, it would follow that we ought to read him and other philosophers in a new way. But if what he 
says is true in the ordinary philosophical sense of truth (which he describes as metaphysical) then in fact 
it cannot be true, for there would then be at least one species of writing – namely Derrida's type of 
metaphilosophy – which has escaped the universal condition of writing of never just being able to deliver 
the truth for consumption. But if we drop the claim to truth, then how and why should we believe Derrida's 
claims about language as writing? Derrida has the problem of saying what he means without meaning 
what he says.1299  
 
The paradox returns, us, then, to the question of the performativity of deconstructive 
questioning. If what Derrida says is true about the delimitation of being, Derrida can never do 
justice to – meaningfully express, justify and/or differentiate – his questioning. The paradoxical 
nature of Derrida’s questioning gives rise to what Priest calls the "inexpressibility of 
differance."
1300
 Priest recognizes that such a paradox is rationally forced on Derrida "by the 
internal logic of his position."
1301
 Derrida, of course, tries to be consistent about expressing 
(performing) an inexpressible: although "such a move might be thought absurd or foolish, it is 
at least heroic."
1302
 While it is arguably impossible to have a stable or determinate sense of 
differance as the determination of meaning, Derrida nonetheless purports to be able to "express 
(refer to) something…that cannot be expressed."
1303
 Given that differance's rational status 
remains questionable, the question is whether we should ever have "reason to believe"
1304
 that 
such a seemingly arbitrary or nonsensical word can ever "latch onto anything non-linguistic."
1305
 
Since differance can never refer to anything that can be meaningfully determined – direct 
                                                
reappropriate the origin…the inscription of the origin is doubtless its Being-as-writing, but it is also 
its Being as inscribed in a system in which it is only a function and a locus." 
1299
 Wood, David. "Derrida and the Paradoxes of Reflection" in Lawlor, Len and Direk, Zeynep (eds.) 
Derrida: Critical Assessments (London: Routledge, 2002), p.184. 
1300
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thought towards "an appropriate notion of truth to which assertion must answer"
1306
  – Derrida 





Derrida argues that truth emerges from – and falls back into – the abyss insofar as it can be 
neither found nor founded.
1308
 Derrida purports to question the "limits of truth"
1309
, and typically 
asks whether it is possible to "cross the borders of truth"
1310
 and allow reason to "be carried 
beyond the limits of truth."
1311
 Derrida attempts to navigate his way around the circle  "since 
truth would be a certain relation to what terminates or determines it."
1312
 It is worth reminding 
ourselves, then, of the widespread misconception that Derrida argues against (the concepts of) 
reason and truth. Madison alleges, for example, that "deconstruction undermines traditional 
notions of truth, reality and knowledge, leaving nothing in their place (nihilism)" 
1313
 and so 
rejects "truth altogether."
1314
  Searle claims that Derrida "turns the world upside down"
1315
 when 
turning reason on its head. Derrida does "not attempt to prove or refute, to establish or confirm, 
and he is certainly not seeking the truth"
1316
 – deconstruction is simply an arbitrary "game 
anyone can play."
1317
 Blackburn's guide to the "crisis of truth"
1318
 and the "limits of rational 
thought"
1319
 concurs that the "great postmodernist slogan made famous by Derrida ('there is 
nothing outside the text)"
1320
 rejects truth and reference in favour of linguistic idealism and/or 
limitless interpretive license.
1321
 Many other philosophers, of course, publicly complained that 






 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p.168. To reiterate: The "disappearance of truth as presence, the withdrawal 
of the present origin of presence, is the condition of all (manifestation of) truth. Nontruth is the truth. 
Nonpresence is presence. Differance, the disappearance of any originary presence, is at once the 
condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth." 
1309







 ibid. pp.1-2. 
1313
 Madison Brent Gary. The Politics of Postmodernity: Essays in Applied Hermeneutics (Dordrecht: 




 Searle, John. "The World Turned Upside Down" New York Review of Books, Volume 30, Number 






 Blackburn, Simon. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Penguin, 2006), p. xvi.  
1319
 ibid, p.79. 
1320
 ibid, p.170. 
1321
 Blackburn, Simon, "Derrida May Deserve Some Credit for Trying, But Less for Succeeding" 
Times Higher Education, Nov 12, 2004.  https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/derrida-
may-deserve-some-credit-for-trying-but-less-for-succeeding/192340.article. Although Blackburn 
was not present at Cambridge during the infamous 'affair', he makes a point of saying (after Derrida's 
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Derrida's writing merely tested the limits of their patience and made a mockery of an entire 
profession. This so-called philosopher was allegedly guilty of malpractice because of Derrida's 





 however, that he has been taken out of context. Specifically, "the value of truth 
(and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only 
reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts."
1324
 Further, "the phrase which for 
some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction ("there is 
nothing outside the text") means nothing else: there is nothing outside context."
1325
 It is  "totally 
false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference"
1326
 since "differance is a 
reference and vice versa."
1327
 Context itself refers to "all possible referents"
1328 – all (con)texts 
– and "thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization."
1329
 To reiterate Derrida's position 
in no uncertain terms: to claim that there is nothing outside the text "does not mean that all 
referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book… but it does mean that every referent, 
all reality, has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this ‘real’ except 
in an interpretive experience."
1330
 It "goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a 
discourse against truth…we must have truth."
1331
 Derrida's "commitment to the truth"
1332
 
involves an "engagement which calls for performative gestures…if only to question the 
possibility of the truth."
1333
 Consequently, Derrida's questioning remains "motivated by (a) 
                                                
death) that Derrida was "a poor candidate for an honorary doctorate" and "I relished the irony that 
he was eventually given this degree in the same ceremony as Geoffrey Elton, praised for his 
passionate defence of truth and objectivity in history." Blackburn also goes on to mock the 'bogey' 
of deconstruction, the prevalence of Derrida acolytes in the humanities and their attempt to "elbow 
out decent philosophy." Blackburn counters that "I think it is a political and social achievement to 
enable truth to prevail. The first thing to establish is that it is possible, the second to establish that it 
matters, and there is more to be done after that. I don't think we should honour an attitude that 
makes those tasks harder than they already are." 
1322
 Smith, Barry, et al. "Letter to London Times" Cambridge Review, 113, October 1992, pp.138-
139. 
1323
 Derrida, Jacques. "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion" in Limited INC (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.137. Specifically, "Once again (and this probably makes a 
thousand times I have had to repeat this, but when will it finally be heard, and why this resistance?)"  
1324
 ibid, p.146. 
1325
 ibid, p.136. 
1326
 Kearney, Richard. Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), p.172. 
1327
 Derrida, Jacques. "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion" in Limited INC (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.137. 
1328
 ibid, p.148. 
1329




 Derrida, Jacques. Positions trans.  Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p.105. 
1332
 Derrida, Jacques. "Derrida's Response to Moore" in Glendinning, Simon (ed.) Arguing With 




concern with reason and truth" but "there comes a moment at which this interrogation of truth is 




While it is true that Derrida is attempting to speak in a "straightforward way as possible,"
1335
 the 
reality is that he is merely navigating the circle of his own understanding and referring to 
something other than the 'truth' in question.1336 Reality conceived as differential trace is primarily 
intelligible within the context of the very inquiries (presuppositions, delimitations) in question 
and remains at odds with ontological realism. As Chalmers notes, ontological realism is 
committed to the belief that "every paradigmatic ontological existence assertion has an objective 
and determinate truth-value"
1337
 and the question of an assertion's truth-values "does not 
depend on a context of assessment."
1338
 The enabling presupposition is that there exists an 
independent or "objective structure to reality"
1339
 transcending and/or acting upon our 
statements  – and it is that context-transcending realm that we refer to (perform, enact) via 
competing truth-claims. The performative contradiction is that Derrida's disavowal of 'theoretical 
conceptions' or 'rational procedures' displaces the role of the historicity of understanding in his 
own questioning. Derrida's conception of reality remains theory laden in that such observations 
would not be possible (thought meaningful or true) without being ontologically committed to 
(say) Heidegger's concept of ontological difference or Saussure's notion of language as 
differential elements in other (or different) ways.1340 Derrida's interpretations of interpretations 
                                                
1334
 Flotzer, Florian. Conversations with French Philosophers (New Jersey: Humanities Press 
International, 1995), p.72-73. 
1335
 Derrida, Jacques. "Afterword: Toward An Ethic of Discussion" in Limited INC (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.113. 
1336
 Derrida, Jacques. "Differance" in Margins of Philosophy trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1982), p.6. Derrida claims to somehow know, for example, that differance "exceeds 
the order of truth at a certain precise point, but without dissimulating itself as something, as a 
mysterious being."
1336
  Further, differance "makes possible the presentation of the being-present, it 
is never presented as such. It is never offered to the present. Or to anyone."
1336
   
1337
 Chalmers, David, "Ontological Anti-Realism" in Chalmers, David, Manley, David and 
Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on The Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: 




 Sider, Theodore, "Ontological Realism" in Chalmers, David, Manley, David and Wasserman, 
Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on The Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2009), p.16. 
1340
 We don't mean to imply that Derrida conceals the nature or extent of his philosophical debt to 
Heidegger or Saussure – such an implication couldn’t be further from the truth and can be readily 
observed via the 'parasitic' nature of his questioning. We are simply acknowledging the role that 
Heidegger's concept of ontological difference and Saussure's notion of language as differential 
elements actively play in his conception of reality and truth. Nonetheless, part of the reason Derrida 
is frequently misunderstood is that competing philosophers are speaking at cross-purposes or 
moving within distinct intentional horizons (philosophical traditions or contexts). We don't mean to 
reproduce the artificial divide between 'continental' and 'analytic' philosophy, and have already 
indicated that the infamous Cambridge Affair was inaugurated by a philosopher working within the 
so-called 'continental tradition'. The truth, of course, is that philosophically distinct traditions or 
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thereby run counter to the belief in a reality ontologically prior to – or has ontological priority 
over –  our conception of it. Specifically, truth is interpreted as a 'value' that is context-bound or 
determined – where the beings in question are merely inscribed as a function or locus. Derrida 
understands truth as a transitive relation in that truth-values remain in a constant state of 
transition or flux – truth is valuable insofar as it remains on the way and variable. In order to 
make sense of Derrida's insistence that 'truth' is never contested or destroyed – but merely 
reinscribed in different ways across contexts of interpretation – we must therefore first 
understand that Derrida is playing a different language game. Derrida calls this activity, of 
course, the game of the world, and it plays by its own rules. We are therefore obliged to ask: if 
the value of truth remains necessary and questionable, how can it be reinscribed and/or 
recontextualized? Put another way: what can be the value of truth if it is always in transit or 
moving through meaningful contexts that cannot be decided (known, approached) either way? 
 
It is frequently argued that it is self-defeating to argue with Derrida, and such a claim recurs 
across increasingly stratified and expanding contexts of interpretation.
1341
 The reason 
consistently given for the truth of such a proposition is that Derrida does not appear to play the 
language game of argumentation. A sympathetic interpreter will readily concede that Derrida's 
"philosophical style is often deeply idiosyncratic and challenges formal or argumentative norms 
in a way that can…seem almost wilfully perverse."
1342
 Searle is unsympathetic and complains 
that Derrida refuses to enter into rational discussions in which reasons can be transparently 
advanced for or against the truth of a given proposition.
1343
 Gadamer professes to admire 
                                                
movements invariably turn into highly stratified contexts of interpretation – i.e., like-minded 
philosophers may argue amongst themselves or splinter off into different schools of thought. We are 
merely acknowledging that frequent misunderstandings appear to stem from a lack of familiarity with 
(or regard for) Derrida's historical relationship to phenomenology, structuralism, hermeneutics et al.  
1341
 Compare, for example, Foucault's and Rorty's view of Derrida's interpretations of interpretations. 
We have already encountered Foucault's characterization (via Searle) that there was no point in 
arguing with someone who plays the game of obscurantisme terroriste (terrorism of obscurantism). 
Since Derrida's writings are allegedly so obscure, it was not possible to understand him – and that 
Derrida would use the interpreter's inability to correctly follow him against them. Rorty claims in 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), however, that 
Derrida ultimately turns into a "playful" writer toying with words, arguments and/or readers – and it 
would be pointless to take him (or ourselves) seriously. Derrida is said to be primarily interested in 
ironically "undercutting" philosophical pretensions – such as the public search for truth through 
argumentation and theorization – via private jokes and fantasies. The latter Derrida prefers to play 
with his readers, "giving free rein to trains of associations they produce. There is no moral to these 
fantasies, nor any public (pedagogic or political) use to be made of them", p.125.   
1342
 Bradley, Arthur. Derrida's Of Grammatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p.3. 
Bradley is more than just a sympathetic interpreter here – he is attempting to translate Derrida's 
unconventional use of language into more conventional linguistic forms. 
1343
 Searle, John. "The World Turned Upside Down" New York Review of Books, Volume 30, Number 
16, 1983. Searle claims that Derrida's willfully perverse and obscure language reveals him to be "the 




 with language, but proposes that Derrida's clever word play "in 
truth"
1345
 turns into "nothing more"
1346
 than a mere "game."
1347
 Habermas argues that since 
Derrida collapses the genre distinction between philosophy (argumentation) and literature 
(fiction), he reduces standards of rationality to rhetorical devices (styles of writing).
1348
 
Bennington counters, however, that Derrida "has an argument with argument"
1349
 and seeks to 
undermine rational presentations through more persuasive language. Specifically, Derrida 
argues against philosophical arguments by attempting to move them away from their "traditional 
telos"
1350
 (the search for truth via logic) back into the world of make-believe (the pretending to 




Displacing the Space of Reasons – truth, justice and the deconstructive way. 
 
We may now turn to the way Derrida argues with Plato. We do this to determine the limits of 
Derrida's 'argument with argument', and correspondingly, approach the 'border of truth in 
relation to what terminates or determines it'. Derrida purports to be able to enact the question 
of being through the being of questioning, and Derrida does this by calling (back) into question 
the legal justification of the circle in which meaningful beings move in. The concept of justice – 
insofar as 'justice' can be meaningfully conceived – occupies a privileged space in Derrida's 
question in that it plays an active role in questioning the legality of any given decision. As Derrida 
claims, "justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve the law,"
1352
 
                                                
1344
 Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Dialogues in Capri" in Derrida, Jacques and Vattimo, Gianni (eds.) 
Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p.210. While Gadamer is speaking about Derrida's 
approach to a specific word here – the context or "point of reference" is Derrida's reinscription of 
Kant's chora – Gadamer doubts that an "etymology can tell us something important if what is 
uncovered does not somehow continue to speak to us in the living language of today. This is the 
case even if the etymology is correct, whatever correct may mean in this context", p. 201. 
1345






 Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp.185-187. 
1349
 Bennington, Geoffrey. "For The Sake Of Argument (Up to a Point)" in Glendinning, Simon (ed.) 




 Waghorn, Nicholas. Nothingness and the Meaning of Life: Philosophical Approaches to Ultimate 
Meaning Through Nothing and Reflexivity (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p.125. Waghorn therefore 
writes that when we "turn to a critical assessment of Derrida…we cannot really argue with Derrida 
since all writers "cannot fundamentally disagree with" the presupposition of differance in the first 
place. If we "want to argue with Derrida, we need to argue with him without arguing with him…if 
differance is the structure of thought, we need to argue without argument." 
1352
 Derrida, Jacques. "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida"  Caputo, 
John (ed.) Deconstruction in a Nutshell (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), p.16. 
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and so directs rational thought to judge "the true truth or the truth of the truth."
1353
 In passing 
through an undecidable, any claim to truth will nonetheless circle back upon itself by being 
called back into being and/or question. Specifically, it is where the law remains on trial and 
"deconstructs from the inside every assurance of presence, and thus every criteriology that 
would assure us of the justice of the decision, in truth the very event of a decision."
1354
 
Irrespective of the question or approach, it is ‘justice’ which gives deconstruction its directives  
– and deconstruction can only remain true to itself – "be consistent with itself"1355 – when 
questioning the legality of the decision making such questioning possible (truthful, just). While 
the lasting element of Derrida’s thinking might be the way, it is the question of justice that 
continually gives him pause for thought (i.e., a reason for being) and renewed impetus. The 
concepts of law and justice presuppose one another, and it is the question of their 
presuppositional relation that remains open to questioning. The question, then, is: how can such 
a directive give Derrida’s questioning pause for thought and forward movement? 
 
Derrida’s enactments occur by way of adopting contextual strategies thought relevant or 
adequate to such questioning. A given context permits him to question (select) the beings in 
question by directing his thinking towards what cannot be thought (selected) there. By placing 
thought at its limit, Derrida attempts to direct questioning towards an opening at the borders of 
'truth'. Derrida's treatment of the pharmakon of writing thereby does two different things 
simultaneously. Specifically, Derrida claims to move with Plato's text in order to motion against 
it. Derrida's general argument is that it is always already arguing with itself, and such a back 
and forth movement occurs in relation to other (con)texts: the conceptual order invariably 
overturns and displaces its reasoning by being called (back) into question. Derrida claims to be 
able to navigate the "encirclement of the circle"
1356
 by directing rational thought towards the 
"abyss"
1357
 in which it is found moving: it is the circle itself which gives way to the loss of reason's 
rational ground. Derrida claims to be able to find – establish, reach, – such a falling away on 
the basis of the text's own 'secret argumentations' and 'hidden mediations' (points of reference 
and/or departures).
1358
 Derrida plays the game of argumentation to show language's hidden 
                                                
1353
 Derrida, Jacques. The Truth in Painting trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1987), p.5. While it's true that Derrida is talking about the possibility of 
'truth in painting' here, he remains concerned about what 'truth' might mean or be. 
1354
 Derrida, Jacques. "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority" in Cornell, Drucilla, 
Rosenfeld, Michel and Carlson, David (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), pp.25-26. 
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 Derrida, Jacques. The Truth in Painting trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, (Chicago: 




 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p.63. Derrida claims to be able to perceive that "a text is not a text unless it 
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rules and movements, and he proposes to be able to do this via the ways Plato's text secretly 
argues with the contexts in question. Derrida thereby seeks to displace what Sellars calls the 
logical space of reasons,
1359
 and he does this by questioning the very logic of the "spacing and 
articulation"
1360
 of reason. According to Derrida's reasoning, "language is no longer a region, it 
has won the totality of space, its reign…has a sort of extension without limits."
1361
 Derrida 
argues, of course, that Plato's 'text' attempts to delimit – create and/or occupy – a conceptual 
space through a logic of exclusion. Derrida questions the way Plato does this, and claims that 
Plato's thought remains predicated upon a hierarchy of axiological oppositions that overturns 
itself via a "symptomatic form of the return of the repressed."
1362
 Derrida argues with Plato, then, 
by purporting to follow Plato's lead and sharing in the metaphysical presuppositions of Plato's 
arguments. Derrida's goal is not so much to present reasons for or against the truth of Plato's 
position – it is to show the way Plato's text 'argues with' itself and cannot stand its ground.
1363
  
Derrida approaches the logic of Plato's statements regarding the pharmakon of writing in a 
performative sense, and so presupposes that its stated truth-value is already inscribed in a 
questionable way. As Derrida observes, metaphor "becomes the logic of contamination and the 
                                                
hides…the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text remains, moreover, forever 
imperceptible. Its law and its rules are not, however, harboured in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is 
simply that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be called a 
perception." 
1359
 Sellars, Wilfrid. In the Space of Reasons (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). We have 
already encountered Sellars's oft-cited term during the course of our Gadamer discussion, and 
(unlike Sellars) located this space within the historicity of understanding. As the editor's introduction 
notes, Sellars writing typically occurs in a "diagnostic way" (as opposed to "knockdown arguments") 
p.xi and his celebrated term is an attempt to naturally "represent the world so as to make possible 
objective knowledge of it", p. x. Although In the Space of Reasons does not contain the text that 
specifically uses this phrase (its naturalistic conception of the conceptual order is to be explicitly 
found in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind), the concept has nonetheless taken on a life of its 
own and recurs in other philosophical contexts. See, for example, Brandom, Richard, "Knowledge 
and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. LV, No.4, 1995, pp. 895-906, McDowell, John, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), p.82 and Church, Jennifer, "Locating the Space of Reasons" Teorema, Vol. 25, No.1, 
2006, pp. 85-96. The question, then, is how to best conceive (locate) the conceptual 'space of 
reasons' – and naturally this remains an open question or contested terrain. 
1360
 Derrida, Jacques. "The Double Session" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p.222. 
1361
 Derrida, Jacques. Taste of the Secret (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.80. 
1362
 Derrida, Jacques. "Freud and the Scene of Writing" in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,) p.197. Although Derrida might be talking about Freud here, 
he argues that the "metaphor of writing which haunts European discourse, and the systematic 
contradictions of the ontotheological exclusion of the trace. The repression of the writing as the 
repression of that which threatens presence and the mastering of absence."  
1363
 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p.135. According to Derrida, Plato attempts to justify a meaningful distinction 
between "knowledge as memory and non-knowledge rememoration, between two forms and two 
moments of repetition: a repetition of truth (alitheia) which presents and exposes the eidos; and a 
repetition of death and oblivion (lithe) which veils and skews because it does not present the eidos 




 and it is remarkable that "the so-called living discourse should 
suddenly be described by a "metaphor" borrowed from the order of the very thing one is trying 
to exclude from it, the order of its simulacrum."
1365
 Derrida deconstructs the space of reasons 
by relocating the logic in question, and in so doing, purports to be able to partially share secret 
knowledge. If the logical space of reasons turns on the way reason can be rationally motivated 
and/or justified – stands in relation to other reasons – Derrida argues that Plato's logic displaces 
the very conceptual terrain on which reason moves and directs itself. Consequently, Plato’s text 
cannot rise to a "state of knowing"
1366
 since it cannot put itself in the position of "justifying and 
being able to justify."
1367
 Plato cannot locate the prescribed space because his own reasoning 
displaces the way rational thought is supposed to respond to the given reasons and applications 
coherently. Plato's "pharmaceutical operation"
1368
 cannot even be at home in its "most secure 
dwelling place"
1369
 since the prescribed standard of correctness also turns out to be 
inappropriate and/or true in unintended ways. The context acts on Plato's text any-way – by 
opening up the "pharmaceutical enclosure"
1370
 to unintended operations and effects. 
Consequently, Derrida displaces the space of reasons by calling "into question…the presence 
of the fulfilled and realized intentionality adequate to itself and its contents."
1371
 Given that the 
meaning of the pharmakon can never be a "being that is somewhere present"
1372
 it is said to 
constitute the medium in which opposites are opposed and differentiated. The pharmakon 
"would be a substance… if we didn't have eventually to come to recognize it as antisubstance 
itself: that which resists any philosopheme, indefinitely exceeding its bounds as nonidentity, 
nonessence, nonsubstance; granting philosophy by that very fact the inexhaustible adversity of 
what funds it and the infinite absence of what founds it." 
1373
 The pharmakon acts according to 
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 Sellars, Wilfrid. Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), p.76. We are obviously quoting Sellars completely out of context here. 
1367
 ibid. While Sellars is acutely aware that his own account of the structure of knowledge threatens 
to be circular – where does this space begin and when does it ever end? – Sellars attempt to 
circumvent the problem of circularity by deciding the question of its logical outcome. Specifically, 
"above all, the picture" – i.e., of knowledge resting on a firm foundation – is "misleading because of 
its static character. One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on 
a tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge 
with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither will do. For empirical knowledge, like its 
sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-
correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once", p. 78. 
1368
 ibid, p.128. 
1369




 Derrida, Jacques. Limited INC (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.64.  
1372
 Derrida, Jacques. "Differance" in Margins of Philosophy trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1982), p.11. 
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 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1981), p. 70. 
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its own logic, and so actively deconstructs any given constituted (conceived, conceivable) space 
of reasons. Derrida does not claim to deconstruct Plato's reasoning personally – the 'text' 
deconstructs for its own reasons. Such activity neither begins or ends in human understanding, 
and should not be understood as an "act or operation."
1374
 Derrida interprets deconstruction as 
an "event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness or organisation of a (thinking) 
subject."
1375
 Deconstruction might find "its privileged site – or rather, its privileged instability"
1376
 
within an act of questioning, but Derrida argues as if deconstruction happens of its own accord 
across contexts of interpretation and/or irrespective of whether texts are consciously called into 
question. Such an approach obviously begs the questions: how can Derrida know that such 
events occur without thinking about them? That is to say, in what ways does deconstruction 
defer to thought in order to determine its hidden mediations and secret argumentations? 
Correspondingly: what is the ontological status of a ‘context’, and how can it relate to Derrida’s 
contextual strategies? Although Derrida maintains that his interpretations are conditioned by 
what happens within a context, he also talks of an "unconditionality"
1377
 determining "the 
injunction that prescribes deconstruction"
1378
 across contexts. If there is no-thing outside of 
context, we are always already faced with the question of "the determination of context in 
general"
1379
 and an injunction that seemingly "transcends this or that determination of a given 
context."
1380
 Deconstruction therefore finds itself immediately caught between a context that 
transcends thought and one that enables thinking across contexts. It is here that the concept of 
justice arguably makes its entry and/or calls deconstruction into being. Derrida argues, of 
course, that deconstruction is justice, and he has joined (rationally forced) these two terms 
together via the official sanctioning of an is. Nonetheless, Derrida has also maintained that the 
search for truth, justice and the deconstructive way consists in "putting out of joint the authority 
of the is."
1381
  The possibility of justice is thought to exist "outside or beyond"
1382
 the legality of 
any decision and deconstruction remains legally bound to "maintain an interrogation of the 
origins, ground and limits of our conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding 
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 Derrida, Jacques. "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority" in Cornell, Drucilla, 
Rosenfeld, Michel and Carlson, David (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), p.21. 
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 Derrida, Jacques. "The Time Is Out Of Joint" in Haverkamp, Anselm (ed.) Deconstruction is/in 
America, (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p.25 
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 So although Derrida’s strategies might be context or question specific, the possibility 
of ‘justice’ transcends the determination of any contextualization or questioning – i.e., horizon 
of thought adequate to its own thinking (selection, specification, etc.). 
 
Note the way Derrida attempts to do justice to the meaning of the pharmakon via its (possible) 
effects, and such rational treatment – remedying of a condition – renders truth a mere effect of 
the texts in question. The concept of truth – insofar as it can be meaningful conceived and/or 
questioned – becomes inscribed within contexts of interpretation, and these inscriptions can 
only be meaningfully determined as an effect of questionable (unstable, undecidable) contexts. 
The question of whether we can ever do justice to the reality of the pharmakon becomes 
similarly context-bound and/or determined. Consequently, the way concepts stand in relation to 
objects occurs via a referral (transfer to another rational space for further diagnosis and/or 
possible remedy). Undecidable contexts are displaced insofar as they can be directed (sent) for 
further treatment or decision-making in equally questionable contexts of interpretation. The state 
of being true or false depends on the question of the relative effectiveness – "performative 
force"
1384
 – of the very statements in question. Derrida's questioning attempts to do justice to 
the problem of the determination of context by ensuring that the constative remains directed by 
the "overflowing of the performative."
1385
  By going with the flow, Derrida's questioning ascribes 
‘agency’ to language and asks us to move along with its prevailing forces and/or over-rulings. 
Derrida argues as if language’s movements are self-directed or motivated: it is ‘secretive’ or 
‘argumentative’ and acts on its own behalf by enforcing (following) its own rules. The only way 
we can do justice to the beings in question is accepting the reality of the situation and follow 
language's own reasons for disagreeing with the conceptual ordering. While Derrida obviously 
does not intend this to be taken literally, there is no escaping the fact that Derrida's descriptions 
call on intentionalist language. He appeals towards a higher court (the legal authority of 
language) that is allegedly more justified in deciding on an original decision's reasoning: 
language therefore acts as if it were making its own pronouncements and/or remains intent on 
overturning our own decisions. Derrida's concept of the meaning of the pharmakon displaces 
the logical space of reasons by placing the burden of proof on the pharmakon's possible effects 
in an open-ended linguistic chain. The performative contradiction is that Derrida's questioning 
can only be thus effective (possible, meaningful) by fulfilling (presenting, realizing) an 
intentionality adequate to itself and/or its contents. Specifically, Derrida can only call into 
question the presence of a fulfilled and realized intentionality by actively calling on the very 
intentionality of the beings in question. Although Derrida argues that deconstruction does not 
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originate in or tend towards intentionality, the very 'object' of Derrida's inquiry involves an act – 
selection, specification – of conceptual content to determine the truth-value of given intentional 
horizons. In 'arguing with' Plato's 'text', Derrida's intentions thereby take historical precedence 
– precede it in time, override it by way of order of importance or value – and so makes the text 
perform according to his own statements. Derrida must first ascribe substantive meaning to the 
pharmakon of writing – an essential 'non-being' in the truthful form of the 'hidden law of 
composition' or 'rules of the (language) game that displace the game' – to argue that the 
pharmakon is an antisubstance. Derrida thereby downplays the identity of the meaning of 
pharmaceutical substance – a drug's essential attributes or durable 'being' existing prior to its 
possible effects and conceptually distinct from other substances or meaningful beings such as 
(say) circles or hammers – in favour of a causal chain only as strong as its weakest link. By 
conceiving the logical space of reasons in such a selective way, Derrida is able to rule over 
(regulate) the pharmakon's unstable movements – and the pharmakon effectively becomes a 
controlled substance in his own writing. Harland calls such a conceptual sleight of hand the 
"movement of categorical implication"
1386
, and it follows the logic of "creating an abstracting 
space or vacuum around a word."
1387
 By dividing concepts into opposing – but porous – 
boundaries, an "indeterminate whole…separates out into distinct categories"
1388
 that may 
nonetheless pour – overflow – through each conceivable part. Derrida performs a given context 
by transforming the contexts of its possible meaning and/or occurrences. The pharmakon's 
identity of opposites is therefore made possible via the way Derrida identifies and moves 
between the categories of thought in question.  
 
To bring the opposition to the fore, the substances have to be displaced in favour of their effects—and 
especially the principles of their effects. From ‘drug which has a remedial effect’, we need to draw off 
the general principle of Remedy or remedial-ness; from ‘drug which has a poisonous effect’, we need to 
draw off the general principle of poisonousness. But of course poisonousness is no longer limited to drugs 
as such—snakes too can be said to possess poisonousness. And the principle of remedial-ness can be 
invoked for massage, healing words, anything which has a remedial effect. As with any binary-
polarization technique, we have made a shift of abstraction and arrived at a new conceptual level. And 
on this level, it is very easy to see how poisonousness and remedial-ness can be opposed as restoration 
versus destruction…1389  
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The logical space of reasons, then, turns into a self-serving abstraction within Derrida’s 
argument – the rationality of reason becomes an empty and/or open space that can be 
determined (emptied and/or filled) at will. Such an abstraction is only possible via the very 
relationship brought into (a) question – i.e., via the way thought and language are directed back 
towards each other and encircle one another. Derrida argues as if language directs or selects 
itself and moves with thought in a downward spiral. However, it appears to be Derrida's 
questioning which is directing and/or selecting language here – and so allowing language to 
spiral out of control. To think thus abstractly involves the act of moving away from specific beings 
so as to move towards a specified conceptual terrain upon which to build and/or direct an 
inquiry. Such a fulfilled or realized intentionality enables Derrida to displace the space of 
reasons via the quasi-transcendental claims that non-truth is the truth and differance is 
simultaneously the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth. The 
question of deconstruction's condition of possibility thereby occurs via the conditional that its 
questioning remains – in a contradictory way – truth functional or connected. Specifically, 
Derrida’s contextual strategies proceed from the presupposition that relations of presupposition 
remain truth directed insofar as they invariably deconstruct their relation to each other. Given 
this ‘conditional’,  Derrida can "think truth-claims through to the limit and thereby determine their 





 of spelling has a spellbinding effect for this very reason – differance can be made to 
cast a spell over the contexts in question and bind them in different ways. Like any trick, 
deconstruction is performed to manipulate 'objects' through misdirection – and it does this by 
directing our attention away from the presupposed meaning of given terms to possible effects 
overturning relations of presupposition actively brought into (a) question. Note that we are not 
suggesting that Derrida is being deceitful or fraudulent – merely, that 'misdirection' (selective 
and/or directed thinking) is the way of all argumentation.
1392
 Derrida's deconstruction of Plato's 
text shares in this very presupposition: it stage manages (controls) the meaning of pharmakon 
by re-enacting its performance – and this would not be possible (meaningful, truthful) without 
                                                
1390
 Norris, Christopher. Spinoza and the Origins of Modern Critical Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1991), p.179. 
1391
 Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkin Press, 
1997), pp.23-24. 
1392
 Fearn, Nicholas. Zeno and the Tortoise: How To Think Like A Philosopher  (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2009), p.1. As Fearn's historical overview indicates, "tricks of the trade" have remained 
important to philosophy from Zeno onwards. Specifically, "thinking rationally involves deployment of 
the right philosophical tool" to (re)shape objects. Fearn calls philosophical tools (such as Plato's 
dialectic, Occam's Razor, Hume's Fork or Wittgenstein's language games) tricks because of the way 
concepts and arguments direct us to – and away from – the objects in question. Fearn’s text begins 
with an example on reductive arguments found in contemporary biology – where experiences of love 
are reduced to the pharmakon of a drug. Fearn traces reductionism back to Thales (who alleged 
that every being could be reduced to the substance of water). 
 183 
managing an audience's attention for the intended effect. Derrida's 'argument with argument' 
can only be effective if Derrida actively calls on a willing suspension of disbelief for the 
moment,1393 or where reason implicates itself via the categories and directedness of thought.1394 
A willingness to suspend disbelief, then, is made possible through the beliefs in question. 
Derrida's sleight of hand actively controls our perception of reality via the question of our being-
there. Derrida's so-called deconstruction must also borrow from the rational order what it is 
effectively trying to exclude from it, the order of 'what there is' (relevant ontological 
commitments).  Derrida's argument, then, acts in three related ways a) it claims to show us 
Plato's sleight of hand regarding the pharmakon of writing by restaging its actions, b) it is 
directed towards showing us that the concept of 'truth' is a mere illusion or effect and c) Derrida's 
use of misdirection appears to be an integral part of the performance – the very effectiveness 
of his argument relies on an avowed trick of writing. Derrida willingly shows his sleight of hand 
by weaving a (con)text together to pull differance out of an apparently empty or bottomless hat. 
Unlike Plato, however, Derrida's hand waving seems intent on proving that the rationality of 
reason is all part of the 'act'. 
 
Nonetheless, Derrida's performance doesn't prevent him from acting "as if"
1395
 his own 
statements were objectively true. Derrida concedes that he must "let himself be caught out in a 
performative contradiction"
1396
, and such a condition of possibility – acting 'as if' what he argues 
were also truth-bearing or directed – presupposes the way reality appears to be.  Derrida argues 
as if his statements about the pharmakon agree with an objective reality that is linguistically 
accessible and/or expressible. Derrida's argument contradictorily purports to state what the truth 
really is, and these statements play by the rules of language game of argumentation when 
presupposing that others can similarly rise to a state of knowing. Derrida's argument aims to 
produce true belief about an unknown or inconceivable truth and so acts to remedy (correct, 
treat) false beliefs about the way language meaningfully (truthfully, correctly) represents the 
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world. In this way, Derrida presupposes that false beliefs can also meaningfully express the 
'truth' if they can be made to 'cohere with' – refer to, represent – the reality in question. Equally 
questionable is the way Derrida treats the pharmakon of writing in order to remedy reason's 
diagnosed 'condition'. Specifically, Derrida's displacement of the space of reasons acts as a 
reminder that a remedy might be worse than the disease. Derrida's rational treatment potentially 
poses a greater risk to the rationality of reason via unintended (or unforeseen) consequences. 
Witness the way deconstruction has arguably "infected" 
1397
 the "academic bloodstream"
1398
 as 
the prescribed antidote to reason. The question is whether Derrida can do anything other than 
"move thought in the direction of a new organization of a theoretical space,"
1399
 and this directive 
moves thought in two different directions simultaneously. On the one hand, deconstruction 
potentially exposes reason to effects that become (in theory or principle) more adverse and/or 
untreatable. On the other hand, Derrida's treatment threatens to render his own questioning 
meaningless – as having no direction or purpose other than affirming a mode of questioning 
that can be neither directed nor purposeful. While Derrida's questioning might privilege the 
unstable relation between the constative and performative, Derrida inadvertently privileges the 
theoretical over the practical by moving reason towards a mode of speculation that appeals to 
questionable concepts like ‘deconstruction’ ‘differance’, ‘pharmakon’, 'justice' etc.
1400
 The reality 
is whether differance should leave thought indifferent or can rationally motivate it one way rather 
than another. Although Derrida's linguistic performance argues against the rational belief that 
truth-bearing statements correspond to the world in a coherent and/or consistent way, he 
nonetheless argues as if his own statements align with (latch onto, move with) a context-
independent reality: they remain true irrespective of the context and/or independent of what 
anyone says or does. Derrida, however, also wants to turn the conditional of an 'as if' on its 
head, and argues "as if it were possible to overcome a performative contradiction…or rule out 
the possibility"
1401
 of arguing with arguments. The condition of possibility is simultaneously a 
condition of impossibility, and the as if is no longer (or just) about a belief in the possibility of 
rational argument: it also refers to a lack of belief in the possibility (meaningfulness, truthfulness) 
of rational argumentation. In other words, Derrida wants to argue that he is being performatively 
consistent when being performatively contradictory. The logical space of reasons is therefore 
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displaced into an outer – or beyond – space when calling on a quasi-transcendental reason for 
justifying his overall approach across contexts "in the first place."
1402
 Specifically, "the modality 
of quasi (or the logical-rhetorical fiction of as if)"1403 directs reason towards the "question of 
problematic context and strategies, presumably: one must in this place relentlessly reaffirm 
questions of the transcendental type; and in that place, almost simultaneously, also ask 
questions about the history and the limits of what is called transcendental."
1404
 Such a mode of 
being obviously begs the question: how is it possible to make sense of an approach that 
simultaneously displaces its own questioning? 
 
Let's being by noting that the performative status of all (quasi) transcendental arguments remain 
in question. Bennington notes, for example, that the concept of the "quasi-transcendental"
1405
 
merely "names a problem to be further explored."
1406
 The concern goes beyond the rational 
status of a 'logical-rhetorical fiction'.  As Stern notes, the problem is whether it is rational for 
reason to rise above the space of reasons in the first place. Given that such movements occur 
within the language game of argumentation – and the spaces can only be situated and 
navigated accordingly – attempting to move beyond the boundary of given experiences may 
disqualify them from the outset.
1407
 Consequently, the "status of transcendental arguments…is 
curiously hard to fix unequivocally"
1408
: philosophers cannot decide what they could possibly be 
and/or mean anyway. Nonetheless, Sacks provides us with a way to move towards Derrida. 
Specifically, Derrida’s approach may be thought quasi-transcendental insofar as it directed 
towards "presuppositional relations"
1409
 and "conceptual structures"
1410
 as "a necessary 
condition"
1411
 of questioning, and "the question is, what is meant by ‘a necessary condition’, 
‘presupposition’"
1412
 or conceptual structure. Although Derrida's movements within the circle of 
                                                
1402






 Bennington, Geoffrey. "The Frontier: Between Kant and Hegel" in Kunneman, Harry and de 
Vries, Hent (eds.) Enlightenments: Encounters Between Critical Theory and Contemporary French 




 Stern, Robert. Transcendental Arguments: Answering the Question of Justification (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.1. Stern notes that other philosophers have called transcendental 
arguments cheating and merely go beyond the pale: "they have all the advantages of theft over 
honest toil."  
1408
 Stern, Robert. (ed.) Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p.1  
1409
 Sacks, Mark. "The Nature of Transcendental Arguments" International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2006, p.440. Note that Sacks is not talking about Derrida here – he is simply 








understanding may be all over the place at a given time, presuppositional relations necessarily 
"hold between concepts or propositional contents."
1413
 The aim is to move beyond the relations 
in question so as to determine their "conditions of possibility."
1414
 Such questioning can only 
take place within the context of "the situated thought"
1415
, and so must be "internally structured 
or articulated."
1416
 The beings in question, then, can only be understood with respect to the way 
they are "phenomenologically embedded and directed."
1417
 The problem, however, is whether 
such a 'questionable' approach can escape the circle directing its movements. If transcendental 
arguments attempt to make the presupposition of the world simultaneously possible 
(conceivable) and questionable (answerable), they are rationally motivated by the "problem of 
the inference to reality…and the problem of the universality of that inference."
1418
 Within the 
context of Derrida's arguments about differance and/or the pharmakon, the problem is the 
rational status of inferences to a (linguistic) reality. Specifically, does Derrida substitute an 
intensional context (the terrain of meaning) for an extensional context (the realm of truth), and 
so treat one context as if it were another? Philosophers traditionally distinguish between the 
content (or intension) of statements and the referent (or extension) of statements. The 
distinction attempts to capture a reality about language – namely, that while our expressions 
might consistently refer to 'objects' with objective meaning (their extensions or reference), there 
are nonetheless different ways in which they can express said meaning (their intensions or 
sense). A context might therefore be thought to be extensional if it can preserve truth-values 
across coextensive linguistic contexts and/or expressions, and intensional if the meaning 
changes between expressions and/or nonsynchronous linguistic contexts.1419 Take the following 
two statements, where it is possible to change the meaningful content without an alteration in 
truth-values. 
 
Cary Grant acted in The Awful Truth1420 
Archibald Leach acted in The Awful Truth 
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Although the sense (intensions) of these linguistic contexts is distinct, they nonetheless share 
the same referent (extension) in that 'Cary Grant' and 'Archibald Leach' refer to the same person 
in different ways. Given that Cary Grant is the stage name for Archibald Leach, we have co-
referring terms that refer to the same extensional context in meaningfully distinct ways. The 
extension of these statements transcends the context of their occurrence insofar as they remain 
identical (or the contexts can be identified with each other despite the substitution of coextensive 
expressions). The distinction typically occurs via an acknowledgment of the difference between 
propositional knowledge (descriptive and/or objective states of affairs with given truth-values) 
and propositional attitudes (subjective mental states that can be either true or false, or simply 
misdirected). The philosophical problem, of course, is that both contexts presuppose the active 
role of intentionality and the difficulty is sustaining a distinction entangled within the specification 
(determination, constituting) of meaningful contexts and/or objects in the first place. Given this 
distinction, does deconstructive questioning require the mutable – alterable, unstable, transient 
– to contradictorily play (perform) the transcendental role of an invariant or immutable across 
the contexts in question? Witness the way Derrida invokes deconstruction's truth-value "from 
its inscription in chain of possible substitutions"
1421
 when determining the ontological status of 
"a context."
1422
 Contexts may be similarly identified and/or differentiated if they remain 
coextensive or co-referring via the way "differance lends itself to a certain number of non-
synonymous substitutions, according to the necessity of the context"
1423
 in question.  On the 
one hand, deconstruction cannot refer to anything other than an example of itself to justify the 
being of its own questions. On the other hand, it situates its approach by appealing to quasi-
transcendental 'non-beings' such as differance and the pharmakon to exemplify such 
questioning. While deconstruction may be neither here or there, it nonetheless acts as a kind 
(or mode) of being – a neither here or there that is also acting everywhere.  
 
Differance Writ Large – the truth-value of exemplarity.   
 
Perhaps what is most relevant for our purposes is the way deconstruction accords itself an 
"exemplary value"
1424
 as it throws into question the nature of exemplarity (the relation between 
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part and whole). The value of exemplarity is made possible through the presuppositional 
relations moving between 'text' and 'context' in that these constituent parts form a complex 
whole and exemplify one another. The example of Plato's text deconstructing itself is therefore 
thought exemplary because it exemplifies – calls forth, makes possible – the question of justice 
within the law of the circle, and such examples may be multiplied and/or repeated indefinitely 
throughout the circle calling itself (back) into question in distinct ways. Derrida's contextual 
strategies thereby repeatedly attempt to bring forth the question of the difference between being 
and non-being by giving expression to the inexpressible by way of the circle incapable of 
meaningfully directing itself (finding its bearings or true standing). The reason Derrida moves 
between qualitatively distinct strategies across contexts is that he has already decided that 
exemplarity is of particular value and/or universal significance. Derrida chooses to privilege 
and/or occupy conceptually distinct spaces of reasons – sites of instability – by way of the 
rationale that written and/or interpreted texts exemplify the logic of linguistic contexts as a whole. 
Particular texts are treated as a universal model or pattern of the contexts in question in that 
they exemplify the way they may be underwritten and/or overwritten by them. As Harvey notes, 
the truth-value of exemplarity is made particularly valuable (truthful) because it presupposes 
"the law as conceived through the functioning of exemplarity"
1425
 via case studies, and so "marks 
the place"
1426
 to be displaced in Derrida's questioning. Witness the way the pharmakon of writing 
functions within Derrida's writing – it is differance "writ large"1427 and so arguably gives 
expression to the structure of iteration as the condition of the possibility of writing (i.e., actively 
participates in the trans/formation of the beings in question). While the legality of Plato's decision 
might have been questioned and deferred indefinitely, Derrida must nonetheless also be able 
to direct and justify his own decision-making at any given time. Derrida’s contextual strategies 
remain "one of many"
1428
 potentially available to him, and deconstructive questioning purports 
to move with the production of differance by being "the one and the many at the same time."1429 
The performative contradiction, of course, is that deconstruction must therefore 'act' as if it were 
being objectively true – by pretending to be what it cannot be: a neither here or there that 
somehow encompasses (or remains on the horizon of) every being.  
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As the condition of possibility and of impossibility, with all the paradoxes to which this last formula 
constrains us, iterability retains the value of generality that covers the totality of what one can call 
experience or the relation to something in general…and is presupposed by all intentionality.1430 
 
Given the "necessary presupposition"
1431
 of the ways in which an intentional object can be 
specified, the "question of the specificity of intentionality… without limit remains open"
1432
 to 
questioning. Specifically, how can deconstructive thought decide its "relation to the object in 
general, of transcendence and of appearing as such"1433? By his own admission, Derrida’s 
thought is intentionally related to beings in that it not only presupposes the intentionality of 
thought, intentionality is what makes such presuppositions the condition of possibility and 
impossibility.  If Derrida cannot question the delimitation of beings without presupposing the 
intentionality of the beings in question, he remains implicated in the ways thought directs itself 
(back) to language. The performative contradiction is that Derrida attempts to direct rational 
thought away from its sense of direction or directedness, and so attempts to transcend any 
given intentional horizon or movement. As Willard notes, however, Derrida's questioning cannot 
escape the ways in which "an act of consciousness and/or language selects its object."1434 We 
must therefore continue to question the way/s in which language and thought "relate to each 
other and to the objects present to or through them…the grounds (in the act and object) of the 
intentional grasp of the object by the act. "
1435
   
 
We have observed that Derrida consistently attempts to displace the space of reasons by calling 
their spacing – logic, ordering – back into (a) question. We have also observed that Derrida is 
caught in a performative contradiction: he must act as if his own reasoning was internally 
consistent or coherent in that the displacement in question progresses logically in some way. 
Derrida's linguistic acts therefore express the contradictory belief that deconstruction's reason 
for being-there were ever-present insofar as its own 'events' may be placed over and above any 
given logical space of reasons. By attempting to move beyond what can be rationally thought, 
deconstruction questions the very possibility of locating a space in which to decide a meaningful 
course of action. Deconstruction thereby displaces the way reason can meaningfully direct or 
orient itself, and so attempts to do the impossible – by giving expression to the inexpressible 
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(inconceivable, undecidable). Derrida attempts to get rational thought caught within the overflow 
of the performative, and so directs reason towards the organization of potentially new and/or 
endlessly deferred spaces of reasons. By moving thought towards what cannot be thought or 
done, deconstruction questions the way the space of reasons can be approached or directed.  
Nonetheless, Derrida’s questioning remains capable of being thought and understood as a 
question – relative to the context and/or beings in question. Derrida’s ways of thinking continue 
to be dependent upon (conditioned by, related to) the way a context can be meaningfully 
understood and/or questioned. To presuppose that the performativity of language may be 
rationally questioned and/or recontextualized is to provisionally acknowledge that it can be 
called (back) into question and answer for itself in a performatively consistent manner. The 




Gadamer paves the way by providing a logically prior ontological standard that can meaningfully 
call the relation between language and thought (back) into being and/or question. Specifically, 
"the coming into language of meaning points to a universal ontological structure, namely to the 
basic nature of everything toward which understanding can be directed. Being that can be 
understood is language."1437 That is to say, what can be meaningfully brought forth or held back 
within the circle of understanding occurs via the way language performs thought. Furthermore, 
it is our being-there that makes it possible to find our way around language, and the way back 
determines the way forward. The question, however, is determining the 'where' of the 'there' – 
locating our being-there – within the horizon of Derrida's own questioning. Specifically, how can 
we find our place within Derrida's questioning when Derrida remains ontologically committed to 
displacing any given 'being' or 'there'? Following Gadamer, it is the historicity of Derrida's 
position that constitutes the initial directedness of his ability to bring relations of presupposition 
into conflict and/or question and so determines the way interpreters can open ourselves up to 
the world in question. We are therefore now required to give expression to "the reality and 
efficacy of history within understanding itself"
1438
 insofar as the true object of Derrida's 
questioning contradictorily involves displacing a "unity of effect"
1439
 or the historical "texture of 
reciprocal effects."
1440
 We have been arguing that Derrida’s questioning exemplifies the 
relationship between part and whole, and remains caught in the movements between them. 
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Although Derrida argues against the possibility of integrating a complex whole, locating the 
contradiction between the constative and performative remains integral to deconstruction's way-
making movements. We witnessed the way, for example, Derrida attempts to throw into 
question what he called the dialectical inversion of the pharmakon. Derrida argued that the 
pharmakon can never be the sum of its distinct or moving parts, and so cannot be a prescription 
for the performativity of language. Given the way the pharmakon divides and multiplies the 
beings in question – disseminates itself – it actively moves against the possibility of integration 
and stability. The process of differentiation merely "affirms the always already divided 
generation of meaning"
1441
, and would ideally replace "hermeneutic"
1442
 conceptions of what it 
is to mean or be by way of language's hidden mediations and secret argumentations. Although 
Derrida argues that there is no (prescribed) way for reason to be, he always manages to find a 
way to displace the space of reasons anyway. Derrida’s acts as if his questioning comes from 
outer space – i.e., receives its directives from outside the space of reasons. Nonetheless, 
Derrida is somehow able to direct his thought to a concept of dialectic that can be traced back 
to the history of thought – beginning (arguably)
1443
 with Plato and (allegedly)
1444
 culminating in 
the "Hegelian sublation"
1445
. Derrida conceives the dialectical version of the pharmakon as 
                                                
1441
 Derrida, Jacques. "Double Session" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: 
Continuum, 2004), p.272. 
1442
 Ibid, p.269. 
1443
 We say arguably because Plato’s account of dialectic is more sophisticated than Derrida 
concedes. Indeed, the Parmenides dialogue is arguably a precursor to deconstruction – it provides 
the most thoroughgoing dismantling of dialectic (by way of a consideration of the one and many) on 
record. 
1444
 Derrida’s concept of dialectic is surprisingly determinate and unambiguous, and has somehow 
bypassed more nuanced versions throughout effective history. There have been at least two more 
recent attempts to rethink the Platonic notion of dialectical reason. These include Gadamer’s 
concept of dialectic of question and answer and Adorno’s notion of negative dialectics. Gadamer 
and Adorno independently develop a conception of dialectic that stands in contradiction to that of 
reason as an operation of mastery – and they couldn’t be more diametrically opposed. While both 
remain indebted to Plato and Hegel in their own way, they nonetheless move in distinct or opposing 
directions to each other. On the one hand (Gadamer), we have a dialectical view of reason that 
continues to conceive truth as the whole. On the other hand, (Adorno), the whole is thought to be 
false. Whatever the (considerable) differences between Adorno and Gadamer, they agree on two 
things – the need to prioritize conceptions of the (historical) object, and thought’s inability to achieve 
an identity or unity with the objects thus conceived. Given such a problematic, the whole can never 
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history – it is to provisionally acknowledge Derrida’s own tendency to decide and totalise. The irony 
is that Derrida's concept of deconstruction brings him into close proximity with Adorno's conception 
of dialectic in Negative Dialectics trans. E. B. Ashton, (New York: Seabury Press, 1973). Specifically, 
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involving a performative contradiction, if “it is understood according to a noncircular linearity”
1446
 
that enacts a “teleological program, internalized and assimilated by the circle of its unfolding.”
1447
 
As Derrida consistently maintains, we need to understand the relation between part and whole 
"according to a relation that no speculative dialectic of the same and other, for the simple reason 
that such a dialectic always remains an operation of mastery."
1448
 Whatever the context or 
question, Derrida thereby attempts to move rational thought beyond a given intentional horizon, 
and uniformly acts as a reminder that reason can never completely grasp itself or the objects in 
question. Since the objects of thought can never be adequately determined, Derrida decides to 
place emphasis on the ineffectiveness of reason. The questions that need to be asked, 
however, are these: how is the general being of Derrida’s questioning itself effected, and in what 
ways may it generally be thought effective? We raise these questions in a general register 
because of the quasi-transcendental status of Derrida’s questioning. Derrida’s contextual 
strategies are intended to do more than place thought at its limit – the limit is supposed to 
determine the ways in which thought can never be adequately contextualized and displaces the 
determination of meaning across given intentional horizons. The performative overflow of 
meaning allegedly contextualizes a historical process that cannot be meaningfully 
contextualized. On the one hand, Platonism provides the horizon in which thought is 
conceptualized and delimited. On the other hand, the concepts of thought multiply and divide 
themselves across a range of horizons (delimitations). While Derrida resists the suggestion that 
there can be one overriding context, he nonetheless adopts a position that somehow displaces 
the way contexts meaningfully relate to each other. The performative contradiction is not just 
that Derrida’s thought requires distinct contexts of interpretation to flow through each other. The 
problem is the way history continually effects and/or contextualizes his actions – Derrida’s 
displacements require him to strategically select and position himself within a range of horizons 
that remain (potentially) available and/or related. Whilst Derrida acts as if contexts select and/or 
direct themselves, Derrida’s linguistic interactions highlight the problem of what to select and/or 
how to be directed. Despite the waywardness (randomness or arbitrariness) of meaning, 
Derrida does not randomly or arbitrarily select the horizon to move in. Nor does Derrida want to 
claim that deconstruction acts without rhyme or reason – the question of ‘justice’ keeps thought 
open to the possibility of alternate contexts or directives (reasons). Derrida’s own questioning 
is itself directed by the problem of giving expression to the beings in question and/or the 
delimitation of movements. Derrida’s interpretation of the differential movements of the 
pharmakon attempts to con/fuse horizons of meaning so as to give expression to what can be 
meaningfully said. Derrida selects a horizon in order to move towards the effects of history, and 
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was thereby able to question the ways thought orientates itself to given relations of 
presupposition. In order for Derrida perform this movement, however, he needed to defer to the 
very structure that the event of deconstruction continually throws into question. Specifically, 
displacing the space of reasons can only be thought effective if we can continue to re-turn to 
the very effectiveness of the reason in question. Following Gadamer, the performative status of 
reason can only be thus possible and/or questionable by way of a historically effected 
consciousness. The performative status of deconstruction coincides with Derrida’s own 
movements within a historically effected consciousness, and is therefore directed by an effective 
historical consciousness that – contradictorily – attempts to become conscious of (and direct) 
the effects of history. We will, however, need to displace the question of the effectivity of history 



























Chapter 4:  
Lyotard and the Conflicting Rules of Understanding.   
 
 
Aims and Objectives: The aim of this chapter is to move beyond Derrida’s conception of the 
circle of understanding. We venture this movement by turning towards Lyotard’s concept of 
language, and the ways he brings forth the circle in question.  While Lyotard occurs as a 
transitional figure here, he nonetheless places us at the intersection between related parts taken 
as a complex whole. Lyotard is relevant to us, then, because he enables movement between 
distinct ways of thinking and invariably directs us through Derrida and Habermas respectively. 
The problem of the criterion – and its relation to the question of being – occurs by way of the 
concepts of language games and phrase regimes. The difficulty is determining the rule for 
following rules when different semantic fields may conflict over their respective borders and 
conceptual terrains. Lyotard introduces the notion of (a) differend to question the way distinct 
rulings may come into being and/or conflict. Lyotard thereby proceeds from the following 
ontological standard: to be is to be ruled (out) or overruled in contexts of action. Given that 
Lyotard approaches this problematic in myriad ways, we shall need to orient ourselves. The 
following is thereby divided into two interdependent parts. In the first part, we provide an 
overview of Lyotard's approach to language, and argue that these parts form a complex whole. 
In the second part, we direct ourselves towards selective parts to make such a whole 
approachable.  
 
Understanding Lyotard : Ways Not Works 
 
We begin by acknowledging the problem of understanding Lyotard, and locate this problematic 
within the question of understanding itself. As Bickis observes, the "seemingly straightforward 
question"
1449
 of "how and where to begin…must attend to and grapple with"
1450
 the issue of 
orienting itself towards a philosopher who problematizes the very idea of directing the event of 
(an) understanding. Part of the problem is attempting to contextualize the movements of a 
thinker questioning the rational status of knowledge and contexts in the first place. Lyotard’s 
approach to contexts of interpretations is understood to be "tactical" and "always take into 
account the context in which it appears."
1451
 By his own account, Lyotard's published writings 
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 Lyotard, Francois-Jean and Thebaud, Loup-Jean. Just Gaming trans. Wlad Godzich, 
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p.54. 
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are merely "rough drafts"
1452
 that remain piecemeal
1453
: such partial measures become, in turn, 
open to interpretation and questioning since "one cannot enclose oneself in language; for that 
to occur it would have to be a closed totality."
1454 Lyotard approaches linguistic contexts through 
questions that actively resist integration, and the question is the way such a complex whole may 
be brought forth or held back. Lyotard's "discontinuous"
1455
 approach goes so far as to ask 
whether the con/text of his questions can ever add up to more than the sum of their parts.
1456
 
Lyotard provides a "critical philosophy"
1457
 insofar as a "crisis of criteria"
1458
 informs his inquiry 
into the limits of representation and "what is not presentable under the rules of knowledge."
1459
 
The "incommensurability of reality to concept"
1460
 and the "powerlessness of the faculty of 
presentation"
1461
 remain reference points in that the inconceivable – events such as the Final 
Solution and September 11 – move rational thought towards an "impenetrable abyss."
1462
 Each 
"one of these abysses, and others… liberate judgment (and) if they are to be felt, judgment must 
take place without a criterion and that this feeling in turn becomes a sign of history."
1463
 From 
the outset, Lyotard questioned philosophy's need for unity
1464
 and consistently argued that 
reason should remain divided against itself. Specifically, "the totalizing idea of reason"
1465
 is as 
self-refuting as it is terrifying since "there is no one reason, only reasons."1466 Given that the 
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"totality of relations… is at once a relation of complement and contrariety"
1467
 the "enemy is 
within thought itself."
1468
 Lyotard’s questioning therefore primarily occurs in the form of 
"observations, remarks, thoughts and notes…relative to an object"
1469
 of reflection. While the 
"linguistic turn"
1470
 might provide the philosophical "context"
1471
, the question is the way we can 
re-turn to traditional thought or practice. Lyotard’s turn to language is thereby given meaningful 
expression via disputes over the "sense of the referent."
1472
 Lyotard’s statements within 
language can only be accorded "strategic value in relation to the question(s) raised,"
1473
 and are 
oriented along a directional "semantic axis"
1474 subject to reversals in direction and/or strategic 
withdrawals. We must therefore similarly follow the "thought of dispersion"1475 that "shapes our 
context."
1476
 Given Lyotard’s "partial and tendentious"
1477
 approach to contexts of 
interpretations, the "periphery of thoughts…is immeasurable"
1478
 – they "never stop changing 
their location with one another"
1479
  and the question of their rational status "varies with the angle 
from which they are approached."
1480
 Lyotard argues that the true threat to "the work of 
thought"
1481
 is not that it remains partial (can only exist in part, might be entirely 'prejudicial'), 
but that such thinking "pretends to be complete"
1482
 and/or impartial. Lyotard repeatedly 
invokes
1483
 – and attempts to move beyond – Wittgenstein's concept of "language games"
1484
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to question the performative status of linguistic activities. If the "whole, consisting of language 
and the actions into which it is woven"
1485
 may be called a language game, the partiality of 
Lyotard's questioning acts as a corrective to Wittgenstein's own linguistic actions. Kant's 
conception of the sublime as "the immeasurability of nature and the insufficiency of our capacity 
to adopt a standard proportionate to"
1486
 it provides a critical turning point in that it returns us to 
Wittgenstein's concept of language games in a different way. Specifically, sublime feelings – 
the feeling of being overpowered by a "formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented 
in it"
1487
 – provides the most truthful way through language in that such boundless feelings act 
as "the transport that leads all thought (critical thought included) to its limits."
1488
  Consequently, 
Lyotard attempts to move around the "humanistic obstacle to the analysis"
1489
 of language 
games and the role it plays in understanding the immeasurable. Lyotard's goal is to invariably 
downplay or overturn the presupposition that "people make use of language"1490 or "play at 
it"
1491
. Lyotard argues that it is the other way around – it is language which plays with people by 
actively taking hold of them and moving them around. The question, then, is the way they can 
be thrown – or taken aback – by language's movements. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein's view of 
language as a "labyrinth of paths"
1492
 remains integral throughout and the problem is finding our 
way around a disorientating arrangement without losing our bearings. Lyotard follows 
Wittgenstein in different ways for two related reasons – to allow for the possibility of movement 
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between language's network of interconnecting "passages"
1493
 and to throw into question the 
legitimacy of conflicting moves resulting from the act of passing from one state (condition, 
territory) to another. Such reasoning directs Lyotard's approach insofar as "judgment's 
expeditions"
1494
 attempt to find their way through the "labyrinth"
1495
 in question. Lyotard doesn’t 
so much think in terms of a circular relation between thought and language as circular relations 
that legitimate and problematize (redirect, disperse) themselves within a complex whole. 
Lyotard's interpretations understand that "no exit"
1496
 can be "made from the circle"
1497
 in 
question or "can escape this "circulus" 
1498
 through questioning. The problem is finding our way 
around the circle "without presupposing"
1499
 the direction of language's own movements. The 
goal is to move around distinct contexts of interpretation in order to "paradoxically declare that 
their regimens or genres are incommensurable."
1500
 The relation between part and whole 
therefore remains as necessary as it is questionable. The question that Lyotard invariably finds 
himself returning to is: "if no guiding thread leads the way"
1501
 to language as a whole, how can 
thought "find its away amid the labyrinth of passages"
1502
 when "the passages are what 




Lyotard expands upon Wittgenstein's conception of language by way of the concepts of "phrase 
regimens"1504 and "heterogeneous genres of discourse"1505 to get around such a question. That 
is to say, where a given a phrase is "constituted according to a set of rules (its regimen)"
1506
, 
and the corresponding phrase regime presents a meaningful universe (possible world or "being-
there"
1507
) that remain open to each other and/or questioning. Lyotard approaches the rational 
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status of 'language' through the problem of interrogating the legitimacy of given rulings and/or 
inevitable links between phrases,1508 and so returns to the question of a linguistic field's self-
conception as a meaningful activity. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, Lyotard's rational treatments 
do not purport to "leave everything as it is"
1509
 or claim to take up "a position far outside in order 
to see things more objectively."
1510
 Lyotard's approach purports to be therapeutic – and 
efficacious – in that it seeks to remedy cultural practices immanently, or through the acts of 
questioning and interpretations actively brought into conflict. By taking up – or prescribing – 
positions within contexts of interpretation, Lyotard's rational treatments operate inside them and 
thereby attempt to transform the performative "status of knowledge."
1511
 The "predominance of 
the performativity criterion"
1512
, or the way the "performativity of the supposed social system is 
taken as a criterion of relevance"
1513
 is critically treated by Lyotard's linguistic actions.
1514
 
Lyotard calls into question the way "the objects and the thoughts which originate in scientific 
knowledge and the capitalist economy convey with them one of the rules which support their 
possibility: the rule that there is no reality unless testified by a consensus between partners over 
a certain knowledge and certain commitments."
1515
 Generally speaking, Lyotard's 
"illocutionary"
1516
 "point is that one effects new moves, one opens up the possibility of new 
efficacies in the games with their present rules." 
1517
 By emphasizing the search for "possible 
utterances"
1518
  Lyotard raises the "stakes"
1519
 of knowledge claims and "sketches the outline of 
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a politics that would respect the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown."
1520
 Lyotard's 
'political' approach to language "brings us to the first principle underlying our method as a whole: 
to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general 
agonistics."
1521
 Consequently, the tenability of "the observable social bond"
1522
 is said to be 
"composed of language moves"
1523
 calling themselves into being and/or question. The "question 
of the social bond, insofar as it is a question, is itself a language game, the game of inquiry."
1524
 
Lyotard's 'first principle' thereby moves rational thought in two different directions 
simultaneously, and invariably finds us re-turning to the problem of contextualizing his overall 
movements. On the one hand, Lyotard insists on the possibility of putting "forward the 
unpresentable in presentation itself"
1525
 in order to "testify to a difference (the differend) on which 
the fate of thought depends."
1526
 Lyotard's  insistence on the "withdrawal of the real…according 
to (the) sublime relation"
1527
 between the conceivable and the inconceivable is the consequence 
of Lyotard ontologically prioritising the language game of art over all other language games: 
art's disregard for "pre-established rules"
1528
 arguably puts the artist in the ideal "position as the 
(true) philosopher."
1529
 Lyotard thereby places emphasis on "the increase of being and the 
jubilation which results from the invention of new rules."
1530
 On the other hand, Lyotard holds 
the conflict between established rules in high regard because of the way such conflicts can put 
forth and testify to differends, or situations "that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule 
of judgment applicable to both arguments."
1531
 Lyotard retreats back into the real (conceptions 
of reality) since "all thought conceals something of the unthought",
1532
 and the laws of rational 
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thinking must be brought to justice "be it at the price of self-contradiction."
1533
 Specifically, "one’s 
responsibility before thought consists ... in detecting differends and in finding the (impossible) 
idiom for phrasing them."
1534
 The strategic and/or therapeutic value of Lyotard's questioning 
may therefore be similarly called in question: in what way can it be meaningfully contextualized 
(distinguished and/or legitimated) when it remains open to interpretation and questioning within 
the complex whole making it possible?  
 
Witness the way Lyotard provides a narrative of the history of thought, and places his inquiry 
within "the context of the crisis of narratives."
1535
 Lyotard calls this narrative the postmodern 
condition, and our narrator prescribes that we no longer think in terms of meta-narratives, or 
overarching stories about our knowledge of the world of experience.
1536
 Lyotard’s "incredulity to 
metanarrative"
1537
 comes by way of a discourse that questions the very coherence of the 
historicity of understanding. A metanarrative is a global or totalizing story directed towards the 
integration of distinct intentional states and relations, and so moves contexts of interpretation 
towards the same intentional horizon. Lyotard calls such directives a "mode of unification"
1538
, 
and generally divides their modalities into two main movements – the "speculative narrative"
1539
 
and "narrative of emancipation."
1540
 Each mode unifies in that the speculative or emancipative 
finds expression within a "philosophy of history"
1541
 endeavouring to direct and/or integrate our 
"relation to time."
1542
 Lyotard claims that "tradition needs to be rethought"
1543
 and argues against 
"what we (traditionally) call history,"
1544
 namely that we "think it progresses because it 
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  As Cohen notes, Lyotard brings the notion of incommensurability into the 
inquiry of history: our understanding of the continuum of events – the relations between distinct 
parts – remains "out of joint"
1546
 and so "leaves open the question: Is it happening?"
1547
 (i.e., 
where does this leave us or what now)? According to Lyotard, we live in a post modern era – 
our relation to being and time remains in a "nascent state"
1548
 or on the way and may be narrated 
as a "general situation of temporal disjunction."
1549
 Consequently, the postmodern condition 
cannot "be taken in a periodizing sense"
1550
 since there is "no reason of history,"
1551
  "no 
assigned addressee and no regulating ideal" 
1552
 and "no court in which one can adjudicate"
1553
 
the rationality of being in time.1554 Lyotard asks "could the presentation entailed by a phrase be 
called Being?" and answers "not Being, but one being, one time"
1555
 that occurs as "instances 
or relations here in universes presented by phrases, they are situational" :
1556
 beings are yet to 
be-there or be present(ed). The ‘postmodern’ refers to the way modernity stands in relation to 
discontinuous events, and is merely a pole set up to mark and direct questioning – by directing 
our being-there towards what remains at stake and/or in question. Lyotard claims that truly 
justified interpretations can only take place within spaces of reasons seeking to legitimate 
potentially questionable conceptions of 'reality' in distinct ways. Narratively speaking, the aim is 
to turn semantic fields – segments of reality represented by meaningful concepts delineated 
according to affinity 
1557
 – on their head by moving the "semantico-referential axis"
1558
 around 
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the "axis of address."
1559
  Lyotard's concept of language circles around "two axes"
1560
 insofar as 
these distinct poles encircle each other. Given that they remain caught in one another's 
movements, the question is the way "this double polarization"
1561
 is a "transcendental condition 
of the articulation"
1562
 of meaning. Language is thereby understood as a complex whole with 
"no common measure"
1563
 between its constituent parts – 'language' remains comprised of 
immeasurable "language games"
1564
 that enable players to become "several (or distinct) 
beings."
1565
 Lyotard purports to follow Wittgenstein by therefore urging that "the examination of 
language games, just like the critique of the faculties, identifies and reinforces the separation of 
language from itself. There is no unity to language; there are islands of language, each of them 
ruled by a different regime, untranslatable into others. This dispersion is good in itself, and ought 
to be respected. It is deadly when one phrase regime prevails over others." 1566 Lyotard 
ontologically commits himself to the paradox of rule-following in a paradoxical way. Although 
Lyotard insists that the arbitrariness of rules remain an integral part of the performativity of 
language, he also takes it as a given that rules state the way things are or should be done. 
Lyotard follows the lead of given rules in a performatively contradictory way, and argues as if 
the performative contradiction calls into being and/or question rational standards for linguistic 
activities and evaluation.  Lyotard thereby assigns a critical role to the inquiry into rule-governed 
language games, and such a critical faculty arises from a quasi-transcendental "as-if intuition to 
validate itself."
1567
 The act of identifying and reinforcing the separation of language from itself is 
therefore said to be of intrinsic value, and should be done for its own sake. The possibility of 
movement between "heterogeneous genres of discourse"
1568
 presupposes a certain openness 
in the way distinct linguistic rules can be approached – and it is the rules themselves that 
determine which domains and ends are relevant to them. Lyotard invokes the metaphor of an 
"archipelago"1569 to capture the possibility of circumnavigating the wide-open space phrased as 
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'language'. Heterogeneous discourses are nonetheless linked by the very ocean that separates 
them, and the requirement is to find the "passages"
1570
 between language's many phrase 
regimes.  Following Lyotard’s lead, we are therefore obliged to ask: "where can legitimacy 
reside"
1571
 when providing a narrative of the history of thought and prescribing such a linguistic 
remedy? The difficulty is trying to determine the limits of his own thinking, and raises the 
questions: from where does Lyotard claim to know what he does, and how can he prescribe 
knowledge in such a way? Lyotard not only attempts to prioritize parts over the whole, but the 
partiality of Lyotard's writing exemplifies the relation between part and whole. Lyotard follows 
various directives – the search for justice, determining the rule/s for rule-following, delimiting 
contexts, etc. – and explores them in distinct ways. Lyotard moves through contexts of 
interpretations in order to problematize the very notion of what it is to contextualize and 
understand thought. We therefore witness Lyotard attempting to argue against a unitary position 
in a unified or totalizing way.
1572
 The performative contradiction is that history conceived as a 
'temporal disjunction' provides the historical context for Lyotard's own questioning. While it is 
true that Lyotard subsequently distanced himself from his 'report on knowledge' on the grounds 
that it was false (or falsifying)
1573
, it nonetheless continues to provide the context – and "marks 
the transit point"
1574
 – for his overall movements. Lyotard therefore remains a pivotal thinker 
insofar as he moves us between questions and helps to locate our own approach.  
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Lyotard remains "indispensable to any reflection on the most difficult problems"
1575
 of cultural 
thought or practice. Lyotard’s way-making movements provide "an overview of these problems 
and is one of the most important theories to draw them together."
1576
 The main difficulty in 
approaching Lyotard, of course, is that he actively resists offering a theory that can bring 
disparate parts together. Barker notes that Lyotard not only remains "consistent in his 
inconsistency"
1577
 but (consistently) "reinvents himself with each new work"
1578
 to displace the 
possibility of ordering the relation between parts. Naas cautions that since Lyotard's writings 
consist of a "scattered corpus…with heterogeneous interests and competencies,"
1579
 we should 
resist speaking "of Lyotard in a more complete or comprehensive way."
1580
 It is not possible to 
"mark out limits and horizons"
1581
 or "fly over the archipelago and make a map"
1582
 since there 
will always be "new phrases to surprise us"
1583
 and "shifts in genre to interrupt our panoramic 
vision or make us revise our panoptic pronouncements."
1584
 And as James concurs, Lyotard’s 
interpretation of interpretations provides a "critical safeguard against the dogmatism of the 
theoretical in general."
1585
 Lyotard’s account of the questionable status of knowledge claims 
avoids resolving the problem of the criterion in any conceivable way: it is the "consensus about 
the criterion for this reality"
1586
 that would ideally remain in dispute by way of the differend. If 
and when a given 'reality' is called into question or unjustly displaced, we find ourselves brought 
before "the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be put into 
phrases cannot yet be… This state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling." 
1587
 It 
therefore becomes necessary to "find new rules for forming and linking phrases that are able to 
express the differend disclosed by the feeling"
1588
 and so "bear witness to differends by finding 
idioms for them."
1589
 Lyotard claims that his own questioning "is called forth by a feeling…(like) 
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, and such feelings cannot be meaningfully expressed via a systematic 
approach to language. It is the delimitations (rulings and/or linkages) of language that gives rise 
to such feelings, displacing the logical space of reasons in a more meaningful way. Lyotard calls 
this limit the inarticulate affect phrase, or a feeling for which "one cannot find the words."1591  
  
We have observed that Lyotard is somehow able to find a place in which to diagnosis and 
prescribe a remedy for cultural thought or practice. Lyotard thereby performs a "global or 
totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience."
1592
 
While the performative status of Lyotard’s interpretation of language has given rise to conflicting 




 – the 
status of performatives cannot themselves be simply affirmed or negated within the problem of 
understanding.
1595
 The issue isn’t straightforward as so much circular, giving rise to the problem 
of interpretation in the first place. As Jay observes, "the tension between the constative and 
performative modes of language is permanent and irreducible"
1596
 and has its basis in the 
relation between part and whole. While Lyotard maintains that competing and/or conflicting 
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interpretations of the world are becoming increasingly subject to the same standard of 
interpretation (the performativity criterion), his own thought is ruled by interpretations that seek 
to displace all thinking and linguistic contexts.1597 Specifically, Lyotard directs us towards a 
metanarrative to ontologically prioritize smaller narratives (contexts of interpretations that 
legitimate their own movements by being directed towards themselves) while throwing into 
question the nature of truth across the contexts in question anyway. By claiming that all 
knowledge claims remain an integral part of incommensurable discourses – as being relative to 
context-bound narratives or regimes – truth-values invariably possess a mere ‘fictional’ and/or 
'power differential' status. If all knowledge claims are to be contextualized as either works of 
‘fiction’ or as relations of 'force', what does this say about the truth-value of Lyotard's narrative 
and the role it plays in displacing other genres of discourse? Particularly unsettling is the way 
Lyotard attempts to raise "the fact/value disjunction to a high ethical principle"
1598
 in order "to 
displace… all manner of problems at its very heart."
1599
 Instead of emphasizing the parallel 
between epistemology and ethics, Lyotard wants to maintain a distinction between their 
corresponding object domains. Lyotard argues that the descriptive and the prescriptive are 
distinct language games,
1600
 and prescribes (rules) that it is against the rules to derive an ought 
from an is. The only problem is that Lyotard's description of the divide finds itself moving within 
a circle. If someone were to (say) play the language game of inquiry, they would need to follow 
the rules of argumentation, and such rules act as a norm for prescribing (other) actions – such 
as establishing the burden of proof and producing rational belief through the "normative force 
of reasoning."
1601
  Thus: if what distinguishes and legitimates linguistic actions is the prescriptive 
notion of rule-following, the concept of prescription is already built into the description of rules 
as normative. Lyotard's understanding of constitutive rules not only permits him to describe the 
alleged divide between 'facts' and 'values', it also enables him to prescribe what allegedly 
divides and unites the "facts of language."
1602
 While it is true that Lyotard will go on to make the 
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factual claim that "there is no 'language' in general, except as the object of an Idea,"
1603
 the 
ontological status of rules – the question of their very existence and/or value – is taken as given 
and remains open to questioning.  Lyotard therefore risks finding himself all at sea when 
navigating the circle in question: to what extent is Lyotard presupposing the value (prescriptions) 
of the rules being described and how can he evaluate (prescribe) the way they should be 
followed? Although Lyotard argues that he "does not presuppose the rules of his own 
discourse"
1604
, he understands that such "discourse too must obey rules…to the extent that its 
stakes are in discovering its rules rather than in supposing their knowledge as a principle’’.
1605
 
Given this description, "philosophical discourse is waiting for its criterion"
1606
 in that it "has as 
its rule to discover its rule: its a priori is what it has at stake."1607  
 
The Problem of the Criterion 
 
Lyotard's inquiry into the rational status of rules – determining their validity conditions – 
presupposes the question of the conditions of its own possibility, and so turns on the problem 
of legitimating the search for a criterion in the first place. Witness the way Lyotard invokes the 
problem of the criterion when trying to validate the quasi-transcendental status of the very 
conditions of possibility in question. Specifically, rational thought "cannot fail to wonder how the 
critical thinker could ever establish conditions of thought that are a priori. With what instruments 
can he formulate the conditions of legitimacy of judgments when he is not yet supposed to have 
any at his disposal? How, in short, can he judge properly 'before' knowing what judging properly 
is, and in order to know what it might be?"
1608
 Lyotard follows the problem of the criterion to its 
logical conclusion when exploring it within the context of legitimating rule-governed practices. 
The circle in which Lyotard moves is thereby approached from two different directions 
simultaneously. On the one hand, Lyotard argues for the multiplicity – separation or 
exclusiveness – of diverse linguistic practices, and so insists upon the need to legitimate 
(govern, regulate) distinct actions according to the rules governing (distinguishing, legitimating) 
them. On the other hand, the problem of legitimation turns on the question of the status of their 
                                                
1603
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.xii. 
1604




 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. "The Sign of History" in Benjamin, Andrew (ed.) The Lyotard Reader, 
(Oxford: Basil Baswell, 1989), p.394. 
1607
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.60. 
1608
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p.32. Although Lyotard is specifically talking about "the 
reader of Kant" here, anyone reading Lyotard should be able to see that such questions extend to 
his own approach. 
 209 
prescribed rulings, and so the problem is determining the normative content of the very practices 
in question: what criteria – rules or norms – should govern (justify) such practices in the first 
place? The problem of the criterion, then, emerges within the context of the language game of 
inquiry, and Lyotard recognizes from the outset that the state of play cannot be ruled either way. 
Lyotard's questioning occurs "after Wittgenstein"
1609
 in that he problematizes the role human 
agreement can actively play in determining our sense of fair play (feelings of equity that follow 
on from our understanding of the rules in question). Unlike Wittgenstein, Lyotard argues that 
the question of justifying distinct 'forms of life' – deciding the truth-value and/or normative 
content of our practices – is distinct from the question of whether such practices can really be 
thought justified (possess the quality of being fair or just).
1610
 In response to the question of how 
it was possible for judgments to navigate the circle of their own understanding, Lyotard claims 
that "if I am asked by what criteria do I judge, I will have no answer to give. Because if I did have 
criteria… (or) a possible answer to your question, it would mean that there is actually a possible 
consensus on these criteria (and) we would not be in a situation of modernity."
1611
 Lyotard 
questions the justification of trying to determine the rule for following rules, and urges that he 
only has one "criterion – the absence of criteria to clarify various sorts of discourse here and 
there."
1612
 The problem of the criterion is only a problem here – and there – insofar as there can 
be "no criteria because the idea of criteria comes from the discourse of truth, and supposes a 
referent or reality… it does not belong to the discourse of justice."
1613
 Consequently, Lyotard 
attempts to make "judgments about the just and the unjust without the least criterion"
1614
 since 
"the just is not of the same game as the true."
1615
 Lyotard distinguishes between factual and 
evaluative judgments in order to situate and problematize "the very process by which a legislator 
is authorised to promulgate a law as a norm."
1616
 Lyotard does not deny, then, that facts and 
values are related in some way, and the question of their intersection turns on the way the 
"ought of ideal maximization"
1617
 may be crossed (out). Specifically, all language games remain 
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"impure…inasmuch as these games are infiltrated by prescriptions"
1618
 and the question of their 
justification "will consist in preserving the purity of each game."1619 The problem is the way the 
descriptive and prescriptive intersects in the world and whether the divide becomes a crossing 
(out).  The question of what we ought to do "marks a transit point from a descriptive game whose 
goal is knowledge of the given, to a descriptive game (by 'Ideas') of the exploration of the 
possible. The transit point is marked by the prescriptive."
1620
 We need to be wary of wielding an 
"ontological axe"
1621
, or cutting a "divide between that which conforms to being and that which 
does not."
1622
 The very act of cutting is unwieldy in that it contradictorily links distinct modes of 
being – by actively blurring the divide between the descriptive and the prescriptive in order to 
‘fix’ (rig or determine) a game in advance. The process of legitimation simultaneously renders 
itself (potentially) illegitimate because of the way it falsifies the relationship between facts and 
values: in transcribing the being of justice from the being of the law (or ‘truth’) it corrupts the 
relation between them. Lyotard is particularly concerned by the tendency to universalize the 
transcription (ordering) of beings in society. Specifically, where there is a "true being of society, 
and that society will be just if it is brought into conformity with this true being, and therefore one 
can draw such prescriptions from a description that is true in the sense of 'correct'. The passage 
from the true to the just is a passage" that follows the logical imperative "If, then."
1623
 The 
problem of legitimation remains critical because the act of identifying and reinforcing the 
separation of language concerns "the very distribution of being"
1624
 and corresponding 
"distribution of assignments, responsibilities, values."
1625
 Consequently, the idea of justice 
merely provides a "horizon that performs a sort of regulatory role with respect to action."
1626
 
Such an idea arguably puts players in a position of "transcendence"
1627
 by "keeping 
prescriptions in their proper order"
1628
 and by prescribing "the observance of the singular justice 
of each game such as it has just been situated: formalism of the rules and imagination in the 
moves."
1629
 It is for this reason that Lyotard talks about  the horizon of justice in two ways when 
it performs a regulatory role with respect to (speech) action. Specifically, the multiplicity of justice 
(or playing each game by its own rules) and the justice of multiplicity (or questioning the way 
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each game is played).
1630
 The "justice of multiplicity" is thereby "assured, paradoxically enough, 





We have been observing that Lyotard is a difficult thinker to approach because he remains on 
the way to language. Given that such movements occur in different ways – follow distinct 
directives or leads – it was not possible to re-turn to each part in a complete (uniform, coherent) 
way.  We have attempted to pave a way back and forth, however, by following guiding themes 
– such as the problems of justifying rule-following and normativity in linguistic practice, and the 
impossibility of resolving inevitable conflicts due to a lack of the rule for judgment in 
language.  We are finally in a position to approach Lyotard's conception of the differend, or the 
way distinct rules may come into conflict and unjustly overturn (overrule or rule out) justified 
movements within language. The concept of the differend is the way Lyotard attempts to present 
the question of justice as an irreconcilable dispute between conflicting modes of presentations. 
Lyotard moves around the labyrinth of language "to open an abyss between parts by analysing 
their differend."
1632
 The (illocutionary) point of Lyotard's 'analysis', however, is not to provide a 
systematic examination of the elements of a complex whole. It is rather to bring forth an 
understanding of the incommensurability of reality to concept in order to be taken aback by the 
sublime, where questioning may find "its legitimacy in a principle that is expounded by critical 
thought and that motivates it: a principle of thinking's getting carried away."
1633
 Specifically, 
Lyotard’s questioning is directed towards what cannot be completely understood (expressed, 
contextualized) either way – by simultaneously moving towards "an outside and an inside"
1634
 
of thought. Lyotard thinks that incommensurable phrase regimes invariably find expression in a 
differend, which is "to be found at the heart of sublime feeling: at the encounter of the two 
'absolutes' equally 'present' to thought, the absolute whole when it conceives, the absolutely 
measured when it presents."
1635
 Feelings of the sublime are "subjectively felt by thought as 
differend"
1636
 and occurs when the rationality of (a) reason "seeks, unreasonably, to violate the 
interdict it imposes on itself."
1637
 Given reason's inadvertent violation of the rational order (a 
crossing of boundaries via the act of exceeding a permitted limit), "thinking defies its own finitude 
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as if fascinated by its own excessiveness."
1638
 Lyotard's overall aim is "to connect this feeling 
with the transport that leads all thought (critical thought included) to its limits."
1639
 The reason 
Lyotard wants to transport thought through such feelings is to lead it to the understanding that 
there is no Reason that can conceive every 'object'  and so "with reflection, thinking seems to 
have at its disposal the critical weapon itself."
1640
 The possibility of identifying and reflecting on 
an inconceivable actively places a constraint on conceptual thought insofar as it releases it from 
permitted bounds when "thinking becomes impatient, despairing, disinterested"
1641
 in directing 
itself any further. The situation becomes critical when reason can be mobilized against its 
reasons for being-there. Consequently, it is the "limit itself that understanding cannot conceive 
of as its object. The limit is only conceivable with an outside and an inside"
1642
 and "immediately 
implies both the limited and the unlimited…The limit is not an object for understanding. It is its 
method."
1643
 Lyotard's 'methodologies' actively bring forth the "limitation"
1644
 of an 
understanding, and Lyotard does this by questioning the way the circle acts as a delimitation – 
i.e., via links passing through each possible part. Lyotard explores the way distinct criteria of 
relevance or adequacy may be called into being and/or question, and the resulting conflict 
enacts the questionable relation between part and whole. Lyotard phrases the problem before 
him in the following way. 
 
Given I) the impossibility of avoiding conflicts (the impossibility of indifference) and 2) the absence of 
a universal genre of discourse to regulate them (or, if you prefer, the inevitable partiality of the judge): to 
find, if not what can legitimate judgment (the linkage), then at least how to save the honour of 
thinking.1645  
 
The Reality of the Referent.  
 
Lyotard remains reluctant to provide a definition of the most fundamental concept of his analysis. 
Although the "phrase event"
1646
 remains an integral part of Lyotard's questioning, he argues that 
phrases are – in principle – undefinable, and such events are "merely what happens"
1647
 in 
language. Any attempt to define a phrase's "being"
1648
 would privilege one kind of phrasing over 
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another and illicitly "fix the sense of a term."
1649
 Lyotard's strategic use of the term phrase, then, 
is merely deployed to call "upon the capacity of ordinary language to refer to itself"
1650
 when 
"one phrase calls forth another, whatever it may be."
1651
 Such phrasing, of course, immediately 
raises two related questions: if we cannot determine the sense of our most fundamental term – 
or phrase – how is it possible to argue as if (other) phrases meaningfully refer to the language 
in question and/or go on to argue that these other phrases – or events – invariably come into 
an irreconcilable conflict 'there'? In the first instance, we need to be able to fix a reference point 
if we are to follow (understand, agree with) Lyotard, and in the second instance, we need to be 
able to determine the referent of the corresponding 'differend' (phrase events in dispute). 
Lyotard in obviously not unaware of the circle in which he is moving, and the goal is to move 
(back) towards it by arguing that it is the "reality of the referent"
1652
 that is being called into 
question through differends. While Lyotard presents various examples of a differend, one 
"situation in question"
1653
 continues to call forth his thinking. The "so called Final Solution"
1654
 
poses a difficulty insofar as it presents a situation that cannot be answered with specific criteria. 
The situation becomes even more questionable when historical revisionists deny the 
Holocaust's reality and displace the burden of proof onto the very victims of genocide. Given 
the denier's frame of reference, a differend emerges when it is "not only reality, but also the 
meta-reality that is the destruction of reality"
1655
 that is called into being and/or question. While 
"it is true that there would be no history without a differend"
1656
 such "a differend is born from a 
wrong and is signalled by a silence"
1657
 indicating "that phrases are in abeyance of their 
becoming an event, that the feeling is the suffering of this abeyance."
1658
 The feeling of being 
wronged is not just how such an inconceivable event could have possibly come into being, but 
the way Holocaust deniers unjustly refuse to even conceive of the gas chambers existence in 
the first place. The problem is that the victims cannot bear witness to their own experiences, 
making it possible for Holocaust deniers to question that such a historical event actually took 
place. The burden of proof is shifted onto the people that cannot be (act as) its truth-bearer: 
lacking the capacity to speak for themselves, millions of people are denied the reality of their 
own mass murder. Given this speech act criterion – where it becomes "necessary to prove that 
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the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it was seen"
1659
 – it is not possible to testify to the 
existence of the gas chambers silencing millions of people. Indeed, "if one is dead, one cannot 
testify that it is on account of the gas chamber" since the "only acceptable proof that it was used 
to kill is that one died from it."
1660
 So if no one can testify to the fact that they were murdered in 
a gas chamber, it follows that there were no gas chambers to murder anybody – reported 
millions of deaths are either a lie or hoax. We thereby find ourselves presented with the logic of 
the "double bind"
1661
, a situation where phrases may come into conflict by contradicting one 
another. Further, the victims have been put in the wrong (or doubly wronged) because they 
cannot resolve the conflict or opt out of the situation initially wronging them. The Holocaust 
denier not only attempts to silence the screams of its many victims, but to bury the reality of the 
Holocaust in a silence that cannot be heard throughout history.  Nonetheless, "the silence 
imposed on knowledge does not impose the silence of forgetting, it imposes a feeling"1662 of 
(say) anxiety or alarm that needs to be immediately answered or remedied (rephrased). The 
'honourable' thought of the differend is therefore an attempt to locate what is passed over or 
rendered silent in language, where the event of "silence is (also) a phrase"
1663
 calling out to be 
heard in other ways. In such a differend, an unjust situation "asks to be put into phrases, and 
suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away…(we) learn through 
the feeling of pain which accompanies silence… to recognize that what remains to be phrased 
exceeds what can they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms 
which do not yet exist."
1664
 Lyotard goes so far as to say that while "every reality entails this 




It is now legitimate to ask two related questions: why does Lyotard ascribe the possibility of 
legitimacy to the act of denying genocide and why is the reality of the Holocaust legitimated – 
felt to be more real – than other historical realities anyway? The answers, of course, are to be 
found within Lyotard's conception of language, and turns on the question of his ontological 
commitments. That is to say, Lyotard's "mode"
1666
 of inquiry – in the "philosophic"
1667





 – is determined by the theoretical presuppositions 
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already thought to be true in some way (adequate and/or relevant to his overall approach). 
Lyotard might deny having the criteria for making rational determinations, but a criterion of 
relevance and/or adequacy is already in play and brought to bear upon his questioning. 
Lyotard's commitment to a) an agnostics of language, b) the lack of a universal rule to regulate 
(arbitrate, decide between) linguistic conflicts and c) an insistence on creating new rules to give 
expression to the inexpressible enables Lyotard to call the ontological status of 'reality' into 
question. The real question is: what is 'reality' within Lyotard's questioning? We ask this question 
for a 'realistic' reason: to what extent is it legitimate to locate the reality of the Holocaust within 
the potentially discontinuous events of language, or in relation to the ways in which it can be 
meaningfully referred to (denied, affirmed)? Put another way: isn't the question of its truth-value 
– of whether the Holocaust actually occurred – independent of the question of whether its 
existence can be either affirmed or denied? Lyotard argues that the reality of the referent cannot 
be "subordinated to the effectuation of verification procedures"
1670
 since the "annihilation of the 
reality of the gas chambers conforms to the annihilation of the referent's reality during 
verification procedures."
1671
 In other words, it is not possible to determine a referent's reality 
without being on the way through language (caught within the circle turning 'reality' into a limit 
and/or question). According to Lyotard, 'reality' occurs by way of the referent, and the way 
'reality' emerges and/or withdraws is through its relation to phrase events (distinct frames of 
reference). Given that it is the links between phrase regimes that may be called into being or 
question, Lyotard argues that 'reality' is similarly context-bound or determined (framed in terms 
of its reference points). Given this approach, the question of the adequacy or relevancy of 
referring terms does not have its ontological ground in the referent. Indeed, the "ontological 
argument"
1672
 – or the context-independent truth-value of the objects in question – "is false"
1673
 
since "nothing can be said about reality that does not presuppose it."
1674
 The act of referring to 
reality, then, can never determine the truth-value of a referent by way of simply specifying 
(naming, describing) the object in question. A given designation – referring term – can never be 
adequate to (secure, determine) reality by way of the ontology of a referent since phrase events 
merely act as an interim measure. Designation "is not, nor can it be, the adequation of the logos 
to the being of the existent"
1675
 and "reality is not a property attributable to the referent answering 
to the name."
1676
 Lyotard therefore rejects ontological realism, and (like Derrida) may be called 
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an ontological anti-realist for lack of a better referring term.1677 Lyotard ontologically commits 
himself to the view that 'reality' remains constituted through phrase regimes, and it is phrase 
events that may be called into being and/or question. The "possibility of reality, including the 
reality of the subject, is fixed in networks of names ‘before’ reality shows itself and signifies itself 
in an experience" 
1678
 and (the question) of reality emerges when "a swarm of senses lights 
upon a field pinpointed by a world. It is able to be signified, to be shown, and to be named, all 
three."
1679
 The circle in which Lyotard moves within, then, is determined via the way phrases 
refer to each other within a complex whole. Specifically, our conception (and questioning) of 
"reality entails the differend"
1680
 in that "it concerns (and tampers with) its ultimate 
presuppositions."
1681
 In order to make sense of this enabling presupposition, we need to re-turn 
to the reality of the referent. Specifically, determine the way Lyotard can claim that "reference 
cannot be reduced to sense"
1682
 when it is the "sense of the referent"
1683
 within "at least one 
universe"
1684
 that may be called into being and/or question. 
 
Lyotard argues that when a Holocaust denier "does not have a stake in establishing reality"
1685
 




 permitting them to preclude the 
possibility of referring to the reality in question. While it is true that victims of genocide can never 
refer to the events of their deaths, the reverse is also true: how can we ever know – establish – 
that we were even born if we can never personally testify to (refer to, remember) our births?
1688
  
We only ask this question to bring forth what is really at stake here: the problem of determining 
                                                
1677
 Chalmers, David. "Ontological Anti-Realism" in Chalmers, David, Manley, David and 
Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on The Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2009), p.93. To reiterate the meaning of the phrase referred to in the previous 
Derrida chapter. Specifically, Lyotard is not ontologically commitment to the view that objects and 
events have "an objective and determinate truth-value." Correspondingly, Lyotard's ontological anti-
realism affirms that the reality of the referent always "depends on the context of assessment." 
1678
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.46. 
1679
 ibid, p. 50. 
1680
 ibid, p.92. 
1681
 ibid, p.xv. 
1682
 ibid, p.41. 
1683
 ibid, xii. 
1684
 Ibid, 70. 
1685






 Witness the way reality is presented as false – or simulated –  memories in the HBO television 
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and primarily sees the world – or reality – through the traumatized eyes of artificially intelligent and/or 
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role to play in specific narratives. 
 217 
whether any past event actually occurred and/or the possibility of ensuring continuity between 
discontinuous events throughout time.
1689
 The question, then, is the way 'reality' may be built 
up and held in place or broken down and displaced via given referents. Lyotard follows Kripke 
here – or at least, purports to
1690
 – by providing a causal theory of reference that actively 
undermines descriptivism (the view that the meaning of proper names is identical to the meaning 
of the descriptions associated with them).
1691
 Consequently, the issue is the way the referent is 
passed around in the circle of understanding, and in being "passed from link to link"
1692
 we may 
call the reality of the referent (back) into being or question. Lyotard's goal is to preserve the 
possibility of reference while claiming that referring terms are without true (real) content or 
sense. The reality of the referent is said to be determined via the way it is specified (named). 
Such specifications (naming) do two things simultaneously – they act as a "rigid designator"
1693
 
of the objects in question, and actively refer to the referent through its links in a casual chain 
designating 'reality' as such. Lyotard urges that "reality is not established by ostension alone"
1694
 
and the problem is determining whether the "referent is real"
1695
 in related ways. The reality of 
the referent Holocaust may therefore be established if the referring term can be "‘signified’, 
‘named’, ‘shown’"
1696
 through self-referential terms (such as Auschwitz, Zyklon B, etc.). 
Nonetheless, it is "not sense which can supply the identity of referents, but the "empty rigidity 
of the name"
1697
 which "can act as a linchpin"
1698
 when identifying related terms. A referring term 
thereby "holds the position of linchpin"
1699
 and "endows its referent with a reality."
1700
 In this way, 
phrase events may present a meaningful universe – and the meanings presented in such a 
universe follow the rules of the regimes constituting them as meaningful presentations. 
Specifically, a "phrase presents what it is about, the case, ta pragmata, which is its referent; 
                                                
1689
 Descartes raised the famous possibility in Meditations on First Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), of course, that reality might refer to (be) an illusion created by an evil demon. 
Gilbert Harman expanded upon such a systematic doubt in Thought (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2015), p.5. Harman proffers the more modern notion of a brain in a vat being misled 
by a mad scientist (the brain thinks that it is an embodied person experiencing the external world 
when its experiences merely refer to its relationship to its connection to neurons and electrical 
impulses). 
1690
 We shall return to Lyotard's rephrasing of Kripke's phrases in our discussion.  
1691
 Soames, Scott. Reference and Description (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
Soames provides a critical evaluation of the descriptive accounts of proper names traditionally traced 
back to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, and extends to more recent philosophers like Robert 
Stalkner and David Chalmers. 
1692
 Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 302. 
1693
 Ibid, p.37. 
1694
 ibid, p.40. 
1695
 ibid, p.41 
1696






 Ibid, p. 44. 
1700
 Ibid, p.43. 
 218 
what is signified about the case, the sense, der Sinn; that to which or addressed to which this 
is signified about the case, the addressee; that "through" which or in the name of which this is 
signified about the case, the addressor. The disposition of a phrase universe consists in the 
situating of these instances in relation to each other."
1701
  Consequently, Lyotard argues that if 
"there is someone to signify the referent and someone to understand the phrase that signifies 
it; the referent can be signified; it exists"
1702
 within that universe. Phrase events follow rules, of 
course, because they occur within – are causally linked to – the regimes enacting (bringing 
forth) the corresponding norms of action and/or evaluations for the course of events. The way 
phrases present meaningful universes is thereby determined by the regimes governing them. 
As such, the legitimacy of their mode of presentation – being-there or sense – corresponds to 
the way such phrase events may be linked to – follow on from – one another. If there is one rule 
of thumb – common standard or measure determining the reality of referents – it is 
"incommensurability, in the sense of the heterogeneity of phrase regimens and of the 
impossibility of subjecting them to a single law…For each of these regimens, there corresponds 




According to Lyotard, "the referent is presented in the universe of a phrase, and is therefore 
situated in relation to some sense."
1704
  Further, it is the relationship between senses that 
determine their relationship to referents. Concepts are said to lack content – names are really 
"empty"
1705
 vessels – and the objects they refer to are thought to be similarly lacking in an 
independent reality. The referent is presented by the way "the name"1706 relates to other 
concepts (names with their own sense of place and relations), thereby carrying meaning to the 
objects they refer to through their attachment to phrases linking up to each other. The name 
"fills the function of linchpin because it is an empty and constant designator
1707
… Phrases come 
to be attached to this name, which not only describes different senses for it… and not only 
places the name of different instances, but which also obey different regimes and/or genres."
1708
 
Lyotard observes that there can be (known) first or last phrase, and no way of directing 





, and urges that the rule for the concatenation of phrases "remains to 
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 While phrases should ideally remain within their circle of determination, this is not 
what actually happens – and it is not even possible. Lyotard asserts that it is "impossible"
1712
 for 
there to be no phrase and that it is "necessary to make linkage"
1713
 between phrases that remain 
contingent and/or potentially related. Lyotard thereby states the law of concatenation with the 
following phrase: "to link is necessary, but how to link is not."
1714
 Since a phrase can have no 
discernible point of origin or directed towards a final destination, it is best thought of as a 
potential event passing through an open-ended chain.  We can never know in advance where 
it should "take its place"
1715
 or to "what end it will be subordinated"
1716
 only that the possible 
modes of linking "are ready to take the phrase into account and to inscribe it into the pursuit of 
certain stakes, to actualise themselves by means of it. In this sense, a phrase that comes along 
is put into play within a conflict between genres of discourse. This conflict is a differend, since 
the success (or validation) proper to one genre is not the one proper to others."
1717
 Lyotard 
urges that the attempt to make sense of a given phrase – to locate what is at stake or 
subordinate it to some end – remains a strategic move that cannot be controlled by being played 
by the game of language. When phrases typically occur, it is really language indefinitely playing 
(directing) the players and/or the contexts of their occurrence. For this reason, Lyotard urges 
that "genres of discourse are strategies – of no one."
1718
 Genres of discourse remain part of a 
complex whole and the strategies taken can never be the more than the sum of their moving 
parts. As "a general rule, an object which is thought under the category of the whole (or of the 
absolute), is not an object of cognition (whose reality could be subjected to a protocol, etc.)"
1719
 
It is therefore "important to distinguish between phrase regimes" and to limit "the confidence of 
a given tribunal to a given kind of phrase."
1720
 The limiting of the given is an attempt to do justice 
to the phrases in dispute – by delimiting their respective courts of appeal. And it is by placing 
thought at these limits that the different phrases may be seen to come into conflict and/or 
question. A "phrase which links and is to be linked is always a pagus, a border zone where 
genres of discourse enter into conflict over the mode of linking."
1721
 No "matter what its regimen, 
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every phrase is in principle what is at stake in a differend between genres of discourse. This 




This obviously begs the questions: why do phrases come into conflict over the question of their 
linking and what is at stake (in question) when they conflict with each other? There is, of course, 
no way to answer these questions without presupposing the things at issue – and what becomes 
the issue within any given situation is the status of the presuppositions themselves (the way 
conflicting presuppositions are presented and/or situated through their respective phrase 
regimes and linkages). While Lyotard maintains that the "linkings obey rules that determine the 
stakes and ends"
1723
 , it is the condition of their possibility that remains the real question here – 
insofar as the differend proceeds from a question accompanying every (possible) phrase and 
linkage and (possibly) calls into question the legality of a given (over)ruling. Part of the reason 
is the "abyss"
1724
 separating the descriptive from the prescriptive and our tendency to think in 
terms of narratives to cross the divide between them. Narrative is a crossing (out) insofar as 
"the genre of discourse within which the heterogeneity of phrase regimes, and even the 
heterogeneity of genres of discourse, have the easiest time passing unnoticed."
1725
 Specifically, 
"narrative recounts a differend or differends and imposes an end on them or it, a completion 
which is also its own term."
1726
 The problem is that the events of their occurrence invariably 
displace the question of the legality of a ruling, pushing the injustice called forth by a differend 
"back to the border."
1727
 Consequently, what is at stake everywhere is that the question of the 
mode of a possible linking should never come to an end and always remain open to questioning. 
Phrases in dispute thereby serve a critical function – by highlighting their questionable status 
and/or the problem of rule-following. To link phrases might be "necessary, but a particular 
linkage is not. This linkage can be declared pertinent, though, and the phrase that does the 
stating is a rule for linking."
1728
 Lyotard's distinction between presentation and situation may 
help clarify the pertinence of the links (and rules) in question. The distinction is important 
because victims of the Holocaust continue to be presented with a situation that still needs to be 
spoken about – as witnessed by the way that their testimony has been ruled out of bounds. 
Although phrase regimes may call forth different situations of an initial presentation, phrase 
events are to be distinguished by their relations and instances. The law of concatenation can 
itself never decide the legitimacy of the given presentation – it can only situate (legitimate) it in 
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relation to other phrase events. That is to say, phrases may be presented as a given situation 
– as one situation among many possible situations – but these situations can never be fully 
presented (phrased). In "order to grasp the presentation entailed by a phrase, another phrase 
is needed, in which this presentation is presented. The present presentation is not able to be 
phrased now; it is only able to be phrased as a situation."
1729
 Take the phrase ‘Fire!’. The phrase 
could refer to (present) many universes and possible meanings, and there is no way to make 
sense of it without specifying the context of its occurrence. Suppose an actor yelled "Fire!" on 
a stage – it is an open question as to whether the actor is alerting other characters in a play or 
warning members of the audience. Suppose a child uttered the same phrase in the theatre – 
what are they trying to say and to whom? (they could be either delighted or frightened by the 
sight of fire, or merely playing with words heard on stage because they like the sound of 'fire!' 
or the effect the word is having on others). Either way, the same phrase could present different 
situations – a round of applause from the audience, a clip around the ear from the child's parents 
or a stampede towards the exits. Given these possibilities, a presentation "is the event of its 
inapprehensible presence (and) to deal with it is to situate it, to place it in a phrase universe."
1730
 
Further, "these universes are constituted by the way the instances (not only the sense, but also 
the referent, the addressor, and the addressee) are situated as well as by their interrelations. 
The addressor of an exclamative is not situated with regard to the sense in the same way as 
the addressor of a descriptive. The addressee of a command is not situated with regard to the 
addressor and to the referent in the same way as the addressee of an Invitation or of a bit of 
information is."
1731
 Consequently, "genres of presentation, if there any, are presentable only as 
genres of situation"
1732
 and a "presentation is that there is at least one universe. A situation is 
that at the heart of a universe presented by a phrase, relations indicated by the form of the 
phrases that link onto it (through the phrases regimen, which calls forth certain linkings) place 
the instances in relation to each other."
1733
 In this way, differends may be said to refer to – name 
– situations brought into questionable relationships through their links to genres of situations. 
By being placed in a situation that cannot be presented, necessary links become broken or 
displaced and give rise to disquieting feelings. While it might not be possible to resolve the 
situation in question, it continues to ask to be put into unknown phrases through their links to 
the very language calling such rulings into being and/or question. 
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           Critical Discussion    
Aims and Objectives  
The aim of the following is to critically evaluate Lyotard's understanding of language, and the 
role it plays in the identification and critique of culture. Following Lyotard's lead, our questioning 
will primarily occur as a contextual strategy, and the context enabling it remains the language 
game of inquiry. Given that such a language game presupposes rational motivation and/or 
justification, the performative status of Lyotard's statements remains integral. We shall direct 
ourselves towards differends produced within Lyotard’s own thinking by way of the circle of 
understanding, and argue that Lyotard cannot circumvent the performative contradiction of his 
approach to language. Consequently, it will be the circle of understanding that calls the 
performativity of Lyotard's questioning back into question. Specifically, Lyotard's statements 
about the events of language are performatively contradictory in that they move against the 
parts of the complex whole in question – by trying to present a phrase universe (or universes) 
that transcend and/or act against potentially conflicting situations or contexts. While Lyotard's 
example of the differend might be thought to give expression to heterogeneous elements, it 
nonetheless acts as a unitary standard throughout Lyotard’s questioning. In this way, the event 
of Lyotard’s understanding may be said to contradictorily move (back) towards the structure of 
understanding itself – by transferring a part throughout the whole and/or taking the part for the 
whole. Nonetheless, Lyotard's contradictory movements remain consistent with the circle of 
understanding in that they direct us back towards the question of the conditions of their 
possibility. The question before us, then, is not whether Lyotard remains caught in a circle or 
contradiction – but the ways in which the circle of understanding itself performs Lyotard's 
contradictory actions. Unlike (say) Fairbank, we will not be seeking "the revenge of 
coherence."
1734
 The concern is more: what does Lyotard's performative contradiction consist in 
and how may we refer to such contradictory movements? The problem is trying to carefully find 
our way through what Rasch calls the "minefield of self-referential paradox"
1735
, or the 
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 of navigating the complex whole in question. If each genre of discourse is 
arguably a separate island and/or ideally remains apart, how is Lyotard's philosophical 
discourse able to find its way around them and/or maintain (state, prescribe) their separation as 
a whole? Lyotard not only argues that an interrogation of language should actively identify and 
separate language from itself, he also prescribes universalizable actions across the language 
in question (such as the transformation of the rules being described and/or calling them into 
question through competing linguistic acts). The issue is that Lyotard presupposes a universal 
norm or standard when purporting to question the normative status of (other) norms or 
standards. The task ahead of us, then, is trying to find our way between what Benhabib 
describes as Lyotard's "criteriological dogmatism"
1737
 and Keane calls Lyotard's "logic of 
occasion…and particularism."
1738
 Although Steuerman claims that Lyotard's "move to 
language"
1739
 is a "tour de force"
1740





 to be our tour guide. The problem is whether Lyotard can show 
us that "logic and cognitive rules"
1743
 do not always apply to rational discourse or whether the 
paradoxical act of arguing against reason must remain within its prescribed boundaries 
(regimens, rulings). Our answer, of course, is relatively straightforward: such a paradoxical act 
is only intelligible within the circle calling itself (back) into question. If Lyotard can bring 
conflicting rules into (a) question, we invariably find ourselves directed back towards the 
problem of contextualizing Lyotard's directives and movements. Specifically, how are we able 
to link onto the differend within the circle of understanding, and how does such a linking 
determine the stakes (purpose, end) of his own questioning? Frank observes that Lyotard’s 
reasoning is performatively contradictory because it "must move in a circle
1744
 presupposing the 
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legitimacy of the rulings being interrogated, and so "presupposes…as a condition of 
possibility"
1745
 the validity of questioning (overturning, moving beyond) objects within mutually 
given intentional horizons.
1746
 Consequently, Lyotard's statements remain caught in a circle 
"since it is only at the price of self-contradiction can it expunge the validity claims contained in 
its constative force."
1747
 As Readings reminds us, however, "any attempt to pay attention to the 
performativity of a statement or phrase, precisely to the extent to which it problematizes its 
constative content, will be a peculiarly Lyotardian move."
1748
 Our approach to Lyotard shall 
thereby proceed in three related parts. In the first part, we acknowledge that the language game 
of inquiry and argumentation is the way Lyotard presents the differend. In the second part, we 
delimit Lyotard's paradoxical approach to the paradox of rule-following. In the final part, we 
rethink Lyotard's conception of the reality of the referent by questioning the validity of his 
interpretation of Kripke's argument for rigid designators.  
 
Playing the (Language) Game of Argumentation.  
 
We begin by "situating"
1749
 Lyotard "within the argumentative genre"
1750
 and note that Lyotard 
is way ahead of us. He had previously located his defensive position within the language "game 
of inquiry"
1751
 and subsequently attempted "to bear witness to the differend"
1752
 by producing 
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 through reasons given and taken there. Equally telling is that Lyotard refers to the 
differend in epistemic terms – as phrases in dispute, or an argument over the very things in 
question. Lyotard argues that a differend is what happens when a dispute is brought "before the 
tribunal"
1754
 of reason and is "neutralized…as if there were no damages."
1755
  Specifically, "I 
would like to call a differend the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and 
becomes for that reason a victim."
1756
 The differend is where parties bringing an action in a court 
of 'law' find themselves forced from presenting their case in the language game of inquiry and/or 
argumentation. If the reasons for arguing their case are ruled out of bounds, Lyotard's 'argument 
with argument' concerns the criteria for determining relevant evidence and/or boundaries in the 
first place. Consequently, Lyotard's defensive manoeuvres purport to use the force of (an) 
argument against the arguments of force, and such a provisional tactic arguably gives rise to 
feelings of powerlessness (or moral disquiet). Nonetheless, our trained philosopher also argues 
that "stakes must be introduced"
1757
 in order to be given the means to argue and that "within the 
hypothesis of a discussion in which the stakes are not the same for each of the two interlocutors, 
consensus appears impossible to obtain…This corresponds precisely to Wittgenstein’s 
conception of a language game. The procedures for discussion and argumentation are 
dependent on these stakes"
1758
 in that the "homogenization of stakes is authorized."
1759
  While 
the name of the game might be to agree to disagree, disagreements remain directed towards 
making the stakes more uniform or similar by "persuading the other of my veracity. This is to 
admit but a single procedure, persuasion, and a single set of stakes, veracity."
1760
 To cut a long 
narrative short: the goal is to try to win someone over to your position or concede defeat to the 
other side and move on. We invariably find ourselves presented with a situation calling for the 
following questions: why does Lyotard also appeal to the "genre of academic discourse 
(mastery)"
1761
 – when invoking Wittgenstein, Kant and Kripke
1762
 – to "defend… the 
differend"
1763
 against (other) "adversaries"
1764
 seeking power over contested conceptual 
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 ibid. Lyotard identifies two main adversaries here – the genres of economic and academic 
discourse. The contradiction is that his approach consistently appeals to the very academic 
discourse in question.  
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terrains? Further, what does he try to establish – prove – through the corresponding arguments? 
The answer should be obvious: to legitimate his general mode of inquiry. Lyotard plays the 
language game of argumentation within a prescribed circle of understanding, and the game's 
stakes remain epistemic insofar as the goal is to reach the 'truth' via an interrogation of logical 
spaces of reasons.
1765
 Lyotard might have his reasons, of course, but such reasons are only 
intelligible (rationally motivated and/or justified) on the continuum making questioning possible 
and/or necessary. Williams observes that it is therefore "important to stress the mercenary 
aspects"
1766
 of Lyotard's defensive manoeuvres. 
 
Lyotard appeals to the works of other philosophers in order to make points which are entirely his own. 
This means that although his reading of other philosophers may be productive and interesting in the way 
it brings their work into his perspective, the interpretation is often partial and tendentious. Lyotard's 
relation to the philosophical tradition is one of productive exploitation not one of objective assessment or 
careful restoration.1767 
 
Williams also goes on to make another observation that will require further elaboration. While 
"Lyotard has taken much of his terminology from other philosophers"
1768
 he "has not made the 
same careful analytic distinctions"
1769
 and so "is apt to sketch his point with little regard to the 
detailed study of what it entails."
1770
 The concern, however, is not that Lyotard fails to provide 
similarly systematic analyses. Lyotard provides reasons for arguing against the rationality of 
entailment itself. Lyotard consistently argues – as a matter of principle or general rule of thumb 
– against the idea that arguments should have logically necessary and/or widespread 
consequences.
1771
 The prospect of logically binding – permanent and/or inescapable 
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conclusions – is antithetical to this thinking insofar as such a 'terrifying' approach leads to a 
totalitarian (phrase) regime. The real concern is that Lyotard's partial and tendentious approach 
fails to adequately establish or maintain the links between the phrases in question. The 
performative contradiction is what happens during Lyotard's acts of appropriation (selective 
reasoning, seizing upon philosophical concepts via the joining of disparate parts or movements). 
We invariably bear witness to a patchwork 'theory', or arguments consisting of miscellaneous 
and heterogeneous elements. Lyotard's attempt to identify and reinforce the separation of 
language from itself presupposes the very thing in question – namely, the possibility of language 
taken as a whole (i.e., as constituting the totality of possible linguistic relations and approaches). 
The consequence is a homogenization and/or quantification of discourses, or an attempt to 
make qualitatively distinct contexts of inquiry more veracious via such a uniform or similar 
approach. Lyotard thereby enacts a differend when displacing the original contexts of analyses 
via the force of his arguments. The question is not whether Lyotard exhibits the appropriate care 
to the concepts providing the links through his thinking. Phrases entering into potential dispute 
come with the territory in that the language game of argumentation remains territorial: it involves 
defending a position by any means necessary and requires the marshalling of all available 
forces. Given the difference in stakes between (say) Wittgenstein's and Kripke's arguments, 
however, Lyotard's defence of the differend directs itself back towards the question of its 
performativity. Specifically, when appropriating the arguments of other philosophers, Lyotard 
motions against their phrase events for incommensurate reasons. Lyotard's selective reasoning 
results in the following irresolvable conflict: the only way we can make an argument for the 
differend is if it turns on a performative contradiction – i.e., rules out or overrules phrases in 
dispute.   
 
Witness the way Lyotard seizes upon Wittgenstein. We shall set aside the question of whether 
Lyotard's "interpretation is so radically wrong that it points by negation"
1772
 to the 
appropriateness of the "reduction of the social to discursive practices"
1773
 in (potential) conflict. 
We shall also remain agnostic as to whether "Lyotard’s enlistment of Wittgenstein as an ally…is 
a strange and even inappropriate misinterpretation."
1774
 It remains an open question as to how 
best appropriate (interpret) Wittgenstein's questioning. We can only do justice to Wittgenstein's 
thought by reminding ourselves that it remained resolutely on the way, and the requirement is 
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to follow language’s lead within an ever-expanding circle of interpretations.
1775
 Nonetheless, 
Wittgenstein attempted to direct his "sketches of landscapes…made in the course of long and 
involved journeying’s"
1776
 onto the most appropriate (correct) pathways. Wittgenstein consented 
to the posthumous publication of Philosophical Investigations on the grounds that "if my remarks 
do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, I do not wish to lay any further claim to them 
as my property."
1777 Given that Wittgenstein's far-reaching and disparate thoughts were widely 
"misunderstood"
1778
 and in general "circulation" 
1779
 anyway, the requirement was to put a 
constraint on interpretations.
1780
 Although the goal was to "stimulate someone to thoughts of his 
own," 
1781
 Wittgenstein remained concerned about what was going on and would no doubt be 
on-going – "more or less mangled or watered down"
1782
 appropriations of his thinking. Following 
Wittgenstein's lead, Lyotard's defence of "the civil war of language with itself"
1783
 may be thought 
"misleading"
1784
 and/or overpowering. Specifically, "Lyotard’s one-sided celebration of 
differences, fragmentation, and dissensus in agnostic language games"
1785
 is argued so 
forcefully that it brings him into direct conflict with Wittgenstein. Lyotard readily acknowledges, 
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of course, that he attempts to find his way ‘after’ Wittgenstein and argues that lineage may 
legitimate an approach insofar as "what comes after displaces what precedes it."
1786
 
Wittgenstein precedes Lyotard by acknowledging the question of his relations to other 
philosophers. Finding himself faced with the problem of inaugurating "new movements of 
thought"
1787
 Wittgenstein wonders whether he can "only think reproductively" and doubts if he 
"ever invented a line of thought."1788 Nonetheless, philosophy’s responsibility is to carry "out the 
work of clarification" and to do justice to the problems our philosophical forebears have created 
for us – otherwise thinking threatens to become "just a clever (language) game"
1789
 reproducing 
itself without rhyme or reason. The difficulty, then, is trying to find the best way to rephrase 
familiar – and familial – philosophical questions and disputes. The problem of translation is 
therefore already inscribed within philosophical inquiry in that it involves the act of changing 
words or texts from one idiom into another. Wittgenstein's conception of language illustrates the 
very nature of such a productive translation process. The "term language game"
1790
 attempts to 
transform the way we think about philosophical problems by bringing "into prominence the fact 
that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life."
1791
 Wittgenstein’s  speech 
acts rely on distinctive figures of speech, or the invention of "new similes"
1792
 to rethink traditional 
problems. Trying to contextualize a thinker’s relationship within the tradition is therefore 
important because it clarifies the ways philosophers actively link onto one another. Given this 
philosophical discourse, tradition effectively reproduces and questions the way distinct thinkers 
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Wittgenstein's phrase language game remains pivotal throughout Lyotard's questioning in that 
it turns on it in different ways.
1794
 Although Lyotard moves beyond Wittgenstein's philosophical 
investigations, it nonetheless provides the context for Lyotard's overall approach. Lyotard's text 
is not only phrased in the same way – as tangentially related "sketches"
1795
 divided into 
numbered parts – Lyotard's conception of the "number of phrase regimes"
1796
 goes on to 
rephrase Wittgenstein's "review of the multiplicity of language games."1797 Wittgenstein 
(indirectly) speaks for both Lyotard and himself when he notes that his "thoughts as 
remarks...travel over a wide of field of thought (that) criss-cross in every direction"1798 insofar as 
they remain "connected with the very nature of the investigation."
1799
 Wittgenstein and Lyotard, 
however, part ways in significant ways. Unlike Lyotard, Wittgenstein sets out to resolve phrases 
in dispute by way of the concept of language games. The concept is brought into being to avoid 
"the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of 
language."
1800
 Wittgenstein does not deny the philosophical importance of running head first 
towards language's barriers to understanding: a "philosophical problem has the form: I don't 
know my way about"
1801
 and the requirement is to find our way around. Consequently, what is 
at stake within Wittgenstein's investigation is the necessity of avoiding getting lost in no-win 
arguments – the way we argue about and with language concerns "the civil status of a 
contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem."
1802
 Wittgenstein is 
therefore concerned about civil strife within language, or its many different regions entering into 
conflict through their respective borders or hidden pathways. Wittgenstein's inquiry into 
language games is offered as a more conciliatory position, or as a way of reconciling language's 
disputes with itself. The goal of Wittgenstein's questioning is not to "refine or complete a system 
of rules for our words in unheard ways"
1803
 but to give "philosophy peace so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself into question."1804 Equally contradictory – and similarly 
missing from Lyotard's conflicting arguments – is that Wittgenstein provides a unifying standard 
for measuring – identifying and distinguishing – language's many different regions and 
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boundaries: that of family resemblance. Specifically, the concept of language-games is merely 
"set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by 
way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities."
1805
 Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
investigations can only be thought meaningful if it can have an "object of comparison – as, so 
to speak, a measuring rod…(since) we want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use 
of language."
1806
 Further, "what should interest us is the question, how do we compare these 
experiences, what criterion of identity do we fix for their occurrence?"1807 Wittgenstein proceeds 
to the concept of language games by way of analogy, or establishes an identity by relation 
between two ordered pairings via his actions  - i.e., actively refers to one thing to identify (fix) 
the occurrence of something else. Wittgenstein's point of comparison is the way linguistic 
experiences may be "related to one another in many different ways and it is because of this 





a language game may therefore be identified and differentiated in the same way that other 
games – board games, card games, ball games
1810
, etc. – traditionally are: via an examination 
of a "complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing."
1811
 Given the possibility 
of distinct relationships and/or similar ancestry, Wittgenstein "can think of no better expression 
to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances 
between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. 
overlap and criss-cross in the same way. I shall say: ‘games’ form a family."
1812
 The analogy of 
family resemblances, then, becomes critical to understanding the way language games relate 
to each other. The derivation of the phrase analogy – from the Latin analogia, meaning ratio or 
proportion
1813
 – can help clarify the relationships in question. Specifically, Wittgenstein's 
argument from analogy presupposes the possibility of two or more different things agreeing with 
each other in relevant ways. Most importantly, Wittgenstein's argument for the relevance of such 
an agreement insists on the relation of parts within a complex whole and proposes to measure 
their degree of proportionality or commensurability. Witness the way Wittgenstein's analogy can 
establish the link between the phrases 'language' and 'games'. Wittgenstein mobilises different 
"parts of language"
1814
 to draw a (family) resemblance between them, and he does this via a 
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ruling that permits movement from one region of language to another. As Riberio notes, the 
"epistemological relevance"
1815
 of such analogical reasoning calls on the very language brought 
into (a) question. Specifically, the "complex nature of analogy arises from its own nature, or is 
intrinsically inherent to it. Two entities or states of affairs are compared as they have a property 
or predicate in common. In structural terms, the link between all of the terms involved entails 
shifting from the entities compared to that property, or from the later to the entities it refers 
to."
1816
 Prior to Wittgenstein establishing the link between conceptually distinct phrases, the 
concepts of 'language' and 'games' would have otherwise been thought in conflict. Put another 
way, Wittgenstein's argument from analogy presupposes the very thing that Lyotard argues 
against – the possibility and/or necessity of translating seemingly disparate or heterogeneous 
phrases into a common language (game) or frame of reference.1817 Although Wittgenstein 
makes the analogy to question the very notion of essential linguistic features and boundaries, 
the role it plays there remains integral: to find unity in multiplicity and/or division.  Wittgenstein 
followed language's lead by arguing that the concept of 'language' – like the concept of 'family' 
– had porous boundaries and the requirement was to move through them in order to determine 
the ways we were "entangled in our own rules"
1818
 and relations. Lyotard's willingness to rule 
out or downplay Wittgenstein's intrinsic notion of family resemblance brings him into dispute 
with the genre of discourse enabling his own questioning.
1819
 The (performative) contradiction 
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is that the conflict between them can be resolved in a Wittgensteinian way: the only way we can 
make sense of Lyotard's relationship to Wittgenstein is through the very notion that Lyotard 
displaces – by establishing (and calling into question) their familial relationship. Nonetheless, 
Wittgenstein's unitary standard of measurement (identification by relation) inadvertently 
reintroduces the paradox of rule-following. If all families – like games – resemble each other in 
distinctive ways, it remains an open question as to how (dys)functional they all are or might 
become.
1820
 Family members – like game players – could either agree or disagree over a given 





Following the Paradox of Rule-Following Paradoxically 
 
We have observed that Lyotard and Wittgenstein conflict over the question of language. The 
phrase language game might be a standard frame of reference, but Wittgenstein and Lyotard 
refer to language in significantly different ways. We shall now observe the way Lyotard follows 
Wittgenstein's paradox of rule-following. Wittgenstein interprets away or downplays the paradox 
by identifying interpretation with understanding: determining the validity of a given rule becomes 
incorporated into the way it is already followed. Specifically, "there is a way of grasping a rule 
which is not an interpretation"
1822
 or has "yet another standing behind it"
1823
: acting this way is 
"exhibited in what we call obeying the rule and going against it in actual cases."
1824
 Lyotard, on 
the other hand, does not similarly assimilate interpretation and understanding: he plays up and 
reinterprets the paradox by placing the onus on acting out. Lyotard problematizes a rule's 
validity conditions by arguing that they can only become truly valid when our reasons for feeling 
and acting move beyond their prescribed limits and can be grasped in different ways (by being 
taken aback or further away). The way we would ideally understand a rule is through feelings 
of (say) anxiety or surprise – and we can only move past such limits by way of conflicting or 
alternate interpretations (rulings). Consequently, "rules become the main problem"
1825
 when the 
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limits of our understanding actively bring forth the paradox: we understand their limits when they 
conflict with each other or overrule conflicting interpretations. Lyotard attempts to resolve 
Wittgenstein's paradox in a paradoxical way – by following the question of the normativity of 
meaning in a performatively contradictory manner. Rules become the problem in the following 
way: while every course of action must be made to accord with the rules in question, courses 
of action must also be brought into conflict and/or question.  By placing the burden of proof on 
the content of feelings, however, Lyotard presupposes the way distinct intentional states may 
meaningfully relate to each other. Specifically, Lyotard's conception of affective phrases does 
two different things simultaneously – it appeals to subjectively and/or privately felt 'rulings' to 
determine the meaningful content of given feelings whilst presupposing the normative status of 
said feelings by way of a tacitly agreed upon public standard of moral correctness.  Lyotard 
thereby argues as if the feeling of being (say) surprised or anxious by arguments for Holocaust 
denial speaks for itself. Although Lyotard's concept of the differend does not identify an 
inarticulate affect phrase with the expression of feeling1826, a problem nonetheless remains: how 
can we determine the moral correctness of an emotional response without presupposing the 
validity of the very language games and/or phrase regimes in question? The problem of the 
criterion is particularly acute when the differend arguably enacts a self-evident or unquestioned 
moral presupposition. Lyotard evidently ascribes moral content to potentially conflicting or 
arbitrary feelings and so begs the question as to the moral status of an inarticulate phrase affect. 
It remains an open question as to whether it is possible to articulate (phrase) the feelings of 
anxiety or surprise in a morally correct (coherent, consistent) way. Perhaps that is why Lyotard 
calls on Kant's conception of sublimity to (paradoxically) arbitrate the moral question of phrases 
in dispute – such feelings arguably provide their own justification when pushing reason beyond 
its limits. The difficulty, however, is that the two philosophers are arguing at cross-purposes. 
Lyotard overrules Kant by displacing the question of "the immeasurability of nature"
1827
 and the 
feeling of being overpowered by a "formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in 
                                                
"the rule of the philosopher’s discourse has always been to find the rule of his own discourse. The 
philosopher is thus someone who speaks in order to find the rule of what s/he wishes to say, and 
who by virtue of that fact speaks before knowing the rule, and without knowing the rule. I think that 
this situation is comparable to that of the artistic avant-gardes…The artist is one who pinpoints in 
and by his work an aspect of those rules that had remained unquestioned. In this sense, s/he works 
and has been working as a philosopher", p.214-215. 
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 Kant's concept of the "dynamically sublime"
1829
 argues that there is an "agreeableness in 
the cessation of something troublesome"
1830
 when reason finally comes to terms with the "power 
that has no dominion over us."
1831
  Unlike Lyotard's conception of the differend, Kant insists on 
the superiority of the power of reason in that it has little reason to remain (say) anxious by "our 
own limitation in the immeasurability of nature and the insufficiency of our capacity to adopt a 




The paradox of rule-following, however, involves delimiting the way rules govern reasons for 
feeling and acting – i.e., in what way should courses of action accord with rules and/or conflict 
with them? Finkelstein observes that Wittgenstein's paradox concerns the performative status 
of prescriptions in that it "has its roots in the thought that there is always a gulf between the 
statement of a rule – a string of words – and the rule's execution or application."
1833
 The problem 
is bridging "the gulf between every rule and what it requires"
1834
 or trying to "block the infinite 
regress of interpretations"
1835
 determining a given rule's statements: how can an interpretation 
of rules begin or end without performing the very rules (interpretations) in question? The 
paradox, then, is that rules remain related to norms of conduct that may be either in accord or 
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conflict: by what standard may we evaluate the standard – or reasons – for feeling and acting 
without presupposing the very norms in question? Put another way: how is it possible to 
question the normativity of a rule without calling on equally problematic – or questionable – rules 
and norms in turn? The paradox of the normativity of rules raises distinct but related questions 
concerning the normative status of all meaningful interpretations and/or reasons for acting. As 
Araszkiewiczobserves, the "problem of normativity"1836 requires us to determine the "very 
concept of a reason for action"
1837
, or the tenability of the "distinction between motivating and 
justificatory reasons."
1838
 If our rules ultimately lie beyond rational motivation and justification, 
can we ever have reason – good or better reasons – to question the related norms for action? 
 
Wright provides a useful overview of the "dilemma"
1839
 by observing that the reality of rule-
following raises a "clutter of deeply perplexing questions of constitution and epistemic 
access."
1840
 Specifically, "wherever there are rules, there have to be facts about what their 
requirements are – and facts, moreover, which we are capable of knowing if the rules are ones 
whose guidance we are capable of receiving and acting on."
1841
  If rules "enjoin determinate 
mandates, permissions and prohibitions,"
1842
 the problem is determining the way they might 
lead us (astray) in undetermined situations. Wright goes on to suggest that three interrelated 
conditions must be met for rules to derive their paradoxical status as rulings.   
 
The objectivity condition: they have to issue their requirements independently and in advance 
of our appreciation of them…but what kind of fact can it be that, in a context which no one has 





Lyotard ontologically commits to the objectivity condition paradoxically, or as an 'object of an 
idea' that occurs independently of any given context of thought or action. The paradox is that 
Lyotard tacitly objectifies such an idea by arguing that the concept of rule-following has a quasi-
transcendental status: mandated rules are always already given in language and those following 
them would ideally break (transform, question) their mandates in turn.  Lyotard's paradoxical 
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commitment to rule-following thereby moves in two directions simultaneously: towards the 
possibility of meaningful accord and conflict.  Specifically, Lyotard acts as if the rules are 
objective in the sense that they issue their requirements in accordance with their directives and 
movements. Given the paradox of rule-following, it is not truth conditions and/or functions that 
render rules objective and/or necessary: we can never provide completely truthful statements – 
complete descriptions – of the conditions under which rules should be followed. Nonetheless, 
Lyotard argues as if his descriptions of rules exhibit the condition of being objectively true – by 
purporting to describe the way rules really are and/or should be. It might be true that there are 
no objective (i.e., external) reasons for rules to prescribe action, but their normative status 
remains conditional (subject to certain requirements being met and/or qualified by reservations). 
Rules provide us with reasons for acting in virtue of the 'language' (games, genres) reproduced 
and regulated through the very actions called into being and/or question. The rules of language 
may therefore be thought 'objective' – necessarily true and binding – in that they remain 
determined by their own system of governance, or governing authority. Rules remain internally 
related to the phrase regimes determining them as rules, and may be externalized logically 
(objectified) as an empirical social phenomenon (i.e., as an object of inquiry directed towards 
the question of the justification of norms of conduct and/or the legitimacy of social bonds). 
Consequently, determining a rule's conditions of possibility turns on the very paradox calling its 
validity conditions (objectivity, necessity) back into question. Lyotard's law of concatenation 
exhibits the performatively contradictory condition of given rules being objectively true or legally 
binding: its statement helps to specify the potentially questionable links between distinct parts 
within a complex whole.  As Lyotard states, "it is necessary to link onto a phrase that happens 
(be it by a silence, which is a phrase), there is no possibility of not linking onto it…to link is 
necessary; how to link is contingent."
1844
 The performative contradiction is readily apparent: is 
Lyotard's phrasing of the law a necessary (objective) truth or is it merely contingently true? In 
what way can it be linked to every (other) phrase – necessarily or contingently?
1845
 Lyotard's 
real objective is questioning the way the law of concatenation (ontologically) commits us to an 
unjust ruling. Specifically, Faurisson's Holocaust denial is concatenated in such a way as to 
make it possible to call into question the reality of the referent 'Auschwitz' – by actively denying 
the tenability of the links between phrases in dispute. If there can be no higher court of appeal 
– objective standard for adjudicating the (performativity of) competing statements – how can 
anyone prove the existence of the Holocaust when burying it in silence? If Holocaust victims 
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are divested of the means to argue for themselves, the law of concatenation legally permits the 
dispute to be referred to – transferred and translated – into the language game of the denier. 
The law cannot itself make a determination one way or another – it merely forces us to 
acknowledge that anyone vocally disavowing the Holocaust is "playing another genre of 
discourse, one in which conviction, or the obtainment of a consensus over a defined reality, is 
not at stake."
1846
 The paradox is that Lyotard finds such an unconvincing argument partially 
'convincing' anyway. Lyotard's philosophical background plays an active role in the 
"dilemma"
1847
 presented – he explicitly calls on the rules of logic or formal argument to validate 
the "logical mechanism of the double bind."
1848
 It is objective –  or objectified –  rules of inference 
that give rise to the differend as moral exemplar, where the validity of the argument is 
determined by its logical form, and not its moral or epistemic content. Lyotard might be able to  
fault the logic morally but such a questionable argument is not itself considered faulty on logical 
grounds.
1849
 The argument's links to conflicting phrase events are objectively determined (or 
overruled) by the requirements of language itself, and so become rational to a fault. 
 
The relevancy condition: if a rule is to lead us, it has to be that rule rather than any other rule 
whose guidance we are accepting – there have to be facts about the identity of the specific rule 
we intend to follow. But what kind of fact could it be that…such-and-such a response, or course 




The relevancy condition also figures paradoxically in Lyotard's conception of rule-following. The 
relevance of rules remains integral insofar as Lyotard seeks to distinguish between the legality 
of a given determination and the problem of justifying the legitimacy of the relevant rulings. The 
paradox is the nature of the relationship between general principles exercising legitimate 
authority over particular areas of activity and the legitimacy of their extensions (the act of 




 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 




 ibid.pp.5-6. Witness the way Lyotard renders the logic of Faurisson's argument – by citing the 
links between two contradictory statements via the logical operations of exclusion and implication. 
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extending limits in accordance with relevant rules). Consequently, whatever is said or done 
necessarily follow already predetermined and circumscribed rules. Such rulings can only take 
place in yet to be determined – open ended and potentially questionable – situations and 
contexts. Specifically, they just exercise their authority via given criteria of rationality, and it is 
in that way that rules prescribe and/or select actions. If we are to ‘follow’ the normative status 
of meaningful actions, the requirement is to determine the relevance of the rules (norms) and 
conditions in question. The relevancy condition, however, puts a constraint upon Lyotard's 
approach in that it produces an irresolvable conflict within Lyotard’s own questioning. Such a 
conflict goes to the heart of the source of the normativity of rule-following, and is perhaps best 
expressed as the contradiction between being ‘played’ (directed, governed) by language and 
‘players’ directing (determining the course of, extending) the events of language's relevance. 
Specifically, it gives rise to a conflict between the performative and the constative, or players 
who serve (follow) language and/or are supposed to be served (directed) by it. Witness the way 
Lyotard uses the concept of socially constituted rules to delimit the horizon of thought and to 
push thought beyond such horizons. Lyotard’s conception of the paradox of rule-following is 
directed towards enclosing thought with its circle(s) of understanding, ensuring that users play 
by the very rules they’re supposed to question and/or invariably bring into conflict. The paradox 
is that rules must retain their relevance if they can be relied on to guide and constrain linguistic 
activities. While he urges a distinction between facts and values, he nonetheless crosses the 
divide to bridge the perceived gap between the descriptive and prescriptive. Lyotard prescribes 
conflict and/or questioning as the preeminent linguistic value, or the ultimate fact of the matter 
determining the moral relevance of the rule-governed practices in question. Lyotard demarcates 
the question of language according to given criteria of relevance, and urges that there are 
certain facts about the identity of the rules that require us to identify and reinforce the separation 
of language from itself. Lyotard thereby argues that the question is trying to determine the 
relevance of the links between heterogeneous elements: in what way do the rules governing 
the occurrences of actions become questionable when phrases necessarily link onto and/or 
conflict with each other? Specifically, the standards of heterogeneity or incommensurability 
(identification by difference or non-uniformity) presuppose the very relevancy condition in 
question – the possibility of circumscribing (prescribing and/or evaluating) linguistic activity in 
accord with distinct criteria of relevance. Witness the way the relevancy condition plays an active 
role in Lyotard's conception of the differend: by calling (back) into question the moral relevance 
of a 'logical mechanism' asking genocide victims to prove that they were mass murdered.   
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The epistemology condition: the problem of accounting for our ability to follow the lead of 




Lyotard ontologically commits himself to the epistemological condition in a similarly paradoxical 
way. Such a commitment is the culmination of the role the objectivity and relevancy conditions 
paradoxically play in Lyotard's conception of rule-following. Lyotard argues that it is the interplay 
between the predetermined and the undetermined that determines the way we should follow 
the very rules in question. The epistemology condition problematizes the relation between the 
objective and relevancy conditions – by actively calling into question the ways they might be 
objectified and/or determined relevant. On the one hand, Lyotard maintains that the rules of 
language are already established or decided in advance by governing authorities (language 
games, phrase regimes). Rules become 'things' (the object of an idea, an observable standard 
or pattern of behaviour) determining our knowledge of linguistic course of events. Rules thereby 
set or impose limits by opening up and delimiting given linguistic pathways and interactions. 
Lyotard sets out to follow their lead (directives, contours) by delimiting 'language' in accord with 
the objectivity and relevancy conditions. That is to say, with respect to the way they issue their 
requirements independent of anyone actually following them and in terms of their distinctive 
identity criteria. On the other hand, Lyotard also maintains that the legitimacy of these rules can 
never be authoritatively (independently, completely) determined or settled one way or another. 
By following the lead of language, we may invariably come to realize that rules can either 
constrain the limits of our knowledge and/or push authorized actions beyond acceptable 
boundaries. Such legal constraints give us the authority to question the way they might remain 
relevant or objective. The interplay between the predetermined and undetermined therefore 
makes it possible to transform the way we relate to (follow) the rules guiding and/or justifying 
linguistic activities. All said and done, disagreeable feelings provide epistemic access to the 
paradox of rule-following – by directly leading thought to the possibility that there are other ways 
in which to interact with rules and their possible extensions. By placing the burden of proof on 
internal affective states, potentially arbitrary or indeterminate feelings may either conflict with 
each other or never be in accord. Given that Lyotard presents the differend in epistemic terms, 
we find us ourselves returning to the paradoxical status of the rules in question. The paradox is 
that Lyotard knows (rules) in advance that Fausisson's legally permissible argument is morally 
indefensible, and is selected (directed, followed) for that very reason. Lyotard presupposes that 
feelings of anxiety or surprise are morally correct (justified) responses in that the differend's 
mode of address would ideally direct everyone to feel similarly. Nonetheless, Lyotard 
presupposes the very thing in question when asking the differend to make its validity claim: the 




situation that Lyotard presents may 'speak' in a completely different way to others (lead to 
conflicting feelings like pleasure or amusement instead).
1852
 Although Lyotard’s phrasing 
indicates what he thinks we should all feel in this situation, he cannot provide a way of 
determining the epistemic and/or moral status of the very feelings in question. While there might 
not be a universally valid way to determine the legitimacy of the links between phrase events, it 
somehow remains possible and necessary to question the ways in which phrases may come 
into conflict or be legitimately linked. The resulting differend therefore acts as a moral corrective 
to the indeterminacy and/or contingency of linkages in that it presupposes (or entails) a 
universally valid emotional response anyway – as evident by the fact that the given phrase affect 
arguably provides its own evidence (testimonial, justification). By Lyotard’s reckoning, however, 
affirmation of a differend can only occur in the form of a negation since his discourse "denies 
itself the possibility of settling, on the basis of its own rules, the differends it examines."
1853
 
Lyotard resists reasoning that tends towards totality or integration for this very reason, and 
privileges phrase-affects in his ‘defence’ of the differend. The relation between thought and 
affect remains problematized, and occurs at the border between them. The problem, however, 
is that the borders appear to be porous in Lyotard’s own questioning. As Lyotard’s presentation 
of the differend attests, thought must be able to pass through and ‘absorb’ the conflicts 
(contexts, phrase universes) in question. The paradox is that Lyotard presupposes the 
possibility of translating incommensurable features of language into something that also exhibits 
the act of uniform movement (the act of transferring one rule into another so as to be able to 
claim that different rules or contexts cannot be transferred or compared on the same conceptual 
terrain). Lyotard’s questioning depends on the part/whole relation that his movements claim to 
throw into question: it somehow transcends the situation being presented (questioned) in that 
his thoughts move through and transfer the conflict (and context) in question. Specifically, 
Lyotard’s presentation (phrasing) of the phrases in dispute appears to originate in a 
performatively contradictory way: through the very act of stating (delimiting and/or 
contextualizing disparate parts/rulings). If Lyotard can bring these conflicting rules/parts into (a) 
question, we find ourselves directed back towards the question of contextualizing his overall 
movements or directives. The question therefore is: how can Lyotard’s conception of the 
differend present a phrase universe that transcends and/or acts against all possible situations 
and/or contexts of interpretation? We’ve argued in a performatively contradictory way: by 
transferring the phrases in dispute into an interpretive context that can be mutually understood 
and/or agreed (ruled) upon as a differend. Consequently, Lyotard's own questioning moves 
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and that such contradictory feelings are thought morally justified and/or truth-bearing. 
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 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.xiv. 
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against the contexts in question by following different rules of discourse into a context that 
somehow lies beyond further questioning and/or conflict. Lyotard's presentation of the differend 
presupposes a context of relevance that is interpreted (presented, situated) on two levels 
simultaneously – via the possibility of accord between the constative and the performative. Dunn 
presents the paradox best when he observes that "the terms in which the differend is described 
revive the cognitive systems which the differend protests."
1854
 Further, such presentations 
produce a "series of contradictions that…vitiate the differend’s ethic of total resistance and make 
it an unacknowledged apology for familiar ethical norms."
1855
 Lyotard’s differend therefore can 
only give expression to such feelings by presupposing "the language of norm and need in which 




While Lyotard’s felt response to Holocaust denial may be thought appropriate (suitable and 
fitting), the problem is the way such thinking can appropriate (actively bring forth, relate to) 
objectively relevant feelings. We trace the problem of arbitrariness and/or meaninglessness 
back to Lyotard's movements against Wittgenstein's family resemblance argument. Specifically, 
we still need an identity by relation to identify and distinguish the 'features' (normative content) 
of emotional terms and their relationship to linguistic rules.
1857
 The epistemic problem may 
therefore be phrased in the following way: how can we know that we are in agreement about 
the content of our feelings if a differend has rendered us all speechless or we have found 
ourselves without the words to give them meaningful expression? Although the requirement is 
to find a way to readdress the privation of meaning through the invention of new phrases, 
Lyotard overrules Wittgenstein by contradictorily committing himself to the intelligibility of a 
private language.1858 That is to say, where privately felt 'rulings' can somehow publicly state the 
(moral) case – despite the fact that an affect phrase is inarticulate and unarticulated, and 
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 Wendling, Beatrice. "Emotions: Various Language Games" in Baider, Fabienne and Cislaru, 
Georgeta (eds.) Linguistic Approaches to Emotions in Context (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
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 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), Nos.243–275, pp.89-96. We are referring, of course, to what has been famously 
called Wittgenstein's private language argument.  Specifically, where "the words of this language 
are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So 
another cannot understand the language." Given that there is considerable controversy as to 
whether there are one or many different related arguments being advocated here, we shall not 




 As Wittgenstein argued, however, "it is not possible to obey a rule 
privately"
1860
 or "give expression to inner experiences – feelings, moods and the rest"
1861
 – 
without a public "criterion of correctness"
1862
 to determine their meaning.
1863
 According to 
Wittgenstein, "an inner process stands in need of outward criteria"
1864
 since "the inner is tied up 
with the outer logically, not just empirically."
1865
 We can only meaningfully identify and 
distinguish the content of our intentional states via a publicly agreed upon standard of 
correctness, and such standards can only be judged correct(ly) if they remain part of an external 
and rationally observable world. If we are to follow Wittgenstein correctly here, we need to go 
further and argue that the differend also stands in need of a criterion of moral relevance or 
adequacy to determine the correctness of potentially conflicting or arbitrary feelings. If it is 
possible to determine the meaningfulness (correctness) of rule-governed language, the 
differend must also stand "in need of a justification which everybody understands"
1866
  and can 
agree (rule) on. 
 
The (logical) possibility of rigidly designating the reality of the referent.  
 
We are finally in a position to question Lyotard's conception of the reality of the referent. We do 
this for two related reasons 1) to bring together our observation of the role the objectivity, 
relevance and epistemology conditions paradoxically play in Lyotard's conception of the 
differend and 2) to argue that Lyotard's link to the phrase rigid designator produces a conflict 
incapable of being equitably resolved for lack of a rule applicable to both arguments. Lyotard 
and Kripke not only argue at cross-purposes, but the concept in question gets lost in translation. 
Lyotard's rephrasing of a heterogeneous term of reference may therefore be similarly called 
back into question via the language game of argumentation. The main difference between 
Lyotard and Kripke is whether the 'ontological argument' can be phrased as true or false. The 
issue that divides them, then, is the very 'reality' in question, or the way in which thought relates 
                                                
1859
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. "The Affect Phrase" in Crome, Keith and Williams, James (eds.) Lyotard 
Reader and Guide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp.104-105. 
1860
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations  trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), No.202, p.81. 
1861
 ibid, No.243, p.88. 
1862
 ibid, No.258, p.92. 
1863
 Wittgenstein seems to anticipate Lyotard here when he observes that "in the end when one is 
doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would just like to emit an inarticulate sound." 
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein goes on to say "But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a 
particular language game, which should now be described", No.261, p.93. 
1864
 ibid, No. 580, p.153. 
1865
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. 2 (Oxford: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1994), p.64. 
1866
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p.93, No.261. 
 244 
to (specifies, conceives) its objects. Our main, concern, however, is not to give an overruled 
and/or silenced phrase universe its due.
1867
 It's to permit the possibility of rigidly designating the 
reality of the referent 'Auschwitz' and the correctness of the corresponding emotional response 
to the differend.  
 
According to Kripke, the paradox of rule-following indicates that "all language, all concept 
formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible."
1868
 The "main problem is not, ‘How can we 
show private language – or some other special form of language – to be impossible?’; rather it 
is, ‘How can we show any language at all (public, private or what-have-you) to be possible?’"1869 
Kripke goes on to place emphasis on extensionality, or extensional contexts, to secure the 
(objective) reality of the referent. Kripke provides an outward criterion for internal thought 
processes to logically link the empirically meaningful content of intentional states and objects to 
an external (mind-independent) world. Unlike Lyotard, Kripke argues for the possibility of 
transcending given intentional horizons through recourse to a meta-discourse lying beyond the 
limits of language. The reality of the referent is approached from within the context of 
intentionality in that the state (quality, condition) of being actual or real remains contextually 
bound or related. Specifically, it determines the nature of the (intentional) relation between 
thought and language by attempting to delineate the tenability of the distinction between 
intensional and extensional contexts (the realms of meaning and truth respectively).
1870
 If the 
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 Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition 




 We have already elucidated the distinction between the intensional and extensional in our 
previous (Derrida) chapter. The distinction has gone by many names over the years and remains 
non-rigid due to its theory-ladenness. Suffice to say, let's non-rigidly designate such a philosophical 
term of reference by capturing its 'essential qualities' via the distinctions between meaning and truth, 
sense and reference, connotation and denotation, content and referent, concept and object, signifier 
and signified, propositional attitudes and propositions, intentional states and intentional objects, 
representation and represented, etc.  
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concern is the different ways in which thought can refer to (conceive, specify) its objects, 
Kripke's phrase universe intentionally relates to the question of the condition of its possibility in 
the following way: to what extent is it possible to refer to a language-independent reality via a 
linguistic frame of reference? Kripke's arguments rest on two related theses – the essentiality 
(or necessity) of origins
1871
 and the causal relationship between referring terms and the objects 
to which they refer.
1872
 Kripke argues that if it is necessarily true that an object is identical to 
itself, identity statements between referring terms must similarly obtain by necessity and/or 
truth.  As McDowell observes, what is at stake "is not the object's fitting a specification in the 
content of the thought but its standing in some suitable contextual relation to the episode of 
thinking."
1873
 The concept of rigid designator attempts to distinguish between intensional and 
extensional contexts by specifying the way reference must "constitute an extra-intentional 
relation between language or thought and objects."
1874
 The intensional and extensional is 
thereby said to "conform to the rule of rigidity"
1875
 via a "criteria of trans-world identity."
1876
 
Specifically, the reality of the referent is meaningfully determined and located by specifying the 
relationship between identical objects across distinct and co-referring (phrase) universes. 
Kripke's avowed essentialism argues that meaningful concepts make sense when they can pick 
out and refer to the same objects in all possible worlds. The concept of rigid designator thereby 
attributes essential properties to objects across counterfactual situations. If language is to 
designate rigidly, it must be able to satisfy the objectivity, relevancy and epistemology 





What do I mean by rigid designator? I mean a term that rigidly designates the same object in all possible 
worlds…(and) do not mean to imply that the object referred to has to exist in all possible words…  When 
I use the notion of a rigid designator, I do not imply that the object referred to necessarily exists. All I 
mean is that in any possible world where the object in question does exist, in any situation where the 
object would exist, we use the designator in question to designate that object. In a situation where the 
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object does not exist, then we should say that the designator has no referent and that the object in question 
so designated does not exist.1878 
 
The 'rule of rigidity' and 'criteria of trans-world identity' play an integral role in fixing the reality 
of the referent. As opposed to Lyotard, Kripke's conception of 'reality' is specified in modal terms 
in that the truth conditions of a 'referent' necessarily occur prior to, and independent of, the 
linguistic properties of given statements. If and when we make statements about what it possible 
or necessary, the concept of rigid designator rationally motivates language users to ask: which 
referent(s) – or referential relations – determines the truth conditions (objective reality) of the 
statements in question? Unlike Lyotard, Kripke's use of the term ontologically commits itself to 
the logical possibility of a multiverse that encompasses the totality of all possible worlds and 
existents. As the term trans-world itself designates, such a rational determination is only 
logically possible via a transitive relation: it presupposes the possibility of translating and/or 
transferring an identity of meaning between distinct worlds. Kripke's concept of rigid designator 
is therefore directed towards the question of the condition of its possibility (intelligibility), and 
delimits ontological realms of possibility, impossibility, necessity or contingency. In so doing, it 
qualifies statements in terms of their enabling and/or identity conditions: in what way can the 
referent in question be possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent? Kripke's use of the 
phrase rigid designator, then, presupposes identity relations across possible worlds to secure 
the independent reality of the referent: referring terms are not emptied of their meaningful 
content but filled with possibilities that may be called into question or being. Kripke argues that 
identity across possible worlds must be grounded by the qualities essential to the objects in 
question. Such an approach raises an important metaphysical question: if the same objects can 
(in principle) exist in more than one possible world, what is the nature of the links between 
them? Phrased another way: how do we determine whether logically distinct objects and/or 
possible worlds are in accord or conflict? Kripke attempts to fix the objective reality of the 
referent by establishing causal links to referring terms. Specifically, Kripke distinguishes 
between modal and essential properties to account for the necessary identity relations between 
worlds (referents).
1879
 Consequently, Kripke argues that possible worlds must first be identified 
and distinguished via stipulation,1880 and so specifies as a universal condition the need for 
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agreement between counterfactual situations. While the appeal to stipulation arguably 
reintroduces the problem of the criterion, Kripke insists that such a proviso helps us circumvent 
the spectres of relativism and arbitrariness. Given that reference may be said to obtain by (an) 
agreement with the reality in question, the requirement is to delimit a qualitative conception of 
referring terms – i.e., measured by or in relation to the referent's qualities across conceivable 
worlds. The stipulation neither discovers nor establishes 'reality' – it merely specifies the way in 
which objects are to be meaningfully referred to. The stipulation does this by following 
language's lead and (arguably) secures an extra-intentional relation between content and 
referent in accord with the given directives. In order to determine the modal properties of objects, 
we therefore don't need to make a ruling about what is really true or false in every possible 
world – we just need to locate logically conceivable possibilities within the relevant "causal or 
historical connection."
1881
 Let's cite two different examples of rigid designators – one referring 
to a "theoretical identity"
1882
 and another to an infamous historical entity. In both examples, 
Kripke describes what he calls the necessary a posteriori,1883 or statements of fact that are 
necessarily true. We shall similarly invoke the necessary a posteriori to fix the (moral) reality of 
the referent of 'Auschwitz'. 
 
According to Kripke, the theoretical identity statement 'Water is H2O' indicates that it is possible 
for the same referent to have two distinct – or co-referring – terms. In the world of everyday 
experience, water refers to a fluid substance essential for life and is typically identified with 
reference to distinctive qualities (liquidity, colourlessness, transparency, etc.). We already know 
this to be true because water necessarily refers to the liquid substance bearing (identifying) 
these essential qualities. It was subsequently discovered, however, that water may also refer to 
its molecular composition and has been identified with reference to the chemical formula 'two 
atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen'. Kripke argues that if water is H2O in the actual 
world, then water is necessarily H2O in every possible word. The co-referring terms rigidly 
designate the referent's essential qualities – otherwise anything that might be mistaken for 
'water' on (say) Mars cannot be meaningfully identified with it.
1884
 Kripke is thereby making two 
related claims – that the "origin of an object is essential to it…and the substance of which it is 
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 In the second instance, Kripke's thesis of the necessity (or essentiality) 
of origins is also invoked to rigidly designate the referent 'Hitler'. Kripke raises the question of 
whether the person necessarily answering to that designation was essentially evil.1886 In modal 
terms, the question becomes: are Hitler's moral attributes identical to his physical attributes in 
all possible worlds? Despite his "gut feeling"
1887
, the answer is "probably not"
1888
 because it is 
logically possible (conceivable) that 'Hitler' could have lived a different life and not gone on to 
commit mass murder. Hitler's moral identity is a matter of contingency and must be 
distinguished from his physical identity – even if the referring term 'Hitler' may rigidly designate 
that one and same person across possible worlds.
1889
 We can imagine situations where the 
term 'Hitler' could refer to an alternate (effective) history – where 'Hitler' (say) passed the 
entrance exam of the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna
1890
 or won the Second World War and 
established the Greater Nazi Reich with the Empire of Japan.
1891
 Either way, Kripke's causal-
historical theory of reference tries to fix the reality of the referent 'Hitler' by providing a qualitative 
criterion of identity – one that specifies the referent's essential qualities across possible worlds. 
So, how are such "causal or historical"
1892
 connections established and transmitted via an "initial 
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 We set aside the question of whether someone's moral identity is determined by nature or 
environment – or indeed, whether it is possible to separate the natural from the environmental 
anyway. See, for example, the journal Twin Research and Human Genetics for an ongoing inquiry 
into the problem of determining the heritability of traits within social contexts. Ironically, studies of 
identical and fraternal twins – separated at birth and/or growing up together – problematizes Kripke's 
example and calls into question the genetic makeup of moral identities across possible worlds. See 
Boomsma, Dorret, Busjahn, Andreas, and Peltonen, Leena.  "Classical Twin Studies and Beyond" 
in Nature Reviews Genetics, 3 (11), 2002, pp. 872-882 for an overview. We stress, then, the limits 
of Kripke's argument. The reason that it is possible to refer to Hitler as a morally troubling example 
because it highlights the problem of separating the essential (necessary) from the accidental (or 
contingent) within given environments.  
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School, but he did not meet the requirements to enter that either. A "necessary qualification for 
entrance into this school was a Leaving Certificate from the Middle School. And this I simply did not 
have. According to the human measure of things my dream of following an artistic calling seemed 
beyond the limits of possibility", p.29.    
1891
 Dick, K Phillip. The Man In the High Castle (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1962). Dick's novel 
famously explores the possibility of such an alternate history. Dick's 1956 short story "Minority 
Report" (London: Gollancz, 2002) also appears to be an unacknowledged inspiration for the Baby 
Hitler Paradox considered below. 
1892




 Although an original act of naming might figure centrally in identifying a referent, 
its reality (identity) precedes and acts upon such linguistic actions. The reality of the referent is 
independently fixed in its own way –  in relation to itself – and the issue is locating its objective 
reality within a temporal-causal network. The causal chain is already in motion via the object's 
pre-existing links to an objectively determined world, and the causal-historical connection 
between content and referent is mediated through social relations and/or rule-governed 
practices. The ontological status of the referent is therefore predetermined in that it necessarily 
agrees with the reality in question. Baby 'Adolf' didn't come into being or question,
1894
 for 
example, when initially referred to: Hitler's essential qualities (genetic makeup, relation to other 
family members) preceded the act of naming, and such a linguistic action interacted with – was 
brought about and transmitted – through intervening agencies. Consequently, "an initial 
'baptism' takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name 
may be fixed by a description"
1895
 and "passed from link to link"
1896
 within an "actual chain of 
communication."
1897
 It is our historical position within a causal chain that determines the reality 
of the referent, and (contra Lyotard) the links between 'reality' and 'referring term' can be neither 




We are finally in a position to determine the reality of the referent 'Auschwitz'. Our approach will 
serve a dual purpose – to mitigate against the possibility of counterfactual re-contextualizations 
of the reality in question and to ensure the normative content – moral correctness – of emotional 
responses to the differend. We shall be doing this in previously delineated terms – with respect 
to a normative conception of ourselves as rational beings.
1899
 That is to say, where a practical 
conception of our identities remains the question throughout effective history, and our being-




 We are all familiar with the moral problem posed by the following thought experiment: if you 
could go back in time and kill Hitler while he was still a baby, would you? The experiment is 
predicated upon the moral considerations of a counterfactual situation in a possible world – namely, 
would you murder an innocent baby to prevent mass murder in the future? The ethical problem 
derives, of course, from a logical paradox: how can we prevent the future from happening when it is 
already in the past? Equally paradoxical: in what way is it morally justifiable to prevent murder from 
happening by committing another murder in the first place – particular since the murders in question 
are yet to happen?  The famous question trended on social media on October 23
rd
, 2015 when New 
York Times magazine did a public poll. The Age anonymously reported some illuminating responses 
on the 24
th
 October, 2015. http://www.smh.com.au/world/nyt-magazine-asks-readers-whether-
theyd-kill-baby-hitler-20151023-gkhggy.html.  According to the chart posted on New York Times 
magazine's Twitter account https://twitter.com/nytmag/status/657618681204244480 , 42 % of 
respondents answered 'Yes', 30% answered 'No', and 28% answered 'Not Sure'.  
1895




 ibid, p.93. 
1898
 ibid, p.169 and p.195. 
1899
 We delineated this conception, of course, during our Gadamer discussion.  
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there can only be called into question via the distinction between motivating and justifying 
reasons. Indeed, only a normative conception of our identities – as beings committed to the 
question of their rationality - can justify such disconcerting 'feelings' to the differend. 
 
We have argued that Lyotard's conception presupposes the very thing in question – namely, 
the ontological status of the referent 'Auschwitz'. As opposed to Kripke, Lyotard argues that 
'reality' is a linguistic construct and that there is no essential (linguistically prior, inherent or 
fundamental) ontological connection between 'reality' and 'referring term'. The reality of the 
referent is therefore reduced to a rhetorical construction or mode of discourse: the referent's 
ontological status can only be properly determined – rigidly designated – in accordance with the 
context of its occurrence. The paradox of rule-following ensures that linguistic contexts can 
never be stabilized – ruled one way or another – and may overrule one another indefinitely. The 
performative contradiction is readily apparent: when Lyotard claims that 'the ontological 
argument is false' , he is making a truth claim (or argument) about ontology and so presupposes 
a universe of discourse – objective realm of relations and properties – that can be truthfully 
(rigidly) referred to in such a meaningful way. While Lyotard's argument might turn on the truth 
claim that 'nothing can be said about reality that does not presuppose it', his statement 
nonetheless returns us to our original problem: the rational status (reality) of the presuppositions 
thrown into question or brought into conflict. Witness the way Lyotard's ontological commitments 
enable and/or legitimate a questionable argument for Holocaust denial. Part of the problem is 
the way Lyotard rationally accommodates himself to the possibility of denying the objective 
reality of the referent. We therefore need to delimit the permissible range of conduct for linguistic 
interactions – i.e., the way such an argument should be ruled out of bounds or an instance of 
foul play. Although Faurisson's argument might be rationally motivated in a logical sense – acts 
in accord with given rules of logic – it cannot be thought rationally justified because it runs 
counter to other norms of conduct, or what is to count as fair play when playing language games. 
Lyotard's conception of language actively collaborates with Faurisson by allowing for a 
"counterfactual history."
1900
 Nonetheless, the differend may be made rationally accountable via 
the counter-argument that the ontological argument is true. Kripke's concept of rigid designator 
makes such a linguistic move possible via "counterfactual game playing."
1901
 Specifically, the 
                                                
1900
 Shermer, Michael and Grobman Alex. Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never 
Happened and Why Do They Say It?  (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), p. 263. 
1901
 Ibid, p.267. Although Shermer and Grobman are not talking about Kripke here, we invoke their 
phrase because of its relevance to the negation of history. As Gadamer's concept of effective history 
intimates, however, we need to distinguish between historical revisionism and any attempt to negate 
history. The one attempts to revise the historical record in accord with new discoveries or alternate 
interpretations while the other attempts to rewrite the record via distortions and evasions. See Alain 
Finkielkraut's The Future of a Negation: Reflections on the Question of Genocide trans. Mary Byrd 
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term 'Auschwitz' rigidly designates because it requires us to pick out the same things in all 
possible worlds. The referring term can only do this by following the rule of the necessity (or 
essentiality) of origins – by way of properties essential to 'Auschwitz's' identity as a historical 
phrase event. Let's identify 'Auschwitz's' essential properties as 'extermination camp through 
gas chambers'. We'll need to proceed carefully, however, and note a couple of things in 
advance. Firstly, the reality of these events is not dependent upon validation procedures, modes 
of presentation or intentional states. 'Auschwitz's' truth-value is independent of the question of 
whether its events can be proven, denied and/or presented. The question of the nature of its 
'reality' – being as non-being – remains answerable to (identical with, conditional upon) itself, 
and the possibility of validating 'Auschwitz's' events occurs after the fact. Secondly, 'Auschwitz' 
is not to be identified with the Holocaust and is (for the sake of argument) merely a theoretical 
identification or historical signifier. Although it might be true that over a million people were sent 
to and killed at 'Auschwitz', the term has also come to refer to millions of other people 
systematically mass murdered elsewhere.
1902
 The phrases 'Auschwitz' and the 'Holocaust' 
might have become synonymous – or synonyms – but they cannot be identified with each other 
out of respect for millions of civilians killed elsewhere. The problem of distinctive features bears 
witness to the fact that 'Auschwitz' was distinguished in relation to its ancestry – where the line 
of descent is an essential part of its identity. Specifically, historians distinguish between 
'Auschwitz One' and 'Auschwitz-Birkenau', and it is the latter place that is identified with the 
inconceivable in a causal chain. 'Auschwitz’s' identification with this subsequent development, 
however, merely reiterates the role the necessity of origins plays in our argument:
1903
 its physical 
existence became identical to death, and the concept of genocide was literally built into its 
foundations.
1904
 It is by way of stipulative definition that historians may identify the gas chambers 
with the essence of genocidal practices – and by extension – as being essential to (or identical 
with) the Holocaust. Thus, the claims that the chemical composition of Zyklon B and/or the 
physical nature of the camp remains essential to 'Auschwitz' follows on from rule-governed ways 
                                                
Kelly (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998) for an illuminating discussion of the distinction 
between revisionism and negationism.  
1902
 These other places include, of course, Chełmno, Bełżec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Majdanek and 
Trostenets. We also do an injustice to many of the murder victims by subsuming them all under the 
category of Jew. The Holocaust might traditionally be referred to as the genocide of Jews, but its 
many millions include non- Jewish victims, and we must resist the tendency to pass over their deaths 
in silence. 
1903
 'Auschwitz 1' was built in 1940 and primarily functioned as an internment camp for political 
prisoners. 'Auschwitz-Birkenau' was built in 1941 to literally accommodate the Nazi's desire for the 
mass murder of civilians.    
1904
 Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 47-51. Kripke discusses 
the identity of a wooden table, and notes that while the 'table' might be made of wood we need to 
distinguish between tables that appear to be identical to each other. Kripke's point is that if 
indistinguishable tables are made from different blocks of wood, they cannot be identified with each 
other – substance and/or ancestry are part of its identity. 
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of acting: the theoretical identification occurs in accord with the "causal (historical) chain"
1905
 
regulating and/or linking the referring term 'Auschwitz' to an objective reality that includes gas 
chambers and crematoriums. While it might be logically possible – conceivable – to ask whether 
the referent 'Hitler' should be identified with mass murder in all possible worlds, the same cannot 
be said for 'Auschwitz'. Hitler could have conceivably gone on to be an artist, but 'Auschwitz' 
came into being – was conceived – for this very reason. Given that 'Auschwitz' rigidly designates 
genocide in the real world, it must rigidly designate genocide in all possible worlds (phrase 
universes). The differend offends our moral sensibilities for the same reason. The reason being: 
the differend must ontologically commit itself to the value of truth if it is to call forth and justify 
our moral being. While Faurisson's argument might be rationally motivated, the differend cannot 
be rationally justified: it is a direct affront to reality. By acting with reason against reason, 
Faurisson's argument is not interested in persuasive argument and adds insult to jury by 
attempting to dissuade others from taking the pursuit of truth and/or rationality seriously.
1906
  The 
differend might provide a reason, but the reason given is without rational justification and 
disconcerts accordingly.
1907
 In devaluing the value of truth – or rule-governed evaluations of 
statements as truth-bearers – the differend negates reality when displacing the burden of proof 
onto victims lying beyond the rule of reason. 
 
 
                                                
1905
 Ibid, p.139. 
1906
 Sartre, Paul-Jean. Anti-Semite and Jew: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1976), pp.13-14. According to Sartre, "the anti‐Semite is impervious to reason and 
to experience…(and)…likes to play with discourse for, by giving ridiculous reasons, they discredit 
the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, since they seek not to 
persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert."  
1907
 The differend therefore stirs up negative emotions on related (or rational) grounds. 
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Chapter 5:  





Aims and Objectives: The aim of this chapter is to move beyond Lyotard's conception of 
language. We now turn toward Habermas's conception of the relation between critical thought 
and the linguisticality of understanding. The goal is to bring forth Habermas's attempt to rethink 
the relationship between the hermeneutical circle and traditional practice. We shall primarily 
direct ourselves towards Habermas's rational reconstruction of a pre-theoretical rule 
consciousness, and the role rules actively play in the language game of argumentation. 
Habermas offers a methodological approach to the problem of the historicity of understanding, 
and locates this problematic within the performative status of rule-following. Habermas 
approaches effective history via the performative attitude of linguistic actors, and emphasizes 
the possibility of reaching mutual understanding through rational criticism and agreement.  
Habermas argues in favour of a conception of the universality of reason as always already given 
in the linguisticality of understanding. Habermas argues that it is the rules of language that 
makes linguistic actions move back and forth in the circle of understanding. By proceeding in 
this way, rule-governed interactions remain inherently questionable (possible and/or necessary) 
and acquire a critical dimension. Habermas thereby proceeds from the following ontological 
standard: to be is to be directed towards (potentially competing) rulings in action contexts. Our 
overview of Habermas's procedural approach will follow his lead in three interdependent parts. 
In the first part, we outline Habermas's overall approach and situate his way-making movements 
within the context of effective history. In the second part, we explore the way Habermas lays 
the foundations for universal pragmatics, and determines the conditions of possibility for 
reaching a rational understanding across contexts of interpretation. In the third part, we explore 
Habermas's theory of communicative action, or attempt to provide a critical theory of linguistic 
interactions.  
 
Situating Habermas Within the Tradition In Question.  
 
We begin by acknowledging Habermas’s relation to the question of the historicity of 
understanding. Following Habermas, we shall understand this question as the problem of how 
to critically evaluate a historically effected consciousness.
1908
 We acknowledge this intentional 
                                                
1908
 Gadamer, Hans–Georg. Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1996), p. xxxiv. If we recall, Gadamer's concept urges that 
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relation in advance because Habermas takes the problem of competing interpretations as a 
guiding question. Habermas is primarily concerned with the performative status of linguistic acts 
within effective history, and so directs himself towards the problem of legitimating linguistic 
practices and actions. In adopting Gadamer's "paradigm of mutual understanding"
1909
 
Habermas emphasizes "the performative attitude of participants in interaction, who coordinate 
their plans for action by coming to an understanding about something in the world."
1910
 
Habermas attempts to move beyond Gadamer by way of Wittgenstein, and argues that it is our 
ability to follow rules that may be called back into question. Habermas purports to be able to 
circumnavigate the circle of understanding by providing a rational reconstruction of the "intuitive 
rule consciousness"
1911
 of language users and so brings into our historically effected 
consciousness "those concepts and rules that underlie experience insofar as it can be couched 
in elementary propositions. The analysis focuses on general, indispensable, conceptual pre-
conditions that make (linguistic) experience possible."
1912
 Habermas's rational reconstruction 
may be said to "acquire a critical function"
1913
 in that it "explicates the conditions for the validity 
of utterances."
1914
 According to Habermas, mutual understanding and agreement occur when 
we know what makes our linguistic acts "acceptable"
1915
 , and we may know how to accept such 
actions because they "interpret themselves" through their "self-referential structure."
1916
 The 
circle of understanding is where "the identity and validity of rules are systematically 
interconnected"
1917
 and the "identity of the rule in the multiplicity of its realizations"
1918
 remains 
conditional upon "the intersubjectivity of its validity."
1919
 Habermas thereby provides a 
                                                
"understanding is at once the consciousness effected in the course of history and determined by 
history, and the very consciousness of being thus effected and determined."   
1909
 Habermas, Jürgen. "An Alternative Way Out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative 
Versus Subject Centred Reason" in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. 




 Habermas, Jürgen. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Cooke, Maeve (ed.) On The Pragmatics 
of Communication (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998) p.33. 
1912
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Philosophy as Stand In and Interpreter" in Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007), p.6.  
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences" in Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen 




 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p.297. 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions and Lifeworld" in 
Cooke, Maeve (ed.) On The Pragmatics of Communication (Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1998), p. 217. 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A 






consensus criterion for truth, or situations that may be accepted as true in accord with the 
possibility of rational agreement. Specifically, the "rational structure of action orientated towards 
reaching understanding is reflected in the presupposition that actors must make if they are to 
engage in this practice at all. The necessity of this must"
1920
 should be interpreted in "a 
Wittgensteinian...sense"
1921
 and corresponds to the way linguistic forms of life regulate 
themselves. Given the fact such regulations are "inescapable" there is an "inevitability stemming 
from the conceptual connections of a (learnt) system of...rule-governed behaviour."
1922
 The 
"language game of argumentation"
1923
 is privileged over all other language games insofar as it 
provides the way to question and/or evaluate the "public space of reasons"1924 in accord with 
"criticizable validity claims."
1925
 Every rule-governed linguistic practice and action is criticizable 
in the sense that their reason for being there remains open to intersubjective questioning and 
assessment: the public space of reasons may thereby become fair game throughout effective 
history. Particularly critical is the role certain – specific, inevitable, irrevocable – presuppositions 
actively play in Habermas's rational reconstruction of an intuitive rule consciousness. While 
Habermas recognizes that the historicity of understanding remains context-dependent, the 
possibility of reaching mutual understanding through agreement is supposedly not context-
bound. Habermas argues that there are universal and necessary presuppositions directing all 
linguistic interactions throughout history, and these "idealizing presuppositions"1926 validate the 
circle of understanding's directives and movements. Specifically, Habermas's rational 
reconstruction purports to "reproduce pre-theoretical knowledge…in an essentialist sense"
1927
, 
and "if true…corresponds precisely to the rules that are operatively effective in the object 
domain – that is, to the rules that actually determine the production of"
1928
 the linguistic 
interactions in question. Given the inevitable contradiction between linguistic ideal and historical 
reality, delimiting the domain of objects – rules and their possible extensions – becomes the 
critical question. Habermas argues that the possibility of rational discourse or disagreement 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "From Kant's Ideas of Pure Reason to the Idealizing Presuppositions of 
Communicative Action" in Truth and Justification trans. Barbara Fultner (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1998), pp.85-86. 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "Freedom and Determinism" in Between Naturalism and Religion 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p.175. 
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of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1984), p.119. 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms trans. William Rehg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1996), p.230. 
1927
 Habermas, Jürgen. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" in Cooke, Maeve (ed.) On The Pragmatics 




"begins with the counterfactual assumption that universal agreement is possible" 
1929
 and 
maintains that "communicatively acting individuals must commit themselves to pragmatic 
presuppositions of a counterfactual sort."
1930
 Habermas thereby rules that "a set of unavoidable 
idealizations forms the counterfactual basis of an actual practice of reaching understanding, a 
practice that can critically turn against its own results and thus transcend itself. Thus the tension 
between idea and reality breaks into the very facticity of linguistically structured forms of life."
1931
 
Habermas's rational reconstruction, then, is ontologically committed to the ideal of the 
universality of reason acting over and above particular linguistic contexts and actions: the 
historicity of understanding is reason in action and "the transcendent moment of universal 
validity bursts every provinciality asunder, the obligatory moment of accepted validity claims 
renders them carriers of context-bound everyday practice. Inasmuch as communicative agents 
reciprocally raise validity claims with their speech acts, they are relying on the potential of 
unassailable grounds. Hence a moment of unconditionality is built into factual processes of 
mutual understanding."
1932
 Habermas understands the historicity of understanding to be a 
problem insofar as there can be no getting around the interpretive nature of historical thought 
or practice. Indeed, any interpretation can only occur within the "context of effective history"
1933
, 
which simultaneously acts as "the locus of continuing tradition"
1934
 and critical thought bringing 
traditional thought (back) into question. Following Gadamer, Habermas urges that "the effective 
history of cultural traditions and formation processes unfolds… in the medium of questions and 
answers."
1935
 It is only within the "horizon"
1936
 of a given understanding that the objects of 
thought can be meaningfully presented and/or situated (i.e., rationally determined and 
questioned). Consequently, access "through the understanding of meaning of itself makes the 
rationality problematic unavoidable."
1937
 While the question of "immanent rationality"
1938
 "always 
require an interpretation that is rational in approach"
1939
, the "very situation that gives rise to the 
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problem of understanding meaning can also be regarded as the key to its solution."
1940
 
Habermas presents this situation as "the philosophical discourse of modernity"
1941
, and situates 
it within the problem of history needing "to create its normativity out of itself."
1942
 The problem 
of the criterion thereby finds expression in the understanding that historical practice cannot 
simply derive "the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another 
epoch."
1943
 The experience of history therefore provides its own narrative or interpretive 
framework in which to ask (and answer) questions.  Modernity can never take the issue of its 
normativity as a given – it must always direct thought back to the problem of historicity of 
understanding itself. While Habermas’s thought must obviously be distinguished from the 
thinkers that have preceded him in our movement around the circle (Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Derrida and Lyotard respectively), they have nonetheless all found themselves circling around 
the question of the reciprocal relationship between thought and language. The question of their 
intentional relation has remained integral because there can be no breaking out of the circle – 
thought is obliged to question the ways it remains directed upon the objects of its own 
understanding. Following Heidegger’s ways of thinking, we have seen that this thought occurs 
within the context of an interpretation urging that we always already find ourselves moving within 
an understanding of being,
1944
 and such movement determines how we are directed towards a 
meaningful world disclosed in language. Specifically, the historicity of understanding can only 
be presented (rendered meaningful) within the horizon of the language in which it is situated 
and/or projected. Habermas, however, is critical of Heidegger’s attempt to undermine the role 
of rational thought within the circle of understanding. Heidegger’s "critique of reason in terms of 
the history of Being"
1945
 is thought to render the problem of truth meaningless. Heidegger’s 
preoccupation with the ontological difference is said to pay little "attention to the difference 
between reason and understanding" and so "levels reason to the understanding."
1946
 Given 
Heidegger’s attempt to understand what cannot be understood (Being) in language, thought is 
directed towards "the interpretation of a meaning"
1947
 that circumvents the possibility of rational 
scrutiny and evaluation. The "propositionally contentless speech about Being has… the sense 
of demanding resignation to fate. Its practical-political side consists in…  a diffuse readiness to 
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 Ibid, p. 145. 
 258 
obey in relation to an auratic but indeterminate authority."
1948
 Heidegger’s speech acts "attunes 
and trains its addressees in their dealings with pseudo-sacral powers."
1949
 Given this movement, 
Heidegger "fails to see that the horizon of the understanding of meaning brought to bear on 
beings is not prior to, but rather subordinate to, the question of truth."
1950 
 
Habermas initially turns towards Gadamer to expand upon the horizon of meaning brought to 
bear on the understanding of beings. Habermas's primary goal is to bridge the divide between 
'truth' and 'method' via the "universalist promise of reason,"
1951
 and he makes his approach 
through the possibility of "the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims."
1952
 
Habermas argues that Gadamer’s appeal to authoritative (traditional) knowledge is a historical 
move against reason because "the background consensus of established traditions and 
language games can be a consciousness forged out of compulsion"
1953
 and/or potentially 
illegitimate power plays. Given this problematic, there must be at least one rational criterion for 
distinguishing (moving back and forth between) reason and understanding. If hermeneutics is 
to justify its claim to universal truth, it must also question the horizon of its meaning – and it can 
only question the being of its questioning via methodological considerations. Specifically, 
hermeneutical understanding "is conducive to a critical confirmation of the truth only to the 
extent that it subordinates itself to a regulative principle which requires universal communicative 
agreement within an unlimited community of interpretation."
1954
 The normative status of 
modernity should therefore remain an open question, or as being in a nascent state –  as a 
"post"
1955
  set up to mark the direction and status of reason’s movements within effective history. 
This brings us, then, to a question that Habermas – like Lyotard – finds himself directed towards: 
the question of what is at stake when trying to legitimate knowledge claims in historical practice. 
Specifically, where does legitimacy reside when following the rules of language games and/or 
necessarily calling one another's linguistic actions (back) into question? Although Habermas 
criticizes Gadamer for downplaying the role of power relations in language, he does not want to 
claim (like Lyotard) that "knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who 
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decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?"
1956
 Habermas actively 
resists reducing the force of an argument to arguments of force,
1957
 and argues in favour of the 
possibility of being rationally "motivated solely by the unforced force of the better argument."
1958
 
Habermas understands the problem of legitimation in terms of the uncoerced power of reason 
and argues that rational force is embedded in the structure of linguistic interactions opening 
themselves up to the possibility of criticizable validity claims. Consequently, we may talk of the 
"transcending force of universalistic validity claims"
1959
 and historical (or a historicized) reason 
remains capable of resolving the crisis of its legitimation when preserving "at least one rational 
criterion" to "explain the corruption of all rational criteria."1960 Indeed, any attempt to reduce the 
circle of understanding to the authority of tradition fails to do "justice to the rational content of 
cultural modernity."
1961
 A historically effected consciousness can only become thus critical (i.e., 
determine the rationality of the reasons given and taken there) if it remains directed towards 
"the idea of reason derived from the tradition"
1962
  in question. Habermas calls this rational 
criterion "the principle of universalization as a rule of argumentation,"
1963
 and it presupposes a 
normative conception of our practical identities. Specifically, it concerns the coordination of 
"plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms 
of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims"
1964
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "Introduction" in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays trans. 
William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), p.vii. We quote the translator’s 
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The concept of effective history may be similarly invoked to determine the rationality of 
Habermas’s reasoning. As Freundlieb observes, Habermas "continues to be one of the most 
important and influential thinkers today."
1966
 Habermas remains ‘effective’ insofar as his project 
had "made lasting contributions"
1967
 in a range of cultural practices and/or intellectual 
disciplines. Further, Habermas’s thought presents a "continuing reflection on the way in which 
the work of critique itself may be articulated and grounded."
1968
 The question remains, of course, 
as to how effective Habermas's thought should be. Habermas would be the first to argue that 
historical importance (cultural standing) and influence (authority) are to be distinguished from 
the concepts of truth and validity. Habermas’s institutional or normative status as a 
contemporary thinker begs the original question of effective history.  Witness the way Fish 
argues that "any positive reference to Habermas in the course of argument is enough to 
invalidate it."
1969
 Our cultural critic – a proponent of the relativistic concept of interpretive 
communities
1970
 – denies that the very situation giving rise to the problem of understanding 
meaning can also be regarded as the key to its solution. Fish urges that  "the insight of historicity 
– of the fashioned or constructed nature of all forms of thought and organization –  is too 
powerful a weapon for those who appropriate it to attack the projects of others; for it turns 
against them when they attempt to place their own project on a (universally pragmatic) 
footing."
1971
 Habermas is understood to have placed himself in the awkward position of 
"acknowledging as inescapable the condition of historicity, but claiming nevertheless to have 
escaped it."
1972
 In other words, Habermas's attempt to ground critical interpretations of historical 
thought or practice become self-contradictory and merely reinstates the problem of legitimating 
the historicity of understanding. Lyotard argues that "the problem of legitimation"
1973
 cannot 
move in the "direction of a search for universal consensus…(or) a dialogue of argumentation"
1974
 
since it is not "possible for all speakers to come to an agreement on which rules or meta-
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prescriptions are universally valid for language games."
1975
 Consequently, the "principle of 
consensus as a criterion of validation"
1976
 is itself invalid because the "legitimacy of any 
statement"
1977
 and the "regularisation of the moves permitted in all language games"
1978
 is 
precisely the problem of (effective) history. Dews offers a more sympathetic interpretation and 
notes that Habermas has "tried, in different ways, to pull off what looks like an impossible 
balancing act. On the one hand, he has sought to be thoroughly post-metaphysical" by 
renouncing "the claim to provide an interpretation of the world as a whole. Yet on the other 
hand, he has struggled to hold onto the (more traditional) notion of the inner relation between 
reason and history."
1979
 If effective history – or the totality of reciprocal effects – determines the 
way reason acts, the performative status of Habermas's own speech acts can only be properly 





Witness the way the problem of the relation between part and whole has invariably found its 
way into interpretations of Habermas. Despite its (relative) effectiveness in history, Habermas 
has observed that he has frequently been misunderstood and laments that his writing has failed 
to "awaken the hermeneutic willingness requisite for its reception."
1981
 Habermas’s inability to 
reach complete or satisfactory understanding obviously throws into question the performative 
status of his own questioning. Piecemeal understanding and/or conflicting interpretations raise 
the question of the relation between the "partiality for reason"1982 (being rationally motivated) 
and the partiality of reasoning (motivated rationality, being prejudiced).1983 Steinhoff argues that 
modernity’s predisposition towards dissensus are all the evidence we need that Habermas’s 
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 Dews, Peter (ed.) Habermas: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p.1. 
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Giddens complains that the relation between part and whole is enacted – and problematized – by 
the purview of Habermas's own questioning: is the whole greater or less than the sum of its parts? 
Often "where one would like to see evidence presented to support a view that is proposed, a table 
is offered instead – as if the way to overcome objections is to pulverize them into conceptual 
fragments." Habermas’s "puritanical formalism" and tendency to write in "the grand manner" acts as 
if that is the way we can determine the truth or validity of his own reasoning. Although it is "impossible 
not to be impressed with the encyclopedic range" of Habermas’s thought and "marvel at the treasure 
trove of the critical commentary on others" interpreters have to "do a lot of work trying to puzzle out 
the relation between some of the main arguments." 
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 Dews, Peter (ed.) Habermas: Autonomy and Solidarity – Interviews with Jürgen Habermas 
(London: Verso, 1986), p.51. According to Habermas, "the partiality for reason has a different status 
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 We shall return to the distinction between rational motivation and motivated rationality, a 
distinction brought into question by Gadamer's rational conception of prejudice.  
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"theory of communicative action fails as a theory and a diagnosis of the era and fails as a 
defence of modernity as well."
1984
 Habermas's failure to awaken such a hermeneutic willingness 
is attributed to the fact that there is "no criteria and means"
1985
 provided by modernity to regulate 
different interpretive frameworks and communities – if only because "reason and argumentation 
are still not sufficient to guarantee rational agreement between rational people in normative 
questions."
1986
 Rational procedures "cannot provide us with any objective or universally 
intersubjective criterion of normative validity" when interpreting "the norms it propagates."
1987
  
Benhabib counters, however, "the fact that the theory of communicative action"
1988
 cannot 
resolve the problem of its own legitimacy or provide an "answer to all these questions is not an 
argument against it, but for it… it is no argument against such a theory that it does not answer 
all the questions it raises. The issue is: does it succeed in generating future research 
hypotheses which are fruitful and subject to refutations?"
1989
 Either way, the relation between 
reason and history thereby threatens to raise the spectres of relativism and circularity. As Lafont 
notes, the "problem is that the attempt to place the constitution of meaning under the control of 
universal validity claims runs into an in-principle difficulty: for something to be true…it must first 
of all be meaningful. For only when something is already meaningful, only when speakers are 
already in agreement about the interpretive framework in which to consider that about which an 
understanding is sought, can they question the truth."
1990
 The problem of the constitution of 
meaning threatens to present a vicious circle – namely, situations resulting "in the impossibility 
of isolating the acceptability conditions of speech acts from the background knowledge that 
determines these conditions and thus makes possible the understanding of speech acts."
1991
   
Habermas attempts to resolve this difficulty with respect to the "performative attitude we have 
to take up if we want to reach an understanding with one another."
1992
 Such an intentional 
relation "demands an orientation toward reciprocally raised, criticizable validity claims"
1993
 that 
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occurs "against the background of others who are potentially present"
1994
 and/or in potential 
agreement. From "the possibility of reaching understanding linguistically, we can read off a 
concept of situated reason that is given voice in validity claims that are both context-dependent 
and transcendent: ‘Reason is, in this sense, both immanent (not to be found outside concrete 
language games and institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we can use to criticize 
the conduct of all activities and institutions)’."
1995
  The relation between part and whole may 
therefore be thought complex if and when we can recognize "the unity of reason only remains 
perceptible in the diversity of its voices."
1996
 By orienting ourselves towards criticizable validity 
claims, the regulative idea of reason lends "unity and organization to the situation interpretations 
that participants negotiate with each other."
1997
 Habermas’s thought has undergone various 
changes and refinements in this way.
1998
 Habermas’s questioning is motivated by the search for 
truth, and has sought the unity of reason via divisible reasons called into being and/or question. 
The relation between a historically determined reason and a rationally unfolding (or ideally 
regulated) history is therefore mutually attuned and reciprocally related in language.  
 
Habermas’s concept of communicative action has remained integral to this pursuit of rationality 
in effective history, and recurs across many different texts communicating the linguistic activities 
in question. As Cooke notes, communicative "rationality refers primarily to the use of knowledge 
in language and action"
1999
 and reflects a "mode of dealing with validity claims"
2000
 that have 
their basis in the "formal specifications of the structural characteristics of possible forms of 
life."
2001
 Given this condition of possibility, Habermas’s linguistic interactions are as influenced 
as they are influential. They take their lead from Gadamer's conception of the historicity of 
understanding and Wittgenstein’s interpretation of language, and push our historically effected 
consciousness in a different direction – towards an understanding of forms of life that cannot be 
reduced to context-specific rulings. Such activities are directly tied to the practice and/or rules 
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of argumentation, where reason arguably determines the effectiveness (ruling, validity) of 
linguistic interactions brought into potential conflict or question. Consequently, Habermas’s 
thinking remains a part of the effective history in question, and seeks to transform the context 
of Gadamer’s and Wittgenstein’s questioning.
2002
 The question, of course, is whether 
Habermas’s appropriations can themselves be thought effective (valid). In reconstructing the 
rules of language through arguments with others, Habermas purports to follow the rules of 
discourse when seeking to reach an understanding through communicative actions. 
Habermas’s attempt to (re)formulate the rational presuppositions of communicative acts itself 
presupposes performative attitudes potentially brought into conflict or question – it involves 
adopting an intentional stance towards the rules of argumentation and is orientated towards the 
possibility of securing their own validity conditions. Specifically, Habermas’s reasoning has 
proceeded via a critical engagement with other thinkers similarly motivated by the search for 
normativity and/or truth within a contested space of reasons. Habermas’s interpretations have 
attempted to bridge the divide between traditions of thought, and include debates with 













 Habermas’s performative attitude remains faced with the problem of its rational 
status in effective history. We thereby find ourselves presented with a questionable situation in 
re-turn: to what extent can the project of reconstruction be consistent (or cohere) with the effects 
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of history? This situation remains a question insofar as Habermas’s communicative actions 
remain directed towards the possibility (or anticipation of) completion. Such a projection is 
effectively the reason Habermas (like anyone else) argues in effective history: attempting to 
decide the rationality of reason is arguably incompatible with a context invariably mobilized 
against (contesting) its reasons for being-there. While Habermas attempts to contextualize and 
historicize reason, the questions remain: to what extent – or in what ways – may Habermas’s 
own knowledge of language be contextualized and/or thought reasonable? Following 
Habermas’s lead, we approach these questions in two related parts and determine their 
relationship to one another within the complex whole in question. In the first part, we follow 
Habermas as he questions the hermeneutic claim to universality, and provides an answer in the 
form of a corrective – that of universal pragmatics. In the second part, we follow Habermas 
towards a theory of communicative action, or the argument that rational criticism becomes 
necessary (possible and/or questionable) via the universal rules of language.    
 
Universal (or formal) Pragmatics – the conditions of understanding.  
 
Habermas follows Gadamer by taking the question of the universality of understanding as his 
starting point. He purports to depart from Gadamer when calling for a more "critically self-aware 
hermeneutics" that "links understanding to the principle of rational discourse"
2009
 and ideally 
culminating in a "theoretical reconstruction"
2010
 of language. As we have already seen, Gadamer 
claims that "Being that can be understood is language. The hermeneutic phenomenon here 
projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of what is understood, 
determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its own relation to beings as 
interpretation."
2011
 Habermas interprets Gadamer’s inference from the universality of 
understanding to the universality of language as an illegitimate move. Part of the problem is 
Gadamer’s conception of effective history begs the original question. Specifically, how can the 
medium of language mediate (distinguish and move) between a true and a false historically 
effected consciousness? Conversely, Habermas is also concerned about the possibility that 
language is the very medium in which the difference between truth and falsehood can be 
concealed. Habermas is critical of Gadamer’s conception of the historicity of understanding 
because it is understood to reduce the normativity of rational standards to the authority of 
linguistic tradition (inherited patterns of thought, practices of given standing, etc.). According to 
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Habermas, it is the institutional nature of tradition that needs to be "called into question"
2012
 – if 
only because the historicity of understanding can act against the interest of reason. 
Nonetheless, history’s partiality for reason remains the way thought can identify and reflect upon 
its own practices. Consequently, Gadamer’s dialectic of question and answer "fails to recognize 
the power of reflection that unfolds" in the understanding, one that critically questions "the 
tradition from which it proceeds and to which it returns."
2013
 Gadamer’s unquestioning 
appropriation of tradition is thought to be inappropriate for a reason moving against the principle 
of reason itself. Tradition’s "claim to truth"
2014
 must not correspond to "agreement about tradition 
itself"
2015
 and the "antithesis between authority and reason" can never "be rescinded 
hermeneutically."
2016
 Indeed, "reason, as the principle of rational discourse, is the rock on which 
existing authorities exist, not the one on which they are founded."
2017
 On Habermas’s 
interpretation, "the tradition is objective in relation to us in the sense that we cannot confront it 
with a claim to the truth on principle…Gadamer infers the ontological precedence of linguistic 
tradition over criticism of all sorts: we can, it follows, bring criticism to bear only on given 
individual traditions, since we ourselves are part of the encompassing traditional context of a 
language."
2018
 Such an identification "leads to the ontologization of language and to the 
hypostatization of the traditional context."
2019
 According to Habermas, we need to identify and 
reflect upon the circle of understanding itself – by moving within a horizon enabling rationally 
justified and criticizable questioning. Specifically, the interest of reason "requires that the 
hermeneutic approach limit itself. It requires a system of reference that transcends the context 
of tradition as such. Only then can the tradition be criticized. But how is such a system of 




Habermas provides an answer by way of a "formal analysis"
2021
 of a self-referential system 
thought to simultaneously transcend and move within the context/s of tradition. He calls this 
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analysis "universal pragmatics" 
2022
 and says that its immediate goal is to "identify and 
reconstruct universal conditions of mutual understanding."
2023
 Given this proposed 
reconstruction, Habermas’s speech actions remain directed towards the "general 
presuppositions of communicative action…aimed at reaching understanding" through the 
"validity basis of speech acts."
2024
  According to Habermas, "the principle task of speech act 
theory is to clarify the performative status of linguistic utterances"
2025
, and such clarification can 
be done with respect to their "double structure"
2026
, or "inherent reflexivity."
2027
 That is to say, 
concerning their propositional content (what is said about the world) and their illocutionary force 
(what is done with said actions). The inherent reflexivity of the system of reference  formally 
analysed is said to "make explicit the self-referentiality that is already contained in every speech 
act."
2028
 The true "object of understanding"
2029
 is neither the content of speech acts or the 
intention of speakers "in specific situations but rather the intuitive rule consciousness that a 
competent speaker has of his own language."
2030
 A rational reconstruction attempts to make 
itself conscious of "the rules according to which the lexicon of language is constructed."
2031
 The 
validity basis of speech acts is said to be already built into the rationality of linguistic interactions, 
and "the task of reconstructive understanding"
2032
 is to translate intuitive (or "pre-theoretical"
2033
) 
knowledge into a formal (or conscious) critical theory. Habermas’s attempt to reconstruct the 
universally valid basis of speech acts therefore presupposes an important distinction between 
intersecting levels of knowledge and/or rule consciousness. Habermas's claims to reconstruct 
an intuitive rule consciousness into "categorical knowledge"
2034
, and the reconstruction is said 
to depend on the "operation of conceptual explication"
2035
 validating the raising of "universal 
validity claims"
2036
 when "performing any speech act."
2037
  Following Ryle, Habermas 
distinguishes between know how (a tacit ability or understanding of rules) and know that (explicit 
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knowledge about how such an understanding occurs).
2038
 More specifically, it is where someone 
"knows how to use the system of rules of his language and understands their context-specific 
application, he has a pretheoretical knowledge of this rule system which is at least sufficient to 
enable him to produce the utterance in question…The interpreter, in turn, who not only shares 
but wants to understand this implicit knowledge of the competent speaker, must transform this 
know-how into explicit knowledge, that is, into a second level know-that."
2039
 Within the context 
of a rational reconstruction, the requirement is locate understanding within an in "between."
2040
 
According to Habermas, understanding is only possible if thought can move between the 
linguistic poles of social accord and discord. Such a possibility turns on the pivot of 
intersubjectivity, or the constitution of publicly shared (communicable) meaning and norms. 
Accordingly, "reaching an understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the 
presupposed basis of validity claims that are mutually reciprocated" 
2041
 and determined.  If and 
when something is thrown into question or generally misunderstood, the possibility of real 
communication breaks down and cannot continue. The "task of mutual interpretation, then, is to 
achieve a new definition of the situation that all participants can share" and this can only occur 
when "participants presuppose that they know what mutual recognition of reciprocally related 
validity claims means."
2042
 The question of the self-referentiality of language – and its relation 
to context – remains integral. Language’s self-referentiality makes it possible to validate 
problematic knowledge claims through the process of reasoning and/or giving (questioning and 
evaluation) of competing reasons. Habermas's goal is to stabilize context so as to rationally 
ground (contextualize) the performativity of language. The meaning of linguistic interactions 
may therefore be rationally grounded (validated) over and above given statements. That is to 
say, if contexts may trans/form the meaning of statements, they can nonetheless be stated in a 
context-independent form. Specifically, "a performative expression is either available or, if 
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Habermas thereby identifies and reconstructs four universal conditions of possible mutual 
understanding.
2044
 These four validity claims are said to be presuppositions built into speech 
acts – they already presuppose a claim to appropriateness (interpreted as something adequate 
or relevant to meaningful expression), and are appropriated (may be taken as a given) 
accordingly. Specifically, the claim to comprehensibility, a claim to truth, a claim to normative 
rightness, and a claim to the truthfulness of speakers. These conditions are understood to be 
universal insofar as claims to validity can be raised and validated with respect to every possible 
speech act. A speech act is said to be comprehensible when meaningfully expressed 
(understood and acted upon) via the grammatical rules of language. Speech acts are also said 
to have truth-values insofar as the expressed content is intended to share knowledge about an 
objective world. And they must be expressed truthfully in that whatever is done occurs with 
sincerity. Finally, the chosen (speech) action is performed against a shared normative 
background (with respect to established norms and regulations). Understanding therefore 
becomes conditional upon the validation of potential speech acts. The question of implicitly 
raised validity claims is correspondingly used to ground three kinds of related speech acts: the 
constative, the regulative and the expressive. Specifically, the constative refers to the possibility 
of making true or false statements about the world, and involves giving grounds for their 
presupposed truth-value. The expressive refers to the possibility of showing subjective thoughts 
or feelings through linguistic actions, and presupposes truthfully expressing them in action. The 
regulative refers to speech acts regulated against a given normative context, and involves acting 
in accord with accepted and/or understood norms. Habermas stresses that the raising of distinct 
validity claims typically occurs simultaneously and may not be formally expressed (thematized) 
as such. To cite the example of requesting a glass of water. It is possible to contest the validity 
of the request in relation to the context occurrence. Specifically, the request (while 
comprehensible) might be thought invalid because of its normative rightness (a student asking 
a teacher during a lecture) and/or it might be invalidated with respect to its true intent (student 
trying to disrupt the teacher’s lecture) and/or it might be falsified because of the legitimacy of 
the request (there are no glasses of water within the immediate vicinity).  Given this model of 
reality, Habermas purports to be able to link the validity basis of speech acts to the "rational 
foundation of illocutionary force",
2045
 or the way rational thinkers are obliged to enter into a 
relationship with (act upon) one another. If someone were to make an assertion, for example, 
they are trying to reach an understanding "in such a way that the latter can take up an 
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 Although Habermas initially identifies four conditions, three tend to figure centrally insofar as the 
first (the claim to comprehensibility) makes the others possible/meaningful. Throughout his 
subsequent writing, Habermas therefore prefers to focus on three claims to validity and links these 
claims to a threefold relation to the (life)world.     
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 with them against a background of shared presuppositions. To "be 
understood in a given situation, every utterance must at least implicitly establish and give 
expression to a certain relation between the speaker and her counterpart. We can say that the 
illocutionary force of a speech act consists in fixing the communicative function of the content 





If the goal of speech act theory is to clarify the performative status of utterances, Habermas 
claims that such clarification occurs in relation to their double structure, or inherent reflexivity. 
According to Habermas, speech acts are reflexive in the sense that their propositional and 
illocutionary parts occur on two levels simultaneously. That is to say, by acting upon speech 
actors through the establishing of relations (illocutionary force) and trying to reach an 
understanding about the world (propositional content) accordingly. In this way, speech acts 
make an offer that can either be accepted or rejected by potential respondents. The 
(illocutionary) point of Habermas’s reconstruction is to try and determine the way linguistic 
interactions acts may become culturally acceptable in institutional (organized and administered) 
settings. Speech acts therefore have the performative status of a cultural ‘institution’ – they are 
an established activity that has been brought about and regulated for a specific purpose, and 
they actively institute (bring about) interactions for rationally motivated reasons. Specifically, 
where the "reciprocal binding and bonding relationship has a rational basis"
2048
 and the 
corresponding validity claims can bring about mutual understanding across institutional settings. 
Habermas distinguishes between two institutional settings – the institutionally bound and 
institutionally unbound. The distinction is meant to capture a difference between the 
specification of contextual conditions and the way their actions may be thought binding across 
contexts. With "institutionally bound speech acts, specific institutions can always be specified. 
With institutionally unbound, only general contextual conditions can be specified – conditions 
that typically must be met for a corresponding act to succeed…To explain what acts of betting 
and christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting or christening. By contrast, 
commands or advice or questions do not represent institutions but types of speech acts that 
can fit very different institutions."
2049
 In the first instance, the institution of christening remains 
bound by very specific conditions and the corresponding action can be specified via the context 
of occurrence. In the second instance, the speech act of (say) questioning is not bounded per 
se: it can only be specified (contextualized, institutionalized) in relation to norms of action and 
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may transcend the given context of occurrence. Habermas's analysis emphasizes the 
institutionally unbound because the question of their performative status remains indeterminate 
and open to questioning. 
 
We’ve observed Habermas identify and reconstruct the conditions of possible understanding. 
Habermas does this by specifying the general presuppositions of speech acts, and the role they 
actively play in reaching agreement through an understanding. Specifically, by determining the 
validity basis of speech acts and their orientation towards rational understanding. These 
idealizing presuppositions include the raising of truth, normative and/or sincerity conditions 
across contexts of interpretation. We now turn to Habermas’s attempt to specify the conditions 
of possible understanding against the background of tacit – and potentially questionable – 
knowledge claims. Habermas raises the question of the legitimation of social institutions and 
specifies the conditions for questioning the legitimacy of the norms of cultural modernity. The 
normative issue –  as Habermas understands it – involves the colonization of the lifeworld by 
systems and he attempts to legitimate the meaning of the lifeworld through the question of 
communicative acts. Habermas thereby attempts to rethink the way context/s determine the 




The Theory of Communicative Action.  
 
Habermas follows tradition by distinguishing between the natural and historical–hermeneutic 
sciences, and urges that this "continuing dualism …finds expression in the coexistence of two 
distinct frames of reference."
2051
 Despite the different theoretical frameworks, Habermas’s 
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 It is worth noting that Habermas does this within the context of understanding (delimiting) cultural 
thought or practice. Specifically, Habermas problematizes the logic of the social sciences, or the 
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knowledge claims. Habermas not only recognizes that a theory of culture is one practice 
(interpretation) amongst others, he attempts to provide the most meaningful (truthful) horizon for 
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acts. The task ahead of us, then, is to explore the way Habermas attempts to delimit (contextualize) 
his own interpretation, and determine its relation to the performative status of the conditions of 
possible understanding. 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. On The Logic of the Social Sciences trans Shierry Weber Nicholsen and 
Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge: The MIT Press,1988), p.1-2. Although the German publication of this text 
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thought, and note that Habermas’s conception of a dualism between sciences (following Dilthey, 
amongst others) continues in The Theory of Communicative Action. It is also worth noting the 
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primary concern is the way "competing approaches have been developed"
2052
 in the one frame 
of reference – and that the "approaches of general theories cannot be applied in the same way 
as the objectified natural processes."
2053
 Habermas wants to reframe the hermeneutic sciences 
in "action theoretic terms"
2054
 via the question of "interpreting meaning."
2055
 Given this 
understanding, it should be possible to provide a framework in which to present and situate 
(interpret) respective knowledge claims. The question of their presentation and/or situation is 
understood to be meaningful if we can critically evaluate what is said and done in effective 
history. Habermas’s goal, then, is to urge a "relative legitimacy"
2056
 to competing "theoretical 
approaches"
2057
 within the cultural sciences since their object of inquiry – "meaningful cultural 
entities handed down by tradition"
2058
 – must "bear the tension of divergent approaches"
2059
 and 
conflicting claims to validity. According to Habermas’s own approach, the question of relative 
legitimacy can only occur within a framework that allows for claims to universality – namely, one 
that directs itself towards the "problem of rationality" by "way of interpretive understanding."
2060
 
In this way, we can have a "critical"
2061
 hermeneutics, one that provides a rational framework 
which "does not relate to established lines of research as competitor…it attempts to explain the 
specific limitations and relative rights of these approaches."
2062
 Consequently, "rationality has 
less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire 
and use knowledge"
2063
 when reaching an understanding. Specifically, "rationality is understood 
to be a disposition…expressed in modes of behaviour for which there are good reasons or 
grounds"
2064
 and may be evaluated (acted upon) accordingly. According to Habermas, "we 
understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. From the standpoint of the 
speaker, the conditions of acceptability are identical to the conditions for his illocutionary 
                                                
contrast between Lyotard, who claims that (effective) history has given rise to a different conception 
of the sciences – specifically, where the natural and cultural sciences may now be subsumed under 
the hermeneutic (or self-interpreting) concept of narrative. 
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 Given this characterization, speech acts interpret themselves in that they identify 
the conditions in which they can be accepted. Their self-referential structure permits 
respondents to adopt a performative attitude towards the way/s knowledge is acquired and/or 
used. Understanding occurs when a respondent may "take a yes position on the claim raised 
by the speaker"
2066
, and so understands the context of their occurrence (reason for being, 
general contextual conditions, etc.). The theory of communicative action therefore attempts to 
broaden the horizon of the meaning of practical reasoning. Such meaningful interactions admit 
of a "wider concept of rationality": that of "rationally motivated conviction" brought about via the 
"force of argumentative speech."
2067
 As Habermas claims "every action orientated to reaching 
an understanding can be conceived as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming at 
situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognized."
2068
 Indeed, these ‘situations’ provide 
(or help define) the contexts in which understanding becomes possible and/or problematic. 
Habermas invariably came to the understanding that what constitutes good reasons or grounds 
can never occur independently of contexts of interpretation. The "neutralizing (of) context"
2069
 
works against the very notion of moving within a horizon of meaning and/or trying to reach a 
different understanding. Consequently, we also need to introduce "validity claims that are not 
directed toward truth conditions or tailored to the relationship of language to the objective 
world."
2070
 Instead, what is required is a context that allows for the constitution of meaning – 
and the question of our being in the world would itself be constitutive of the problematic of 
understanding. The question of being in the world directs thought to the "circular process that 
takes place between …the linguistically prior interpretive knowledge that discloses the world for 
a linguistic community" and the way our "knowledge of the world is acquired and expanded" 
through questioning of "antecedent interpretive knowledge."
2071
 Given our being-there, there 
can be no ground zero and/or there may always be better (or competing) reasons for thinking 
and acting in a world effectively disclosed throughout history. Indeed, it is for this reason that 
we have the problematic of reason, and Habermas’s argument is forced to introduce "the 
concept of lifeworld as the correlate of the processes of reaching understanding."
2072
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Specifically, there already always is a "context forming lifeworld that serves as a resource for 
processes of reaching understanding."
2073
 The lifeworld situates interpretations by presenting 
"contexts of relevance"
2074
  through an "action situation"
2075
 and "moveable horizon."
2076
 A 
context of relevance not only defines and "stores the interpretive work of preceding 
generations"
2077
, it acts upon historically situated beings in such a way that they will invariably 
find themselves questioning the normative content (direction, relevance) of said actions. It is 
against this "background knowledge" that speech actors "draw their interpretations"
2078
 and/or 
may inform potential contexts of relevance when bringing certain presuppositions to the 
foreground. Habermas’s correlate of the lifeworld is supplemented by what he calls the three 
worlds to which speech actions relate, or the "relatively foregrounded knowledge"2079 of contexts 
of relevance. These three worlds – that of the objective, subjective and intersubjective world – 
actively bring forth the way rational subjects relate to their background knowledge as an 
intentional horizon. Rational subjects "already find themselves within the context of a lifeworld 
that makes their communicative actions possible, just as it is in turn maintained through the 
medium of these processes of reaching understanding. This background, which is presupposed 
in communicative action, constitutes a totality that is implicit and comes along prereflexively – 
one that crumbles the moment it is thematized; it only remains a totality in the form of implicit, 
intuitively presupposed background knowledge"
2080
 that may be partially called into question 
and consciously thematized. Consequently, the "formal reference system of the three worlds" 
permits access to the lifeworld "through the medium of interpretive efforts, in the sense of a 
cooperative negotiation of situation definitions."
2081
 The lifeworld –  and corresponding three 
world relations –  form a complex whole insofar as they provide a linguistic worldview 
(interpretive framework) and mediate interactions within potentially moveable horizons of 
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meaning and/or validity. What is "at issue here is a situation specific horizontal knowledge and 
a topic-dependent contextual knowledge."
2082
 The lifeworld might provide background 
knowledge, but the three worlds involve a frontal relation to whatever is presupposed within 
"cultural systems of interpretation."
2083
  The three world relations thereby give expression to 
(foreground) the possibility of raising validity claims across contexts of relevance in the lifeworld. 
Specifically, when reaching an understanding, there is an objective world of meaning that we 
can all understand or refer to (the clock is on the wall), a subjective world referring to the inner 
state of speech actors (I'm running late!), and an intersubjective world of norms regulating said 
actions (clocks are used to tell time instead of as Frisbees). According to Habermas, rational 
agents "always come to an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their lifeworld is formed 
from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions…and situation 
definitions…The world concepts and corresponding validity claims provide the formal 
scaffolding with which those acting communicatively order problematic contexts of situations, 
that is, those requiring agreement, in their lifeworld, which is presupposed as unproblematic."
2084
 
The only problem is that such a "linguistic worldview"
2085
 threatens to be "reified as the world 
order"
2086
 and may not be seen as an "interpretive system open to criticism."
2087
    
 
Habermas directs us, then, to the problem of reification, or the objectification of linguistic 
worldviews in effective history. Reification is where an interpretive system is misunderstood as 
an objective reality and/or loses its performative status as a ‘mere’ interpretation open to 
questioning and/or criticism. To quote Bourdieu from another context, reification involves 
mistaking "the model of reality for the reality of the model."
2088
 While there have been different 
ways in the which the world has been reified throughout history, Habermas’s primary concern 
is rationalization, or the interpretation of modernity through standards of rationality placing 
emphasis on systematic organization and efficiency. Given the "loss of (true) meaning and 
freedom,"
2089
  Habermas remains faced with the problem: where can legitimacy reside in a world 
effectively subject to rationalization as reification? Specifically, he attempts to identify and 
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reconstruct the conditions of a (more) legitimate understanding, and he does this through his 
conception of communicative rationality.  Habermas identifies the legitimation crisis of society 
as "the colonization of lifeworld"
2090
 by systems, and he attempts to restore legitimacy to the 
lifeworld through the problematic of communicative action. 
 
Habermas adopts a two-level theoretical model of society, and the question is the way these 
two levels interact with each other in effective history. Following the tradition Habermas actively 
questions, these may be called the action- theoretic and system-theoretic models of reality. 
Habermas’s goal is to situate them within a more complex model of reality. Habermas attempts 
to account for the way social practices become systematically differentiated from each other as 
society simultaneously tends towards standardization and integration. The critical problem is 
allowing for the possibility of reaching an understanding across cultural interpretations – i.e., 
enable standards of rationality and contexts of relevance not reducible to a given system or 
rationale. A critical theory needs to "conceive of societies simultaneously as systems and 
lifeworlds."
2091
 Habermas urges that the "distinction between a social integration of society, 
which takes effect in action orientations, and a systemic integration, which reaches through and 
beyond action orientations, calls for a corresponding differentiation in the concept of society 
itself."
2092
 The model of system/lifeword is therefore an attempt to locate distinct social relations 
and practices within the context of effective history, and determines how reification as 
rationalization effectively colonizes (occupies and rules over) other contexts of relevance. 
Specifically, reification is where economic and legal systems colonize the "culturally transmitted 
and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns."
2093
 Indeed, rationalization threatens 
to affect the transmission and reproduction of the lifeworld by enclosing it within a vicious circle. 
When the lifeworld is mediated through the dollar sign or is increasingly subject to 
bureaucratization, reason potentially loses its capacity for questioning and/or self-criticism. The 
problem is not rationalization per se, but the fact that it exhibits "countertendencies"
2094
 to "action 
orientations"
2095
 and "value generalization."
2096
  The tension between action theoretical and 
system theoretical models of the world is thought to be particularly critical here. Specifically, 
"value generalization is a necessary condition for releasing the rationality potential immanent in 
communicative action. This fact by itself would entitle us to understand the development of law 
and morality, from which value generalization originates, as an aspect of the rationalization of 
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 The difficulty, of course, is that the generalization of social values acts against 
the rationality of communicative actions – by "steering"
2098
 the circle of understanding in the 
direction of rationalized standards.  
 
Habermas distinguishes between two typologies of action that (broadly speaking) can be 
mapped onto a distinction between rational action and social rationalization. The question of 
their rationality turns on the way reason coordinates actions within the lifeworld, and the issue 
is whether the reasons for acting intersect and/or can determine their respective performative 
status there. While the distinct typologies roughly correspond to a distinction between reaching 
an understanding through speech acts and the act of organizing something through a given 
rationale, both actions reside within the lifeworld and occur within the medium of language. 
Habermas therefore proposes two-fold reasons for acting, and the question is the way their 
reasoning may be distinguished and/or related to each other in a rationalized society. 
Specifically, Habermas primarily distinguishes between communicative and strategic actions by 
way of their "respective mechanism for action coordination."
2099
 Strategic actions are typically 
"interpreted in utilitarian terms; the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends 
from the standpoint of maximizing utility and expectations of utility."
2100
 The strategy is to use 
other actors to achieve specified goals by way of "egocentric calculations of success"
2101
 – to 
bring about situations whose value is determined in accordance with self-interest and means-
end rationality. Communicative action, on the other hand, is where individuals have objectives 
other than the maximizing of utility. Instead, individuals pursue activities "under the condition 
that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions" and 
"through acts of reaching understanding."
2102
 And it is only possible to reach an understanding 
through "the binding and bonding energies of language itself."2103 Given this distinction, the 
mechanisms for coordinating actions can be distinguished thus: that of "reaching 
understanding, which motivates convictions, and that of exertion of influence, which induces 
behaviour."
2104
 Although strategic action presupposes communicative action – speech acts are 
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typically used to bring about desired situations – communicative actions are not to be identified 
with situational (context specific) standards of rationality. Communicative rationality transcends 
given situations or contexts by questioning the standards of reasoning and/or reasons for acting 
– i.e., communicative acts may question whether strategic actions are truly reasonable and/or 
should be thought valuable (pursued). The relation is one of part to whole, and the question of 
the rationality of reason can only occur within the context of a belief system subject to rational 
questioning and/or criticism. It is where the totality of our beliefs and actions may be 
"thematized"
2105
 by way of "validity claims"
2106
 "traced back to (the) three basic modes"
2107
 
corresponding to three–world relations: that of the constative (speaking truthfully), expressive 
(speaking sincerely) or regulative (speaking rightfully). The question of what makes speech acts 
acceptable (valid) becomes intelligible (defensible, criticizable) in relation to other beliefs and/or 
reasons for acting in the world. Specifically, speakers could ideally appeal to "potential reasons 
that could be brought to bear for it. The reasons interpret the validity conditions and to this extent 
are themselves part of the conditions that make an utterance acceptable."
2108
 Given the relation 
between part and whole, one might think that Habermas is predisposed towards a coherence 
theory of truth. Specifically, where meaning and validity are parts tending towards internal 
coherence and consistency (integration) – i.e., meaningfully occur with respect to other beliefs 
and/or (potential) reasons for acting. The theory of communicative action, however, locates the 
question of truth elsewhere: within a community of interpreters seeking consensus via the 
possibility of rational discourse (potential discord directed towards mutual understanding and 
agreement). The reason for this displacement is readily apparent: rationalization attempts to 
make potentially questionable beliefs cohere while rational discourse permits us to question the 
way the parts may or may not remain coherent (answerable for themselves). Habermas 
therefore offers a consensus theory of truth directed towards a concept of reason that remains 
in (potential) disagreement with itself. Such a dialectical conception of reason problematizes the 
very notion of a rational consensus by arguing that rational discord is reason acting in accord 
with its directives – and it is the language game of argumentation that determines the 
performative status of agreements via the dialectic of question and answer. Communicative 
"rationality is embedded in language games in which the participants take a position on 
criticizable validity claims."
2109
 Habermas approaches the lifeworld’s meaningful content as both 
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the problem and solution to colonization – its potentiality for meaning permits rational actors to 
question the agreements reached in (an) understanding. Specifically, Habermas urges that the 
truth-bearer (acceptability conditions) of speech acts is related to the possibility of rationally 
motivated agreements "binding and bonding"
2110
 language users. The relation between 
meaning and validity can only properly obtain when we can understand what makes our speech 
acts acceptable, and such a relation is only possible when we can determine (agree upon) the 
reasons for rationally accepting such actions. The question of their performative status can only 
take place within a context of relevance, and what makes a context particularly relevant 
(meaningful) is when interpreters can make them universally relevant (valid). This is where the 
three world relations – and corresponding validity claims – come into play in the language game 
of argumentation. That is to say, where objective, intersubjective and/or subjective relations 
may be related to conditions of truth, normativity and/or sincerity. The three validity claims – 
that of "propositional truth, normative rightness and subjective truthfulness"
2111
 give expression 
to the "threefold relation to the world of communicative agents."
2112
 In this way, the reciprocal 
binding and bonding relationship acquires a rational basis throughout effective history – and so 
may determine the question of the rationality of our being-there. Competing validity claims may 
therefore become subject to rational critique because they presuppose a shared world 
(historicity of understanding) that can be built up and held in being and/or broken down and 
thrown into question. Speech situations effectively become ideal in history – directed by 
idealizing presuppositions – insofar as they interpret conditions of validity by way of "achieving 
understanding in language."
2113
 The possibility of such an achievement "suggests a rationally 
motivated agreement…measured against criticizable validity claims"
2114
 that remain 
"counterfactual."
2115
  Specifically, where knowledge claims remain subject to the possibility of 
reversals in direction in the circle of understanding. While our interpretations "aim beyond 
contingent and local contexts" the phenomenon of understanding nonetheless remains "rooted 
in the facticity of everyday practices."
2116
 Habermas’s questioning thereby gives expression to 
an "ideal speech situation"
2117
 defined – and situated –  by the dialectic of question and answer. 
Such a situational definition can only meaningfully occur through the "ritualized competition for 
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 The ritual of argumentation ideally "motivates"
2119
 rational thinkers to 
accept the "forceless force of the better argument"
2120
, or a "single right answer"
2121
 in the form 
of the most acceptable interpretation that remains open to questioning. 
 
Critical Discussion (part 1) 
Aims and Objectives  
The aim of the following is to bring Habermas into indirect dialogue with Lyotard. We attempt 
this roundabout discussion by bringing the double bind of the differend into conflict with the 
double structure of speech acts. The paradox of rule-following remains integral, and turns on 
the problem of the sources of normativity and its relation to our practical identities within the 
language game of argumentation. Specifically, if the conception of ourselves as normative 
beings rationally motivates and/or justifies our actions, the critical question is: where does the 
rationality (normativity) of reason lie?  Put another way: what is the rule for following a rule when 
it is the very normativity of rules that bring our linguistic interactions into question and/or conflict? 
As Bogen observes, the problem is whether Habermas's "theoretical fetishization of a 
vocabulary of rules"
2122
 can coherently lead to a critical theory of society: if rules already govern 
conduct within prescribed areas of linguistic actions, in what way can socially acceptable rules 
direct us towards transforming the very practices in question? We are therefore faced with the 
problem of "the incoherence of 'rules' as a privileged theoretical construct"
2123
 from the outset. 
Pleasants goes further by asking if a theory primarily concerned with justifying the practice of 
rule-following can answer "the question of how exactly, and in virtue of what, critical theory is 
supposed to achieve its much-vaunted criticality."
2124
 Part of the problem is that Habermas's 
procedural approach sets out to theoretically justify what we (allegedly) already know on an 
intuitive level anyway: critical theory thereby threatens to become "purely theoretical 
contemplation in lieu of substantive social critique"
2125
 and transformative action. Particularly 
questionable is whether "the ‘problem’ of theoretical grounding"
2126
 can ever be a "real, practical 
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problem…(instead of) a purely academic one; the point of a critical theory is surely not, or not 
just, to persuade other professional theorists, but rather to persuade"2127 'practitioners' of all 
persuasions to act against the very rules in question.
2128
 Following Lyotard's lead, we may 
therefore ask "is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, as Habermas 
thinks?"
2129
 or do we also require "a theory of (language) games which accepts agonistics as a 
founding principle"?
2130
 We have already seen that Lyotard consistently argues in accord with 
the "civil war of language with itself"
2131
 and urges that "the war is not without rules, but the rules 
allow and encourage the greatest possible flexibility of utterance."
2132
  It is important to stress in 
advance, however, that Lyotard will now lead from behind and merely provides a way to 
contextualize warring impulses within Habermas's own linguistic actions. Our objective is to 
identify a differend within Habermas's conception of language. We shall turn Habermas's 
criticism of performative contradiction against him and argue that the performative attitude is 
performatively contradictory – if only because it is the circle of understanding that performs 
(motivates and/or justifies) reason's disagreement(s) with itself. As we've argued elsewhere,
2133
 
the language game of argumentation is self-defeating in that it remains in a conflicted state or 
constant (re)play. The space of reasons is invariably displaced throughout effective history, and 
the (alleged) force of the better argument becomes fair game (a legitimate target, inevitable 
object of attack) in turn.
2134
 The possibility of general agreement and/or seasonal changes in 
'intellectual fashion statements' 
2135
 merely reintroduces the problem of the criterion and its 




 By "practitioners" of all persuasions we mean people coming from (intersecting) walks/forms of 
life or different backgrounds, experiences and/or personal beliefs. 
2129
 ibid, p.xxii. 
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2131
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.141. 
2132
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.17. 
2133
 See our Gadamer discussion.  
2134
 Witness the way the problem of the One over many (the relation between structure and event 
and/or the universal and particular) has recurred in Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Lyotard and 
Habermas.  We have, of course, being instantiating this problematic via the problem of the criterion 
throughout our entire approach. 
2135
 Pappas, Nickolas. The Philosopher's New Clothes: The Theaetetus, the Academy, and 
Philosophy's Turn Against Fashion (New York: Routledge, 2016). Although Pappas is not interested 
in the permanent and irreducible tension between the constative and the performative, he notes that 
the history of philosophy (amongst other intellectual activities) is predicated upon the problem of 
wrestling with other thinkers over the very ideal of the rationality of reason. Competing philosophical 
statements therefore remain subject to changing "fashions" (styles of thinking, schools of thought) 
as philosophy wrestles with other traditional manners and/or actions. Witness the way the concept 
of language game and/or the performative have since become fashionable, and occurs as a mode 
of action within contemporary philosophical discourse. As Pappas argues, the Theaetetus "contains, 
as…no other work of Plato’s does, signs and remnants of Plato’s movement toward the 
institutionalization of philosophy" and competing "philosophical schools" of thought. The Theaetetus 
is notable for the way the "dialogue’s participants refer to its setting in a gymnasium" and draws "a 
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relation to dissenting arguments (styles of reasoning, patterns of thinking, etc.). Following 
Derrida, we shall call such an inherently questionable situation "the problematic of the 
performative"
2136
 and reiterate that "the tension between the constative and performative modes 
of language is permanent and irreducible."
2137
 Specifically, Habermas's "performative 
idealization"
2138
 contradictorily presupposes the intelligibility of a determinate context of 
interpretation, or an idealized speech situation moving counter to the circle in question.  The 
problem is whether it is possible to perform appropriate (acceptable) definitions of a situation 
that may be appropriated (accepted) in turn. Unlike Frank, then, we shall not "take a position in 
a non-existent debate – a debate about dissent and consensus, which should have ideally taken 
place."
2139
  Adopting such a position presupposes the very thing at issue – namely, that it would 
be ideal to resolve the dispute between conflicting criteria for legitimating social relations and 
practices. Despite Lyotard's criticism of Habermas's "principle of consensus as a criterion of 
validation,"
2140
 Habermas does not attempt to reach mutual understanding through 
agreement
2141
 – a situation that Lyotard ironically took exception to.
2142
 Thomassen, 
                                                
comparison between philosophical dialectic and naked wrestling" (p.74). Consequently, the 
historical "reality of the philosopher" is represented by "the philosophical appearance: what you 
might have to look like to resemble a philosopher" (pp.15-6). Given that philosophers have to lay 
themselves bare by (contradictorily) clothing themselves in competing arguments, Pappas explores 
"the athletic metaphors that Plato uses for philosophy", of "philosophizing (seen) as the extension 
and completion of physical exercise rather than as its rival", of "competitive struggle (as) the feature 
common to wrestling and philosophical exchange" (pp.76-7). In other words, the history of 
philosophy is the history of its entanglements and trying to disentangle ourselves from one another’s 
"naked" embrace. "To speak of dress is to speak of fashion, and the question now for philosophers 
becomes how they might present themselves given the fact of fashion. How will they avoid 
fashionable dress", given their well-known "hostility toward fashion" that leads philosophers to "think 
of fashion as the antipodes to their profession," ibid, p.113. 
2136
 Derrida, Jacques. "Signature Event Context" in Limited INC (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), p. 13.  
2137
 Martin, Jay. "The Debate Over Performative Contradiction: Habermas Versus the 
Poststructuralists" in Honneth, Axel, McCarthy, Thomas, Offe, Claus and Wellmer, Albrecht (eds.) 
Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1992), p. 262. 
2138
 Wellmer, Albrecht. "Truth, Contingency and Modernity" in Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature 
of Modernity trans. David Midgley, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), p.143. 
2139
 Frank, Manfred. The Boundaries of Agreement, (Aurora: Davies Group Publishers, 2005), p.i. 
2140
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.60. 
2141
 Habermas, Jürgen. Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987). Although Habermas does not specifically discuss 
Lyotard’s thinking, he nonetheless alludes to the publication of the key text of "postmodernity" in the 
preface, xix.  And while Habermas does not discuss Lyotard's report in the resulting lectures, it 
appears to guide his overall approach to "postmodern" thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Derrida and Foucault (amongst others). See, for example, the lecture "The Entry into Postmodernity: 
Nietzsche as a Turning Point", pp.83-106.   
2142
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). In the essay 
subsequently appended to Lyotard's report ("Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?"), 
Lyotard situates himself within a tradition "initiated" by Wittgenstein (amongst other thinkers). He 
 283 
nonetheless, argues as if the exception proves the rule and positions himself in the non-existent 
debate. Thomassen attempts (without irony) to reach general agreement or accord via the truth 
claim that the very concept of "rational conception is aporetic"
2143
 and such a conflicting situation 
"should lead us to rethink the status of rational consensus and the relationship between 
consensus and dissent."
2144
 Instead, it is "disagreements and difference (that) are the condition 
of possibility of rational discourse."
2145
 Further, "consensus and dissent not only seem to imply 
one another, but also mutually contradict one another – hence the aporia."
2146
 While Frank urges 
that Lyotard’s attempt to divide reason against itself is a "performative contradiction" that shakes 
the "foundation of his (own) argument,"
2147
 Thomassen counters that Habermas cannot resolve 
the problem of a reason already divided against (arguing with) itself and that the "notion of 




In the following, we bring together three interdependent parts to give expression to a complex 
whole. In the first part, we examine Habermas's appropriation of Wittgenstein's conception of 
understanding and its relation to rule-following. In the second part, we work our way towards a 
double bind within Habermas's understanding of the double structure of language. In the third 
part, we shall examine the way such a conflict throws into question the relation between the 
partiality for reason (rational motivation) and the partiality of reason (motivated rationality). 
                                                
also goes on to complain that while "a few other thinkers (French or other)" have continued this 
tradition, they have not had "the honour to be read by Professor Habermas – which at least saves 
them from getting a poor grade for their neoconservativism", p.73 in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. We say ironically because Lyotard was, of course, critical of the very notion of rational 
discourse.  Habermas arguably generalizes from one ‘postmodern’ thinker to another in his 
philosophical discourse of modernity anyway, discussing Lyotard's position on language through 
(say) his discussion of Derrida. Specifically, where he interprets a qualitatively distinct thinker as a 
paradigm example of the postmodern condition – a condition generally understood in terms of "neo-
conservatism and aesthetically inspired anarchism" (p.5). Habermas accuses postmodernism of 
being neoconservative because of the allegedly conservative tendency to make aesthetic 
experience a cornerstone of critique – i.e., where aesthetic judgment (such as feelings of the sublime 
or concepts of intertextuality) determine the limits of rationality. If Habermas is guilty of treating 
heterogeneous thinkers equally here, such an unjust approach plays into Lyotard's own argument 
regarding the incommensurability of language games. The irony, then, is that Lyotard attempted to 
engage Habermas (amongst other potential addressee's) in a dialogue about the limits of rational 
discourse – and found himself in a double bind when Habermas talked past him. Lyotard’s catch 22 
situation may be said to exhibit the logic of the differend from the word go. Lyotard originally 
presented his case in opposition to Habermas, and the resulting (or sought after) conflict invariably 
produced the very situation ideally avoided in the first place – namely, a differend seeking resolution 
through rational discussion and agreement. 
2143
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The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing… At the foundation of well founded belief 
lies belief that is not founded.2149      
                   
On the validity of Habermas's rational reconstruction and its relation to Gadamer.  
 
We begin by calling into question Habermas's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Like Lyotard, 
Habermas 'enlists Wittgenstein as an unlikely ally'
2150
 when interrogating the performativity of 
rule-following. Habermas, however, 'follows' Wittgenstein from the opposite direction – towards 
the possibility of rationality reconstructing an allegedly intuitive rule consciousness. We say 
allegedly because Habermas rationally reconstructs what Braver calls the "groundless 
grounds"
2151
 of rule-following, or the "original finitude"
2152
 of rule-governed linguistic practices. 
Wittgenstein thereby becomes an ally for the opposing team: instead of arguing in favour of 
rules that legitimate dissensus and breakdowns in understanding, Habermas argues for rules 
directed towards the legitimation of consensus and mutual understanding. Consequently, 
Habermas moves against Wittgenstein in order to move beyond Gadamer's conception of a 
historically effected consciousness. In so doing, however, Habermas returns to a traditional 
concept of rule-following as originating in "a transcendent ground,"
2153
 and so reinstitutes the 
very presuppositions that Wittgenstein's questioning sought to lay bare. Our primary concern, 
then, is the conflict being played out within Habermas's overall approach, where he purports to 
provide quasi "transcendental arguments…aimed at demonstrating that the presuppositions of 
relevant practices are inescapable, that is, that they cannot be cast aside." 
2154
 Habermas's 
rational reconstruction is, of course, intended as a corrective to hermeneutics’ claim to 
universality in that it seeks to justify a given understanding via universal – and criticizable – 
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Consciousness and Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p.32. 
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validity claims. Habermas turns to Wittgenstein to examine the conditions of possibility for 
following a rule-governed understanding. There is no escaping the fact, however, that 
Habermas's rational reconstruction objectifies what Baker calls "the idea of a rule functioning 
as a transcendent standard of correctness."
2155
 Baker describes such an idealizing 
presupposition as "the myth of language as a calculus of meaning-rules."
2156
 Baker reminds us 
that Wittgenstein's avowed goal was to demystify language by making "transparently ridiculous 
the idea of a hidden or unconscious following of a rule"
2157
 and so "reduce to absurdity the thesis 
that the intelligent use of language is grounded in following, unbeknownst to ourselves, a 
complex set of uniform meaning-rules."
2158
 As we've already seen, Habermas locates the source 
of the normativity of rules in the idealizing presuppositions of linguistic practices insofar as the 
rules of language games would ideally remain self-directing and/or correcting. That is to say, it 
is the normativity of rules that uniformly make or set right the practices in question – by acting 
as a corrective and/or counteracting unacceptable (incorrect) linguistic actions. Habermas 
invokes Wittgenstein's alleged 'necessity of the must' acting behind such actions,
2159
 or the way 
we become rationally bound by an imperative requirement when reaching an understanding. An 
ideal of rationality is therefore said to be always already built into linguistic practices for a 
hypothetical reason: rational reconstructions are based on a working hypothesis regarding a 
rule's ideality (conceivability, practicality), and the normativity of rules act as a starting point for 
subsequent philosophical investigations. In providing a transcendent ground for the correctness 
of our reasons for acting rationally, the performativity of our practical identities may become 
subject to rational scrutiny and evaluation in re-turn. Habermas summarises the "hypothetical 
status"
2160
 of rationally reconstructing the circle in the following way.  
 
I am referring to rational reconstructions of the know-how of subjects who are capable of speech and 
action, who are credited with the capacity to produce valid utterances, and who consider themselves 
capable of distinguishing, at least intuitively, between valid and invalid expressions. This is the domain 
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 and corresponds to the way linguistic forms of life regulate themselves. 
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of disciplines like logic and metamathematics, epistemology and the philosophy of science, linguistics 
and the philosophy of language, ethics and action theory, aesthetics, argumentation theory, and so on. 
Common to all these disciplines is the goal of providing an account of the pretheoretical knowledge and 
the intuitive command of rule systems that underlie the production and evaluation of such symbolic 
expressions and achievements as correct inferences; good arguments; accurate descriptions, explanations, 
and predications; grammatically correct sentences; successful speech acts; effective instrumental action; 
appropriate evaluations; authentic self-presentations; etc. Insofar as rational reconstructions explicate the 
conditions for the validity of utterances, they also explain deviant cases, and through this indirect 
legislative authority they acquire a critical function as well. Insofar as they extend the differentiations 
between individual claims to validity beyond traditional boundaries, they can even establish new analytic 
standards and thus assume a constructive role. And insofar as we succeed in analysing very general 
conditions of validity, rational reconstructions can claim to be describing universals and thus to represent 
a theoretical knowledge capable of competing with other such knowledge.2161  
 
Note the way Habermas levels the playing field. The concept of a critical reason is located within 
the rationality of 'players' across all fields of endeavour, ensuring that everyone can play by the 
same set of rules. Anyone capable of speech and action is also (potentially) capable of critically 
evaluating the language games in question.  All linguistic interactions therefore become subject 
to the same standards of rational evaluation because their validity conditions – reasons for 
being-there – remain open to questioning and justification. Habermas's rational reconstruction 
purports to provide a rational basis for rule-following in that every action turns on the way rules 
make such actions possible and/or justified. The paradox of rule-following plays an active role 
in determining a practice's legal standing because they may direct us to ask: to what extent – 
or by what standard – may courses of action be made to accord and/or conflict with the rules in 
question? Habermas thereby attempts to bring Wittgenstein and Gadamer together in the 
following way. On the one hand, the intelligibility (possibility, legitimacy) of a 'hidden or 
unconscious following of a rule' is brought into the open by the notion of an intuitive rule 
consciousness that may be rationally reconstructed and questioned. The concept of rule-
following is invoked to rationally ground the way we enter into an agreement through a tacit 
understanding of language. On the other hand, the only way we can come to rational agreement 
is through a historically effected consciousness subjecting itself to the activity of mutual 
understanding and questioning. In this way, it becomes possible to meaningfully evaluate 
linguistic actions brought into conflict and/or question. Reversals in direction become possible 
when courses of action are actively brought forth via universally valid standards of rationality 
                                                
2161
 ibid, pp.32-33. 
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(rulings) attempting to 'course correct'. Either way, such an approach is a complete reversal of 
Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following.  
 
While it is true that Wittgenstein emphasizes the role of agreement in a given understanding, 
our reasons for acting in accord is not the result of a negotiated settlement or legally binding 
arrangement. According to Wittgenstein, agreements in courses of action invariably lie beyond 
reason. It would therefore be inconceivable to rationally reconstruct rule-governed actions from 
the ground up. All said and done, the act of following a rule occurs without rational assent or 
grasp and cannot be rationally justified without falling into an "abyss."
2162
 Rules might underlie 
all our activities – motivate and/or justify our actions – but our reasons for being in accord 
remains an "ungrounded way of acting."
2163
 This is, of course, the paradox of rule-following: 
courses of action could have conceivably gone either way, and the paradox is being able to find 
and occupy such an arbitrarily determined common ground anyway. Given that rules remain 
arbitrary and/or indeterminate, their performative status can only be determined by "blindly"
2164
 







 because it is our actions that agree with each other. Contrary to Habermas, 
then, it is outward actions – and not our consciousness – that is mutually attuned and 
reciprocally related. Reason cannot play an active part because their reason for being-there 
invariably falls by the wayside.
2168
 Such an approach calls into question Habermas's conception 
of Wittgenstein's 'necessity of the must' underlying linguistic actions. We do not enter into an 
agreement but have found ourselves already there (in agreement without rational assent or 
consent). If we all required to act as one, the only reason is that acting in accord is what (the) 
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 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), No.211, p.84. 
2168
 See, for example, No.241, p.88, "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is false 
and what is true? -- It is what human beings say that is false and true; and they agree in the language 
they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." Alternatively, see also, Wittgenstein, 
Ludwig. On Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 
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 Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following also raises questions about the blind 
leading the blind. Specifically, can we ever really know what we are doing or where we are going 
without being led astray? Furthermore, can we ever have reason to act otherwise or be able to 
avoid falling into the abyss? These questions bring us to the role a historically effected 
consciousness plays in both stabilizing and orienting a given understanding. We raise these 
questions to bring forth the contradiction within Habermas's conception of immanent 
transcendence, or transcendence from within language games that remain open to questioning. 
Habermas follows Gadamer by emphasizing a detranscendentalized use of reason within the 
linguistically of understanding. Nonetheless, Habermas's rational reconstruction insists that the 
familiar "task of situating reason"
2170
 calls for a universal reason's context-transcending actions 
across linguistic practices. Habermas defines our well-known situation as a conflict of 
interpretations within the historicity of understanding – and the conflict itself is defined in terms 
of common or related features sharing a family resemblance. Specifically, the encounter 
between competing arguments is "a domestic dispute over which side accomplishes the 
detranscendentalization in the right way: whether the traces of a transcending reason vanish in 
the sand of historicism and contextualism or whether a reason embodied in historical contexts 
preserves the power for immanent transcendence."
2171
 Habermas follows Gadamer by adopting 
the "paradigm of mutual understanding"
2172
 and argues that "the effective history of cultural 
traditions and formation processes unfolds… in the medium of questions and answers."
2173
 
Given the historicity of understanding, "contemporary rationality debates circle around the 
concepts of truth and justification" 
2174
 and the problem is that there is no getting around a 
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 when trying to determine the rationality of the relevant intentional horizon. 
Habermas attempts to resolve the problem of circularity, of course, by situating questioning 
within the context of the circle's directives and movements. Since we "cannot compare linguistic 
expressions with a piece of uninterpreted reality – that is with a reference that eludes our 
linguistically bound inspection"
2176
, we must refer to "the linguistically disclosed horizon of our 
lifeworld." 
2177
 Consequently, Habermas's questioning directs thought to the way the circle of 
understanding attempts to answer (justify) the dialectic of question and answer. For 
interpretations to remain directed towards universally valid claims, they must already always be 
understood to be meaningful and/or truthful. Contexts of interpretation invariably raise the 
question of the circle's rational force insofar as there always remains a question of the validity 
of "unquestioned"
2178
 presuppositions. Habermas moves beyond Gadamer, however, by 
actively questioning reason's role – or effectiveness – within effective history.   
 
Gadamer’s prejudice in favour of the legitimacy of prejudices (or prejudgments) validated by tradition is 
in conflict with the power of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the claims of traditions. 
Substantiality disintegrates in reflection, because the latter not only confirms but also breaks dogmatic 
forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge. Certainly, knowledge is rooted in actual tradition; it 
remains bound to contingent conditions. But reflection does not wear itself out on the facticity of 
traditional norms without leaving a trace. It is condemned to operate after the fact; but, operating in 
retrospect, it unleashes retroactive power. 2179  
 
Note the way Habermas wants to distinguish between the 'power of reflection' and the 
'legitimacy of the prejudices validated by tradition'. Habermas's rational reconstruction of 
linguistic interactions purports to be able to do this on methodological grounds. The aim is to 
render truthful – or truth-evaluable – Gadamer's distinction between 'the true prejudices, by 
which we understand' from the 'false prejudices, by which we misunderstand'.
2180
  Following 
Gadamer's lead, Habermas attempts to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes 
effect in history, and (like Gadamer) Habermas wants to "solve the question of critique"
2181
 on 
the ground of "reasons."
2182
 : determining the truth-value and/or validity of our being-there 
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remains the "undeniable task of critical reason to overcome."
2183
 Unlike Gadamer, however, 
Habermas actively resists the idea that authority and knowledge should be confused with each 
other. The critical presupposition is the retroactive operation of a universal reason always 
already in effect via reason's capacity to reach mutual understanding through negotiated 
settlements and legally binding arrangements. We immediately see, however, a performative 
contradiction concerning the power of reason and its relation to effective history – reason 
threatens to incapacitate its movements and directives by enclosing itself within the very circle 
in question. Habermas's concept of communicative rationality requires conflicting interpretations 
to be meaningfully resolved via a self-legislating community making statements (determinations, 
decisions) in accord with a discursively reached consensus. Such a 'legislature' is constituted 
through judgments and sentences handed down by the supreme court of rational discourse. 
Habermas's "legislative authority"
2184
 therefore already presupposes the legitimacy of the 
authority of the power of a universal reason acting over and above particular individuals capable 
of rationality. Given this authority, there can be no higher court of appeal than the "anticipation 
of an ideal speech situation"
2185
 and its "defining feature…is that any consensus attainable 





 – as a socially binding and/or bonding force – effectively reinstates 
tradition's claim upon us in that it appeals to established authorities – rule-governed practices, 
the rationality of traditional norms – to authorize its actions. All said and done, how is it possible 
to distinguish between knowledge and authority when a consensus criterion of truth authorizes 
us to agree on the legitimacy of the prejudices in question? As Gadamer reminds us, it is the 
"tyranny of hidden prejudices"
2188
 that is the critical question, particularly since the power of 
reflection invariably emerges in the "distorting mirror"
2189
 of a historically effected 
consciousness. And as Lyotard might concur, a situated reason acting on its own behalf 
threatens to become tyrannical – or prejudiced towards its power – when it does not know its 
place and hides behind universal truth-claims. Equally questionable is the way Habermas 
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reconceives Gadamer's conception of the anticipation of completeness. 2190 Habermas replaces 
a situated reason's (misguided) directive with the notion of an "unavoidable anticipation of an 
ideal speech situation"
2191
 that acts as both "normative foundation"
2192
 and guiding (illocutionary) 
force. The "formal anticipation of idealized conversation"
2193
 becomes our ultimate historical 
guide insofar as it acts as a "prefiguration of a (complete) form of life"
2194
 and "guarantees the 
"ultimate" underlying counterfactual mutual agreement"
2195
 already understood to be in effect. 
Habermas's ideal speech situation, then, is effectively in conflict with effective history: it 
presupposes the possibility of moving within a horizon of interpretation that can be 'fixed' 
(determined, known, completed) in advance. Habermas's conception of the dialectic of question 
and answer doesn't so much presuppose reversals in direction but a directive moving all 
understanding 'forward' (a situated reason approaching the front end of history). Habermas 
thereby directs us towards the ideal of enclosing ourselves within a final – or ultimate – horizon 
of interpretation. Habermas's projected horizon of interpretation is not something that constantly 
changes or moves with interpreters but effectively changes their relationship to effective history: 
it anticipates a situation (or ideal) when everyone is in mutual agreement via an attempt to 
"theoretically effect a closure"
2196
 in the historicity of understanding. Such a situation, however, 
renders reason completely ineffectual: tradition justifiably reinstates its claim upon us in a 
dogmatic way if it can no longer give us any reason to ask further questions. Habermas's critical 
theory, then, contradictorily anticipates a speech situation where the lifeworld has completely 
been colonized by an expansive reason's imperialistic ideals – by legitimately seeking to expand 
its rule over all other linguistic interactions and practices. In its anticipated 'domestication' of 
possible linguistic disputes, critical reason effectively becomes tractable and docile when 
interpreters have finally surrendered themselves to the force of the better arguments (an 
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unquestioning condition made theoretically possible by ultimately being in complete 
agreement).  
 
We are now in a position to approach Habermas's concept of the double structure of language 
through Lyotard's conception of the double bind. We thereby bring forth a differend within 
Habermas's interpretation of the relation between part and whole. While our concept of the 
differend is interpreted as a situational definition, it shall nonetheless become a conflict situation 
that cannot be meaningfully defined (resolved) within the historicity of understanding. We shall 
argue that the relation between part and whole remains questionable – the normative content 
of modernity can never be answered in a rational way. The main problem is the performative 
status of Habermas's concept of an ideal speech situation. Our guiding question will therefore 
be: to what extent can an idealized situation regulate the rationality of situational definitions? 
Indeed, it would seem that Habermas's interpretation of the ideal speech situation becomes a 
situation that can never be mutually understood (rationally defined) or adequately 
contextualized. 
 
The Double Structure of Language: Finding Ourselves In A (Double) Bind.  
 
According to Habermas's conception of language, it is possible to identify and reconstruct 
universal conditions of mutual understanding. These conditions are understood in normative 
terms, and interpreted as the idealizing presuppositions of truth, rightness and truthfulness 
across three interdependent worlds (objective, intersubjective and subjective worlds of 
experience). Universal conditions of understanding ideally obtain across contexts of 
interpretation and direct speech acts towards situations that could be defined in accord with 
universal standards of rationality. Specifically, where interpretation "means the search for a 
mutual agreement about a situation definition''
2197
 and refers to what is generally understood 
"as the society's normative reality."
2198
 Habermas thereby purports to be able to determine the 
performative status of linguistic acts through a determination of their double structure. 
Habermas distinguishes between levels of understanding in the following way. 
 
I would distinguish (i) the level of intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary 
acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an understanding with one another, and (ii) the 
                                                
2197
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Intentions Conventions and Linguistic Interactions" in On The Pragmatics 
of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action trans. Barbara 




level of propositional content about which they wish to reach understanding in the communicative 
function specified in (i).2199  
 
A basic feature of language is connected with this double structure of speech, namely, its inherent 
reflexivity. The standardized possibilities for directly and indirectly mentioning speech merely make 
explicit a self-reference that is already contained in every speech act. In filling out the double structure 
of speech, participants in dialogue communicate on two levels simultaneously. They combine 
communication of a content with "metacommunication" communication about the sense in which the 
communicated content is used.2200  
 
Note the way Habermas adopts – and redefines – the paradigm of mutual understanding. 
Habermas follows Gadamer by insisting on the linguisticality of understanding, or the way 
language speaks through a historically effected consciousness. Such a paradigm, however, can 
only become truthful (or truth-evaluable) via the linguistically disclosed horizon of shared 
"lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are already embedded."
2201
 
Habermas moves beyond Gadamer by locating the rational structure of understanding within 
reason's capacity to critically question and/or overturn the linguistically disclosed horizons of 
the lifeworld. The raising of criticizable validity claims ensures that we can identify and reflect 
upon the historicity of understanding, or the way the space of reasons and linguistic actions 
meaningfully interact throughout history. When truth-claims invariably come into question or 
conflict, rational discourse course corrects itself insofar as communication "necessarily begins 
with the counterfactual assumption that universal agreement is (still) possible."
2202
  We thereby 
all remain oriented towards the possibility of reaching the truth of given (definitions of) situations 
when the rationality of our being-there may be called (back) into question. Habermas offers a 
theory of the 'logic' of linguistic actions within effective history – and the theory itself acts as a 
critical measure for evaluating the performativity of speech acts within the "lifeworld context of 
shared cultural knowledge, valid norms and accountable motivations."
2203
  Given Habermas's 
conception of the public space of reasons, the distinction between motivating and justifying 
reasons may be dis/placed accordingly. That is to say, the problem is critically evaluating the 
relationship between the reasons communicative rationality invariably acts upon and the 
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reasons that ultimately justify said actions. Although the historicity of understanding might 
motivate all our social interactions – by acting upon us for a given reason and/or bringing said 
actions into question or conflict – the requirement is being able to justify particular reasons for 
acting via universal standards of rationality. Consequently, motivating and justifying reasons 
may re-turn towards each other and rationality direct the circle of understanding through the act 
of adjudicating competing truth-claims. By orienting ourselves towards criticizable validity 
claims, the regulative idea of an ideal speech situation integrates the relation between 
motivating and justifying reasons in accord with language's double structure, or inherent 
reflexivity – specifically, where competing situational definitions direct us towards rationally 
motivated agreements. 
 
Given Habermas's definition of the (hermeneutical) situation, we must attempt to determine the 
performative status of the ideal speech situation. If we recall, the question of a situated reason's 
performative status can only take place within a context of relevance, and what makes a context 
particularly relevant (meaningful) is when conflicting interpretations attempt to make themselves 
universally relevant (valid, true) via mutual understanding and agreement. Habermas thereby 
claims that we can determine the status of competing validity claims – the rationality of our 
being-there – by referring to the way/s interpreters can justify their interpretations under ideal 
(speaking) conditions. The question, then, is: to what extent can the ideal speech situation 
regulate the performativity of linguistic interactions within the historicity of understanding? Such 
a question can only be meaningful (valid) if Habermas's performative idealization can itself be 
validated in some way – i.e., directed towards a universally valid (relevant) truth claim. As we 
shall see, Habermas's regulative idea can never transcend the context of its occurrence and 
remains groundless – Habermas's statements about such a regulative ideal is itself context-
bound and/or determined. Habermas's performative contradiction is the result of a conceptual 
sleight of hand that originates in a quasi-transcendental approach to language that ultimately 
lies beyond questioning and rational argumentation.
2204
 Habermas's linguistic performance – or 
"conjuring trick"
2205
 – turns traditionally accepted ways of behaving into universally valid rules 
whose truth-value (or validity) must simply be taken as given (necessarily binding and/or 
bonding). Consequently, Habermas attempts to theoretically legitimate what Sellars calls the 
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myth of the given2206, or a "false view of what is given"2207 as always already true in 
experience.
2208
 Habermas's questioning is therefore caught in a performative contradiction, and 
gives rise to a differend within his own conception of language as transcendence from within 
linguistic practices. Habermas's definition of the ideal speech situation invariably throws into 
question its own contextual relevance and/or the rationality of situational definitions. The 
question now becomes: how – or from where – can Habermas's regulative idea itself be situated 
and/or defined? 
 
Habermas anticipates such a question, and is aware of the problem of defining the contextual 
relevance of the "form of life we anticipate in the concept of the ideal speech situation."
2209
 He 
understands that "the expression ideal speech situation... suggests an end state that must be 
strived for in the sense of a regulative ideal."
2210
 The possibility of a definitive understanding  
"cannot be represented as a meaningful goal because it would engender paradoxes (an ultimate 
language, a final interpretation, non-revisable  knowledge, etc.").
2211
 Wellmer and Bennington 
independently give expression to such a contradictory situation. Wellmer observes, for example, 
that the idea of a definitive or complete interpretation renders the concept of effective history 
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meaningless since "what is meant as a situation of ideal communication"
2212
 and mutual 
understanding "turns out as a situation beyond the necessity of communication." 
2213
 The 
"ultimate ideal language would be a language beyond language"
2214
 and so beyond the 
necessity to reach mutual understanding through language. Habermas's conception of the ideal 
speech situation as a regulative idea effectively deregulates the turn of events in that it can 
neither control or direct effective history according to its own prescribed rules or directives. 
Specifically, insofar as such an idea "includes the negation of the conditions of finite human 
communication, it also implies the negation of the natural and historical conditions of human 
life, of finite human existence."
2215
 Such an idea "remains paradoxical even if it is only 
understood as a regulative idea... because it belongs to the meaning of this idea that it commits 
us to work towards its realization. The paradox in this is that we would be committed to strive 
toward the realization of an ideal whose realization would be the end of history. The goal is the 
end; ideal communication would be the death of communication."
2216
 Bennington interprets the 
situation similarly in that he understands that there can only be communication "to the extent 
that we do not, in fact, agree...so if we want to communicate, we also have to want to not quite 
understand each other."
2217
 Consequently, Habermas's concept of a rationally motivated 
consensus by way of the force of the better argument is irrationally motivated and self-defeating. 
Reason "cannot rationally prescribe its own demise in consensus...to the extent that it 
prescribes consensus, it is complicit with the coercion that forever prevents that consensus be 
rational."
2218
 Bennington urges that such "appeals to reason and consensus in fact function 
coercively by trying to deny the non-rational  origin of rationality or the non-consensual ground 
of consensus."
2219
 Habermas, of course, interprets the situation differently: truth as consensus 
is already built into the very definition of thinking and acting rationally. Pragmatically speaking, 
he observes that while we can never determine the transcendental status of presuppositions 
operating within speech acts, the question of their universal validity is simply something we 
have to take as given and/or true. Our actions "continue to have a transcendental necessity, 
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from which we have to set forth"2220 when communicating rationally. Nonetheless, a situated 
reason remains context-bound in that rational thinkers remain in a historical bind, since the 
idealizations of a "communicative reason (are) at once claimed and denied"
2221
 throughout 
effective history. Habermas’s dialectic of reason is predicated upon the recognition that a 
situated reason must presuppose the transcendental status of context-specific actions anyway. 
A historicised reason has no choice but to act otherwise even though speech acts can never be 
in a position to determine their performative status (contextual relevance, rational acceptability) 
throughout effective history. Transcendence is implicitly claimed in the very act of stating while 
the statements themselves may be invariably contradicted (reverse their direction). Habermas 
explicitly states that the context-transcending status of validity claims is an "essentialist 
misunderstanding"
2222
 that may be compared to a "transcendental illusion."
2223
 Such a situation 
necessarily remains an integral part of the context/s anticipated in the ideal speech situation. 
Despite their illusory status, we still need to "do justice to the meaning of context-transcending 
validity claims."
2224
 Furthermore, we may reach an understanding about the performative status 
of the ideal speech situation is if we distinguish "between ideal" (concept) "and reality" 
2225
 (or 
object). The way Habermas attempts to do justice to the ideal of justifying our truth-claims 
nonetheless remains contradictory and puts him in a double bind : claims to universal validity 
can only meaningfully occur by way of a "methodological fiction."
2226
 This returns us to our 
guiding question. Specifically, how – or from where – can Habermas's regulative idea itself be 
situated and/or defined? We ask this question within the horizon of Habermas' own questioning 
for a reason: the concept of an ideal speech situation appears to conceive of a situation that 
cannot be mutually reached (understood) or meaningfully contextualized. We already 
understand that such a situation – or the way Habermas attempts to define it – refers to idealized 
conditions of justification. Habermas's questioning attempts to clarify the circumstances under 
which a rationally motivated discourse ideally regulates the event(s) of understanding. 
Habermas's definition of the hermeneutical situation purports to follow the rules of 
argumentation and receives its directives from within the very circle calling itself (back) into 
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question. If Habermas's speech acts are to have any meaning (validity), the requirement is to 
determine the performative status of the 'methodological fiction' contextualizing the being of his 
own questioning. We must situate Habermas's questioning, of course, within a performative 
context and follow his lead by placing the emphasis on language's purported reciprocal binding 
and/or bonding relationships. That is, with respect to the way/s an ideal speech situation can be 
validated (questioned). Given that the ideal speech situation remains a methodological fiction – 
a concept without a real object or objective – there is clearly a question about its propositional 
content (or lack of), and how such privation can still have illocutionary force (can really be 
effective in history). Such a question directs us back towards the problem of the criterion and 
raises the spectre of a legitimation crisis. According to Habermas's own definition of the 
situation, "the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a construct, 
but a reciprocal operation unavoidable in discourse...it is a (methodological) fiction that is 
operatively effective in communication. I would therefore prefer to speak of an anticipation of 
the ideal speech situation."
2227
   
 
The question, then, is how is it possible to 'anticipate' a situation best understood as a 
'methodological fiction' and effectively directing reason towards the realm of 'make believe' 
anyway? Specifically, why must we act as if it were true (or valid) to ensure the truth-value (or 
validity) of other potentially questionable beliefs and actions?2228  Note that Habermas claims to 
be speaking about an ideal regulating (other) rule-governed speech actions. The idea that truth-
values are conceptually connected and/or rule-governed by a working fiction remains 
questionable. To anticipate Lyotard's interpretation of Wittgenstein here: it is to judge the rules 
of one language game with the rules of another language game.  At the very least, it raises 
questions about the epistemological and/or ontological status of seemingly distinct genres of 
discourse and their respective entities. It might be objected, of course, that Habermas's 
reference to 'fictitious' concepts and situations is not to be taken literally here – that the idea of 
a working fiction is not to be literally compared to works of fiction. The relationship between 
overlapping concepts is one of family resemblance and not identity. The real idea, of course, is 
that the concept of truth remains a work in progress, or is really a situation to be imagined 
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(projected) under idealized conditions of justification. Nonetheless, such a working definition 
brings us closer to the problem of 'truth' understood as consensus and rational acceptability. 
The main problem is Habermas's inability to reconcile the contradiction between a 
reconstruction of universal conditions of mutual understanding and a context trans/forming 
lifeworld enabling meaningful horizons of interpretation.  
 
We’ve observed Habermas interpreting the validity of knowledge claims via their meaning 
conditions. For a speech act to be understood as universally valid – rationally binding and/or 
bonding across contexts of interpretation – it must have already been interpreted as meaningful 
within a linguistically disclosed lifeworld. Habermas distinguishes between background and 
foreground knowledge to bring forth a conception of rationality defined in terms of "good reasons 
or grounds"
2229
 that "admit of objective evaluation."
2230
 Specifically, competing validity claims 
are said to occur in relation to the three worlds in which interpreters remain situated and must 
orientate themselves (the objective, intersubjective and subjective worlds of experience). Given 
that these interrelated worlds are the ground on which a situated reason necessarily moves, 
Habermas defines communicative rationality as (ideally) directing itself towards "the 
unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different 
participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally 
motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the 
intersubjectivity of their lifeworld."
2231
 The problem, however, is delineating the relationship 
between 'reasons' and 'grounds' within the "context of effective history"
2232
: if our reasons for 
acting have a rational basis, on what grounds may our actions be called into question or brought 
into conflict (be objectively criticized and/or evaluated)? Habermas readily acknowledges our 
entanglement in "the intuitively present, in this sense familiar and transparent, and at the same 
time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions that have to be satisfied if an actual utterance 
is to be at all meaningful, i.e., valid or invalid."
2233
 According to Habermas's definition of the 
situation, the performative status of conflicting interpretations can only make sense within a 
context of relevance and movable horizons of interpretation. Specifically, the lifeworld 
contextualizes interpretations by presenting contexts of relevance and action situations. The 
corresponding meaningfulness – i.e., validity – of speech acts therefore re-turns to the historicity 
                                                
2229
 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization 




 ibid, p.10. 
2232
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity's Consciousness of Time" in Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p.13. 
2233
 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p.131. 
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of understanding. Given this hermeneutic situation, the problem is how to best interpret 
(present, situate) the relation between the circle of understanding and moveable (or 
trans/forming) horizons of interpretation. Habermas's regulative idea of the ideal speech 
situation purports to be able to resolve the problem of situational definitions that remain open to 
questioning –  it envisages the possibility of the most definitive interpretation and/or answers to 
questions. If interpretations can only occur within the context of effective history, however, the 
question asks itself: how can a cultural tradition be rationally determined (presented and/or 
situated) across contexts of interpretation? We encounter an irresolvable tension within 
Habermas's own answer to this question. The tension is to be found within a definition directing 
itself towards the possibility of the most valid interpretations – i.e., uniformly correct answer 
transcending all possible situations and contexts.  On the one hand, Habermas's formal 
concepts of world attempt to stabilize context in order to make it relatively 'ineffective' (i.e., 
counterbalance the destabilizing and/or distorting effects of a given cultural tradition). In this 
way, it becomes theoretically possible to universalize the conditions of mutual understanding 
across contexts of interpretation. On the other hand, Habermas's conception of the lifeworld 
mobilizes context in order to account for an interpretation's relationship to history (i.e., the way 
context conditions the historicity of understanding). Following Gadamer, Habermas presents 
the effectivity of history within the understanding, and so relativizes interpretation to interpretive 
situations and contexts. Unlike Gadamer, however, Habermas understands hermeneutics’ 
claim to universality to be only possible (meaningful) if we can counterbalance the effects of 
history via a performative idealization. The historicity of understanding is itself interpreted 
(presented, situated) via an idealizing context and/or presupposition – that of an ideal speech 
situation.  
 
Habermas's definition of the situation finds itself presented with a problem that moves the 
horizon of his questioning in a performatively contradictory direction: the attempt to universalize 
situational definitions re-turns us to problem of context specificity and/or boundaries. If the 
status of interpretations remain relative to effective history, how is it possible to direct (rationally 
determine, integrate, etc.) the context of their occurrences? Part of the problem is that the idea 
of a context-transcendent reason remains at odds with the reality of a situated (or context 
specific) rationality. The notion of an ideal speech situation presupposes that interpreters should 
ideally be able to determine what is rationally acceptable over and above culturally distinct 
situations and linguistically disclosed worldviews. As Parekh observes, however, the view that 




 Habermas's contradictory performative idealization presupposes a 
"culturally neutral speech"
2235
 that acts against the way language effectively discloses and 
trans/forms the historical world. Indeed, the idea that the one and same language (or speech 
situation) could be "equally hospitable to a variety of worldviews is inherently impossible."
2236
 
Habermas's idealization arguably exhibits a culturally specific prejudice towards a universal 
concept of reason. Habermas "ethnocentric discourse of modernity"
2237
 appears to have its 
basis in the lifeworld of the enlightenment project and attempts to transform the contexts of its 
occurrences accordingly. Lafont sums up Habermas's problematic situation in the following way: 
 
The problems inherent in the contextualization of the processes of understanding…arise at two different 
levels. On the one hand, problems arise with respect to the very account of the conditions of possibility 
of understanding. The introduction of the lifeworld as a constitutive element of the processes of 
understanding entails the relativisation of any understanding to the factual belonging to a particular 
tradition… On the other hand, these relativistic consequences affect the scope of the analysis itself. For 
according to Habermas's own theory, this analysis necessarily takes place within a particular cultural 
tradition. Therefore it is in danger of merely reconstructing the self-understanding characteristic of this 
particular tradition, illicitly elevating it to a supposedly universal dimension. 2238  
 
Habermas's attempt to raise context-specific knowledge claims to a universal dimension has its 
basis in an epistemic conception of truth. That is to say, within a concept that interprets truth-
values in relation to meaning conditions, or the way in which rules meaningfully determine 
understanding and/or justify (govern, contextualize) historical practices. As another famous 
Wittgensteinian observed, however, our understanding of what is rationally acceptable must be 
relativized to the linguistic context/s in question. Winch famously raises the problem of 
interpreting other cultural traditions from within a Wittgensteinian perspective, and such a 
problematic is understood to have implications for what effectively constitutes an ideal speech 
situation (or historically valid interpretations). Winch's guiding question was "how to make 
intelligible in our terms institutions belonging to a primitive culture, whose standards of rationality 
and intelligibility are apparently quite at odds with our own."
2239
 According to Winch, "the 
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 Li, Victor. "Habermas and the Ethnocentric Discourse of Modernity", in Kreiswirth, Martin and 
Carmichael, Thomas (eds.) Constructive Criticism: The Human Sciences in the Age of Theory 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp.44-61. 
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 Lafont, Cristina. The Linguistic Turn In Hermeneutic Philosophy trans. Jose Medina, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p.175. 
2239
 Winch, Peter, "Understanding a Primitive Society" in Wilson, B.R. (ed.) Rationality (London: 
Blackwell, 1979), p.94. 
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possibilities of our grasping forms of rationality different from ours in an alien culture"
2240
 are 
"limited by certain formal requirements centeringround the demand for consistency."
2241
 Yet 
these formal requirements "tell us nothing in particular about what is to count as 
consistency."
2242
 We "can only determine this by investigating the wider context of the life in 
which the activities in question"
2243
 meaningfully consist in. In other words, an epistemic 
conception of truth can only "elucidate what is involved in the notion of a form of life as such. 
Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept of following a rule and his account of the peculiar kind of 
interpersonal agreement which this involves is a contribution to that epistemological 
elucidation."
2244
 While he does not expressly raise the question of effective history, his 
interpretation problematizes the very notion of idealizing presuppositions – the problem of 
interpreting historically distinct cultures and/or interpretations raises the question about the 
relation between meaning conditions and truth-values. If "our idea of what belongs to the realm 
of reality is given for us in the language we use"
2245
, it must be "in principle possible for other 
people to grasp that rule and judge when it is being correctly followed"
2246
 without judgment 
(criticism of the cultural standards questioned by other cultures). We therefore must not 
presuppose the very standards of rationality in question, and any inquiry into the historicity of 
understanding must seek to legitimate "different and competing ways of life, each offering a 
different account of the intelligibility of things."
2247
 Such a Wittgensteinian approach invariably 
turns every concept of rationality into a social ritual, or  formal ceremony.2248 Compare (say) the 
different interpretations for rainfall in Native American and Western cultural traditions. Each 
tradition has their reasons for justifying qualitatively distinct interpretations of the world, and the 
justification remains part of the web of presuppositions in which cultural beliefs are meaningfully 
contextualized (questioned, determined).
2249
 The difficulty with an epistemic conception of truth, 
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 Ibid, p. 97 
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 Ibid, p.82. 
2242
 Ibid, p.81. 
2243
 Ibid, p.100. 
2244
 Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1990), p.41. 
2245
 ibid, p.15. 
2246
 ibid, p.33. Winch follows Wittgenstein's quietism by insisting that a philosophical inquiry into 
language must leave everything the way it is found(ed.) and the task of the social scientist was 
therefore to try and understand another culture by following (determining) its linguistic rules and 
conventions. And it can only do this by not being critical of the cultural standards in question. 
2247
 Ibid, p. 103. 
2248
 Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p.26. Habermas refers, of 
course, to the "ritualized competition for the better arguments." According to Winch, however, we 
merely have competing rituals (or different ways of arguing) and ritualialized arguments cannot 
compete with each other on the same rational grounds. 
2249
 If a rain dance failed to produce rainfall, we would question the causal efficacy of rainmaking 
rituals.  The failure of a rainmaking ritual, however, can be rationally situated and/or justified within 
the context of Native American beliefs – by merely confirming the lack of equilibrium between the 
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then, is that it invariably raises the problem of contextual relevance and its relation to 
confirmation bias. If linguistic context trans/forms the very conditions (meaning, rituals) of 
rationality itself, the problem is the way human understanding universally becomes "agreeable 
to itself"
2250
 (prejudiced towards its own set of mutually supportive beliefs) so as to make the 
given realm of reality "agree with" 
2251
 the reasons for believing in the first place. The question 
for an epistemic conception of truth is the nature of the direction of fit between a rational 
consensus (agreement) and rationality (reason giving). Specifically, to what extent can a 
rationally motivated agreement be a criterion for truth – and by extension, cultural critique?  
 
These questions are important because they highlight the tension within Habermas's conception 
of rationality. The tension is situated within the operation of idealizing presuppositions in 
effective history. On the one hand, Habermas problematizes consensus by arguing that rational 
thinkers would ideally be motivated to disagree with questionable norms and practices. 
Habermas's regulative idea urges that social agreements ideally remain in question, and 
conflicting interpretations play a critical role insofar as rational dissent may interpret mutually 
understood situations differently. Validity claims thereby become susceptible to critique because 
of the way they trans/form our relationship to the world. On the other hand, Habermas privileges 
consensus by urging that truth effectively becomes a matter of social agreement in an ideal 
speech situation – rational thinkers would ideally be motivated to agree with one another when 
determining the status of conflicting interpretations. Consensus as a criterion of validation is 
itself performatively contradictory in that it must act as a contradictory standard bearer 
throughout effective history. Specifically, rationally motivated agreement is simultaneously the 
reason for truth-bearing (socially acceptable, verifiable, valid) statements and orientations and 
also the reason for the falsifiability (socially unacceptable, refutable, invalid) statements and 
actions. It is only by subjecting traditionally accepted beliefs and practices to rational 
disagreements (contradictory actions) that interpreters may reach another mutually acceptable 
understanding or agreement – rendering the passing down (rationality, acceptability) of 
statements and orientations to performative contradiction in turn. If the lifeworld continues to be 
the site of potential disagreement, the very idea of what constitutes a rationally motivated 
                                                
spiritual and material realm. If and when a dance does appear to produce rainfall, its causal efficacy 
– and harmonious relations between realms – would invariably be confirmed. 
2250
 Bacon, Francis, Novum Organum: Or, True Suggestions for the Interpretation of Nature (London: 
Longmans and Co, 1875), p.56. Bacon famously made the following observation about the human 
tendency towards confirmation bias. "The human understanding when it has once adopted an 
opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to 
support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found 
on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinction sets aside 
and rejects; in order that by this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former 




consensus contradicts – runs counters to – the validity (meaningfulness) of universally valid 
truth-claims. Indeed, it is within the realm of meaning conditions that ideal and reality actively 
come into conflict. Note that the ideal has two epistemic registers – firstly, that people would 
agree if they were completely rational, and secondly, such agreement would ideally make 
consensus more rational (or complete). The problem is placing the burden of proof on social 
agreements/conventions in the first place. Specifically, the normative content of the lifeworld will 
remain open to question when there continues to be the potential for rational disagreements 
over the status of the rational consensus itself. If truth is ideally a matter of agreement (rational 
acceptability under ideal conditions), the question of what may be thought rationally acceptable 
will never be ideal since there will always be the possibility for conflicting interpretations across 
unanticipated situations.  
 
The Partiality of Reason: the problem of motivated reasoning.  
 
The problem, then, remains the contextualization (or situation) of reason itself – whether it’s 
possible (meaningful) to delimit its context of relevance and/or determine the normative status 
of the content surrounding (enabling, defining) a situation or event. Bernstein provides a useful 
definition of the situation:  
 
Abstractly there is something enormously attractive about Habermas's appeal to the 'force of the better 
argument' until we ask ourselves what this means and presupposes. Even under 'ideal' conditions where 
participants are committed to discursive argumentation, there is rarely agreement about what constitutes 
the 'force of the better argument'. We philosophers, for example, cannot even agree what the arguments 
are in any of our canonical texts – whether Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Hegel, etc. – and there is certainly no 
consensus about who has advanced the better argument. 2252 
 
Bernstein is primarily talking about the difficulty of achieving mutual understanding and 
agreement on problems traced back to the philosophical discourse of antiquity.
2253
 The problem 
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 Bernstein, Richard. "An Allegory Of Modernity/Postmodernity: Habermas and Derrida" in 
Thomassen, Lasse (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), p.89.  
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 Chalmers, David. "Why Isn't There More Progress in Philosophy?" Philosophy, Vol.90, No. 1, 
2015, pp. 3-31. Chalmers provides a recent state of play of 'analytic philosophy', and his diagnosis 
of its lamentable condition might deter anyone from considering whether it is even rationally possible. 
Some of the reasons for philosophy's lack of progress include: its primary method – that of argument 
–  remains powerless to produce "collective convergence on an answer", (p.5), anti realism –  "there 
are no objective truths to be had in the relevant domains" in question (p.26) – and unknowability, or 
that philosophical problems might be unsolvable since "the answers" might not be "knowable or 
(remain) unknowable" in principle (p.30). Chalmers nonetheless continues to recognize the 
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of reaching a rationally motivated (or impartial) consensus, however, goes much further back – 
to the way "motivated reasoning"
2254 (or the partially of reason) actively informs definitions of 
given situations. Renoir's Rules of the Game (1939) provides a succinct characterization of the 
way the game of life is effectively played: the awful truth is that everyone has their reasons and 
the problem is that even the most questionable reasons may be rationalized (justified, 
interpreted away) accordingly.
2255
 As Kunda observes, every rational person's intuitive 
(unconscious, reflexive) "reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes – strategies for 
accessing, constructing and evaluating beliefs"
2256
 – calls into question the way we meaningfully 
argue with each other. Correia notes that the "phenomenon of motivated reasoning poses a 
considerable challenge for normative theories of argumentation"
2257
 because of the difficulty of 
entering and/or exiting the circle of another individual's understanding in a completely rational 
(impartial) way. Thagard points us in the right direction when he acknowledges that strategies 
for accessing, constructing and evaluating beliefs are partially determined by the way rational 
thinkers relate to their intentional states. It would therefore "be pointless to try to capture these 
(motivated) inferences by obviously fallacious arguments, because people are rarely 
consciously aware of the biases that result from their motivations"
2258
 – a situation complicated 
by the fact that we are all similarly motivated by the false belief that we are ourselves unbiased 
(unmotivated seekers of an objective truth). Part of the problem, then, is that our determination 
(understanding, evaluation of) a given situation plays off social psychologies, or distinct 
situations in life.
2259
 Specifically, the way we relate to the lifeworld remains a reflection of 
personal identities and interpersonal dynamics. Conflicting interpretations therefore become 
subject to cognitive and motivational biases or the "seeking out of confirmatory"
2260
 reasons for 
                                                
philosophical importance of asking questions – to justify philosophy's continued (albeit) questionable 
existence (p.31).    
2254
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p.480. 
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 It is Renoir's character Octave that makes this observation, and as Octave famously observes 
"The awful thing about life is this: everyone has their reasons." The French film is a comedy of 
manners and provides a critical view of the ruling class by bringing out the tension between public 
morals (or social etiquette) and private actions.  
2256
 Kunda, Ziva. "The Case For Motivated Reasoning" Psychological Bulletin Vol.108, No.3, 1990, 
p.480. 
2257
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 Thagard, Paul. "Critical Thinking and Informal Logic: Neuropsychological Perspectives" Informal 
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interpretations do agree on one thing: how to make sense of interpersonal identities and dynamics. 
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 Taber, Charles and Lodge, Milton. "Motivated Scepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs" 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 3 ,2006, p. 77. 
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believing and acting. Competing validity claims emerge within the context of other beliefs and 
values and the 'power of reflection' itself reflects (stands in relation to, provides evidence of) the 
question of our being-there. Motivated reasoning remains a problem because of the role 
prejudices actively play in constituting the objects in question: the objects to which we refer to 
and argue about are partially determined by the partiality of reason. Motivated reasoning is 
particularly questionable when an individual's prejudice towards their prejudices may direct the 
"circular way of constituting the normative groups at issue."
2261
  Frimer, Skitka and Motyl 
observe that "at least three basic processes work in tandem to create confirmation bias: ) people 
selectively expose themselves to belief confirmation information, b) people interpret information 
that is already in front of them in a belief confirming manner, and c) people remember 
information that confirms their beliefs."
2262
 Pronin, Puccio and Ross provide the best definition 
of the hermeneutic situation. The "recipients of persuasive arguments often prove to be 
rationalizing rather than rational agents, and are influenced less by logical rigor or objective 




Witness the way Wittgenstein's Poker readily confirms that professionally trained philosophers 
are among the groups of people refusing to acknowledge the way hidden prejudices might 
motivate and/or distort their own understanding. The dispute is over whether Wittgenstein 
physically threatened Popper with a red-hot poker during their disagreement over whether there 
are any philosophical problems. The heated argument between Wittgenstein and Popper in 
1946 resulted in conflicting testimonies between the many other people present and accounted 
for, and the infamous "argument continues inconclusively"
2264
 to this day. The "delightful 
irony"
2265
 is that individuals rationally motivated to seek the "grounds of knowledge, 
understanding and truth"
2266
 remain in fundamental disagreement "on crucial questions of 
fact."
2267
 Conflicting definitions of the situation abound – regarding the sequence of events, what 
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 Thomson, Mel, and Rodgers, Nigel, Philosophers Behaving Badly (London: Peter Owen 
Publishers, 2005), p.145. As the title of the book might indicate, our philosopher of agreement was 
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(he was briefly their teacher until he had to flee the scene of his crimes). 
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really happened, etc. –  and the other misunderstanding is divided along partisan lines.2268 The 
partiality for reason – the mutually agreed upon search for the truth of the matter – comes into 
direct conflict with the partiality of reason (conflicting interpretations, varying and/or selective 
reasoning, etc.). The disagreements over Wittgenstein and Popper's personal disagreement 
highlights the way motivated reasoning can directly 'inform' (determine) the content of the very 
'information' being conveyed and/or called into question. Specifically,  
 
Opposing partisans exposed to the same set of objective facts interpret these facts differently as they fill 
in details of context and content, infer connections, and use idiosyncratic scripts and schemas in search 
for coherence and meaning.  Cognitive biases lead them to see and remember a reality that is consistent 
with their beliefs and expectations, while motivational biases cause them to see what is consistent with 
their needs, wishes and self-interest. Through such information-processing biases, two opposing partisans 
who encounter the same facts, historical accounts, scientific evidence, or even witness the same events 
can find additional support for their preconceptions.2269  
 
Habermas's ideal of a rational motivated agreement therefore presupposes two questionable 
things in advance: the rightness of one's position over and against someone else's, and the 
right to defeat (displace, overcome) them via common consent. To argue in favour of the force 
of the better argument thereby exhibits a prejudice towards potentially illegitimate power 
relations and/or differentials – by positioning the activity of argumentation over and against other 
activities. Habermas's regulative ideal not only presupposes that everyone should play by the 
same rules governed by the 'legislative authority' in question, it legitimately forces people out of 
the publicly contested space of reasons if they cannot (or will not) attempt to beat someone at 
their own language game. Correspondingly, Habermas's legislative authority displaces and 
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 Biernat, Monica, and Eidelman, Scott. "Standards" in Kruglanski, Arie and Higgins, Tory (eds.) 
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Suppose, for example, that "court historians"
2271
  are in general agreement about the historical 
reality and moral status of the Holocaust. The difficulty is that such a consensus primarily 
reflects the official position of the normative groups at issue – academics and mainstream media 
outlets as ruling elites
2272
 –  and manages to conceal (or falsify) the prevalence of Holocaust 
denial and/or the normativity of anti-Semitism in culturally distinct lifeworlds.
2273
 Habermas's 
distinction between communicative and strategic action is similarly problematized by his use of 
Wittgenstein's concept of language game. Specifically, if the language game of argumentation 
is played to determine the outcome of disputes, the requirement is to adopt the most effective 
strategy. Rules cannot determine the state of play or moment of truth – they merely make the 
game possible by delimiting (situating, bounding) opposing reasons for thinking and acting. If 
competing arguments are to reach the desired goal, the problem is persuading others – 
participants and observers alike – on the validity (effectiveness) of strategic actions. It is 
contextual strategies2274 that provide the true measure of meaningful actions, but the question 
remains: by what standard can a situated reason determine the final "conversational score"?
2275
 
There are no impartial observers in the language game of argumentation: participants cannot 
call on anyone to act as an independent referee to objectively arbitrate on matters arising from 
the play. The problem is particularly acute when we acknowledge the performative contradiction 
inherent in Habermas's conception of the language game in question – while the validity 
conditions expressed by competing statements is relativized to the context of their occurrence 
(argumentation), their truth-values may vary from context to context (arguments) since the 
conversation in which we find ourselves remains open- ended and/or ongoing. Habermas's 
performative contradiction can be defined in the following way: when making context-
transcendent truth-claims, a situated reason attempts to score the goal of truth in a language 
                                                
to have occurred 'when a person engaging in a given behaviour estimates that behaviour to be 
shared by a larger proportion of some reference group than would be estimated by a person 
engaging in an alternative behaviour'. In other words, false consensus is not about deviations from 
actual consensus but, rather, about deviations between individuals who differ in their self-reported 
attributes in terms of their predictions and expectations regarding others’ standing on those 
attributes. The effect has been reported in such domains as behaviours, traits, preferences, beliefs, 
and personal problems."  
2271
 Faurisson, Robert. "Faurisson Versus France" in Cassese, Antonio (ed.) The Oxford Companion 
to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.668. We cite Faurisson's 
term of reference (or abuse) because of its contextual relevance here. We briefly return to 
Faurisson's attempt to redefine the situation via the court of public opinion below. 
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 Amongst other groups, of course. 
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 See, for example, the Anti Defamation League's 2013-2015 global survey of Holocaust 
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1 (New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 238.   
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game yet to be played and/or on conceptual terrain that remains undetermined. Compare 
argumentation to (say) a basketball game: the performative attitude contradictorily presupposes 
the possibility of scoring a field goal in another competing team's language game or on a 
different – and unforeseen – court. The problem of delimiting context and arbitrating between 
contexts reintroduces the problem of the criterion and its relation to effective history: "who 
decides what is and is not an argument, by what criteria, and what constitutes the force of the 
better argument?...Is the very idea of a rational consensus in such concrete conflictual contexts 
even intelligible"?
2276
 Rescher argues that an ideal speech situation is beside the question 
anyway. agreement is never the real goal of conflicting interpretations. Habermas's regulative 
ideal removes the question of truth "from the operational range of the effective criteriology of 
human inquiry"
2277
 and cannot have "any practical implications"
2278
 in the domain of variegated 
experiences. Rescher observes that no one will ever be in the position of Habermas's ideal 
speech situation – reason is always situated and subject to the vagaries (competing interests, 
plurality of standards, limited knowledge, various fashions) of effective history. The difficulty is 
that Habermas's attempt to make an idealized consensus a criterion for truth presupposes the 
very thing at issue – namely, the intelligibility (historical possibility) of an ideal community of 
interpreters capable of reaching a final (or ultimate) agreement about definitions of situations. 
The question remains, however, whether linguistically disclosed horizons of the lifeworld can 
ultimately agree with a language independent (or objective) reality. Specifically, we still need to 
distinguish between being in potential agreement with each other and whether our meaningful 
statements actually agree with an objectively true – yet linguistically bound or inspected – reality.  
Suppose, for example, that the Nazis managed to wipe the Jews off the face of the earth, leaving 
little evidence of their existence or destruction. If a historian were to somehow ask about the 
fate of the world's Jewry, there would be a rationally motivated consensus around their historical 
status (in the form of a conspiracy of silence and/or eventual forgetting). Consequently, the 
question would itself become meaningless and might not even be possible – rational assent 
would falsify the truth-value of the fate of the Jews. Alternatively, suppose Faurisson was able 
to redefine the situation via his invocation of "critical"
2279
 reason and a "thoughtful and justified 
concern for historical truth."
2280
 Given his "excellent reasons"
2281
 for contesting the authority of 
                                                
2276
 Bernstein, Richard. "An Allegory Of Modernity/Postmodernity: Habermas and Derrida" in 
Thomassen, Lasse, (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), p.89. 
2277
 Rescher, Nicholas. Pluralism: Against The Demand For Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), p.55. 
2278
 Ibid, p.59. 
2279
 Faurisson, Robert. "The Problem of the Gas Chambers" Journal of Historical Review, Vol.1, 




 Faurisson, Robert. "Faurisson Versus France" in Cassese, Antonio (ed.) The Oxford Companion 
to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.668. Faurisson was tried 
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court historians, Faurisson can "raise and strengthen anti-Semitic feelings"
2282
 in the court of 
public opinion. The problem, of course, is that comment consent cannot act as a criterion for 
truth when it may effectively falsify history and add insult to injury. As Rescher observes, while 
"consensus can be invoked to extend the range of what is rationally acceptable as true, it cannot 
be invoked to delineate this range."2283 Specifically, "truth and consensus converge only in the 
ideal limit"
2284
 and the problem is trying to delimit the way truth and consensus agree with (move 
towards) each other in the real world. Kripke's conception of possible worlds can (ironically) 
provide a way out of Habermas's impasse when urging us to "conform to the rule of rigidity"
2285
 
via a "criteria of trans-world identity."
2286
 Specifically, truth and consensus may circle around 
each other if rigidly designating terms of reference actively play the role of delimitation in the 
historicity of understanding. When agreeing to pick out the same objects in all possible worlds, 
rigid designators may thereby secure the ideal of rational inquiry as truth-bearing and/or 
orientating. We say ironical, of course, because Kripke's 'methodological fiction' permits us to 
invoke the world of make believe – or possible worlds – to ensure the reality of the referent 
across contexts of interpretation. Specifically, it has its basis in an objectively agreed upon 
'reality', or definitions of situations that may actively disagree between contexts of interpretation 
(possible worlds) whilst securing the objective reality of the world in question (being re/defined). 
If we invariably understand by acquiring the horizon of question and answer, the question 
therefore becomes: how can we situate ourselves at such an ideal limit when interpreters 
invariably bring their own contexts and preconceptions to bear, transforming the horizon of 
understanding and/or the situation of reason indefinitely?  
 
                                                
and convicted in the French courts on the basis of the two following statements. (i) 'No one will have 
me admit that two plus two makes five, that the earth is flat, or that the Nuremberg Tribunal was 
infallible. I have excellent reasons not to believe in this policy of extermination of Jews or in the 
magic gas chamber’; and (ii) ‘I would wish to see that 100 percent of all French citizens realize that 
the myth of the gas chambers is a dishonest fabrication . . . endorsed by the victorious powers of 
Nuremberg in 1945–6 and officialized on 14 July 1990 by the current French government, with the 
approval of the "court historians" ’.  
2282
 We are quoting France's reason for convicting Faurisson on the grounds of racial hatred and 
incitement.  
2283
 Rescher, Nicholas. Pluralism: Against The Demand For Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), p. 53. 
2284
 Ibid, p.54. 
2285
 Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.10. Rescher does not 
discuss Kripke, and is unlikely to agree with our attempt to run distinct positions together. 
2286
 ibid, p.49. If we recall, rigid designators are determined by stipulation in the actual world (or 
extensional contexts) first. Kripke's essentialism defines his terms of reference via requirements 
insisting upon the condition of possibility for said agreement – if only to explore the ways worlds may 
meaningfully disagree with each other when determining the truth-value of referring terms.       
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Chapter 6: Rethinking the Circle - 
 Deconstructing Habermas, Reconstructing Derrida. 
 
Aims and Objectives: Competing Ontological Commitments and the Logic of the Quasi. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to bring our understanding full circle. The question of the direction of 
fit between thought and language occurs as phrases in dispute, or as a conflict that "cannot be 
equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments."
2287
  As Lyotard 
argues, a "phrase which links and is to be linked is always a pagus, a border zone where genres 
of discourse enter into conflict over the mode of linking."
2288
 Furthermore, this "differend 
proceeds from the question, which accompanies any phrase, of how to link onto it."
2289
 We 
return to Derrida and Habermas, then, to bring forth conflicting movements within the circle re-
directing the pathways in question. We argue that these conflicting interpretations form a 
complex whole and should be understood (questioned) through each other. Specifically, it the 
circle of understanding which directs itself in such a contradictory way, invariably throwing its 
interpretations (mode of linking, approach) back into question. Our aim is to explore the ways 
in which the circle of understanding performs conflicting interpretations of interpretations. We 
thereby call for(th) the conflict of interpretations as a contextual strategy, and argue that the 
conflicting interpretations serve a methodological function in the circle performing (enabling, 
directing) such contradictory questioning. The differend gives expression to these conflicting 
interpretations, enabling a link between distinct parts (or rulings) forming a complex whole. 
Derrida and Habermas, of course, presuppose conflicting criteria of relevance when navigating 
the circle in question. The conflict of interpretations now becomes particularly relevant in that it 
directs thought towards competing conceptions of critique (delimitations of self-understanding). 
The conflict nonetheless directs the question of the delimitation of being in a similar way – 
towards the question of ontological commitment as cultural critique.
2290
 That is to say, where 
                                                
2287
 Lyotard, Francois-Jean. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p.xi. 
2288
 Ibid, p.151. 
2289
 Ibid, p. 137-138. 
2290
 The term ontological commitment, of course, derives from Willard Quine. See Quine's essay "On 
What There Is" in From A Logical Point of View (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961) 
for an elucidation of the way we "involve ourselves in ontological commitments: by our use of bound 
variables", p.12. According to Quine's attempt to make sense of the question of being, "to be 
assumed an entity is to be assumed as a value of a variable" within a given language (game) or 
conceptual scheme, p.13. Given these assumptions, to be committed to an ontology is to 
presuppose a criterion of relevance or adequacy mapping out (bounding) the relevant conceptual 
terrain. Quine's term is relevant for our purposes because he asks: "how are we to adjudicate among 
rival ontologies?" and answers that we look to the question of a "prior ontological standard... not in 
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the being of their questioning directs the question of our being-there. On the one hand, we find 
ourselves on the way towards a reconstruction of understanding (Habermas). On the other 
hand, we find ourselves on the way towards a deconstruction of understanding (Derrida). Either 
way, the question of ontological commitment delimits the way an interpretation intentionally 
relates to (questions) our being-in-the-world.
2291
 While their interpretations of interpretation 
might remain at cross purposes, they similarly direct us through the same intersection – 
ontological commitment as cultural critique. 
 
Given the competing ontological commitments – or distinct ways of being-there – we invariably 
find ourselves re-turning to the problem of evaluating the ontological standards in question: how 
can we determine the relevance or adequacy of the criteria specifying the relation between 
thought and language? Habermas and Derrida not only talk at cross purposes, but they also 
appear to meet at a great divide.
2292
 While these two thinkers speak at cross purposes,
2293
 they 
                                                
order to know what there is, but in order to know what a given remark or doctrine, ours or someone 
else's, says there is; and this much is quite properly a question involving language", p.15-16. 
2291
 While we will not be committing ourselves to Quine's naturalistic ontology and/or behavioral 
theory of meaning, it is worth noting what he says about the role of interpretation in understanding. 
According to Quine, the question of being can only be intelligible within a context of interpretation, 
and so, the adjudication of rival ontologies requires us to contextualize beings in different ways - i.e., 
involve ourselves in the competing interpretations through a relativization of ontological 
commitments. Specifically, in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969) Quine urges that "what makes sense is to say not what the objects of a 
theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in 
another", p.50. It therefore "makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying 
how to interpret or reinterpret that theory in another", p. 51. 
2292
 Bernstein, Richard. "An Allegory of Modernity/Postmodernity" in Thomassen, Lasse (ed.) The 
Derrida-Habermas Reader (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p.73. As Bernstein 
observes, interpreters following their respective movements cannot help but question whether they 
"share any common ground" and may "despair of bridging what appears unbridgeable. It is all too 
easy to think that an abyss separates them, that if there ever were vocabularies that are 
incommensurable, then the vocabularies of Habermas and Derrida qualify as paradigmatic 
examples." 
2293
 As we've already seen, Habermas accuses Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) of claiming that "any interpretation is inevitably a false interpretation, 
and any understanding a misunderstanding", p. 198. Further, that "Derrida is particularly interested 
in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric" and that he deals "with the works of philosophy as 
works of literature", p. 187 and 188 respectively. According to Habermas, Derrida isn’t a true 
philosopher because he "does not proceed analytically" and instead "proceeds by a critique of style", 
p.189. Indeed, Derrida's procedure is said to lead thinking away from rational analysis and into an 
"empty formula-like avowal of some indeterminate authority" supposedly underwriting all con/texts, 
p.181. Given Derrida's overall approach, he collapses the distinction between true and false, and 
renders all validity claims meaningless. Suffice to say, Derrida was not impressed with Habermas's 
interpretation of his philosophical works. He complains in Limited INC (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), that Habermas deliberately misunderstands his con/texts and invalidates 
his interpretations of interpretations. Indeed, everything Habermas says about him "is false. I say 
false, as opposed to true", p.157. Derrida accuses Habermas of not even bothering to respect the 
"elementary rules of philology and of interpretation", resulting in a "frankly comic" misunderstanding 
of his philosophical position/s, p.158. 
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nonetheless intersect at the problem of the performative. Habermas and Derrida might provide 
conflicting interpretations of interpretation, but they also share a common understanding: the 
role interpretation plays in a circle that encompasses (enacts or moves through) the relation 
between thought and language. It may nonetheless still be possible to bridge the divide in some 
way. We can inaugurate our movement by understanding that Habermas and Derrida similarly 
approach the question of being through the pathway of transcendental thinking, or by way of 
the question enabling their questioning in the first place. Whatever the differences between 
them, we've observed that Habermas and Derrida similarly understand their respective 
approaches to the question of being as a working fiction (hypothesis, possibility) that follows the 
lead of the being of the question/s directing (conditioning, necessitating) them. Specifically, their 
questioning is understood as "a methodological fiction"
2294
 and "logical-rhetorical fiction"
2295
  – 
as being conditional upon a "transcendental illusion"
2296
 or a "quasi-transcendental"
2297
 
respectively. Habermas and Derrida have independently agreed that their competing claims to 
knowledge can only have a "quasi-transcendental status."
2298
 Nonetheless, their respective 
quasi-transcendental approaches still refer to the possibility of a "moment of uncondtionality"
2299
 
built into the rationality of reason, or an "unconditional rationalism that never renounces…the 
possibility of… criticizing unconditionally all conditionalities, including those that still found the 
critical idea, namely, those of the krinein, of the krisis, of the binary or dialectical decision or 
judgment."
2300
 While they approach the problem of context-transcending validity claims from 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms trans William Rehg, (Cambridge Mass: MIT 
Press, 1988), p.326. 
2295
 Derrida, Jacques. "As If It Were Possible Within Such Limits" in Paper Machine (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 83. 
2296
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Truth and Society" in On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary 
Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action trans. Barbara Fultner (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2001), p.103. 
2297
 Derrida, Jacques. Glas (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), p.162a. See also 
Bennington, Geoffrey, and Derrida, Jacques. "Derridabase: The Series: (Quasi) Transcendental 
Questions" in Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.278. 
2298
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis" in Theory and 
Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p.8. While Habermas is only talking about himself here, the 
fact that both philosophers have used the term quasi-transcendental is not without significance. 
Whatever the disagreements between them, they have independently agreed about the quasi-
transcendental character of their questioning over the years. Although the latter Habermas has since 
downplayed this term in favor of "transcendental illusion" and/or "methodological fiction", the latter 
Derrida has continued to sanction its use. See also Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), for an earlier use of this term. Specifically, prior to Habermas's 
rational reconstruction and/or theory of communicative action, he talks about the "meaning of the 
validity of statements derivable within the quasi-transcendental system of reference of processes of 
inquiry", pp. 194-195. 
2299
 Habermas, Jürgen. "An Alternative Way Out of the Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative 
Versus Subject-Centered Reason" in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures trans. 
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p.322 
2300
 Derrida, Jacques. "To Arrive – At The Ends of the State" in Rogues: Two Essays on Reason 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p.142. 
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different directions, they similarly move towards the question of the conditions of possibility in a 
self-referential structure, or the way a complex whole is itself conditioned and/or necessarily 
becomes questionable.
2301
 As Allen observes, the competing philosophers are "offering two 
different ways of characterizing…a certain transcendent moment of reason, a moment of 
unconditionality within (the conditionality of) reason."
2302
 Consequently, any move towards 
quasi-transcendental questioning necessarily occurs via the circle directing (structuring) the 
events of its understanding, and becomes an inquiry into the conditions of its possibility 
(existence, occurrence), or mode of being-there.
2303
 While Habermas and Derrida might 
independently agree that their questioning necessarily occurs in a quasi-transcendental mode, 
they nonetheless part ways over what the "logic of the quasi…would consist of"2304 in the 
complex whole in question. 
                                                
2301
 In the intervening years, Habermas has come to the understanding that Derrida might also be a 
philosopher and attempts to locate Derrida's interpretations within a shared philosophical tradition. 
See, for example, the 2004 interview with Eduardo Mendieta "America and the World: A 
Conversation with Jürgen Habermas" (published at the online journal Logos). During the 
conversation, Habermas observes "what connects me to Derrida is the philosophical reference to 
an author like Kant. Admittedly – and though we're roughly the same age, our life histories have 
been very different – what separates us is the later Heidegger." Further, "When Derrida and I 
mutually understand our so different background motives, a difference of interpretation must not be 
taken as a difference in the thing being interpreted." 
http://www.logosjournal.com/habermas_america.htm.  
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 Allen, Amy. "Philosophies of Immanence and Transcendence: Reading History of Madness With 
Habermas and Derrida" in Custer, Olivia, Deutscher, Penelope and Haddad, Samir (eds.) 
Foucault/Derrida Fifty Years Later: The Futures of Genealogy, Deconstruction, and Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016), p.114. 
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 Bubner, Rudiger. "Is Transcendental Hermeneutics Possible?" in Manninen, Juha and Tuomela, 
Raimo (eds.) Essays on Explanation and Understanding (Dordrecht: D.Reidel Publishing, 1976). As 
Bubner previously indicated, the "transcendental presupposition" (p.61) remains directed by the 
question of its mode of being: it attempts to uncover "the conditions for the possibility…of 
understanding" (p.69) by determining the limits of the "ontological commitment" (p.63) in question. 
Consequently, an inquiry may be referred to as (quasi) transcendental when it "takes as its subject, 
together with the general conditions of knowledge, the conditions of its own genesis and functioning", 
Bubner, Rudiger. "Kant, Transcendental Arguments, and the Problem of the Deduction" Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol.28, 1975, p.462. 
2304
 Laclau, Ernesto. "Converging on an Open Question" in Diacritics, Vol.27, No.1, 1997, p.18-19. 
Laclau observes that any such theoretical approach remains "haunted by the perplexing question of 
the precise status of that quasi. The problem touches on, on the one hand, the question of meta-
language; on the other the status, in theory building, of categories that apparently refer to empirical 
events but that in practice have a quasi-transcendental status, operating as the a priori conditions 
of intelligibility of a whole discursive domain.... Because of the undecided status of the ‘quasi’ we 
are confronted with a plurality of alternatives, whose two polar extremes would be a total hardening 
of those categories, which would thus become a priori conditions of all possible human development, 
and a no less extreme historicism which sees in them only contingent events, products of particular 
cultural formations. The first extreme is confronted with the whole array of problems emerging from 
any transcendentalisation of empirical conditions; the second, with the difficulties derived from not 
dealing with those conditions which make possible even a historicist discourse. The logic of the quasi 
tries to avoid both extremes, but it is extremely unclear in what that logic would consist of." While 
Laclau is primarily talking about his own (and Judith Butler's) quasi-transcendental approach to 
questioning, Habermas and Derrida similarly converge on an open question: it cannot be decided 
either way. 
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The task ahead of us, then, is to clarify the conditions in which their understanding takes place. 
Such an elucidation requires us to approach the circle of understanding from different directions. 
The question is how such contradictory movements can be possible, and the requirement is to 
determine the ways in which such interpretations may come into conflict and/or question one 
another. Given the competing ontological commitments, the problem is determining the ways 
different contexts of interpretation can be meaningfully contextualized (understood and/or 
questioned). We address this problem by adjudicating between rival ontological schemes, and 
so (re)interpret – or move between – the relevant intentional horizons. On the one hand, we 
allow for a conflict of interpretations and do not attempt to resolve the conflicting approaches 
via a common standard or measure. On the other hand, we critically evaluate one context of 
interpretation via another context of interpretation or ontological standard. We therefore attempt 
to deconstruct Habermas and reconstruct Derrida to question their conflicting movements 
around the circle of understanding. We thereby transcend the problem of context dependency 
or boundaries, and allow for the possibility of conflicting interpretations across contexts of 
interpretation. Our performative contradiction should be apparent from the outset – while these 
conflicting interpretations might attempt to transcend the context of their occurrence, the 
contexts must themselves remain context dependent or specific. We resolve the contradiction 
via a dialectic between question and answer. Following Gadamer, this invariably involves a 
reversal in direction, and the question is situating and/or directing their respective questioning 
accordingly. The question of conflicting ontological commitments, then, can only be answered 
within a fusion of horizons – and we move towards each horizon of being through the 
corresponding reversal in direction.  
Deconstructing Habermas 
We begin by bringing out the tensions within Habermas's rational reconstruction. These 
tensions circle around Habermas's attempt to ground validity within meaning, and have their 
basis in an intuitive rule consciousness that remains "fallibilistic in orientation."
2305
 Specifically, 
if our knowledge of the world of experience is fallible, how is it possible to universally validate 
knowledge claims that remain subject to the possibility of contradiction across contexts of 
interpretation? In the following, we shall therefore identify three main tensions within 
Habermas's attempt to rationally reconstruct the conditions of understanding, and deconstruct 
him accordingly. Specifically, there is the tension within 1) Habermas's reasoning about  
conditions of possibility, 2) within Habermas's understanding of contexts of relevance and 3) 
                                                
2305
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Philosophy as Stand In and Interpreter" in Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1992), p.16. 
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within Habermas's interpretation of the performative status of statements subject to rational 
criticism and/or validation. 
Rules and conditions of (im)possibility.  
Habermas's rational reconstruction is quasi-transcendental in that it seeks to establish the 
necessary conditions for (already) meaningful practices and a (potentially) more truthful 
understanding. Given the historicity of rule-governed activities, Habermas's questioning may 
therefore be divided in two related parts: what are the conditions of their possibility, and in what 
way is it possible to question their validity conditions? Habermas's questioning directs itself 
towards a fallibilistic consciousness insofar as the "unsettled ground of rationally motivated 
agreement among participants in argumentation is our only foundation."
2306
 Consequently, the 
attempt to ground any validity claim is made possible by the very rules in question.
2307
 The 
problem, however, is the circle in which Habermas's questioning moves: how do we determine 
the direction of fit between rational motivation and motivated rationality? If the historicity of 
understanding necessarily occurs against a background of unquestioned and/or potentially 
questionable presuppositions, reason may invariably call its directives and movements back 
into question. There are at least two related issues here.  
The first is that consensus remains a criterion of truth irrespective of whether agreements are 
rationally motivated and/or directed. Habermas's interpretation of effective history presupposes 
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 Habermas, Jürgen. "Reply To My Critics" in Thompson, John and Held, David (eds.) Habermas: 
Critical Debates (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), p.238. 
2307
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1930–1932 (Oxford: Blackwell. 
1980), p.88. To reiterate from another context: Wittgenstein argues that while (language) games 
remain their own justification, the paradox is that it is not possible (rational) to justify the rules of 
language games. Specifically, "Reason’ only applies within a system of rules…It is nonsense to ask 
for reasons for the whole system of thought. You cannot give justification for the rules." Habermas 
recognizes the paradox when he observes "We understand the term "justify" when we know the 
rules for an argumentation game within which validity claims can be redeemed discursively. Now, 
we can make these rules the object of theory of argumentation or truth…yet, justifying these 
theories… must itself fit into the framework of an argumentation game to the same extent as must 
the justification of harmless, e.g. practical everyday utterances. Certainly, the claims made of 
justification vary according to the argumentation form and context. Yet, which reason counts as a 
good or indeed as the better reason for what object in what context has to be assessed in terms of 
standards which under certain conditions become problematical and in turn require justification. 
Justifications must always be provided in one and the same place – there are no meta-discourses 
in the sense that a higher discourse is able to prescribe rules for a subordinate discourse. 
Argumentation games do not form a hierarchy. Discourses regulate themselves. Discourses are in 
principle open. And it is impossible to predict the outcome of discourses, that is, except from the 
perspective of an observer who is not a party to the discourse, yet who has to enter into another 
discourse in order to be able to justify his/her prognosis" (Habermas, Jürgen. "A Reply" in Honneth, 
Axel and Joas, Hans (eds.) Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's The Theory of 
Communicative Action (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), p.231). 
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the being (or normative legitimacy) in question in that certain tacit presuppositions need to be 
taken as given (or true) for other presuppositions to be explicitly brought into question. The 
question, of course, is: how can a situated reason distinguish between the one and the other in 
relation to a universalized reason? Specifically, determine the rationality of the parts comprising 
a complex whole when it is their very relationship that remains open to questioning and/or 
movement? All presuppositions can only have a provisional truth-value unless otherwise 
presupposed (foregrounded and questioned). Since background knowledge can never be made 
completely explicit and/or questionable, the question effectively becomes: to what extent can 
effective history truly be thought rational (rationally motivated and directed)? The second issue 
concerns the rational status of effective history, or the way the dialectic of reason directs the 
rationality of any given understanding. If reason can question the status of its directives, it must 
simultaneously problematize its own criterion for truth and/or conditions of possibility (mutual 
understanding through rationally motivated agreements). The role of rational dissent is critical 
here: effective history is ideally where falsification occurs and can make rational disagreements 
possible and/or inevitable. The dialectic of question and answer thereby remains caught within 
the contradictory movements and/or rulings of reason itself. The dialectic is not only directed by 
the possibility of contradiction – reversals in direction –  it is itself contradictory: the move 
towards mutual understanding through rational agreement simultaneously presupposes a 
counter ideal or movement: mutual understanding through rational disagreements.  
Gadamer's conception of dialectic, of course, motions against the intelligibility of uniquely 
correct interpretations.
2308
 The hermeneutical situation is itself defined by the possibility of 
equally meaningful interpretations, and the question was determining their validity throughout 
effective history.
2309
  While Habermas's conception of universal reason is intended to correct 
Gadamer's emphasis upon the dialectic of experience, we also need to provide our own 
corrective by reversing the direction of dialectical reasoning. Specifically, there is no getting 
around the problem that the dialectic of reason raises a question about the logic of its own 
directives and movements in effective history –  namely, why should the dialectic of question 
                                                
2308
 Gadamer, Hans–Georg. Truth and Method trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1996). Gadamer observes that "in view of the finite nature of our 
historical existence, there is, it would seem, something absurd about the whole idea of a uniquely 
correct interpretation", p.107.   
2309
 Gadamer does not deny, of course, that our presuppositions (or "prejudices") can act as truth-
bearers. Nonetheless, he understands the problem of validity –  or truth and falsity –  differently to 
Habermas and so wants us to distinguish between ‘truth’ and ‘method’. While the one might 
presuppose the other, the way to truth is not to be identified with methodological considerations. 
Indeed, it is method that effectively falsifies (objectifies) our relation to history, or rather, our 
relationship to the very presuppositions that may be thrown into question. Gadamer therefore urges 
that we need to distinguish "true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones, by which 
we misunderstand and only "temporal distance can solve question of critique in hermeneutics", 
p.298– 299. 
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and answer direct reason to the understanding that any interpretation should ever be thought 
correct (decisive, valid)? Following Derrida, we are obliged to question the rationality of the 
reason moving within the historicity of understanding in that a mobile reason invariably finds 
itself directed back to the question of its aporetic structure: the condition of its possibility (mutual 
understanding through agreement) is simultaneously the condition of its impossibility (mutual 
understanding through disagreement). Such a paradoxical undertaking puts a situated reason 
in an impossible situation and remains performatively contradictory: anyone who makes or takes 
a truth-claim irrationally commits themselves to the question of its universal validity and falsifies 
the historicity of understanding by way of reasoned agreement and potentially defeasible 
rulings. The question, then, is: to what extent can mutual understanding through agreement be 
thought truly rational? This question is particularly critical when we understand that it is the 
possibility of disagreements that invariably direct the rational status and/or movements of our 
agreements. Habermas's account of rationality requires dissent to determine the question of the 
truth-value of effective history – but only insofar as it contradictorily stops questioning and 
secures assent indefinitely. 
The aporia is whether Habermas's rational reconstruction can transcend the hermeneutical 
situation and meaningfully allow for conflicting interpretations across contexts remaining in 
potential trans/formation. Or to put the problem within the context of a question: to what extent 
can Habermas's reconstruction be thought rational within effective history? It is important to 
emphasize that Habermas's universalization of reason remains at odds with Gadamer and 
Wittgenstein in distinct ways. As McCarthy observes, Gadamer's "universalization of 
hermeneutics rests on a logical argument against the possibility of methodologically 
transcending the hermeneutic point of view: any attempt to do so is inconsistent with the very 
conditions of possibility of understanding – the linguisticality and historicity of human 
existence."
2310
 Wittgenstein's conception of language games similarly rests on a logical 
argument against the possibility of methodologically transcending the linguistic point of view: 
any attempt to do so is inconsistent with the very conditions of possible understanding – the 
context specificity of rule-governed activities turns on the paradoxical nature of rule-following. 
The idea of a rationally motivated agreement is antithetical to Wittgenstein's reasoning because 
there can be no rule for following a rule: the possibility of disagreeing with a given ruling is an 
integral part of their meaning and an interpretation cannot rule in advance without being led into 
an "infinite regress of the agreement/understanding on the meaning of words."
2311
 The 
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possibility of conflicting interpretations, however, is not just built into the concept of rule-
following: the rules of argumentation make it possible to have rational disagreements about how 
interpreters should intuitively follow (understand) them anyway. Consequently, we are required 
to ask the following question: to what extent can competing knowledge claims be thought 
rational – meaningful, valid –  if they purportedly follow the same rules of argumentation and 
occur via a tacit agreement making ongoing disagreements possible? This question goes to the 
heart of the problem of the criterion and its relationship to effective history: it presupposes the 
paradox of rule-following in that it gives rise to conflicting rulings and/or a rule consciousness 
that remains conflicted in orientation. Habermas's rational reconstruction, then, directs us back 
towards the paradox in a different way: the possibility of rules deconstructing themselves. 
Habermas's concept of rule-following ideally directs thinkers towards the possibility of 
transcending their consciousness: rational thinkers not only follow rules because they can 
become conscious of them within given contexts, but their rule consciousness is also directed 
by a context-independent reality. Habermas thereby leads us towards "the moment of 
unconditionality that we intuitively associate with truth-claims…in the sense of a transcending 
of local contexts." 
2312
  Our speech acts are said to aim "at the moment of unconditionality that, 
with criticizable validity claims, is built into the conditions of processes of consensus 
formation."
2313
 Our rule consciousness may therefore be thought to be rational because rules 
agree with (follow) something other than themselves and/or their own following (actions). 
Nonetheless, Habermas's rational reconstruction circles around a performative contradiction 
within the historicity of understanding: our rule consciousness remains directed by the possibility 
of contradictory rulings and/or reversals in direction. Rules lead reasoning in different directions 
simultaneously: towards the possibility of rational agreement and/or disagreement about 
(definitions of) the situations in question. Rules of argumentation potentially "rule out"
2314
 the 
way they should be followed –  argued about – and so throw into question the rule for following 
a rule throughout effective history. Habermas therefore cannot resolve the tension between an 
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epistemic conception of truth
2315
 and an epistemological realism
2316
 directed by a 
methodological fiction. Specifically, the rules of argumentation derive from and/or give rise to 
the paradox of rule-following: it is where their meaning conditions cannot be decided and their 
corresponding truth-values are "held in reserve"
2317
 and deferred indefinitely. Arguments remain 
indecisive or inconclusive because "no completeness is possible"
2318
  when the rules directing 
them are themselves undecidable: questioning can go either way and remains questionable 





 when its "condition of possibility"
2321
 cannot be rationally followed any-
way. Specifically, to what extent "is the reason for reason rational"
2322
 when reason finds itself 




 its questioning and rulings impossible? Derrida is, 
of course, directing reason (back) towards the movements of the pharmakon, which he reasons 
to be "at once the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth."
2325
 If the 
rule2326 for following the rules of the language game of argumentation simultaneously 
presupposes contradictory validity conditions, reason cannot possibly direct itself towards 
meaningful definitions of situations: reason remains in disagreement with itself insofar as it 
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involves an active differentiation and deferral of meaning (redefinition of situations). Whenever 
someone decides to argue, they appear to be following a rule that cannot be ruled (out) –  i.e., 
decided and/or acted upon. Following rules of argumentation merely sets a situated reason in 
motion and invariably displaces its corresponding claims to truth or falsity. Consequently, our 
rule consciousness is not so much directed by a demand for reaching an understanding via 
rational consensus but equally (or paradoxically) orientated towards the possibility for rational 
dissent and/or further misunderstanding. 
Contexts of Relevance: what is a context and when does it become particularly relevant 
(critical)?  
The possibility for rational dissent and/or contradictory rulings raises the question of contexts of 
relevance. The question is the relevance of context within Habermas's questioning –  i.e., the 
role the lifeworld critically plays within a rational reconstruction and the extent rational thinkers 
can become "conscious of the world as universal horizon, as (a) coherent universe of existing 
objects."
2327
 Specifically, what is a context and/or when does it become relevant (meaningful, 
questionable, etc.)? The problem is the way Habermas's conception of the lifeworld must act as 
a "transcendental site" 
2328
 in order delimit the "incalculable web of presuppositions that have to 
be satisfied if an utterance is to be at all meaningful, that is, valid or invalid."
2329
 Following 
Derrida, Habermas attempts to "calculate with the incalculable"
2330
, or decide (limit) undecidable 
relations of presupposition when determining the contextual relevance of interpretations. We 
raise the question of contextual relevance –  the relation between relations of presupposition – 
because it foregrounds the way a complex whole determines the partiality (incompleteness, 
prejudicial relation) to its truth-claims. Such a determination necessarily occurs against a 
background of implicit and unquestioned knowledge claims that can only occur with varying 
degrees of relevance. The issue of contextual relevance therefore highlights the contradictory 
movement between a given intentional horizon and attempting to move beyond it. The question 
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of the "context of effective history"
2331
  becomes particularly relevant because it directs us back 
towards the original problematic: the nature of the relevance (relation) between part and whole. 
According to Habermas's definition of the situation, interpreters "understand the meaning of 
communicative acts" because they are already always "embedded in contexts of action oriented 
to reaching understanding – this is Wittgenstein's central insight."
2332
 Habermas attempts to 
validate historically effected truth-claims by emphasizing "the action situation"
2333
 within the 
"movable horizon"
2334
 that "points to the complexity of the lifeworld."
2335
 This raises two 
questions: what is a context of interpretation and how does it interact with (act upon) speech 
acts directed towards the possibility of a more truthful understanding?   
Habermas claims that legitimate knowledge claims are only possible when they become 
relevant in the appropriate contexts: when they invariably raise the question of their own 
contextual relevance. Specifically, "situations do not get defined in the sense of being sharply 
delimited. They always have a horizon that shift with the theme. A situation is a segment of a 
lifeworld contexts of relevance that is thrown into relief by themes and articulated through goals 
and plans of action; these contexts of relevance are concentrically ordered and become 
increasingly anonymous and diffused"
2336
 within effective history. As soon as a "context of 
relevance…is brought into a situation"
2337
, it may throw claims to knowledge back into question 
and resituate a historically effected consciousness. And it does this by revealing the 
"interconnections of meaning holding between a given communicative utterance, the immediate 
context, and its connotative horizon of meanings. Contexts of relevance are based on 
grammatically regulated relations among the elements of a linguistically organized stock of 
knowledge."
2338
 The concept of lifeworld remains critical: it provides the context in which to 
determine what can be meaningfully understood as relevant and makes it possible to re–
contextualize interpretations. Nonetheless, the lifeworld is by definition comprised of situations 
taken as given or self-evident and it can never be completely brought forward and situated within 
a question. Lifeworld contexts act as a "correlate to the processes of reaching understanding" 
since interpreters "acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the horizon of 
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 Habermas subsequently redefined this (hermeneutical) situation because he 
became increasingly conscious of the "methodological limitation" of "neutralizing context."
2340
 In 
"coming to an understanding about something by way of their speech acts", interpreters "not 
only take up a frontal relation to three worlds" they also "have at their backs a context–forming 
lifeworld that serves as a resource for processes of achieving understanding."
2341
  Habermas's 
interpretation of the performative status of understanding is itself correlated with a horizontal 
concern: the tension between system (predefined and administered situations) and lifeworld 
(the movable horizon of meaningful actions and situations). This concern is expressed in the 
thesis colonization of the lifeworld. Specifically, where instrumental and administrative 
standards of rationality override and/or penetrate the realm of practical reason (the problem of 
evaluating the meaning of said actions). The relation between system and lifeworld forms a 
complex whole, and the question is the way they trans/form each other.  We should therefore 
"think of the lifeworld as represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock 
of interpretive patterns"
2342
 that remains subject to re–contextualization (integration and/or 
questioning). While parts of the lifeworld may become increasingly (ir)relevant throughout time 
(remain in the background and/or move with the horizon), not every context can become 
questionable (relevant to a given situation). Habermas distinguishes between a direct and 
"indirect context "
2343
 of interpretation and attempts to delimit the ways these contexts trans/form 
each other. The distinction turns on the nature of the interaction between the lifeworld and an 
"action situation's thematically delimited domain of relevance."
2344
  It therefore raises the 
question: in what situations can a context become actionable (particularly relevant, 
questionable, etc.)? The issue of contextual relevance remains the overriding question in that it 
invariably directs the dialectic of question and answer. Only "the limited segments of the 
lifeworld brought into the horizon of a situation constitute a thematizable context of action 
oriented to mutual understanding; only they appear under the category of knowledge."
2345
      
 
Given the role the lifeworld plays in a rational reconstruction, we are now obliged to ask: what 
kind of 'knowledge' is Habermas rationally reconstructing –  i.e., trying to validate within effective 
history universally? Specifically, Habermas's definition of the lifeworld derives its rational 
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content from context-specific occurrences: culturally re/produced horizons of meaning subject 
to rationalization and colonization. The underlying rationale of a reconstructive rationality is to 
preserve the "communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld"
2346
 by enabling the question of its 
normative legitimacy via criticizable validity claims. As Ingram observes, Habermas's approach 
"raises questions about the extent to which our meaningful representations of the world can be 
shared across specific contexts of communication and the cultural lifeworlds that ground 
them."
2347
 Part of the problem is that Habermas's conception of the lifeworld "threatens to 
reintroduce the very relativism and conservatism" that a rational reconstruction "was supposed 
to circumvent. In the venerable words of Wittgenstein: ‘if the true is what is grounded, then the 




Specifically, Habermas's attempt to rationally reconstruct effective history remains caught in a 
performative contradiction – that the 'unsettled ground' (tradition, lifeworld) is somehow a more 
original or primary source of truth and the validity of meaning ultimately lies beyond reason 
anyway. While Habermas attempts to provide a rational basis for meaningful interpretations, the 
concept of lifeworld invariably relativizes knowledge claims to distinct contexts of relevance 
and/or unstable grounds for criticism.  Suppose, for example, that there are culturally distinct 
lifeworlds and their respective forms of life are incommensurable.
2349
 That is to say, their 
interpretive frameworks –  language games –  cannot be played by the same rules and their 
corresponding logic of discourse (standards of rationality) would ideally not be compared and 
evaluated. Habermas's appeal to the concept of lifeworld results in the problem of the ground 
moving between contexts of interpretation. On the one hand, the concept of lifeworld 
problematizes the notion of shared reference points between qualitatively distinct forms of life 
– i.e., where standards of rationality and intelligibility could never be rendered commensurable 
(similarly contextualized and/or universalized). On the other hand, the concept of 
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communicative action moves beyond its context of relevance by allowing for the possibility of 
questioning incommensurable modes of discourse. It not only implies that distinct forms of life 
can be equally valid (or true) relative to interpretive framework, it is also contradictorily 
committed to the claim that some lifeworlds are more valid (universal, rational) than others. The 
concept of communicative rationality attempts to moves beyond its context/s of interpretation 
by insisting on the "possibility of evaluating worldviews"
2350
 and their corresponding lifeworlds. 
Rational interpreters can therefore distinguish between qualitatively distinct "cultural interpretive 
systems"
2351
 via effective history itself – i.e., by distinguishing between the "closedness of 
mythical worldviews and the openness of the modern understanding of the world." 
2352
 Given 
the distinction between mythical (closed) and modern (open) interpretations, Habermas argues 
that there is a "context-independent standard for the rationality of worldviews."
2353
 The question 
is whether an interpretive system can "permit a reflective relation to itself"
2354
 and be "open to 
criticism"
2355
 and "critical revision."
2356
 Habermas's definition of the hermeneutical situation, 
however, raises three related questions. If a mythical lifeworld is closed, how it is possible for 
an external standard of rationality to understand (enter and criticize) its interpretations? Further, 
if a modern worldview is open to criticism and/or revision, why do such criticisms/revisions make 
it inherently more rational (true, valid)? All said and done, how open (critical) can a modern 
worldview be when it remains oriented to the re/production (renewal, elevating) of its own 
lifeworld? The fact that Habermas chooses to prioritize one particular cultural tradition is not 
without relevance: it draws attention to the problem of delimiting a context of relevance in the 
first place. Habermas might talk the language (game) of universals, but such claims to 
knowledge threaten to displace and/or enshrine a parochial interpretative framework. The 
performative contradiction is that performative attitudes remain predicated on the attempt to 
"close off"
2357
 the possibility of further criticism/revision through rational discourse: reason 
attempts to resolve disagreements and/or overrule alternate standards of rationality via the myth 
(methodological fiction) of uniquely correct interpretations. Nonetheless, Habermas moves 
beyond Wittgenstein's central insight by arguing that the possibility of reaching an 
understanding lies within linguistic interactions always already directed towards rationally 
motivated assent. Communicative action presupposes rational agreement at a fundamental 
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level: within a form of life giving rise to universal truth-claims. Habermas argues as if 
communicative action rationally motivates background knowledge in some way (via forms of life 
grounded in socially prior tacit assent), and the lifeworld reproduces and/or interrogates itself 
through this communicative infrastructure. Steinhoff notes that Habermas's argument attempts 
to "seek shelter"
2358
 under the concept of lifeworld as it "takes over the explanatory duties that 
the concept of communicative action was supposed to fulfil."
2359
 Consequently, Habermas's 
appeal to the lifeworld "moves in circles"
2360
 – the question of the direction of fit between 
communicative action and background knowledge claims closes in on itself and thus the "circle 
begins anew."
2361
   
The paradox is that it is Habermas's attempt to break out of the circle of understanding that 
re/produces this series of concentric circles and/or rotations along circular pathways. The main 
difficulty is the way Habermas circles around the relation between the unconditional – a context-
transcendent reason –  and the conditioned – context-specific and/or immanent reasoning. 
Specifically, Habermas tries to have his background knowledge and foreground it too.2362 The 
question re-turns: in which situations can linguistic interactions be foregrounded and/or become 
universally valid (contextualized accordingly)? The problem is particularly acute when we recall 
that speech acts raising universal validity claims remain bound to a particular context –  an ideal 
speech situation –  occurring over and above their respective occurrences: it contextually binds 
speech acts through the practice of rational argumentation and remains directed towards the 
unconditional accordingly. According to Habermas's definition of the hermeneutical situation, "a 
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 Habermas's attempt to have it both ways can be seen via the distinction between institutionally 
bound and institutionally unbound speech acts. If we recall, the institutionally bound refers to speech 
acts which arise within specific social contexts and remain bound to them (i.e., marriage 
ceremonies). The institutionally unbound, however, transcend social context and/or particular 
institutional practices and settings (i.e., rational arguments). Stanley Fish sums up Habermas's 
paradoxical situation in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory 
in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) in the following way. Habermas 
"can only proceed by assuming as already available the very conditions…whose possibility he sets 
out to establish." It is the "existence of institutionally unbound speech acts (and therefore a linguistic 
space in which critical reflection can occur) that is the question, and the question is begged if it is 
simply answered by invoking the phrase institutionally unbound speech acts. The problem is to find 
some, and the only direction Habermas provides is to start with concrete speech acts embedded in 
specific contexts and disregard all aspects these utterances owe to their pragmatic functions." Since 
language users remain "pragmatically situated" the distinction "would be no less context-bound than 
the functions that were its object", p.454. 
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moment of unconditionality is built into factual processes of mutual understanding"
2363
 and a 
quasi-transcendental "reason is by its very nature incarnated in contexts of communicative 
action and in structures of the lifeworld."
2364
 Habermas might conceive such a situation as a 
methodological fiction, but its performative status remains critical regardless: true understanding 
is directed towards rational consensus and presupposes the possibility of universally correct 
interpretations within a historically effected consciousness.  
Habermas's rational reconstruction is, of course, an attempt to move between the immanent 
and the transcendent in order to question the contextual relevance of competing knowledge 
claims. The dialectic between question and answer provides the ground on which to move 
between them: it is the context in which critical reason arises and determines the relevance of 
our reasons for thinking and acting. Habermas's rational reconstruction thereby purports to be 
conditioned by a given understanding operating on two levels: a) that it is itself motivated by 
reason's attempt to determine the rationality of the lifeworld, and b) the resulting speech acts 
are themselves determined by the unconditional nature of truth-claims. The problem, however, 
is whether a rational reconstruction can bridge the divide between rational motivation and 
motivated rationality. As Taylor observes, the problem is the way a situated reason invariably 
relates to its relations of presupposition: in what way do we unconditionally evaluate the 
relevance – truth-value – of the presuppositions in question and how may their "unconditional 
nature"
2365
 act as a relevant precondition for acting critically? Specifically, the logic of discourse 
invariably raises the question of its capacity to provide reasons for action and motivating reason 
via rational evaluations: why should rational critique "occupy a special position"
2366
 within the 
lifeworld or convince us that "that it should be preferred to all other purposes?"
2367
 Habermas's 
definition of the situation presupposes the critical issue: a criterion of relevance within specific 
contexts of interpretation – i.e., the way our presuppositions should relate to each other and/or 
direct (contextualize) our reasons for acting. Habermas's move towards the unconditional 
therefore remains conditional upon the very contexts in question (dependent upon competing 
evaluations and/or movable action contexts).  
Habermas's questioning moves within a circle it cannot break out of, and directs reason back 
towards its guiding question: how to relate to presuppositions that remain effected and/or may 
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turn back on themselves. On the one side of the circle, Habermas directs us towards the 
question of determining the status of relations of presuppositions within contexts of relevance 
(definitions of situations invariably brought into question and thematized). On the other side, we 
find ourselves moving back towards the question of determining the relevance of relations of 
presuppositions across contexts of interpretation (the discourse that surrounds and defines 
interpretations of given situations). The problem is the presupposition directing his overall 
movements within the circle in question.  Specifically, Habermas's rational reconstruction 
remains built on a questionable presupposition: that it is possible to find a place to direct action 
contexts and relate to other presuppositions accordingly. Habermas's circular motion results 
from an attempt to define (decide) what is contextually relevant when given definitions of a 
situation are thrown back into (a) question. Following Derrida, the "category of intention"
2368
 is 
intended to play a decisive role within Habermas’s questioning: it attempts to "govern the entire 
scene and system of utterance"
2369
 from within a given definition of a situation. Although 
Habermas already understands the situation to be indefinable, he attempts to situate (decide, 
maintain) it anyway by making "intentionality adequate to itself and its contents."
2370
 
Consequently, Habermas's questioning is "guided by an intention of truth"
2371
, and his speech 
acts remain directed towards saying "the ontological: the presumed possibility of a discourse 
about what is"
2372
 meaningful or true – i.e., contextually relevant throughout time. Habermas's 
concept of the lifeworld, however, continually throws such a fundamental presupposition into 
question. If we can never occupy a place outside a "horizon forming context "
2373
  that moves 
with us, the question of what is contextually relevant lies beyond the threshold of conscious 
understanding or control. The attempt at saying the ontological, or speaking about the presumed 
possibility of a discourse about what is meaningful or true therefore redirects Habermas back 
to the problem of delimiting contexts of relevance. While the being of a question might provide 
a meaningful context in which to question our (relationship to) presuppositions, the relation 
between part and whole remains complex (undecided, indeterminate). The reason Habermas's 
rational reconstruction attempts to presuppose –  say –  relations of presuppositions is that he 
thinks that intentionality can direct the question of our being–there. Habermas has already 
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decided that thought can follow its contradictory directives and guide it towards a rational end 
within language –  hence the performative contradiction from the outset.   
The performative contradiction occurs via Habermas's attempt to direct effective history towards 
a universal reason (i.e., towards a definition of a situation that can somehow encompass and 
enact all understanding). Coming from one direction in history, there remains the problem of an 
implicit (or background) knowledge that must be taken as given or self-evident until it can be 
thematized and questioned. Coming from the other direction, there is the problem of not 
knowing what themes or questions may move into the foreground from a future approaching at 
different distances and varying relevance. The contradiction goes beyond the difficulty of 
understanding situations that must be taken as given from both directions in history –  it's that 
the relationship between background and foreground necessarily results in a fusion of horizons 
that may move in either direction at any given time. Habermas was, of course, originally critical 
of Gadamer's concept of fusion of horizons and sought to transcend the problem of knowledge 
claims converging around a "single point"
2374
 in history.  According to Habermas, reason "calls 
for a reference system that goes beyond the framework of tradition as such, only then, can 
tradition also be criticized."
2375
  He immediately found himself asking, however, "how could a 
reference system be legitimated except, in turn, out of the appropriation of tradition"?
2376
   
While Habermas's rational reconstruction provides an answer to this question, the problem of 
historical context invariably reintroduces the question of the relationship between background 
and foreground knowledge claims (relations of presuppositions and/or the way a situated reason 
relates to them). The lifeworld raises the problem of "always moving within the horizon"2377 of a 
given understanding: interpreters can never "step out of"
2378
 the reference points moving with 
them as the lifeworld simultaneously directs them towards the transcendental site in question – 
i.e., to a place in which the appropriation of tradition can be questioned and/or legitimated. 
Nonetheless, the very concept of horizon continues to throw into question the relationship 
between background and foreground, or the way in which a context trans/forms itself when in 
motion. Indeed, it is this very way-making movement that makes a context relevant (known, 
possible) in the first place: such movements trans/form the way in which relations of 
presupposition can be contextualized and understood (approached, questioned). Specifically, 
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the line at which distinct planes of reference appear to meet changes continually, resulting in 
an intentional horizon determined by the possibility of back and forth movement. Consequently, 
it is the way in which presuppositions relate to each other there that becomes the contextually 
relevant question –  insofar as the relationship between background and foreground knowledge 
remains an open question. Relations of presupposition shift with the horizon in trans/formation 
–  by being called into question and/or being via horizontal movements. Following Derrida, then, 
linguistically constructed relations of presupposition remain undecidable and invariably place 
themselves within (a) question that can be deconstructed in turn. The movement between part 
and whole ensures that such relations remain questionable across contexts of interpretation. 
They invariably call "to each other from afar"
2379
 by way of a "hidden mediation"
2380
 and "secret 
argumentation."
2381
 Given that contexts are always already trans/forming themselves, the 
question of their normative content (or legitimacy) remains subject to conflicting interpretations 
and/or move with the horizon in question.  
Performative Status of Statements that Remain Open to Question and Criticism.  
We now turn to the performative status of statements that remain open to question and/or 
criticism (validation). We do this to question "the ground of its presuppositions, the entirety of 
the discourse in which one could articulate the question of the "entire field" (as a question and 
hence as a discourse)."
2382
 Habermas argues that the relation between question and answer 
plays an active role in determining the status of competing statements potentially "caught up in 
the tumult of opposing reasons."
2383
 Specifically, the dialectic of reason directs communicative 
reason to "those linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue illocutionary 
aims"
2384
 and can "take up an interpersonal relationship with a thematically stressed validity 
claim."
2385
 Rational agents thereby "express a general will"
2386
  towards mutual understanding, 
and implicitly agree to enter into a relationship "on the presupposed basis of validity claims that 
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 Habermas clarifies the conditions of a possible overturning in 
understanding by directing rational thinkers towards the question of their "binding and 
bonding"
2388
 relationship to the "stubbornly transcending power"
2389
 of language "renewed with 
each act of unconstrained understanding."
2390
 The concepts of illocutionary acts and 
illocutionary force are particularly effective – and questionable – here. We are therefore forced 
to ask: what is the source of the illocutionary force of the dialectic of question and answer, and 
how does the generation of "communicative power"
2391
 direct the way–making movements of 
effective history? Given that "communicative reason operates in history as an avenging 
force,"
2392
 the answer becomes self-evident. The dialectic's illocutionary force coincides with the 
"unforced force of the better argument"
2393
 in that reason proposes to act as its own corrective 
and/or directive via its "generative power"
2394
 to call into being good reasons for thinking and 
acting otherwise.
2395
 In adopting an intentional stance,2396  "the performative attitude allows for 
a mutual orientation toward validity claims (such as truth, normative rightness, and sincerity), 
which are raised with the expectation of a yes or no reaction (or a quest for further reasons). 
These claims are designed for critical assessment so that an intersubjective recognition of a 
particular claim can serve as a basis for a rationally motivated consensus." 
2397
 The problem, 
however, is the circle in which a situated reason moves against itself: how can reason be 
thought truly (or completely) rational when it remains caught in the tumult of potentially opposing 
reasons? The "rational acceptability of validity claims is ultimately based only on reasons that 
withstand objections under certain demanding conditions of communication. If the process of 
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argumentation is to live up to its meaning, communication in the form of rational discourse must 
allow, if possible, all relevant information and explanations to be brought up and weighed so 
that the stance participants take can be inherently motivated solely by the revisionary power of 
free-floating reasons."
2398
 If, however, the relation between question and answer directly 
constrains the way objects can be meaningfully understood and argued about, our question 
becomes: to what extent can reversals in direction themselves be directed? Given that such 
back and forth movements occur within the historicity of understanding, the question is whether 
it's possible to direct the circle of understanding itself.  
The concern is whether our (ontological) commitment to the language game of argumentation 
forces us to falsify a reason's presupposed truth-value via "the moment of unconditionality that 
we intuitively associate with truth-claims…in the sense of a transcending of local contexts." 
2399
 
The problem is the way the moment of unconditionality is always already "built into the 
conditions of processes of consensus formation"
2400
 when directing ourselves towards 
criticizable validity claims. Witness the contradictory role consensus plays within Habermas's 
own argumentation game: as an unquestioned tacit agreement about definitions of situations 
and as a rationally motivated redefinition of situations reached through questioning and explicit 
assent. The problem is that the rational status of a reason for thinking and acting plays an active 
part within the complex whole in question: by what criterion – social principle or standard – may 
a given reason "count as a good or indeed the better reason"
2401
 for thinking and acting? The 
problem of the contextualization of reason(s) invariably calls the circle of understanding back 
into question. If giving reasons is supposed to persuade us to accept a rationally motivated 
agreement, the very possibility of a 'good or better' reason for acting presupposes actively 
disagreeing with either a) what is already tacitly agreed and acted upon –  persuasive reasons 
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constitutive of a preunderstanding – or b) with critical reason by securing tacit approval via 
reasons that are so persuasive they invariably must be similarly taken as given or as 
unquestionably true).2402 Either way, a reason for thinking and acting can only have the 
performative status as a cultural (de)posit: as statements put forward on the basis of competing 
arguments or as statements invariably held back for (potentially) further argument. We raise the 
question of the normative status of reasons to redirect ourselves back to Habermas's original 
problematic: the problem of systematic distortions and/or colonization of the lifeworld by way of 
system integration. Given this problematic, consensus also becomes a standard for falsification 
and obfuscation within Habermas's interpretation of (a) mutual understanding. Consensus 
becomes contradictory in that it remains part of the complex whole in question: consensus acts 
as a standard for truth and falsity simultaneously, and Habermas cannot resolve this 
contradiction without begging the original question about the relevancy or adequacy of the given 
"criterion to distinguish between true and false consensuses."
2403
 Habermas is thereby logically 
committed to a paradoxical definition of the hermeneutical situation: if a consensus is true it may 
also be – or become – false. Habermas's emphasis upon consensus therefore raises the 
problem of the criterion and its relation to the validity of our reasons for thinking and acting. 
Specifically, how can interpreters agree to distinguish between a true and false consensus 
within their understanding? The concept of consensus brings Habermas's argument full circle 
in two related ways. On the one side, there is the problem of delineating the rationality of our 
reasons within a mutual understanding –  particularly if the requirement is to critically evaluate 
opposing reasons attempting to similarly transcend the context of their occurrence. On the other 
side, there is the problem of con/fusing horizons via methodological considerations, or mistaking 
the standard of truth for the truth itself when determining the normative status of our reasons 
for being-there.  
Suppose that we agree that truth is ideally reached through consensus. Habermas also requires 
us to agree that consensus may be less than ideal in that it is simultaneously a standard for 
falsification and obfuscation. The difficulty is bringing forth and sustaining a truth-evaluative 
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distinction occurring against the background of a lifeworld in constant trans/formation and 
continually subjected to criticizable validity claims. Rorty therefore asks how it might be possible 
for a situated –  and mobile –  reason to distinguish between "true consensus and false 
consensus"
2404
 or "validity and power"
2405
 when consensus always already acts as the 
binding/bonding power in effective history. A consensus about what is "true or valid"
2406
 is 
effectively built into the lifeworld and so exhibits a contradictory binding power: consensus 
simultaneously becomes a standard for truth and falsity and can move (force, bond) interpreters 
either way. The concept of mutual understanding through agreement itself becomes 
questionable because Habermas cannot "provide any criteria for distinguishing a truly rational 
consensus from a merely apparent rational agreement."
2407
 Horizons of understanding remain 
limited by their relations of presupposition and movements (back) towards them: interpreters 
cannot literally transcend the context of their occurrence and independently question (compare 
and evaluate) the validity of their reasons for thinking and acting. Following Gadamer, it is the 
relation between background and foreground that determines the horizon in question –  by 
actively bringing forth the questionability of what is questioned.
2408
 
Habermas's linguistic actions raise the question of the conditions of possibility of rational 
discourse within a given horizon of understanding – via the "cultural interpretive systems or 
worldviews that reflect the background knowledge of social groups and guarantee an 
interconnection among the multiplicity of their action orientations."
2409
 Habermas distinguishes 
between mythical and modern worldviews, and argues that myth and enlightenment
2410
 may be 
meaningfully distinguished and evaluated via a specific criterion: whether those engaged in the 
relevant "conduct (or form) of life"
2411
 can understand that their "linguistically constituted 
worldview"
2412
 is, in reality, merely an "interpretation of the world."
2413
 Significantly, the concept 
of prejudice plays an active role within Habermas's hierarchical distinction. Actors "who raise 
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validity claims have to avoid materially prejudicing the relation between language and reality, 
between the medium of communication and that about which something is being 
communicated"
2414
. Habermas's reason is self-evident: in order to actively resist "reifying the 
linguistic worldview"
2415
 and opening rational thought up to the possibility of more valid or truthful 
interpretations. If a mythical worldview cannot see itself "as an interpretation of the world that is 
subject to error and open to criticism"
2416
 enlightened thinking is fallibilistic in orientation and 
directed towards an "objective world"
2417
 in a more rational way. The rational status of competing 
interpretations therefore turns on the "function of the formal world concepts"
2418
, or the way a 
linguistically conceptualized (interpreted) reality may be reconceived (reinterpreted). Habermas 
posits the notion of an objective world open to criticizable validity claims in accord with the three 
"formal world concepts…(that) presuppose a world that is identical for all possible observers, or 
a world intersubjectively shared by members, and they do so in an abstract form freed of all 
specific content."
2419
 A world conceived thus objectively – i.e., via a theoretical (re)interpretation 
– is said to provide rational access through the "medium of common interpretative efforts, in the 
sense of a cooperative negotiation of situation definitions."
2420
  Consequently, "the concepts of 
the three worlds serve here as the commonly supposed system of coordinates in which the 
situation contexts can be ordered in such a way that agreement will be reached about what the 
participants may treat as a fact, or as a valid norm, or as a subjective experience."
2421
 The critical 
question, however, is the tenability of Habermas's distinction between mythical and modern 
worldviews: is a situated reason's prejudicial "claim to universality"
2422
 self-mythologizing? Put 
another way: how can rational discourse possibly distinguish itself from mythical thinking when 
the claim to universality is also a condition of its impossibility? The problem is that the 
performative attitude is performatively contradictory and so remains in error.2423 In ontologically 
committing itself to the truth – via "the premise that a single correct interpretation has to be 
found"
2424
 – rational discourse effectively misinterprets the historicity of understanding2425 by 
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interpreting away the role of motivated rationality. Habermas's rational reconstruction therefore 
materially prejudices the relation between language and reality in a different way: it reifies a 
linguistic worldview by perpetuating the myth that the "contest of interpretations makes sense 
only on the premise"
2426
 in question. Given that Habermas's rational reconstruction follows the 
lead of the performative attitude, we are forced to ask whether the idealizing presuppositions of 







independently call a category mistake: does it direct reason towards making an "ontological 
error"
2430
 when formally describing the evaluative properties of our 'reasons' for thinking and 
acting as if they were objectively binding and/or bonding? The ontological error is that the 
objective purport of competing knowledge claims – critical evaluations thereof –  attempts to 
weave the rationality of competing reasons into "the fabric of the world"
2431
 in question. 
Nonetheless, "the claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language and thought, is not 
                                                
effective history. Prior to Plato's attempt to invert the (then) traditional hierarchy between myth and 
logos, rational thought was originally conceived as "lies, masquerade, and dissimulation", p.4, and 
was directed towards "shady speech acts: those of seduction, beguilement, and deception", p.x. 
Mythos, however, was "the speech of the preeminent, above all poets and kings, a genre (like them) 
possessed of high authority, having the capacity to advance powerful truth-claims, and backed by 
physical force", p.x. Consequently, mythos and logos are "not words with fixed meanings (indeed, 
no such words exist), nor did their meanings change glacially over time, as the result of impersonal 
processes. Rather, these words, along with many others, were the sites of pointed and highly 
consequential semantic skirmishes fought between rival regimes of truth", p.18. The requirement, 
then, is "to transform a simple, linear plot of development and progress ("from mythos to logos") into 
one that recognizes the importance of multiple actors, perspectives, and positions. None of these 
are dismissible, none are pure, and none hold a monopoly on truth. Indeed, the protestations of the 
principals notwithstanding, the central issue with which they grapple is not truth per se but discursive 
authority", p.43. 
2426
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Habermas Responds to His Critics: Reply to Symposium" in Cardozo Law 
Review, Vol.17, Nos.4-5, 1996, p.1498.  The full quote is "This contest of interpretations makes 
sense only on the premise that it is necessary to find a single correct reading that claims to exhaust 
the universalistic content of these rights in the present context."  
2427
 Mackie, John. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), p.35. Mackie 
prefers to use the term "error theory" to interrogate the categories of evaluative thinking, and 
provides an "argument from relativity" and "an argument from queerness" to illustrate the categorical 
error of treating "conventional" reasons for moral evaluation as making factual judgments. 
2428
 McCarthy, Thomas, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), 
p.303. McCarthy argues that Habermas's consensus theory of truth mistakes "the meaning of truth 
with the methods for arriving at true statements" 
2429
 Cook, Deborah. Adorno, Habermas and the Search for a Rational Society (London: Routledge, 
2004), p.89. Cook argues that Habermas makes a category mistake typical of philosophers making 
the linguistic turn. Specifically, while it might be true that beliefs and desires "are expressed in 
language", Habermas errs by moving within a circle and so falsely inferring that our intentional states 
"are themselves intrinsically linguistic."  
2430
 Horgan, Terry, and Timmons, Mark. "Morality Without Moral Facts" in Dreier, James (ed.) 
Contemporary Debates in Morality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p.229. Horgan and 
Timmons are specifically discussing Mackie's error thesis regarding the ontology of moral values. 
Although we are not sympathetic to Mackie's attempt to create an ontological divide between ‘facts’ 
and ‘values’ – we've been stressing the parallel between ethics and epistemology from the outset – 
the question remains. 
2431




 and begs the original question regarding a given argument's validity 
conditions. Specifically, does the mutual orientation towards criticizable validity claims 
ontologically commit interpreters to making a category mistake when arguing with each other? 
An idealized projection of ultimately true meaning under more ideal conditions does not save 
(competing definitions of) the situation since it ontologically commits Habermas to a paradoxical 
(and equally false) speech situation: the myth of having a final say. Following Derrida, Habermas 
is legitimating reason's myth of origin (telos, destination) when it can (falsely) claim to direct  
"the hierarchical axiology, the ethical-ontological distinctions which …not only set up value-
oppositions clustered around an ideal and unfindable limit, but moreover subordinate these 
values to each other."
2433
 The myth of reason is that its condition of possibility is also its condition 
of impossibility: determining the rationality of reason is the reason 'reason' remains divided 
and/or mobilised against itself. As Quine's naturalised epistemology also argues for significantly 
different reasons,
2434
 the determination of meaning remains relative to the linguistic horizon in 
question and logically prior –  or more enlightened – ontological standards invariably revert back 
to myth anyway. Quine's ontological relativism even goes so far as to reduce material objects 
to mythical beings:  
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries – not by 
definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the 
gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and 
not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of 
epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts 
of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically 
superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a 
manageable structure into the flux of experience.2435 
                                                
2432
 ibid, p.35. 
2433
 Derrida, Jacques. "Limited INC a b c…" in Limited INC (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1988), p.93. 
2434
 The irony, of course, is that Quine was the most prominent philosopher who publicly objected to 
Derrida receiving an honorary degree from Cambridge, and would not approve of being brought into 
close proximity to Derrida here. Although they approach the question of being from opposing 
philosophical ‘worldviews’, they do share a common perspective: the problem of determining the 
identity of meaning conditions, or the meaning of ‘being’ (there). 
2435
 Quine, Willard. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), p.44. Quine also argues in "Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis" 
that "We can improve our conceptual scheme, our philosophy, bit by bit while continuing to depend 
on it for support; but we cannot detach ourselves from it and compare it objectively with an 
unconceptualized reality. Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to inquire into the absolute correctness 
of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standard for appraising basic changes of 
conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic 
standard." Concepts are language, and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in 
 338 
Habermas might argue, of course, that Quine cannot consistently make a claim to universality 
if the logical space of reasons can be relativized to a given ontological commitment: how is it 
possible to compare and evaluate objects of experience if all reasons can be similarly reduced 
to the myth of the given.2436  As Kim independently complains, an "epistemology that has been 
purged of normativity"
2437
 can no longer be thought epistemic or normative: any given reason 
may be thought equally good or bad, and it would not be possible to distinguish between truth 
and falsity meaningfully. If the concept of truth is normative in some way, it must therefore still 
be possible for given reasons to be called (back) into question: in what way can rational beings 
remain answerable to the question of their being-in-the world via the giving and taking of 
potentially competing reasons? This returns us, then, to the parallel between ethics and 
epistemology,
2438
 or the way reasons enter into the normative conception of the very practical 
identities in question.   
The myth of the given occurs within Habermas's conception of consensus in a contradictory 
way.  Habermas attempts to direct the mutual orientation towards validity claims through the 
pathway of agreements bringing forth ongoing disagreements and/or negotiated settlements 
(formal arrangements establishing a sense of community in previously unoccupied or unsettled 
places). Habermas's concept of consensus therefore operates at two different levels 
simultaneously.  On one level, a consensus is generally implicit and unquestionable – it provides 
the meaningful background in which to move and is necessarily taken as given. On another 
level, these unquestionable truths may become explicit and questionable –  via questions and 
themes actively moving into the foreground. The performative contradiction is assigning truth-
values to beliefs and practices that occur beyond reason –  must be taken as given – while also 
seeking to distinguish between a true and false consensus from within the context of opposing 
reasons directed towards a given myth (or methodological fiction). Approached from one 
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direction, particular reasons for thinking and acting have already been objectified – they appear 
to be part of the fabric of the world in question. Approached from another direction, Habermas's 
conception of the performative attitude as self-validating legitimates the objectifying and/or 
weaving process of argumentation via the claim to universality. If, however, the historicity of 
understanding always provides the normative context in which to move back or forth, how can 
a situated reason meaningfully distinguish between true and false consensus in the first place? 
Part of the problem is the functional role of consensus, or the way an agreement becomes 
socially acceptable and acts as a truth-bearer within a complex whole invariably calling itself 
(back) into question. The problem is that Habermas provides an interpretation where meaning 
conditions (mutual understanding through agreement) acts as a "functional equivalent of 
truth."
2439
 The "symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake"
2440
 in that the "subsumption of 
the lifeworld under the system"
2441
 remains at issue. The question of an argument's social 
function intersects with the issue of its contextual relevance, and so re-turns us to the problem 
of the normative dimensions of "communicatively structured domains of action."
2442
 Specifically, 
a rationally motivated agreement becomes performatively contradictorily –  and so potentially 
dysfunctional – when a socially accepted argument may move towards better integrating a 
social order that would ideally remain in question. Eriksen and Weigard sum up the contradictory 
situation best when they observe that "the purpose of Habermas's analysis –  which is to 
demonstrate the irreparability of social integration –  can be accused of being trapped in a 
functionalist frame of interpretation."
2443
 All said and done, Habermas's emphasis on 
"reproductive processes"
2444




 in that it 
equates the reproduction of meaning with the occurrence of a more truthful (rationally ordered) 
society. According to Habermas, "system integration cannot replace social integration in the 
areas of the lifeworld without"
2447
 the latter becoming dysfunctional (i.e., pathological and/or 
distorted). However, if "we continue to ask why it is important to avoid such side effects"
2448
 in 
effective history, the "only answer that Habermas seems able to offer is that it would be 
dysfunctional in relation to the goal of social stability and order."
2449
 Consequently, Habermas 
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offers an argument which "refers to functional efficiency rather than normative legitimacy."
2450
 
The difficulty is that Habermas's definition of the (hermeneutical) situation inadvertently reduces 
normative legitimacy to functional efficiency. If the historicity of understanding necessarily 
create(s) its normativity out of itself, legitimacy is invariably re/produced through the circle of 
understanding. Consequently, the relation between part and whole thereby becomes complex 
(questionable) because it is itself performatively contradictory. Given that genuinely meaningful 
interpretations can only occur within the context of effective history, the question is the way the 
lifeworld acts as the locus of continuing tradition. Habermas's questioning therefore 
presupposes the very paradoxical situation in question – the social function (contextual 
relevance, transmission) of competing arguments and/or rational standards. Given that 
consensus acts as the locus of continuing tradition, it must also throw the (re)creation of its  
normativity (back) into question and unsettle the very ground on which 'truth' moves and remains 
directed.       
Since our rule consciousness remains fallibilistic in orientation, Habermas maintains that "it is 
the goal of justifications to discover a truth that exceeds all justification."
2451
 Nonetheless, 
Habermas understands that the "gap between rational acceptability and truth cannot be 
bridged", putting the "participants in discourse in a paradoxical position."
2452
 Indeed, this is the 
reason why Habermas's conception of rationality is performatively contradictory: he wants 
reason to be directed towards a "Janus faced truth that establishes an internal connection 
between performative certainty and warranted assertibility."
2453
 Habermas's conception of truth 
is two-faced because he wants to distinguish between the conditional (context-dependent) and 
the unconditional (context-independent) to hold onto the possibility of interpretations becoming 
universally true.  
Reaching understanding cannot function unless the participants refer to a single objective world, thereby 
stabilizing the intersubjectively shared public space with which everything that is merely subjective can 
be contrasted. This supposition of an objective world that is independent of our descriptions fulfills a 
functional requirement of our processes of cooperation and communication. Without this supposition, 
everyday practices, which rest on the (in a certain sense) Platonic distinction between believing and 
knowing unreservedly, would come apart at the seams.2454  
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Note the distinction between believing and knowing, and the functional role reason plays in the 
"translation"
2455
 of the one into the other. Interpreters in the lifeworld necessarily "rely on what 
is unconditionally held-to-be- true" when questioning the historicity of their own beliefs. This 
"mode of unconditionally holding-to-be-true is reflected on the discursive level in the 
connotations of truth-claims that point beyond the given contexts of justification and require the 
supposition of ideal justificatory conditions – with a resulting decenteringof the justification 
community. For this reason, the process of justification can be guided by a notion of truth that 
transcends justification although it is always already operatively effective in the realm of 
action."
2456
 Habermas's two-faced conception of truth presupposes Heidegger's distinction 
between "ready– to– hand"
2457
 and present– to hand in that the requirement is to determine the 
truth-value of "habitualized practices" and the question of their "continued functioning"
2458
 in 
effective history. The problem is questioning a "frustrating reality…in an action context that is 
no longer functioning."
2459
 An interpretation that is "contrary to our beliefs destabilizes our 
certainties about how to act. Only if agents distance themselves from their practical coping with 
the world and enter into rational discourse"
2460
 about their dysfunctional beliefs that questioning 
can "become a discursively mobilized reason…and enters as criticism"
2461
 within the 
understanding. 
The question, then, is whether a mobilized reason can ever be unconditionally valid: under what 
conditions –  or (definition of) a situation –  can a criticizable reason become universally 'true'? 
Specifically, "what we hold to be true has to be defendable on the basis of good reasons, not 
merely in a different context but in all possible contexts, that is, any time against anybody. This 
provides the inspiration for the discourse theory of truth: a proposition is true if it withstands all 
attempts to refute it under the demanding conditions of rational discourse."
2462
 The performative 
status of a defensible and/or criticizable reason remains integral here. All said and done, how 
can a mobilized reason withstand all attempts to reverse its direction in effective history? 
Alternatively, under what circumstances can the attempt to translate action contexts 
(habitualized beliefs and practices) into rational discourse (competing knowledge claims) move 
reason towards (definitions of) situations that are unconditionally true in all possible contexts of 
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interpretation? Given the dialectic of question and answer, Habermas's methodological fiction 
invariably becomes dysfunctional in that it can never justify its directive: it merely attempts to 
objectify (parts of) action contexts through the activity of questioning. The translation of action 
contexts into a different context and/or activity therefore reveals the questionability of rational 
discourse –  by begging the question of the continued functioning (contextual relevance and/or 
adequacy) of habitualized practices.
2463
 Truth acting as idealized consensus is antithetical to 
the dialectic of question and answer and interprets away the role of motivated reasoning (the 
way competing reasons –  values and interests – actively inform conflicting definitions of 
situations). Habermas's concept of the lifeworld throws into question the relation between 
reason as a capacity of thought and reason as evidentiary consideration in that reasons 
invariably remain conditional upon (definitions of) situations: they're relevant insofar as being 
culturally specific and/or relative to the contexts in question. Habermas's attempt to situate a 
unitary reason within effective history –  define a situation where reason and reasons can be 
directed and/or united through mutual agreement – problematizes the very regulative ideal of 
truth as consensus. Taken from one direction –  the end of history – a final consensus deprives 
arguments of their original force by urging that the lifeworld would ideally be beyond reason's 
purview and directives (i.e., not fallibilistic in orientation, subject to conflicting interpretations, 
criticizable validity claims). If there is a situation where everyone can (conceivably, theoretically) 
come to a final agreement, the perfomatively contradictory goal is to render effective history 
speechless (ineffective). Taken from the other direction –  communicative reason finding its way 
through competing definitions of situations – a consensus formally defined can never act as a 
truth connective or bearer. The possibility and/or desirability of reason arguing effectively 
renders the reason for arguing dysfunctional (divisive, mobilized). While a functioning reason 
demands to be given back as reasons, reason stays answerable (true) to itself by actively 
falsifying the reasons it invariably gives (back) to itself: it is always already performatively 
contradictory and ideally remains on the way back to the language in question. The distinction 
between rational motivation and motivated rationality therefore acts as a constant reminder that 
the possibility of dissent is "ever present and ineliminable given the inevitable variation in 
people's information and (hermeneutical) situation."
2464
 Disagreements are the way rational 
                                                
2463
 Rorty, Richard.  "Response to Jürgen Habermas" in Brandom, Robert (ed.) Rorty And His Critics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.57. As Rorty reminds Habermas, a situated reason cannot meaningfully 
(truthfully) translate its own meaning conditions into unconditional truth-values. Specifically, "a 
rational discourse is just one more action-context in which a behavioural certainty evinces itself… 
Rational discourses are the species of action-context in which" interpreters are "trying to acquire 
better habits of action by comparing and contrasting" their "own habits with those of others. In such 
contexts, your behavioural certainty makes itself evident in your attempt to justify your belief"
2463
 with 
defensible and/or criticizable reasons. 
2464
 Rescher, Nicholas. Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005), p.7.  
 343 
thinkers identify and evaluate the normativity of reasons for thinking and acting in hermeneutical 
situations in the first place: the normative force of reasons has its basis in their action-directive 
function and involves selecting competing norms or standards for thinking and acting. 
Consensus and dissensus therefore presuppose each other in that reason remains directed 
towards arguing with itself over how to evaluate what constitutes 'a good or better reason'. 
Wellmer sums up the performative contradiction in the following way. 
We can give no criteria for rational consensus other than this: that precisely all those taking part are 
similarly persuaded by good reasons. Since, however, what "good reasons" are can only be shown in that 
they compel us towards an agreement, a consensus can never be the criterion that what we have before 
us are good reasons. The concept of a "good reason" is attached, in an irreducible way, to the perspective 
of the one "persuaded" by good reasons. One cannot describe from a meta- perspective which "qualities" 
reasons must have in order to be really good reasons.  To call reasons "good" is not the ascription of an 
"objective" quality, rather it is the adoption of an attitude with normative consequences…this also means 
that consensus and dissent are equiprimordial: just as every controversy about truth-claims has its telos 
in an uncoerced consensus, so does every consensus carry in itself the seed of new disagreements.2465  
Habermas's two-faced conception of truth therefore throws the reasoning of his argument into 
question: it presupposes the rational status of the very reason in question. Habermas's attempt 
to translate particular cultural beliefs into universal knowledge claims also threatens to collapse 
the distinction between a traditional and critical theory. By emphasizing the re/production and/or 
renewal of a given cultural tradition, Habermas's conception of critique is invariably directed 
towards rationally accommodating itself to the (myth of) given. The dialectic of reason's primary 
concern remains functionalist in orientation in that it derives its illocutionary force from within 
the system re/producing its directives. Critique becomes directed towards validating the 
complex whole in which it occurs: reason's questionable movements are already understood to 
be true insofar as its parts ideally work together to promote a more rational (valid) social order. 
Specifically, where all the constituent parts can form a coherent (or more meaningful) whole 
throughout effective history –  a totality ideally free of (performative) contradictions and/or 
conflicting interpretations. While the dialectic of reason necessarily reproduces contradictory 
movements, Habermas's questioning is contradictorily directed towards re/producing a 
particular form of life as if were always already universally valid (internally consistent, relating 
to such a complex whole in its totality). The performative contradiction is that Habermas's 
attempt to fulfil the 'functional requirement of our processes of cooperation and communication' 
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reveals a mythical worldview that cannot be rationally argued for. The myth being: a given 
cultural tradition can transcend the context/s of its occurrence by appealing to a situated – and 
motivated – reason's presupposed universality. While Habermas prefers to call such a 
worldview a 'methodological fiction', he cannot meaningfully answer the question of its truth-
value and/or bearing – namely, why reason's claim to universality is not mythological (or self-
mythologizing). Given Habermas's inability to decide these questions either way, reason's 
movements occur "by way of the undecidable"
2466
 and cannot direct the question of its 
rationality. The historicity of understanding moves reason in different directions simultaneously: 
it remains performatively contradictory insofar as the condition of its possibility is also the 
condition of its impossibility. Following Derrida, reason is caught "between possibilities" that 
"are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations"
2467
 and so functions within a 
problematic that is impossible to define (determine either way). Performatively speaking, 
reason's attempt to remedy its situations simultaneously becomes its own undoing. 
Consequently, another question needs to be ask: why does reason remain mobilized and/or 
divided against itself? 
Reconstructing Derrida 
On the Way (Back).  
We attempt an answer to this question by following Derrida's movements. We do this, however, 
not just to follow Derrida's lead but to also question his general "sense of direction."
2468
 Our 
directive is therefore contradictory, or guided by movements that "reverse their direction and 
turn back on themselves."
2469
 Specifically, we reconstruct Derrida's questioning to identify a 
differend within the way-making movements of a reason deconstructing itself. Following Derrida, 
we call one of these "differends"
2470
 a pharmakon and argue that reason "divides its own 
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identity… while constituting it"
2471
 in "the law of the circle."
2472
 Derrida's lines of questioning, of 
course, purports to follow the lead of a reason directed against itself. Derrida follows reason's 
way-ward movements for a "consistent"
2473
 – or "undeconstructible"
2474
 – reason: so as to be 
able to do justice to directives moving against reason(s). Derrida thereby throws into question 
the ways rational thinkers attempt to "confine their criteriology"
2475
 to given intentional horizons. 
Dooley and Kavanagh note that the "myth of the given"
2476
 has been Derrida's primary object of 
inquiry in that he has consistently challenged "the notion that objects, consciousness and indeed 
all experience in general are simply given, present and transparent to all."
2477
 Lumsden 
observes that since there can be no direct access to the objects in question, Derrida 
ontologically commits himself to avoiding "reinstalling a given"
2478
 in turn and the logical "space 
of reasons"
2479
 becomes displaced through reason's activities. Nonetheless, Derrida's 
contextual "strategy for thought's transformation of itself"
2480
 returns us to the performative 
contradiction of his quasi-transcendental thinking: in what way does Derrida direct the 
performative flow of the objects in question? As Caputo argues, Derrida's inquiries are "also 
supplying the presuppositions for thinking that whatever sense language does make will also 
be unmade, that the things we do with words will come undone."
2481
 Derrida's questioning 
consistently states that "it is always possible to find some context in which an otherwise false 
statement is true, or an otherwise true statement is false…and this therefore tends to undo the 
universalizability that we would want to attribute to a transcendental property."
2482
 Norris brings 
us closer to Derrida's performative contradictions when he observes that one of Derrida's main 
objectives is to call into question "the methodological priority of language over thought"
2483
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insofar as such prioritizations become "demonstrably self-refuting since they presuppose what 
they purport to deny."
2484
 Note Norris's use of the term demonstrably – such a possibility 
presupposes that Derrida's displacement of the logical space of reasons is itself capable of 
logical proof via the act of placing and positioning objects of thought.
2485
 Culler observes that 
we therefore find ourselves directed back towards the "paradoxical situation"
2486
 in question: 
that the "exercise of language and thought involves us in intractable paradoxes, which we 
cannot escape but only repress."
2487
 The paradox, however, is whether it is possible to repress 
(deny, contextualize) the truth-values in question. Although Norris originally claimed that 
Derrida's thought is "simply the most-hard pressed and consequent of relativistic doctrines 
applied to questions of meaning, logic and truth"
2488
 the paradox remains: is Derrida's 
ontological relativism universally true or false? Norris has since claimed that Derrida's 
'demonstrations' must be ontologically committed to realism if they are to make absolute 
sense.
2489
 Specifically, we need to presuppose universally agreed upon standards of rationality 
to determine their context-independent truth-value – namely, that there exist certain features of 
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…with respect to the question of whether truth can properly or intelligibly be conceived as transcending 
the limits of available evidence, present best knowledge or attainable proof. I (now) maintain that Derrida 
can be seen to espouse a realist position not only in logico-semantic terms…but also as a matter of strong 
metaphysical and ontological commitment. Indeed, if this were not the case, then there could be no 
justification for the claim – implicit throughout his work – that a deconstructive reading can discover 
(rather than project or invent) hitherto unrecognized complexities of sense and logic.2491 
 
Re-turning to the Problematic of the Performative.  
We return, then, to the "problematic of the performative"
2492
 within "strictly defined situations"
2493
: 
the problem remains integral insofar as Derrida deconstructs what a situated reason tries to 
administer to itself across contexts of interpretation. Derrida does this by problematizing "any 
certitude or supposed criteriology that would assure us of the justice of the decision."
2494
 
Derrida's deconstructive questioning thereby finds itself directed towards reinterpreting the 
"relative stability of the dominant interpretation…of the text being commented upon."
2495
 As 
Kakoliris comments, however, adopting such a performative attitude remains a "contradiction in 
terms"
2496
: it requires Derrida to stabilize the meaning of the text through the affirmation of 
authorial (or textual) intent and to destabilize it via the negation of another author's intentions or 
text.
2497
 Such a contradictory approach – via Derrida's (re)quest for mutually opposed reasons 
– is the way Derrida's performs the text(s) across the contexts in question. Derrida claims to be 
able to come to terms with such a contradiction via his ontological commitment to an "absolute 
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 that renders all contexts of interpretation unstable and/or questionable. From 
within the context of these unstable movements, Derrida attempts to move rational thought 
beyond reason – towards the possibility of justice without "economic circularity, without 
calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality."
2499
 The problem, however, 
is determining the rational limits of Derrida's questioning: in what way may its terminal points or 
boundary lines be justified? We use the term justify in two related senses here 1) to have a good 
or better reason for displacing the logical space of reasons so that 2) the lines of Derrida’s text 
can form or follow a through-line (thread, path) towards the margins of interwoven contexts. 
Derrida also claims that deconstruction should never be understood as a conscious "act or an 
operation"
2500
 – it is merely an "event"
2501
 that occurs of its own accord within language. 
Nonetheless, such events must remain "faithful to the themes and audacities"
2502
 of thinking 
insofar as thought and language necessarily direct each other. Consequently, the question of 
the 'specificity of intentionality…without limit remains open"
2503
 to questioning. Our question 
turns into: in what ways does deconstruction defer to thought to interrogate "the ground of its 
presuppositions, the entirety of the discourse in which one could articulate the question of the 
"entire-field" (as a question, and hence as a discourse)."
2504
 Derrida's conception of 
undecidability as a "necessary condition"
2505
 for rationality provides an entry point into the 
question of the legality of his decision-making and begs the question of the conditions of its 
possibility. Following Habermas, we shall therefore reconstruct Derrida's questioning via 
universal conditions of mutual understanding.  Specifically, if our knowledge of the world of 
experience remains questionable –  undecidable – how is it possible to question and/or decide 
upon the limits of rational discourse in such a performatively contradictory way? 
Habermas's concept of performative attitude becomes integral – particularly since Derrida 
independently offers an alternative to Habermas's yes or no ontological commitment to linguistic 
interactions. According to Derrida, there is a more originary speech situation directing our 
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actions, returning us to the "question of the question"
2506
 that has been following us "since the 
beginning."
2507
 Following Heidegger, we are obliged to ask the question of the "possibility of any 
question. i.e., language"
2508
 and so find ourselves returning to the problem of questioning the 
language "already speaking for us – it must, so to speak, be already spoken and addressed to 
us."
2509
 Derrida calls this "quasi-transcendental and silent performative"
2510
 an "archi-originary 
yes"
2511
 that "resembles an absolute performative"
2512
 in that "it is not, strictly speaking, an 
act"
2513
 and must somehow still be listened to and/or spoken for. Such a "wordless…yes"
2514
 
directs our questions back towards the "tacit commitment of language towards language"
2515
: it 
lets language speak through our speech acts because it is a "pre-originary pledge which 
precedes any other engagement in language or action."
2516
 This "yes" is always already an 
answer to any given speech act because it throws speech (back) into question and speaks 
through our acts accordingly. Our speech acts are therefore said to have a more originary 
performative attitude – a yes that also (or simultaneously) says no in that it makes it possible to 
question the rationality of "giving reason"
2517
 back over to itself in language. The yes "resounds 
in it always in order to come before it…and opens the question and always lets itself be 
presupposed by it, a yes that affirms prior to, before or beyond any possible question."
2518
 
Consequently, the "supposed last instance of the questioning attitude"
2519
 can never give 
rational "thought its measure"
2520




In the following, we identify two related performative contradictions within Derrida's attempt to 
deconstruct the logical space of reasons, and reconstruct his questionable movements in 
accordance with Habermas's conception of criticizable validity claims. Specifically, there is a 
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performative contradiction within Derrida's reasoning about reason's conditions of possibility 
and a performative contradiction within Derrida's delimitation of contexts of interpretation. 





 brought into the context of a question. Derrida must 
therefore "be able to provide reasons or grounds"
2524
 for his own questioning and arguments. 
Specifically, a rational reconstruction presupposes the possibility of a lifeworld enabling a 
"reflective relation to itself"
2525
, permitting "in principle that interpretations stored in tradition be 
placed in question and subjected to critical revision."
2526
 Consequently, the performative status 
of Derrida's quasi-transcendental questioning turns on the question of the conditions of its 
possibility, or the contextual relevance of using reasons for deciding (moving) either way. 
What are the conditions of possibility for knowing an undecidable?  





rulings maintaining that there can be no beings – entities and/or movement – without (a) reason 
determining their rational ordering (being-there). Derrida explicitly follows the "path of the 
Heideggerian question"
2529
 in that such an interrogation presupposes the question of being, and 
so circles around the relation between "reason and being."
2530
 Nonetheless, Derrida's 
questioning follows Heidegger's way-making movements to move "beyond"
2531
 the question of 
being. Derrida locates this "beyond" within an "experience and experiment of the 
undecidable"
2532
 since any attempt to "interiorize every limit as being and as being its own 
proper"2533 merely reopens "the field of decision or decidability."2534 Derrida follows Heidegger's 
lead because Heidegger's questioning has given Derrida reason to think that the principle of 
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reason calls itself into question through "juridical reason itself."
2535
 Derrida similarly questions 
the rationality of the "delimiting of ontology"
2536
 or deciding the “ontological: the presumed 
possibility of a discourse about what is."
2537
 Consequently, Derrida remains in Heidegger's 
"debt"
2538
 and wants us to be equally "faithful to reason's call"
2539
 when answering the question 
of reason's authority to govern itself. He offers reason "questions in return"
2540
 to "think through 
the possibility of that summons"
2541
 and so questions "the reason of reason"
2542
 again and again. 
Given the way reason invariably rises against itself, it cannot uphold its sovereignty without 
falling into the abyss. Derrida has therefore made a decision that recurs throughout his thinking, 
namely; that reason should always question the "unquestioned authority of the principle of 
reason"
2543
 and defer to what "remains unthought."
2544
 Derrida consistently claims that it is 
difficult to justify (other) knowledge claims because "one cannot rationally distribute the part that 
is calculable and the part that is incalculable. One has to calculate as far as possible, but the 
incalculable happens…without one's being able to do one's part."
2545
 The "moment in which the 
decision is made is heterogeneous to knowledge…it supposes a rupture with knowledge and 
(is) therefore an opening to the incalculable."
2546
  Derrida nonetheless observes that to have a 
"reason for being…is to have a justification"
2547
 for being-there and so "also a footing and 
foundation, ground to stand upon."
2548
 As Heidegger observed before him, however, there is the 
problem of reason finding its footing and/or rationally standing its ground. The principle of 
reason can only affirm itself through the "double negation...nothing without reason."
2549
 If reason 
tries to affirm the reason for this principle, however, it appears groundless and throws its own 
reason for being-there into question. Reason appears to be without (a) reason and points to 
something other than reason determining its way-making movements: if the principle asserts 
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that there can be no being without (a) reason, "what reason is the reason for the principle of 
reason?"
2550





, the reason for its being-there falls "intractably into groundlessness."
2553
 
Derrida's questioning, then, follows Heidegger by thinking through "the enigma of this 
situation"
2554
 and attempts to direct reason back towards the question of what remains "insidious 
and enigmatic."
2555
 As Derrida reiterates, "is the reason for reason rational?"
2556
 and he asks 
furthermore whether "answering to the principle of reason (is) the same act as answering for 
the principle of reason?"
2557
 Derrida answers that rational thought truly becomes possible when 
reason continually answer the call of reason through questioning. The question, however, is 
whether reason finds itself moving within a circle or towards an abyss. The answer, of course, 
can never be straightforward: the circle or the abyss are not diverging routes but intersecting 
pathways that point to the "aporia or non-way"
2558
 of undecidability. Reason cannot choose 
between (say) rationality as cure or poison and must "go through the ordeal of the 
undecidable"
2559
 to direct (prescribe and administer) itself. Such an aporetic situation is the 
condition of movement insofar as we otherwise couldn't "find our way"
2560
 and this "impossibility 
to find one's way is a condition"
2561
 of remaining answerable to reason's call. Whatever is 
decided, reason will invariably be directed back towards the path (not) taken in a circle lacking 
rational foundation. The "circle would consist in seeking to account for reason by reason, to 
reason to the principle of reason, appealing to the principle to make it speak of itself at the very 
point where, according to Heidegger, the principle of reason says nothing about reason itself. 
The abyss, the hole ..., the empty gorge would be the impossibility for a principle of grounding 
to ground itself."
2562
 Either way, the "principle of reason installs its empire only to the extent that 
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the abyssal question of being that is hiding within it remains hidden, and with it the question of 
the grounding of the ground itself."
2563
  
Given that undecidability remains a necessary condition of competing knowledge claims, 
Derrida moves thought back towards the aporia in question. Derrida's definition of the situation 
– undecidability as an ordeal, trial and/or non-way – presupposes it in that undecidabilty is the 
way reason finds itself moving anyway. By moving back and forth – and trying to break out of 
known pathways – reason may come to know that the way of undecidability is simultaneously 
reason's condition of possibility and impossibility. Undecidability is therefore not to be mistaken 
for "paralysis in the face of the power to decide."
2564
 It is not indecision or indecisiveness but an 
enabling "aporia we have to face constantly."
2565
 Undecidability does not direct reason towards 
the difficulty in choosing between alternative pathways or "two contradictory and very 
determinate rules, each equally imperative"
2566
 in a given situation. Undecidability calls 
situations into being and/or question through reason's way-making movements – and so 
remains (an) imperative either way. Consequently, undecidability is not to be distinguished from 
decision-making and/or definitions of given situations. Such distinctions do the aporia of 
undecidability an injustice – it invariably becomes the reason for reason insofar as reason can 
never be thought completely rational and/or decisive. Undecidability presupposes the context/s 
in which reason necessarily moves and directs thought back towards the problem of 
contextualizing its movements any-way. As an ontologically prior condition, it "prohibits any 
saturation of the context"
2567
 and is merely opposed to situations of complete (or definitive) 
knowledge. Undecidability remains an imperative insofar as it motions against reason's 
tendency towards closure, and reopens every decision to the question of the condition of 
(im)possibilities. Derrida's conception of undecidability, then, does not attempt to resolve the 
problem of the criterion and its relation to the question of being. Undecidability, however, turns 
the paradox on its head by making the problem of deciding (moving) either way reason's 
enabling principle: all claims to knowledge necessarily begin and end in undecidability. 
Consequently, reason remains approachable – answerable and questionable – through the 
impasse of undecidability and moves (back) towards the "ordeal of the undecidable" 
2568
 to 
justify its actions: it remains an integral part of reasoning in that it simultaneously makes all of 
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reason's validity claims possible and impossible. It would therefore not be possible for reason 





(impossibility, non-being). For this reason, Derrida claims that a truly rational thinker must also 
be "mad"
2571
 or "identify a madness"
2572
 in the rationality of decision making. Deconstruction 
recognizes that "the instant of decision is a madness"
2573
, and its "desire for justice"
2574
 remains 
directed towards – or by – momentarily lapses of reason.  
Derrida's conception of the aporetic structure of justice is integral to the way deconstruction 
questions the legality of rational arguments – and indicates the circular way Derrida justifies his 
linguistic interactions. Despite Derrida's privileging of the concept of undecidability, Derrida has 
nonetheless been led to decisively say that "deconstruction is justice"
2575
 – whatever that is or 
can possibly mean across the contexts in question. Indeed, all of Derrida's interpretations are 
understood to be "attempts to have it out with this formidable question."
2576
 Derrida's concept of 
justice and/or deconstruction – insofar as either can be meaningfully conceived or questioned 
– remains directed towards the "sense of a responsibility without limits"
2577
, and such a direct 
response is a "responsibility that regulates the justice and appropriateness of our behaviour, of 
our theoretical, practical, ethico-political decisions."
2578
   As Derrida forcefully argues, "there is 
no such thing as law (droit) that does not imply in itself, in the analytic structure of its concept, 
the possibility of being "enforced", applied by force."
2579
 Derrida's 'concept' of justice thereby 
circles around the "overflowing of the performative"
2580
, or the way "performative force, which is 
always an interpretive force" 
2581
 can meaningfully enable and direct the legality of all 
questioning. The overriding directive is to move reason (back) towards deconstruction's 
"privileged site – or rather, its privileged instability"
2582
 within the circle of understanding. 
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According to Derrida's 'calculation', the unstable relation "between law and justice"
2583
 is "in fact 
only one aporia, only one potential aporetic that infinitely distributes itself"
2584
 throughout the 
rational order. Derrida argues that the distinction between law and justice is untenable because 
each presupposes – or directs itself back towards – the other across contexts of interpretation. 
The problem of their relationship is thereby called back into question through their movements 
and/or directives (relations of presupposition).  We therefore need to similarly direct ourselves 
towards the "difficult and unstable distinction between justice and droit, between justice (infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic) and 
the exercise of justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilizable and statutory, calculable, 
a system of regulated and coded prescriptions."
2585
 The unstable relation between law and 
justice requires thought to think through the enigma of law's origins and/or destinations insofar 
as the question of its justification remains insidious and enigmatic. The law's "very moment of 
foundation or institution…would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore 
interpretive violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous 
law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate."
2586
 
Consequently, the legality of the law remains an open question and/or directive: it follows the 
ways reason attempts to direct the question of its movements. The possibility of justice (as a 
possible experience of the impossible) becomes a directive insofar as it moves rational thought 
"outside or beyond law,"
2587
and remains on the way. If "the law and justice are at the same time, 
but also by turns, inseparable and in contradiction with one another,”
2588
 the problem is the way 
rational decision-making must "submit to the law of giving reason(s)"
2589
 and "can only tend 
toward imperial hegemony"
2590
 when ruling on reason's other. Derrida's performative 
contradiction, of course, is anticipated by the interpretive violence inherent within the very term 
deconstruction. Following the law in the name of justice invariably gives way to interpretive 
violence (via a violent act or procedure) in that it involves a forceful reinterpretation 
(displacement, unsettling, suspension) of other interpretations. 
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Questioning the Question: Derrida's conditions of possibility.  
We begin by questioning the limits of Derrida's questioning. Following Derrida's lead, such an 
interrogation circles around the question of the possibility of Derrida's questioning. Specifically, 
it directs itself towards the "question of the question"
2591
 by asking about the question of 
conditions of possibility across contexts of interpretation. Given that the overall aim is to 
reconstruct the general being of Derrida's questioning, we shall simultaneously be following 
Habermas's lead here. In answering the question of conditions of possibility, we shall therefore 
attempt to "make explicit the self-referentiality that is already contained in"
2592
 Derrida's 
questionable speech acts. We shall also be directing ourselves to the "general presuppositions 
of communicative action…aimed at reaching understanding" through the "validity basis of 
speech acts."
2593





 of Derrida's questioning. By emphasizing the "reflexive structure"
2596
 of 
Derrida's questioning, it becomes possible to determine the question of the relation between its 
meaning conditions and truth-values. As Habermas observes, the double structure of language 
is self-referential in that it makes it possible to question "both how what is said is to be employed 
and how it is to be understood…The illocutionary portion establishes the sense in which the 
propositional content is to be employed and the sort of action which the utterance should be 
understood as."
2597
 While Derrida's questioning might aim to be a "radical critique"
2598
 of what 
can be rationally understood, he also wants to claim that it "certainly entails a moment of 
affirmation"
2599
 and such critiques remain "motivated by some kind of affirmation, acknowledged 
or not. Deconstruction always presupposes affirmation."
2600
 The questions, then, are: what does 
the general being of Derrida's questioning affirm and how can it do this within the circle of 
understanding? To some extent, the answer is already self-evident: it remains rationally 
motivated by reason's other and so acts as a "response to a call."
2601
 Derrida consistently 
"maintains two contradictory affirmations"
2602
 towards his own questioning within 
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 On "the one hand, we affirm the existence of ruptures in history, and on 
the other we affirm that these ruptures produce gaps or faults in which the most hidden and 
forgotten archives can emerge and constantly recur throughout history. One must surmount the 
categorical oppositions of philosophical logic out of fidelity to these conflicting positions of 
historical discontinuity (rupture) and continuity (repetition), which are neither a pure break with 
the past nor pure unfolding or explication of it."
2604
  The performative contradiction is the way 
such questioning becomes "effective or active interventions…that transform contexts without 




Although Derrida argues that is impossible to delimit a meaningful context, he nonetheless 
maintains that we can still ask questions "as if it were possible within such limits."2606 Rational 
thought can attempt to do this because all contexts of interpretations remain questionable and 
so reason can direct itself towards the delimitations in question. The rational status of Derrida’s 
questioning therefore remains similarly open to questioning and/or (re)contextualization: it 
questions the possibility "to overcome all performative contradictions"
2607
 by way of the quest 
for the "quasi (or logical-rhetorical fiction of as if)."
2608
 Derrida's questioning turns on the question 
of the performative status of this as if insofar as it returns us to the problem of a language 
dividing its own identity while constituting it. Specifically, to what extent can Derrida's 
questioning be thought meaningful and/or true across contexts of interpretation directing 
(enabling, necessitating) it? We ask this question because Derrida's overall approach turns on 
the problem of justifying its context-transcending claims within questionable contexts. By 
moving through and problematizing the question of conditions of possibility, Derrida’s 
questioning remains conditional and/or necessarily becomes questionable in turn. Indeed, how 
is it possible for Derrida "to be coherent"
2609
 about the question of "problematic context(s) and 
strategies"
2610
 when answering "the demand for the condition of possibility"
2611
 across contexts 
of interpretation? 
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Perhaps the best way to approach this question is via the performative contradiction that makes 
Derrida's questions possible. That is to say, "who or what decides for Derrida"
2612
 when he 
speaks through – and for –  a complex whole such as language? Part of the problem is whether 
deconstruction attempts to conceal its ideality (or theoretical status) when talking around the 
near-mythical status of its discourse.
2613
 Derrida's questioning requires us to ask whether it 
attempts to disguise (downplay, displace) its own "mastery and totalizing overview"
2614
 of the 
being/s in question. Deconstruction's quasi-transcendental approach appears to contradictorily 
control or master language in a different way – via the knowledge claim that since language 
speaks for itself it can only be truthfully spoken for in this way. Performatively speaking, 
Derrida's approach is contradictory in that what he decides to (not) say to other speakers purport 
to be decisive either way. Derrida purports to speak for language to other language users, and 
as such, attempts to convince others of the universal validity of particular position/s through 
speech acts subject to rational appraisal and consideration. We use the term position advisedly 
here. Derrida not only claims to be uniquely positioned within language – to occupy privileged 
sites of instability and to put other rational thinkers in a similarly unique position – but such 
positioning invariably becomes a decisive act of positing. Derrida's logical-rhetorical fiction asks 
us to take specific assumptions and directives as a postulate (given) in order to destabilize 
(upend, direct) our relationship to language. While Derrida might claim that deconstruction 
cannot itself be defined (stabilized, situated), he nonetheless defers to certain "quasi-
entities"
2615
 (such as differance and pharmakon) to stabilize (organize, direct) the general being 
of his questioning. Derrida argues as if what he says and does in particular contexts is 
unconditionally meaningful and true over and above the contexts in question. The myth of quasi-
beings must be taken as given, and is thought epistemologically superior to the rational order 
of beings in that it proves to be more efficacious as a device for working a manageable structure 
into the flux of experience. The question, then, is the role quasi-transcendental entities like 
pharmakon and differance actively play within Derrida's questioning. More specifically, the ways 
such questionable entities decide (enable and/or direct) Derrida's overall movements and 
questioning: to what extent can a logical-rhetorical fiction have general truth-value or be 
generally thought truth-bearing? Derrida's interpretation of the term pharmakon might have 
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originated in a particular context,
2616
 but it invariably comes to occupy a privileged role across 
contexts of interpretation. Specifically, Derrida claims that the pharmakon is "the prior medium 
in which differentiation in general is produced" since it is "the differance of difference" itself.2617 
While Derrida argues that the pharmakon's meaning can never be decided in the context/s 
originally interpreted and/or moves beyond any given context of interpretation, its undecidable 
meaning is said to exemplify a more general and active mode of (non) being.   
If the pharmakon is 'ambivalent', it is because it constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, 
the movement and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross 
over into the other…The pharmakon is the movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) 
difference. It is the differance of difference. It holds in reserve, in its undecided shadow and vigil, the 
opposites and the differends that the process of discrimination will come to carve out…the opposition 
between different effects.2618 
Note the way Derrida questions the pharmakon's omnipresence – by determining the ways the 
pharmakon actively disrupts and displaces the metaphysics of presence. Derrida's questioning 
maintains that such a 'non-being' trans/forms the contexts – and beings – in question. Derrida 
speaks as if the pharmakon is itself re/productive and trans/formative, and his questioning 
purports to determine the performative status of the quasi being/s in question. Performatively 
speaking, it is the pharmakon which speaks through (enacts) language, and Derrida’s 
communicative acts purport to follow its actions by directing thought back towards the ways it 
identifies and distinguishes itself there. Derrida's interpretation of the pharmakon's 'speech' acts 
as if it were an absolute performative: it is understood to be a quasi (or non)2619 being that does 
not depend on anything else for its existence or occurrence, and so remains beyond human 
understanding and control. Derrida's interpretation speaks as if the pharmakon's way-making 
movements occur without conditions or limitations, and its mode of being (actions) cannot be 
legislated or infringed upon. Derrida's illocutionary point is that the general being of language is 
itself performative, and so exercises illocutionary force in its own right (ways that are appropriate 
for a given situation or condition, and acting in accord with its own sense of proprietary and 
justice). As Derrida consistently maintains, "the disappearance of truth as presence, the 
withdrawal of the present origin of presence, is the condition of aIl (manifestation of) truth. 
Nontruth is the truth. Nonpresence is presence. Differance, the disappearance of any originary 
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 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson. (London: 
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 Ibid, p.125. 
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 ibid, p.130. 
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 ibid. Derrida maintains here that "the pharmakon, without being anything in itself, always 
exceeds" beings "in constituting their bottomless fund. It keeps itself forever in reserve even though 
it has no fundamental profundity fundity nor ultimate locality", p.130. 
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presence, is at once the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth."
2620
 
Derrida's claim to knowledge thereby moves within the circle enabling and/or directing the 
general being of his questioning and its corresponding ontological commitment to non-beings. 
The circle directs Derrida's communicative actions by moving them (back) towards the question 
of the nature of the relationship between the construction of beings and/or their inevitable 
deconstruction. While Derrida's questioning can only ontologically commit itself to a logical-
rhetorical fiction, the question remains: to what extent is it possible to presuppose or imply the 
existence of 'quasi beings' when presupposing the existence (or reality) of 'beings'? That is to 
say, to speak as if language itself speaks and/or cannot be spoken for within language? Derrida 
speaks, of course, as if it were possible to speak about such a limitless non-being within specific 
limits (or beings): it is the being of language that makes the general being of his questioning 
possible in the first place. The pharmakon might be undecidable, but the role it actively plays 
within Derrida's argument nonetheless becomes decisive. Derrida's interpretation of the 
pharmakon's performativity is directed and stabilised in a particular way – via a fusion of 
horizons calling into question any possible meaning (activity). Witness the way the pharmakon 
– and related "forces of association"
2621
 with words such as pharmakos (wizard, magician, 
poisoner, scapegoat)
2622
 – actively become meaningful within an interpretation directed towards 
other interpreters. Although Derrida's questioning might place emphasis on ruptures within 
history, it can only argue for the pharmakon's undecidable status by bringing forth the possibility 
of an effective historical consciousness (or "the unity between"
2623
 interpreter and interpreted). 
Derrida's questioning actively defers to relations of presupposition defining the contexts (or 
situations) in question. Effective historical consciousness determines Derrida's interpretation by 
being "already effectual in finding the right questions to ask."
2624
 And Derrida can only do this 
                                                
2620
 ibid, p.168. 
2621
 Derrida, Jacques. "Plato's Pharmacy" in Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson. (London: 
Continuum, 2004), p.132. 
2622
 ibid. If we recall, Derrida's interpretation of the pharmakon's meaning goes beyond what Plato’s 
original text tries to stabilize and extends to the Plato's subsequent writing about the trial and 
execution of the accused sorcerer Socrates elsewhere (where he becomes a pharmakos – 
scapegoat – and is forced to drink a pharmakon – poison – in order to cure a social ill such as 
destabilizing philosophical questions). Specifically, Derrida argues as if the differential movements 
of the pharmakon is already always in play within Plato’s original text (Phaedrus) and so occurs 
contextually (or in other con/texts). While the related term pharmakos might not be actually present 
there, "for all its hiddenness, for all that it might escape Plato’s notice, is nevertheless something 
that passes through certain discoverable points of presence" elsewhere.  
2623
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Reconstructing Derrida's Argument with Plato.  
We must therefore reconstruct the way Derrida argues about reason's conditions of possibility. 
We do this to determine the limits of Derrida's quasi-transcendental approach to the being of 
the question and so delimit the ways it can be thought possible (meaningful, true). We shall 
thereby question the way it is possible for Derrida to argue that the rationality of reason remains 
impossible and/or irrational.  We can only do this by bringing forth the performative contradiction 
within Derrida's reasoning about reason. We shall argue that deconstructing the relative stability 
of the dominant interpretation within a given text is only possible because Derrida can implicitly 
raise three different validity claims within meaningfully available – and intentionally related – 
contexts. Furthermore, such a questionable approach contradictorily attempts to become 
relatively stable in that it seeks dominance over the contexts in question.  Derrida can only 
occupy a privileged site of instability if he can thus first stabilize his context of interpretation, 
and orient it towards the possibility of mutual understanding and agreement. Although Derrida 
maintains that deconstruction cannot be meaningfully defined or situated, it nonetheless 
remains an object of inquiry delimited by its own purview. To do deconstruction justice, we must 
therefore question its conditions of possibility, and such questioning (reconstruction) remains 
an interrogation of its mode of being. The question immediately before us is: to what extent is it 
possible to "argue with Derrida"?
 2626
 We shall argue that the best way to argue with Derrida is 
by being with him, and so determine the ways the contexts in question argue with – or 
deconstruct – themselves. Following Derrida's lead, then, to argue with Derrida is to agree that 
a con/text invariably disagrees with its arguments, throwing the context back into (a) question 
and/or (an) argument. If we are to question the limits of Derrida's quasi-transcendental 
approach, we must therefore move with and against Derrida by similarly rationally 
accommodating ourselves to the very relations of presupposition in question. Such a rational 
reconstruction directs us (back) towards the question of deconstruction's conditions of 
possibility. Specifically, where arguing with Derrida requires us to embed deconstructive speech 
acts "within three world relations, and claiming validity for them under these aspects."
2627
 We 
do this in order to determine the ways in which a rationally motivated agreement about quasi-
transcendental entities such as the pharmakon and/or differance simultaneously becomes 
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possible and impossible. The aim is to question the truth-value of a logical-rhetorical fiction 
bringing forth the question of reason's conditions of possibility and/or rationality (reason for 
being-there). In determining the performative status of Derrida's transcendental questioning, we 
must thereby determine the limits of reason's acceptability conditions. We shall argue that 
Derrida's questioning is valid insofar as it raises the question of how it can become rationally 
acceptable.2628 The answer turns on the performative status of possible criticizable validity 
claims and their corresponding binding and bonding forces. Following Habermas, the question 
of the rationality of reason remains conditional upon the possibility of giving reasons: it is 
determined by whether reason can actively question its reasons for being-there.   
We understand a speech act when we know the kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to 
convince a hearer that he is entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance – in 
short, when we (can) know what makes it (rationally) acceptable. A speaker, with a validity claim, appeals 
to a reservoir of potential reasons that he could produce in support of the claim. The reasons interpret the 
validity conditions and to this extent are themselves part of the conditions that make an utterance 
acceptable.2629  
The three worlds remain part of a complex whole: questioning our knowledge of the world of 
experience involves bringing the respective parts together and determining the rationality 
(reasons for) their relationship to each other. Interpreters are thereby oriented towards reaching 
mutual understanding through the validity claims in question, and become rationally motivated 
to provide reasons subject to questioning and/or argumentation across related domains. Our 
rational reconstruction of Derrida's deconstruction of Plato's text shall therefore proceed in two 
interdependent parts. In the first part, we elucidate the way Derrida implicitly raises validity 
claims. In the second part, we observe the role the lifeworld actively plays in determining 
Derrida's way-making movements.      
 
Truth/Objectivity 
According to Habermas, our conception of truth remains conditional upon the existence of an 
objective world acting upon any given interpretation of it.
2630
 Although Habermas maintains that 
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our conception of objects remains linguistically determined, bound and mediated, the concept 
of objectivity emerges as a coping strategy across given interpretive contexts: it arises via  
breakdowns in understanding and their corresponding truth-values.
2631
 Given the possibility of 
conflicting or competing interpretations of the very objective world thrown into question, "it is not 
truth as such but the epistemic concept of ascertaining truth that is the regulative idea guiding 
our practices of inquiry and justification."
2632
 The presupposition of ontological realism is 
therefore necessarily built into our actions insofar as an independent reality transcends and/or 
acts upon our directed statements  – and it is that context-transcending realm that we turn (back) 
to via the performativity of our truth-claims. 
What we want to express with true sentences is that a certain state of affairs ‘obtains’ or is ‘given.’ And 
these facts in turn refer to ‘the world’ as the totality of things about which we may state facts. This 
ontological way of speaking establishes a connection between truth and reference, that is, between the 
truth of statements and the ‘objectivity’ of that about which something is stated. The concept of the 
‘objective world’ encompasses everything that subjects capable of speech and action do not ‘make 
themselves’ irrespective of their interventions and inventions. This enables them to refer to things that 
can be identified as the same under different descriptions. The experience of ‘coping’ accounts for two 
determinations of ‘objectivity’: the fact that the way the world is not up to us; and the fact that it is 
the same for all of us. Beliefs are confirmed in action by something different than in discourse.2633 
Derrida's deconstruction of Plato's 'text' implicitly adopts this ontological way of speaking. 
Derrida's contextual strategy actively refers to the way Plato's pharmaceutical operation breaks 
down and becomes a way of performatively coping with the textual breakdown in question. 
Consequently, Derrida more than just claims that non-truth is the truth in this particular context 
of interpretation: he demonstrates a connection between truth and reference across interpretive 
contexts by arguing as if the truth of non-truth is an "unconditional (truth) claim that points 
                                                
beyond an epistemic conception of truth here – towards his equally problematic attempt to bridge 
the gap between truth and epistemology. By this stage, Habermas acknowledges that while "we 
cannot sever the connection of truth and justification, this epistemically unavoidable connection must 
not be turned into a conceptually inseparable connection in the form of an epistemic concept of 
truth", p.38. So although competing truth-claims can only justify themselves in epistemic terms (via 
the reasons given), the concept of truth cannot be identified with what may be thought rationally 
justified (the given reasons).  
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beyond all the evidence available to us."
2634
 Derrida argues for the universality of this claim by 
maintaining that his statements are true over and above the context of their occurrence (beings 
in question), and provides textual evidence for an independent or objective reality (limitless 
contexts) in action there. Derrida's coping strategy remains tied to the rationality of reason giving 
insofar as he provides reasons for the occurrence of non-being. The reason being: the 
substitution and exchange of meaningful beings are exemplified by the pharmakon's mode of 
non-being-there. The particular evidence provided for reasoning about the reproduction of 
differance presupposes a necessary relationship between the truth-value of his questioning and 
an objective world being questioned as such – namely, that conditions of possibility are 
conditional upon the totality of objects and/or events making truly meaningful statements 
impossible in the first place. Derrida's way-making moments are said to follow the lead of the 
differential relations and forces in question – and his ontological commitment remains true – 
faithful, consistent with an objective reality – by acting and/or being in accord with the 
occurrence of non-truth. The context in question therefore becomes questionable and/or 
necessary because it remains part of a complex whole that cannot meaningfully answer for itself 
in such a rational (decisive) way. Such contexts of interpretation merely call back into question 
their relationship to an objective state of affairs understood as a limitless context – which are 
said to be determined by undecidable structures and subject to differential forces that 'for all 
their hiddenness…pass through discoverable points of presence'. 
Normative/Social 
According to Habermas, "normative rightness must be regarded as a claim to validity that is 
analogous to a truth claim"
2635
 and "actualize an already established pattern of relations."
2636
 
Claims to universal validity therefore imply that they are "covered by existing norms, and that 
means by (at least) de facto recognition of the claim that these norms rightfully exist." 
2637
 Note 
that Habermas claims that normative rightness is analogous to an unconditional truth claim and 
not equivalent to it. The requirement, then, is to determine the way distinct universal validity 
conditions may be similarly (or simultaneously) upheld and/or become comparable. The point 
of comparison turns on, of course, the question of the discursive justification of the 
corresponding unconditional validity claims. According to Habermas, "truth is a justification-
                                                
2634
 Habermas, Jürgen. "Rorty's Pragmatic Turn" in Cooke, Maeve (ed.) On The Pragmatics of 
Communication (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), p. 358. 
2635
 Habermas, Jürgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action trans. Christian Lenhardt 
(MIT Press:  Massachusetts, 1990), p.197. 
2636
 Habermas, Jürgen. Communication and the Evolution of Society trans. Thomas McCarthy 






 that "must be met by (objective) reality itself."
2639
 Normative rightness, 
however, is a "justification-immanent"
2640
 concept that emerges within a socially constructed 
world of "well-ordered interpersonal relationships."
2641
 The corresponding validity claim is 
therefore determined "in terms of social conditions and relations of reciprocal recognition"
2642
 
and mutual understanding.  Given our attempt to reconstruct Derrida's claim that non-truth is 
the truth
2643
, we find ourselves arguing with Derrida in another way.  Contextual relevance plays 
an integral role in determining the justificatory immanence of Derrida’s reason giving here. 
Normative rightness is thereby determined by the very contexts in question.  Witness the way 
someone might be accused of asking too many questions or for being an argumentative person. 
Given the context – say, an employee within a workplace – their questions and arguments might 
be thought completely out of place. Suppose, however, the employee is a trained philosopher 
and the workplace a university – questions and arguments come with the territory. Also note the 
commonplace concern that everyone’s comments may be taken out of context: when finding 
their way into a different set of circumstances informing their occurrence (possible meaning), 
the original comments might come to mean something entirely different or other than intended. 
The resulting misunderstanding (confusion or disagreement) therefore raises the issue of 
justifying the context in question: in what way can the justification be thought immanent 
(operating within and across contexts)? We are now in a position to reconstruct the contextual 
relevance of Derrida’s questions and arguments insofar as it prescribes and administers a 
limitless context in accord with a given ‘rule’ (action or text) that should be similarly followed and 
understood. Note that Derrida’s attempt to displace the logical space of reasons is itself placed 
or situated via "the cultural embodiment of reason."
2644
 Derrida’s quasi-transcendental 
questioning does not come from out of space: it occurs in a grounded sequence of potentially 
related linguistic interactions that may be subject to criticizable validity claims in re-turn. 
Derrida’s argument with Plato occurs within the context of a circumscribed text similarly opening 
itself up to boundless or immeasurable contexts. Derrida has followed established norms by 
arguing in a delimited text bearing his name, and this place of writing has been published and 
disseminated in other contexts of interpretation. It’s contextually relevant, then, that Derrida’s 
argument was not (say) written on a disposable napkin or sent by carrier pigeon. Nor did 
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 Amongst other related claims of course. 
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Derrida’s text go up in smoke in the form of skywriting or was it scattered to the winds via smoke 
signal. Equally significant is that Derrida’s text occurs in an interrogative and argumentative 
mode of being-there: the selected linguistic actions do not serve the communicative function of 
(say) an apology, greeting, accusation or refusal.  Derrida’s prescribed text remains directed 
towards other texts and contexts and proceeds from the assumption that it will reach its 
destination(s) as intended. Derrida intends to be understood correctly in that the delimited 
context in question might clear up any possible misunderstanding via the possibility of an 
adequation between meaning and saying.2645 Suffice to say, the normative rightness of Derrida’s 
questioning remains a decisive turning point in the historicity of understanding in that texts 
arguing for the undecidability of meaning and reproduction of differance are covered by existing 
norms regulating the identity (contextualization or identification) of meaning: it presupposes that 
contextually relevant standards or patterns may be rightfully deferred to (called upon and 
enacted) when performing meaningful actions.
2646
 The question, then, is the contextual 
relevance of Derrida’s text: in what way may it be normatively justified when also calling into 
question the notion of normative justification? Derrida's questioning of Plato's pharmaceutical 
operation remains prescriptive in that existing norms are imported into the situation as a 
convenient intermediary acting between interpreters. The performative status of Derrida's quasi-
transcendental questioning, then, does not just occur with respect to the way it raises a 
justification-transcendent truth claim. Derrida's questioning also occurs by way of an analogous 
legal claim to the justification of the social construction of norms relating to evaluating standards 
for thinking and acting. Derrida presupposes that the way we should turn to the beings in 
question is through those questionable practices and relations already woven into the fabric of 
the social world. Consequently, Derrida simultaneously raises a universal validity claim 
concerning the normative rightness of his questioning and arguments – namely, that the being 
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 367 
of the question is normatively right because it is rationally motivated and/or directed by the (non) 
truth-values of the beings in question. Arguing with Derrida involves a tacit commitment to the 
possibility (meaningfulness, truthfulness) of the question of the rationality of reason in a publicly 
contested and evaluable space of reasons. Derrida's general approach purports to follow the 
lead of questionable speech acts across a limitless context – and such a delimitation remains 
determined by its relationship to the normative context/s enabling such questions and 
arguments. Consequently, Derrida's interpretation of the pharmakon's movements remain 
answerable insofar as it follows its lead by administering and/or prescribing questionable 
(undecidable) contexts as the most legitimate (decisive, truthful) social norm or standard 
(prescription or directive put forward and followed there). The question of its own performative 
status is determined by way of the normative context(s) prescribing its way-making movements 
in the first place – and so remains answerable to the contexts (prescriptions) in question 
accordingly. 
Sincerity/Truthfulness 
According to Habermas, "truthfulness guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity 
representing itself in language."
2647
 Consequently, recognition of a subject's truthfulness is a 
necessary condition for reaching mutual understanding and agreement about the objective 
world. The possibility of speaking truthfully therefore raises a universal validity claim to 
subjective self-presentation about objective states of affairs in normative contexts. The 
presuppositions of objective truth and normative rightness thereby remain conditional upon the 
related possibility of sincerely throwing the world into question. While Derrida might seek to 
displace the possibility of rational subjects being (fully) present to themselves and/or the 
contexts in question, a rational reconstruction nonetheless urges that being rationally present 
and accounted for remains integral anyway. Consequently, all presentations – the giving of 
reasons via deconstructive reasoning –  remain potentially criticizable with respect to the 
personal sincerity (openness and self-disclosure) of linguistic interactions presupposing mutual 
trust and understanding. If "a hearer challenges the truthfulness of a speaker's claim, the 
speaker cannot show her sincerity by arguing, because the truthfulness of her expressions, 
including her arguments, is precisely that which is at issue. Instead, she can show her sincerity 
only by acting in a manner consistent with her expressed intentions."
2648
 Derrida's claims about 
reason's inability to consistently express and/or present (decide) its truth-claims therefore raises 
a performatively contradictory universal validity claim. Derrida's questioning about reason's 
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inability to integrate beings presupposes the ontological commitment of the very integrated 
being in question: the integrity of Derrida's truth-claims can only be possible if the sincerity of 
his questioning remains unquestionable. It is not only possible for Derrida to say what he means; 
such a possibility remains conditional upon meaning what he says and believing what is said 
(meant). Derrida's (ontological) condition of being thus whole or undivided – via adherence to 
differential relations and processes – remains consistent with his expressed actions: it 
contradictorily defers to a relationship between truthful subjective self-presentation and 
objective presentations of truth in order to reintegrate (re-contextualise) the question of the 
normativity (integrity, rightness) of our own practical identities in turn. Arguing with Derrida 
presupposes the possibility of an agreement with Derrida's world of subjective experiences 
(sincerely given reasons to displace or take away the space of reasons). It is therefore part of 
Derrida's communicative intent that we mutually understand and/or sincerely agree that his 
statements are capable of truth and are being expressed truthfully. 
Contexts of Interpretation 
We have thus far reconstructed Derrida by directing ourselves (back) to the question of three 
world relations and their corresponding validity claims. We now move beyond the "ontological 
presuppositions"
2649
 of three world relations to bring forth the question of the "background 
knowledge of the lifeworld." 
2650 We now transfer Derrida's questioning to reason's relation to 
"lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded"
2651
 and 
moving. Habermas argues that "because acting subjects have to cope with the world, they 
cannot avoid being (ontological) realists in the context of their lifeworld."
2652
 Specifically, "as 
subjects capable of speech and action, language users must be able to refer to something in 
the objective world from within the horizon of their shared lifeworld if they are to reach an 
understanding about something in communicating with one another."2653 Given the implicit 
presupposition of ontological realism, language users must also presuppose "orientation toward 
unconditional truth"
2654
 when making criticisable validity claims. The lifeworld, of course, is 
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composed of interpretations taken as given and generally re/produces itself beyond "the 
threshold"
2655
 of rational understanding and questioning. Lifeworld contexts therefore raise the 
question of reason's relationship to "the unquestioned ground of everything given in my 
experience, and the unquestionable frame in which all the problems I have to deal with are 
located."
2656
 Within the context of rationally reconstructing Derrida's questioning, the problem is 
locating reason's conditions of possibility and/or given intentional horizon. Although Habermas 
provisionally distinguishes between the concept of the lifeworld from his conception of three 
(other) worlds, all these worlds are obviously related to each other. While the three world 
relations – and their corresponding ontological presuppositions – presuppose the possibility of 
criticizable validity claims, Habermas claims that the lifeworld is the "transcendental site"
2657
 that 
makes questioning possible in the first place. The lifeworld determines our being-there because 
it is "where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their 
utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm 
those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements."
2658
  By being in the 
background, the lifeworld trans/forms "the incalculable web of presuppositions that have to be 
satisfied if an actual utterance is to be at all meaningful, that is, valid or invalid"2659.  
Lifeworld contexts can be seen to play the role of transcendental site within Derrida's argument 
about (speech) activities of the pharmakon and/or differance. The validity of Derrida's argument 
therefore turns on the way the lifeworld trans/forms – speaks through and to – Plato's text across 
contexts of interpretation. Derrida's questioning, then, remains directed by "the question of how 
the lifeworld – as the horizon within which communicative actions are always already 
moving"
2660
 – is itself rationally determined (constructed) and evaluated (deconstructed). 
Specifically, it is the context of effective history which makes Derrida's questioning 
simultaneously possible and impossible. Derrida argues, of course, that contexts are limitless, 
and any delimitation of beings are constantly trans/formed by differential relations and forces. 
Consequently, the very act of trans/formation keeps the beings in question open to interpretation 
and/or questioning (recontextualization). We need to put a constraint upon such a knowledge 
claim: contexts may be delimited – brought into being and/or question – if beings can be 
meaningfully interpreted and questioned. Although Derrida argues with Plato in distinct ways, 
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his general movements follows two main directives. On the one hand, Derrida argues that "for 
all its hiddenness, for all that it might escape Plato's notice, (there) is nevertheless something 
that passes through certain discoverable points of presence that can be seen in the text."2661 
Derrida thereby claims to be able to trace the pharmakon's undecidable meaning through 
wayward movements (pathways, performativity) across Plato's text's accordingly. On the other 
hand, Derrida also claims to be able to retrace the pharmakon's movements through an 
"absent"
2662
 word that exerts performative "force"
2663
 regardless – via the pharmakon's 
relationship to a missing term that remains present and accounted for. Despite the fact that the 
term "pharmakos (wizard, magician, poisoner)"2664 does not directly occur within Plato's 
argument, Derrida argues that it is directing (acting upon) it anyway. The "word in question"
2665
 
derives its force from lifeworld contexts in that it remains directed by the entanglement between 
word(s) and world(s). Specifically, "provided the articulations are rigorously and prudently 
recognized, one should be able to untangle the hidden forces of attraction linking a present 
word within an absent word in the text of Plato."
2666
 
Derrida's argument emerges, of course, within the context of Plato's own argument about the 
pharmakon. Plato's argument is said to be divided against itself because the dialogue cannot 
decide – say, write – the validity (performativity) of its meaning. The pharmakon of writing 
remains undecided for a given reason: the context of its occurrence cannot be decided upon 
either way. Derrida decisively argues that Plato cannot rationally administer the pharmakon of 
writing in his writings. It is not possible to prescribe or apply the context of its occurrence when 
the pharmakon's possible meaning lies beyond rational understanding or control. Consequently, 
Derrida's argument with Plato goes further – back to the way a limitless context constructs 
and/or deconstructs Plato's contextual strategies. Derrida is thereby able to demonstrate that 
its condition of possibility is simultaneously a condition of impossibility – by actively bringing 
forth the role background knowledge (context) effectively plays in Plato's text. 
Following Habermas, we shall divide lifeworld contexts into two main constitutive parts: 
foreground and background knowledge. These two parts form a complex whole in that the status 
of knowledge claims can only be meaningfully determined in relation to what can actively be 
brought forward, held back and/or thrown into (a) question throughout effective history. That is 
to say, historically distinct – and effected – interpreters cannot simply distinguish between 
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lifeworlds or contexts of interpretation. Interpreters are themselves part of lifeworld contexts, 
and the performative status of their questioning moves within the complex whole in question. 
The (hermeneutical) situation remains complex because it turns on the question of definitions 
of situations themselves. Given knowledge claims are determined by a historically effected 
consciousness insofar as they are embedded within and/or directed by the context of effective 
history. The lifeworld's foreground, then, consists of an interpreter's ability to understand an 
utterance in any given situation and "most of what is said in everyday communicative practices 
remains unproblematic."
2667
 Habermas divides such foreground knowledge into "situation 
specific horizontal knowledge"
2668
 and "topic dependent contextual knowledge"
2669
 Horizontal 
knowledge refers to shared presuppositions taken as given within a speech situation – such as 
a speaker's ability to argue with another speaker and/or question the content of their arguments. 
Topic dependent contextual knowledge is what is presupposed – or shared – within the 
"framework of a common milieu or horizon of subjective experience."
2670
 Topic dependent 
contextual knowledge therefore makes it possible to question the context of their occurrence, 
or the way presuppositions arguably relate to each other.  
The "deep-seated background knowledge"
2671
 of the lifeworld, however, is always "implicitly and 
pre-reflexively present"
2672
, and raises the question of what cannot be directly presented and/or 
directed. Such tacit knowledge claims – insofar as they can be known – are distinguished by 




 and "holistic constitution."
2675
 
Given that such knowledge occurs in the background and remains part of a complex whole, it 
cannot be consciously brought forward or mobilized (thematized and questioned) in its entirety. 
The background might belong to and/or determine the question of our being-there, but it 
primarily remains just that (or there): beyond the realm of rational understanding, control or 
questioning. The lifeworld is therefore best understood as a "culturally transmitted and 
linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns"
2676
 of potentially questionable relevance 
and/or commitments. The (hermeneutical) situation facing any given interpretation, then, is: to 
what extent can the lifeworld be brought forth and/or questioned within a rational reconstruction? 
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We ask this question, of course, in order to rationally reconstruct the event(s) of Derrida's 
questioning. Given that the being of the question delimits an ontological commitment, Derrida's 
answer to the question of being determines the way meaningful beings can be thus situated 
(defined and/or specified). An ontological commitment thereby provides a "context of 
relevance"
2677
 and/or potentially questionable "relevance structures" 
2678
 within given situations 
– by questioning the way they may "become relevant to (the definition of the) situation."
2679
 The 
critical question is the way rational thinkers can commit themselves to the corresponding 
ontology, and so requires us to question Derrida's criteria of relevance or adequacy within given 
situations – i.e., in what ways can Derrida's questioning be thought relevant or adequate? 
Following Habermas, "situations do not get 'defined' in the sense of being sharply delimited. 
They always have a horizon that shift with the theme. A situation is a segment of a lifeworld's 
contexts of relevance that is thrown into relief by themes"
2680
 and questions. Consequently, 
relevance structures occur as "interconnections of meaning holding between a given 
communicative utterance, the immediate context, and its connotative horizon of meanings. 
Contexts of relevance are based on grammatically regulated relations among the elements of 
a linguistically organized stock of knowledge."2681 
Derrida argues with Plato, of course, from within the context of Plato's presuppositions and 
ontological commitments. The pharmakon's interconnections of meaning and connotative 
horizons of meaning acquire their contextual relevance accordingly. Derrida's argument about 
the transcendental role of 'non-beings' such as the pharmakon and/or differance thereby occurs 
immanently, and attempts to move beyond the immediate context of their occurrence. 
Correspondingly, Derrida's argument about the pharmakon's differential movements similarly 
derive from the context in which rationally ordered beings arise and move. The pharmakon's 
undecidable truth-values therefore occur in relation to Plato's criteria of relevance, and Derrida's 
argument is an attempt to recontextualize the meaning of their being-there. Specifically, Derrida 
questions the way Plato's text argues with itself, and Derrida's argument calls on Plato's context 
to throw the question of (non) beings back into questioning. Derrida thereby brings forth and 
contextualizes the question of the relation between foreground and background knowledge. 
Following Habermas, the argument's foreground knowledge can be divided into two main parts: 
context-specific horizontal knowledge and topic dependent contextual knowledge. Within the 
context of Plato's argument – or Derrida's interpretation and recontextualization of it – horizontal 
knowledge occurs via the presupposition of what can be meaningfully determined. The 
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dialogue's context-specific horizontal knowledge constitutes the "centre of the speech 
situation"
2682
 in that it is tacitly aware that we speak to share our knowledge and that many 
shared beliefs can be mistaken or open to question. It is taken as a given that a body of 
discourse may be ridden with false or ill-suited beliefs, and the Platonic dialogues are centred 
around a more ideal speech situation: the possibility and/or desirability of such beliefs being 
true. Every speaker implicitly knows of situations, for example, where information might be false 
or falsified – and such situations should be remedied wherever possible. The ideal is to speak 
(know) the truth or speak as if what is said is true. Such horizontal knowledge gives rise to 
another situation within Plato's dialogue – and Derrida's interpretation of it. It purports to follow 
a vertical movement (or an "epistemological ascent")
2683
 and so moves towards the possibility 
of reaching a higher level of knowledge reflected in the well-being of the body politic. While such 
foreground knowledge might be taken as given, an unasked question typically remains in the 
background: how can reason rise to such a situation – i.e., how can true knowledge be possible 
or be meaningfully spoken about? The second form of foreground knowledge occurring here is 
the argument's topic dependent contextual knowledge. Specifically, Plato – and 
correspondingly, Derrida – foregrounds the problem of remedying questionable knowledge 
claims via the topic of writing as a pharmakon, and the dialogue speaks through 
"pharmaceutical"
2684
 concepts to bring forth and administer the question of whether writing is a 
poison or cure. Plato argues that the problem calls for a situation where false speech (acts) can 
be rationally questioned, and it actively prescribes the situation of questioning the pharmakon's 
meaningful limits via the (performatively contradictory) act of writing. The rational status of topic 
dependent contextual knowledge appears to have a prescribed limit and is delimited in accord 
with actions thought truthful to the beings in question. Plato thereby mobilizes and situates 
reasons to determine the rational limits (and situation) of reason. The topic dependent 
contextual knowledge refers to the way a situated and mobilized reason actively plays in 
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remedying (writing, speaking) the question of the limits of knowledge. 
Derrida's interpretation of the pharmakon's undecidable status therefore re-turns to the question 
of conditions of possibility. Derrida's questioning itself becomes possible when he brings forth 
the problem of deciding (delimiting) the background knowledge of the context in question. 
Derrida explicitly "points to an experience that was present in Greek culture"
2685
 and such an 
experience is said to have the "unique feature"
2686





 Derrida is referring, of course, to the "formidable role"
2689
 
the absent word pharmakos arguably plays within Plato's text, and it is argued that lifeworld 
contexts are particularly relevant when determining the rationality of the beings in question. 
Derrida argues as if the pharmakos is ontologically relevant (particularly meaningful or true) for 
a given reason. The reason Derrida gives – mobilizes, bring forth – within Plato's argument is 
"hidden forces of attraction"
2690
 within contexts of relevance, or the way the "system of language, 
cannot not have acted upon the writing reading of this text."2691 Derrida claims that the text's 
words "communicate with the totality of the lexicon through their syntactic play"
2692
 and 
invariably argue amongst themselves via hidden pathways and movements. A limitless context 
determines the question of the pharmakon's meaning conditions because words speak through 
each other in questionable ways. It is particularly important to stress the formidable role the 
pharmakos actively plays within Derrida's argument. Derrida's questioning directs itself towards 
a horizon that Derrida actively mobilizes and/or moves within. The question of background 
knowledge therefore only becomes relevant (possible, meaningful) when Derrida's questioning 
can determine its contextual relevance (possibility, truth). Witness the way the pharmakon takes 
on its possible meaning/s through a consciousness effected by history (our knowledge of 
Socrates' subsequent arrest for using the sorcery of words and his poisoning to cure the body 
of social discourse).
2693
 Socrates' trial determines the question of background knowledge in that 
it provides a context for Derrida's questioning. Derrida is thereby able to argue with Plato by 
claiming that context acts upon Plato's text in a more meaningful way – by acting as a 
transcendental site determining the question of conditions of possibility. A limitless context 
thereby gives rise to a text in argument with – divided against and/or multiplying – itself. 
Derrida's definition of the situation moves beyond Plato's immediate text – towards a context 
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that situates and/or redefines the pharmakon's movements in a more decisive way. Context 
becomes relevant insofar as "certain forces of association unite – at diverse distances, with 
different strengths and according to disparate paths."
2694
 Derrida calls on the (differential and/or 
deferential) role of deep-seated background knowledge to foreground the way the pharmakon 
is called (back) into question within the historicity of understanding. 
Summary 
We have brought our understanding full circle. We've done this in order to enable the question 
of moving between distinct parts forming a complex whole. Following Habermas and Derrida, 
we've interpreted the circle's movements as enacting (directing, performing) a dialectic between 
the structure and event of understanding. Following Gadamer, we've located this movement 
within the dialectic between question and answer. We've argued that the being of the question 
forms a complex whole, and finds itself directed by the circular relation between language and 
thought. Specifically, where the rationality of questioning remains determined by the horizon of 
intentionality and/or intentional relations and objects. We've also argued that such a complex 




 but falsifiable. That is to say, the whole is complex 
(meaningful, true) because the relation between thought and language remains subject to 
reversals in direction and necessarily re-turns to itself. For this reason, we've turned towards 
Habermas and Derrida, and circled around their movements accordingly. Whichever way we've 
turned, we've found ourselves moving towards a dialectical conception of truth, or a part/whole 
relationship that acts as a truth-functional or connective. We've observed Habermas and Derrida 
approaching the circle of understanding from different directions, and interpret its directives in 
different ways. Despite the conflicting movements, their interpretations have nonetheless 
moved towards intersecting pathways – that of the logic of the quasi-transcendental. 
Specifically, the conflicting interpretations have approached the circle of understanding through 
the question of conditions of possibility, and they've both argued that such a question has 
enabled (directed, made possible) their overall approach. The conflicting interpretations 
similarly turned (back) towards the question enabling their movements. Following such a 
directive simultaneously brought forth the question of ontological commitment as cultural 
critique – namely, determining the limits (possibility, being) of questioning linguistic relations 
and practices. We argued, however, that the conflicting approaches – commitments, directives 
– presuppose each other and necessarily bring them into irresolvable conflict and/or potential 
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dialogue. Habermas and Derrida have conflicting conceptions of reason, and no standard of 
rationality can resolve the differences between them. As we previously argued, however, 
Lyotard's concept of differend presupposes the rationality of the very being/s and/or rulings in 
question – by directing itself towards the possibility of rationally identifying and evaluating 
conflicting reasons for being-there. Consequently, it is the circle of understanding that makes 
the conflict of interpretations possible (meaningful, true). While the general being of their 
questioning might differ in significant ways, the circle directs their movements back (towards) 
the question of the structure and event of understanding. Approaching the circle in this way – 
i.e., interpreting the conflict as a differend and committing ourselves to the corresponding 
ontological schemes – enacts a performative contradiction in that it makes possible the question 
of what cannot be said or done across contexts of interpretation. While the concept of a differend 
might refer to heterogeneous elements, it nonetheless acts as unitary standard or point of 
reference. The events of such an understanding may be said to contradictorily move back 
towards the structure of understanding – by transferring a part throughout the whole and/or 
taking the part for the whole.    
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 Heidegger and the Question of Being 































Aims and Objectives: The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of the hermeneutical 
circle via the question of Being. Following Heidegger’s lead, the question of Being will be 
brought forth via the concept of the hermeneutical circle. We shall observe that Heidegger's 
approach to the question of Being was divided into two distinct parts or movements, and forms 
a complex whole. We shall thereby approach Heidegger's guiding question from different 
directions in order to navigate the circle directing his overall movements. The objective of this 
chapter is to explore the way the hermeneutical circle and the question of Being move (back) 
towards each other. We pursue this goal so as to pave the way for our inquiry into the problem 
of the criterion and its relationship to the question of Being. In order to reach our goal, we must 
similarly prioritise the being of the question, or the way Heidegger places historical beings within 
the question directing his movements. Whilst our approach shall primarily be expository, we put 
forth related parts in order to throw them back into question. Heidegger's questioning introduces 
a distinction between Being and beings – which he calls the ontological difference – and the 
difference is invoked to determine how the one makes the other possible and/or questionable. 
Heidegger approaches the ontological difference in two distinct but related ways. We shall 
therefore observe Heidegger initially taking the way of meaning – specifically, where he 
attempted to retrieve the content of the question of Being. We shall note his turn down the path 
of truth – specifically, where he attempted to retrieve the referent of the question of Being. Either 
way, the question is to what extent it is possible to find our way towards language through the 
hermeneutical circle.  
 
We shall proceed in three related ways. In the first part, we acknowledge the difficulty in 
interpreting Heidegger, and locate this problematic within Heidegger's own conception of 
understanding. We attempt to get around this problem by providing a selective interpretation of 
pivotal texts and contextualise our understanding accordingly. In the second part, we follow 
Heidegger's lead by arguing that the question of being is related to the being of the question (or 
the way human beings are already placed in question). Given this approach, we explore the 
way interpretation and understanding are related to each other, and bring forward select themes 
in order to orient our thinking towards the hermeneutical circle. In the third part, we note 
Heidegger's attempt to circumvent the circle by attempting to move beyond what can be 
meaningfully understood or interpreted by way of language's own directives or movements. 
Taken together, we shall find ourselves on the way to questioning Heidegger's approach to the 






 The Difficulty in Approaching Heidegger:  
 
We begin by acknowledging the difficulty in approaching Heidegger. This question of approach 
– of drawing near, to approximate and appropriate his thought – underlines the difficulty in 
understanding Heidegger’s own approach to the question of Being. Part of the problem in 
understanding Heidegger is that an interpretation of his works inaugurates the very problematic 
that concerns us – namely, a part/whole problematic regarding the question of the relation 
between interpretation and understanding. An inscription that precedes his collected writings 
highlights the difficulty immediately facing us. Specifically, the entrance to his collected works 
bears the signpost: Ways, not Works
2697
. Heidegger advises us to approach his collected 
thoughts as parts that do not add up to an intelligible whole. Or alternately, as a totality best 
understood as a collection of distinct elements. Each part is "merely a way–station along a way 
(where) the lasting element in thinking is the way".
2698
 Whilst the question of Being might have 
directed his overall movements, thinking about that question has taken him in various directions 
over time. If there is a guiding theme, it's Heidegger's attempt to move past the "language of 
metaphysics"
2699
 by thinking about the "ontological difference"
2700
, or the difference between 
Being and beings in different ways. Although it has been argued that Heidegger remained a  
"phenomenologist from beginning to end"
2701
, there is the question of whether he followed the 
way of phenomenology to begin with – Husserl and Heidegger famously parted ways over the 
issue of where 'phenomenology' should begin and lead questioning.
2702
 Indeed, Being and Time 
– Heidegger's major contribution to philosophy and a text generally understood as espousing a 
holistic approach to meaning and truth via phenomenology
2703
 – is itself comprised of various 
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parts which do not add up to a meaningful whole.
2704
 Being and Time not only remains 
incomplete, the path taken pulls Heidegger in different directions.
2705
 These conflicting 
movements have their origins in Heidegger's "quasi transcendental"
2706
 approach to the 
question of Being in time. Specifically, where the question of the conditions of possibility of 
"world meaning constitution"
2707
 is located within the horizon of history. Heidegger's concept of 
a world meaningfully constituted attempted to have it both ways simultaneously – to interrogate 
our understanding of being within the line at which history and culture meet and yet circumvent 
the circular boundary in which both appear together or move. Indeed, Heidegger's 
"transcendental historicism"
2708
 has being called a "non viable mongrel"
2709
 because Heidegger 
attempts to "historicize the Platonic dividing line"
2710
 by turning the distinction between Being 
and time around (i.e. Plato's hierarchical distinction between the intelligible and visible worlds).  
One of the reasons Heidegger offers for Being and Time’s indeterminate status is that he 
claimed to misconceive his own question from the outset. Specifically, Heidegger's original 
approach was "bound to lead immediately and inevitably into error"
2711
 because he was yet to 
understand that there was a "thinking more rigorous than the conceptual".
2712
 Heidegger 
subsequently came to the understanding that being understood "is suicidal to philosophy"
2713
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any–way. If we interpret Heidegger correctly here, his major contribution to philosophy was to 
situate his own questioning outside the limits of philosophical understanding. Given that the 
‘task of (his) thinking’
2714
 was to find a way to delimit what could (not) be understood, we find 
ourselves presented with a dilemma when interpreting Heidegger. Either we cannot (and so, 
should not) try to understand Heidegger’s thinking, or any understanding would be a 
misunderstanding (his thoughts take us along various ways, and so, threaten to entangle us 
within a vicious circle regarding their movement or direction). 
 
There are at least two difficulties here. The first concerns the question of interpretation and 
(ironically) raises the traditional problem of hermeneutics relating to textual criticism. If 
Heidegger's magnum opus is itself a "torso, a fragment of a work"
2715
 and resembles a 
"patchwork"
2716
 of irreconcilable and/or incomplete parts, the relation between part and whole 
remains questionable. The situation is compounded by the question of the relation between 
distinct texts taken as a whole. Particularly problematic is that we can only appropriate the parts 
that suit our purposes and can make little attempt to be definitive or unify a complex whole.  
Heidegger's subsequent turn towards the being of language exemplifies this problematic, 
requiring us to direct our general approach by way of "the circle"
2717
 of understanding as 
"determined by language itself, by a movement within language".
2718
 Specifically, Heidegger 
observes that the "fundamental flaw"
2719
 of Being and Time is that he "ventured forth too far too 
early"
2720
 when approaching language and its relation to the question of Being. Although "the 
way to language"
2721
 had "determined the path of my thinking from early on"
2722
, his anticipated 
movements had either being "suppressed in our thematic analysis"
2723
 or was "held back 
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because thinking failed in the adequate saying of the turning".
2724
 Nonetheless, Heidegger 
provides a way forward from the outset – his conception of the hermeneutical circle turns 
towards the language of human beings, and so re-turns to the way language is expressed as 
discourse within the circle of understanding.   
 
The second problem is that Heidegger is a "genuinely novel thinker who breaks with established 
patterns of thought"
2725
 and his language is notoriously "difficult to understand"
2726
 anyway. 
Given the "tortured intensity"
2727
 and/or "wilful obscurantism"
2728
 of Heidegger's general 
approach, the relation between his thought and language are amongst the "obstacles to its 
comprehension"
2729
. Fortunately, Heidegger provides us with a philosophical concept and 
interpretive principle in order to get us on the way to understanding the relation/s between way–
stations. The concept, of course, is the route provided via the hermeneutical circle, and its 
occurrence can be traced back to Heidegger’s initial attempt to retrieve the meaning of Being. 
The ‘principle’ may informally be called the preparatory or futural principle of interpretation
2730
, 
and occurs via Heidegger’s subsequent attempt to retrieve the truth of Being. Although we are 
obviously anticipating our own movements here
2731
, we will need to acknowledge the tension 
between Heidegger's original conception of the circle of understanding – understanding as a 
mode of being in which we already move and are directed – and his subsequent principle of 
interpretation as a directive from the future moving against traditional understanding. The 
tension between these two concepts will justify our own approach to Heidegger. 
 
Specifically, Heidegger would go on to claim that his own conception of the hermeneutical circle 
was "superficial"
2732
 and he attempted to question the hermeneutical "relation"
2733
 directing 
human understanding instead. The hermeneutical circle's purported 'superficiality' lies within his 
attempt to approach the circularity of understanding from different directions and move towards 
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a questioning of being/s (allegedly) more truthful than conceptual thought. The issue of 
superficiality is therefore more appropriately located within the question of the circle’s own 
complexity – that is to say, within the problem of questioning the limits of understanding in the 
first place. Heidegger’s attempt to move beyond the hermeneutical circle is an attempt to 
understand that which bounds and “encircles”
2734
 understanding, and so determines its mode 
of being as a circular limit or boundary. The issue of the hermeneutical relation is therefore 
perhaps best understood as the question of the “determining”
2735
 of understanding  – a 
determination which can/not encompass and relate to the circle's own movements and 
directives. Heidegger concedes that the question of the hermeneutical circle remains 
"unavoidable"
2736
, and thinking is similarly bound to “follow”
2737
 its own relations and pathways. 
Given the way human beings understand, the question of being does not so much direct thought 
into "circular reasoning"
2738
 but moves towards a "remarkable relatedness backward or 
forward"
2739
 and "only the way back will lead us forward".
2740
 Irrespective of the way taken, 
Heidegger will maintain that understanding can never purport to understand “better”, although 
it may understand “differently”
2741
. Whilst understood differences must attempt to remain faithful 
to the original way of thinking, interpretation nonetheless requires a degree of “force against” 
whatever is thought, forcing an understanding in “the direction of a more originary grasping”
2742
. 
The kind of interpretation that Heidegger understands to be relevant to questioning is 
“destructive”
2743
 and involves a “destructuring”
2744
 of traditional thought or practice. Although 
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Heidegger claims that such a violent approach is not to be identified with a "critique…of 
culture"
2745
, he nonetheless wants to question the way human beings have fallen "back upon its 
world (the world in which it is)".
2746
 Heidegger's destructive approach might be historically 
incorrect (questionable), but it is “historically essential, i.e. considered as preparatory for future 




 In order to wrest from the actual words that which these words "intend to say," every 
interpretation must necessarily resort to violence. This violence, however, should not be 
confused with an action that is wholly arbitrary. The interpretation must be animated and guided 




Paving the Way: On the way to the hermeneutical circle, and determining its relationship 
to the question of ‘being’. 
 
Heidegger's inquiry proceeds from two related presuppositions: that we "always conduct our 
activities in an understanding of Being"
2749
 and that we have somehow "forgotten"
2750
 the 
"question of the meaning of being".
2751
 Such claims to knowledge obviously raise two related 
questions: what is the question of being and how has an ancient "theme for actual 
investigation"
2752
 fallen by the wayside over time? It is no accident that Being and Time begins 
with a quote from Plato's Sophist – an age-old confusion paves the way for Heidegger's own 
investigations. Specifically, "For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when 
you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now 
become perplexed" (244a).
2753
 According to Heidegger, three dogmatic – and incompatible –  
"presuppositions"
2754
 have emerged over time despite such perplexity. Firstly, it is now believed 
that being is the most universal concept or is "already included in conceiving anything which 
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one apprehends in entities"
2755
 – i.e., where the universality (or transcendence) of being is itself 
mistaken for a class or genus. The second dogmatic presupposition is that the meaning of being 
is indefinable because it cannot be meaningfully defined as an entity – i.e. if the universality of 
being cannot be included in the conception of an entity it must remain outside the realm of 
understanding The third presupposition accepted without question is that it's meaning is self 
evident because of the way Being is already meaningfully understood – as being already 
included in (or directed towards) our conception of entities. Heidegger urges that "the very fact 
that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of being is still veiled in 
darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again".
2756
 The problem, 
however, is that we "must first work out an adequate way to formulate"
2757
 the question and 
turns towards the way in which we already meaningfully understand beings. Consequently, the 
question of the meaning of    being tries to ask what 'Being' could possibly mean within the 
context of a "pre-ontological understanding of Being"
2758
  (a prior understanding that is implicitly 
shared and/or understood without question). Heidegger's "guiding question"
2759
, then, goes on 
to ask  "what is the mode of being of the entity in which world is constituted?"
2760
 – i.e., how 
does the phenomenon of a meaningful world become possible and/or questionable? Given this 
question, "the problem of being is related – all inclusively – to what constitutes and what get's 
constituted"
2761
 in a temporal existence.  We therefore need to find our way back towards a 
more originary question about the meaning of being and we can only do this by way of  
"fundamental ontology"
2762
 (the making explicit of what it means to be via formulating the 
question of the meaning of being).  Fundamental ontology, however, can only "be sought in the 
existential analytic of Dasein"
2763
 since the "ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what 
makes up fundamental ontology"
2764
 and "existence is the determining character of Dasein".
2765
 
Such an analysis can only meaningfully occur when the question of "being in time…functions 
as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being"
2766
 or can seek to determine how our temporal 
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existence comes "to have this distinctive ontological function".
2767
 Consequently, it is only by 
first questioning the meaning of our being (existence) in the world that human beings can 
properly understand "that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue".
2768
  The 
primary objective of an analysis of Dasein is to thereby "arrive at the horizon for the 
understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it".
2769
  But how can human beings 
move (back) towards this horizon of understanding? According to Heidegger, "phenomenology 
is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology…only as phenomenology is ontology 
possible".
2770
 Heidegger approaches the question of the meaning of Being through the 
"phenomenon"
2771
 of a meaningful "world itself".
2772
 Heidegger calls this phenomenon the 
"hermeneutical situation" 
2773
 or the "totality of…presuppositions"
2774
 determining the horizon for 
the understanding of Being and the possibility for interpreting our being-in-the-world. The goal 
is to "bring forward the entities themselves"
2775
 by questioning their ways of being there (the 
way the world of experience is meaningfully constituted or presupposed). In this way, the 
“ordinary conception of phenomenon becomes phenomenologically relevant…since our 
investigation will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in 
(an) interpretation”2776 of what can be understood and questioned. In so far as it is possible 
(meaningful, necessary) to move back and forth within a given understanding, Heidegger 
therefore points the way backwards and/or forwards by “presupposing”
2777
 the being/s in (his) 
question. He immediately raises the issue of relations of presupposition within questioning and 
distinguishes between the ontological (pertaining to beings) and the ontical (pertaining to 
entities) in order to delineate our understanding 'of what it means to be or exist' (beings) and 'of 
what there is or makes something what it is' (entities). Within a prior understanding, "Being is 
always the being of an entity"
2778
 and to presuppose anything is to already "understand…the 
ground for the Being of some other entity".
2779
 The question is trying to recover lost ground by 
moving back and forth within an understanding of beings. The idea of a way, of course, not only 
implies direction or movement, it suggests a path being prepared or is available for travelling 
upon. In this way questioning offers a way, and so, permits movement or direction. It is important 
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to stress from the outset, then, that Heidegger is merely paving ways throughout his thinking, 
and such a ‘pavement’ is the ground upon which the question of being occurs. Heidegger is 
acutely aware that any attempt to clear the way through questioning threatens to throw into 
question the relations or elements within (his own) thinking. Any questioning potentially involves 
mutually exclusive elements, and so requires piety in thinking questions.2780 Thought must 
remain observant of and devoted to the question of its own way-making movements – by being 
wary of its own thinking/questioning. On the one hand, thought is preparatory in that it attempts 
to make a way available or accessible: questions guide thought in a particular direction and 
seek to uncover and access something.
2781
 On the other hand, questions may be misguided in 




Heidegger sets out to prioritise the question of questioning insofar as it's mode of being 
invariably directs the limits of questioning – i.e., makes an understanding of being both possible 
and/or necessary (questionable). An "inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand 
by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some 
way..(since)..we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this 
understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of being and the tendency that 
leads us towards its conception".
2783
 Further, "any interpretation which is to contribute 
understanding, must have already understood what is to be interpreted"
2784
 and so can be 
questioned in a meaningful way. If presupposing the being/s in question is to already understand 
the ground for the Being of beings, interpretation (questioning) can never be 
"presuppositionless"
2785
 and finds itself being directed (moving) accordingly. We need to 
proceed carefully here. Heidegger's questioning already appears to be moving in a circle and 
he is yet to officially 'enter' the hermeneutical circle. Specifically, what does Heidegger mean by 
'being' within the context of his own questioning? Part of the answer is that even an "unoriented 
and vague"
2786
 understanding of being "bears…the possibility of the question within itself".
2787
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Consequently,  "in the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being – that 
which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already 
understood".
2788
  Approached another way, "when being is thus asked for, it involves inquiring 
into the basic character of the entity, what defines an entity as entity. What defines the entity as 
entity is its being".
2789
 Heidegger would latter clarify that being cannot be meaningfully 
understood (conceived) in terms of being-ness any-way.  Being can never be accepted 
(questioned) as a being (entity) and must be distinguished from the beings defined as entities.  
Heidegger's inquiry into the question of being, then, presupposes that human beings move 
about in an understanding of being and that they have nonetheless misunderstood the 
difference between Being and being. Given that human beings cannot meaningfully answer – 
let alone understand the question of Being – Heidegger has decided to move us back towards 
questioning our understanding of being. Heidegger begins his inquiry into the meaning of being 
in a roundabout way – via ‘the problem of the formal structure of the question of being’, and the 
corresponding ‘priority (possibility, necessity) of such questioning’
2790
. Put another way: "the 
question of being is the being of the question"
2791
, and is made possible by the way human 
beings are "always already"
2792
 related to (moving within) a given understanding. Unlike other 
beings – such as chairs and tables – human beings are ontologically distinct entities in that they 
can and do ask meaningful questions within a prior understanding (such as 'what is the time'? 
or 'what is the meaning of being'?). The 'always already' is thereby accorded a perfect a priori2793 
status: questioning becomes an inquiry into the conditions of it's own possibility and/or necessity 
(meaningfulness, truthfulness). Our prior understanding of being is said to be apriori perfect 
because it retains the potential to determine (question) the limits of what can be meaningfully 
understood. Whilst understanding might move ahead of itself – remains directed towards the 
question of its own possibilities – the question of being has nonetheless fallen by the wayside 
and needs to be recovered again. Heidegger, then, directs his philosophical inquiry towards the 
circle that enables and directs movement (questioning) in the first place – and there is no getting 
around (avoiding) the circle that makes such a roundabout approach possible and/or necessary. 
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Specifically, any philosophical inquiry finds itself "constantly moving in a circle"
2794
 , and every 
"attempt to argue away such circularity in philosophy leads it away from philosophy itself".
2795
 
Indeed, it is not possible to "ask a question in a philosophical way"
2796
 without "having entered 
the circle in the first place"
2797
 and it is "the circular movement"
2798
 of a given understanding that 
makes questioning both possible and necessary – i.e. lets thought find its bearings and/or way. 
Consequently, "what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to get into it in the right 
way…The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any kind of random kind of knowledge 
may move…It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is 
merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing".
2799
 In order to understand the way the circle directs our movements, we must 
therefore inquire into the being of the entity that finds itself meaningfully directed upon (moving 
within, relating to) it as such. Indeed, the “usual conception of intentionality misunderstands"
2800
 
the way rational thought relates to the concepts and/or objects of its own questioning. Rather, 
thought is obliged to make "intentionality itself into a problem”
2801
 since "intentional relations"
2802
 
are not only “related to beings themselves”
2803





 in the first place. From whichever direction Heidegger approaches the 
question of Being, he will therefore continue to ask: what is – or can – the question of Being be 
of or about (directed upon or related to)? While Heidegger might attempt to get around the 
question of thinking “about ”
2806
 Being, (his) thinking nonetheless remains faced with the 
problem of how it comes to be of or about such a question. 
We have thus far being talking around Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutical circle, and 
have been moving (back) towards the question of circularity within questioning. We have done 
this for two related reasons – to approach Heidegger through the question of circular 
movements, and to highlight the manner in which Heidegger approaches the circularity of 
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questioning through his conception of the way as being directed by a 'remarkable relatedness 
backwards and forwards' movement. In this way, we were able to approach (bring forth) the 
question of being and its relation to the being of the question. We are now in a position to direct 
our movements towards Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutical circle proper. Although 




 into the circle in the 
'right way'
2809
, Heidegger's own directives are (unfortunately) misleading here. Given his own 
understanding, we are always already in the circle anyway – it can never be a question of 
entering or leaving but approaching (moving within) the circle from a given direction. It is 
therefore more a question of finding our way around the circle of understanding through 
questioning. Following Heidegger's lead, then, questioning opens or builds a way to an 
understanding of being, and the requirement is to find our place within the question of being. 
The reason, of course, is that the inquirer is already placed within the question, and so becomes 
an integral part of the inquiry. Specifically, "each question is itself always the whole” where a 
“question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is present together with 
the question, that is, is placed in question".
2810
 Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutical 
circle thereby proceeds from the following presuppositions: by finding our place within the 
question, we can lay bare the grounds of questioning and inquire into our own mode of being 
(existence as a questioning being). In asking the question of being, human beings are said to 
enact the limits of their own understanding and determine the possibilities of a meaningful 
existence. Heidegger calls this this enactment or modality Dasein (being-there), and the 
question is the way the meaning of being can become a question through Dasein's temporal 
relationship to the world. Since "Dasein already understands itself in terms of its existence – in 
terms of a possibility of itself"
2811
, the question is the way Dasein relates to its own possibilities 
(relationship to a meaningful world or a world thus made possible and/or questionable). In the 
following, then, we shall bring forth Heidegger's conception of the hermeneutical circle, and its 
relationship to the question of being in the world. We shall thereby observe Heidegger's attempt 
to get around the problem of the criterion by directing our understanding towards the "unitary 
phenomenon"
2812
 that invariably calls itself back into question.   
In order to determine the question of the meaning of Being, Heidegger argues that we must first 
inquire into the meaningful existence of human beings. Whilst Heidegger obviously recognises 
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 in such an approach, he nonetheless maintains that we should 
direct ourselves towards "what we are asking about when we ask this question".
2814
 Questioning 
our "mode of being"
2815
 becomes the question in that what is being presupposed and questioned 
is that  "entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is 
an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about 
–namely, Being…as one of the possibilities of its Being".
2816
 Questioning our "being in the 
world"
2817
 is therefore an integral part of the question of our "being-there"
2818
 and provides a 
phenomenological description of who human beings essentially are: it is what makes Dasein's 
existence meaningful (possible, questionable) in the first place. Presupposing the question in 
this way – and trying to determine the meaningfulness of our presuppositions  - is not an attempt 
to derive an object of knowledge but points the way towards how Being itself becomes possible 
as a question and so "belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself". Such  
presupposing has nothing to do with laying down an axiom from which a sequence 
of propositions is deductively derived. It is quite impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' 
in formulating the question about the meaning of Being; for in answering this question, the issue 
is not one of grounding something by such a derivation , it is rather one of laying bare the 




Heidegger begins to lay bare the ground of his own questioning by exhibiting “the world as a 
phenomenon.”
2820
  According to Heidegger, the “world has already been presupposed, and 
indeed in various ways.”
2821
 Heidegger calls the 'presupposition of the world' the "worldhood of 
the world "
2822
. Heidegger's concept of worldhood refers to the phenomenon of a meaningful 
world – it is where the being of different entities are encountered and understood "as such"
2823
 
– i.e., as being already meaningful and/or distinguished according to different "things that are 
'in' the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars".
2824
 The world is described as a 
meaningful phenomenon, then, not just because human beings reside in it alongside other 
beings – worldhood is that phenomenon which encompasses and incorporates the totality of 
beings, and so, necessarily includes them as part of its own description. World and beings 
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presuppose each other to such an extent that they form a complex (or self referential) whole. 
Being and world therefore cannot be taken apart, and must be approached together: via the 
"avenue of the entities within the world and the Being which they possess".
2825
 Generally 
speaking, Heidegger divides the presupposition of the world into two distinct ways of being (or 
meaningful orientations towards the world). Specifically, Heidegger distinguishes two ways of 
approaching (or being meaningfully orientated to) the world.  The distinction is between the 
ready-to-hand and the present-to-hand. The ready-to-hand refers to the way human beings are 
tacitly oriented to the content of their everyday experience of the world. The occurrence of 
'ready' meaning presents itself within a context of significance that is constitutive of it as being 
readily available and/or handy (useful, meaningful) as such. Meaning becomes readily available 
and/or significant when it occurs in relation to other meaningful entities: by being part of a 
complex (or self referential and/or determining) whole. The present-to-hand refers to the way 
theoretical thought attempts to objectify the content of everyday experience: by presenting 
meaningful entities as objects of thought. Heidegger provides the example of a hammer to 
illustrate the distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-to-hand. He observes that 
a tool like a hammer can be approached (understood) in two distinct ways. We could either take 
it in our hand and hammer away without thinking or we could present it to conscious thought 
and contemplate it as an object from a distance. Heidegger claims that the ready-to-hand is 
ontologically prior to the present-to-hand in that being ready-to-hand is the way we primarily 
understand (approach) meaningful entities such as hammers and nails. When human beings 
use a hammer they don't normally understand it as a 'handle and a heavy metal top with a flat 
side' – the object's physical properties disappear from conscious awareness or retreats into the 
background of our everyday experience of it. We relate to the hammer by way of the task literally 
at hand: by being orientated to the activity of hitting nails on the head and so become a part of 
the activity and/or relation. Consequently, Heidegger attempts to make the phenomenon of the 
world known by pointing to the various phenomena closest to it (of which Dasein is obviously 
an integral part). He calls this integrated proximity the “environment”
2826
, and characterizes the 
environs by virtue of its “dealings” and “concerns”
2827
. The general accessibility of meaningful 
beings is labelled “equipment”
2828
, and accessible beings are whatever is encountered there. 
Dasein is said to be equipped to deal with the world in order to render it serviceable, and the 
equipment it uses are those beings that render it as serviceable. Significant for Heidegger is the 
way in which an in-order-to exhibits a ‘being’s’ referential characteristics – namely, as something 
being assigned to something. Distinct beings may or may not belong together, and the question 
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of their belonging is determined by whether and how they are assigned to each other. A table 
and chair, for example, belong together by referring to (presupposing) each other. Nonetheless, 
these two things do not simply refer to each other, but point to or indicate their relationship to 
other things – like a house in which to situate them and a room in which to arrange them. The 
kind of being Heidegger ascribes to these beings is ‘readiness–to–hand’2829. It is important to 
stress that something being ready–to–hand generally occurs behind Dasein’s back, so to speak. 
The everyday occurrence of beings tends to be inconspicuous, and their inconspicuousness 
derives from the totality of equipment in which they occur. Dasein is – and always has been – 
so involved in its own dealings with the world that it does not generally identify and reflect upon 
the content of its own experiences. Actively thinking of or about something would be to present 
being/s to that consciousness that already encounters it there as such, and so, make an in–
order-to merely present-to-hand (subject to objectification). According to Heidegger, Dasein’s 
“involvement”
2830
 with the world does not involve being consciously directed upon an object – 
rather, its mode of being consists in being directed towards those beings which it already forms 
an integral part. This ‘towards-which’ is integrated in the sense that being involved with beings 
involves being completely immersed within them. Being-in-the-world moves beings in the 
direction of a world to which they collectively belong, thereby providing a horizon (context, 
movement) of involvement.  
 
Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of reference in order to be able to refer us (back) to 
that referential whole which constitutes the ‘presupposition of the world’. Specifically, he refers 
us to “the difference between the reference of serviceability and the reference of indicating”.
2831
 
This difference is said to be indicative of that which can indicate or reveal the world, and what 
it indicates is the ways in which beings can be directed towards an indicative or serviceable 
whole. Heidegger, then, wants to distinguish between reference that indicates or discloses a 
meaningful world, and reference that makes a world thus disclosed or indicated. Signs are part 
of a greater whole – unlike other ‘parts’ (equipment), however, signs can reveal the whole in 
which they form an integral part. Indeed, signs are accorded their special status because of 
their part – whole function: namely, they possess the ability to integrate a whole (bring various 
parts into a meaningful whole), and they have the capacity to reveal an integral whole (indicate 
a whole with respect to its meaningful parts). An example Heidegger provides corresponds to 
‘the way’ element in his thinking. The example is of a car indicating a turn, and illustrates how 
an indicator can help ‘show’ the way. Specifically, an indicator is an item of equipment amongst 
many items of equipment (a road, other travellers, traffic regulations, etc). Human beings 
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encounter this sign on their way from one place to another, and it indicates the way in at least 
two ways – by pointing the way, and enabling it. Heidegger emphasizes the latter over the 
former since having a way indicates a way to come and go. An indicator may point travellers in 
a specific direction, but what it essentially determines is the possibility of being orientated within 
an environment. According to Heidegger, Dasein is therefore always “directed and on its 
way.”
2832
 Such a sign not only indicates that our movements are directed, it actively directs 
movement by arranging and regulating it into a world in which to move. Signs therefore ‘equip’ 
Dasein to deal with the world, and make it possible to bring to light the ways in which the world 
is dealt with (structured). Consequently, a sign is an “item of equipment which explicitly raises 
a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that …the worldly character of the ready-to-
hand announces itself”
2833
. This announcement occurs by way of being signified, since “Dasein 
‘signifies’ to itself”
2834
 its own involvement with the world. We need to distinguish two elements 
within Heidegger’s thinking here. On the one hand, reference simultaneously involves the 
in/conspicuousness of beings: all beings refer to one another in one way or another, and such 
referencing forms a totality which may or may not become conspicuous. Signs are those beings 
which can refer (back) to themselves, if only because they can reveal the referential nature of 
the totality to which all beings belong. On the other hand, signs enable referencing to occur by 
letting things ‘be’ (refer to each other). Signs open up and enclose beings within a world that 
point to and disclose a meaningful enclosure. If being-in-the-world involves being directed 
towards beings, then beings are orientated by those signs which determine their relationship to 
(involvement with) each other. Heidegger calls this “relational character…signifying” and the 
“relational totality of this signifying…significance”2835. Indeed, significance is said to be 
constitutive of the structure of the phenomenon of the world in that it constitutes Dasein’s mode 
of being and finds a way in which to bring beings into signification. Within significance, it is 





Dasein discloses it significance by virtue of having being ‘thrown’ into a world with a given 
understanding. Human beings find themselves delivered over and into situations which are not 
only ‘there’ to be found (culture, history, discourse, etc), but are where they invariably find 
themselves to be situated. Being–there occurs existentially in that being-in-the-world is a feature 
of Dasein’s factual existence: being thrown involves being thrown into an understanding, and 
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such an understanding occurs in terms of the fact of its own existence. As a consequence, 
being-there entails being thrown into a ‘projection’ – or rather, being thrown forward into an 
environment that presents itself as a situation to be understood and dealt with. Being-there is 
given as existence, and the ‘there’ of being is received by being in an understanding. Given that 
an understanding occurs in terms of Dasein’s own existence, understanding as a projection 
throws before itself the conditions and possibilities of its own existence. Being thrown into a 
projection not only indicates that Dasein finds itself orientated (moving towards one possibility 
after another), understanding as a thrown projection actively makes possible the original 
movement and dis/orientation. 'Mood’ is said to be the way in which Dasein experiences an 
orientation, since it determines the ways in which being–there belongs to the throwness of its 
own existence, and so, projects itself towards the possibility of a meaningful existence. Ontically 
speaking, mood belongs to the structure of being-there: it refers to the fact that Dasein is in 
someway directed and on its way (significant). Ontologically speaking, “bare mood”
2837
 is said 
to structure the ‘there’ of being: it determines the direction and  significance of  being-in-the-
world. From "the ontological point of view, we must as a general principle leave the primary 
discovery of the world to bare mood"
2838
, and the way 'mood' lays itself bare – discovers the 
world – is through "the meaning of care"
2839
 (Dasein's involvement with and/or concern about 
its world). Indeed,  mood – a particular disposition or affectedness – lays bare the ground of 
meaningful disclosure, since it frames a “disclosive submission to the world, out of which we 
can encounter something that matters to us”
2840
. Mood is that frame of mind which provides the 
world with its framework – it structures the way in which various parts fit together and come into 
being as a whole of significance. Mood paves the way in a positive and a negative sense. 
Positively, mood makes a world possible by laying the ground on which Dasein directs and 
moves itself – it determines the way we find ourselves in the world by attuning and orienting our 
being there.  Negatively, it lays over the possibility of Dasein being misdirected or wayward: 
there remains the question of whether Dasein has being misled by its own encounters and 
involvements. Whilst Dasein ‘opens’ itself to the world by encountering it as a meaningful world, 
it also invariably encloses itself within its own understanding.  
 
Following Heidegger's lead, we are finally in a position to 'enter' the hermeneutical circle in the 
'right way' and turn towards the question of language. The irony, of course, is that Heidegger 
has gone to great lengths to argue that we are already in there, and the question was being 
able to move back and forth in accordance with his own way-making movements. Specifically, 
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it was from within the circle of understanding that Heidegger attempts to "pursue the 
phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world"
2841
, and Heidegger's goal is to 
distinguish its "mode of genuineness"
2842
 or authenticity by way of the question of Being. And 
the only way he has being able to do this is by making the circle of understanding present-to-
hand – that is, by presenting it as an object of thought within his own inquiry. Heidegger goes 
on to question our "being there as understanding"
2843
 and argues that interpretation is 
understanding made explicit with respect to "its possible authenticity and totality".
2844
 According 
to Heidegger, "understanding is a basic determination of existence"
2845
 and a meaningful 
interpretation of the world is "possible only because the Dasein as existent is itself an 
intrinsically understanding entity".
2846
 The "condition of possibility"
2847
 for meaningful 
understanding is therefore determined by Dasein's own mode of being-there (involvement with 
a world interpreted as such). Heidegger's conception of the circle of understanding, then, directs 
itself (back) towards the way interpretation necessarily becomes possible and/or questionable. 
Heidegger claims that "as understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities"
2848
 and 
that the "projection of understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself"
2849
 
through interpretation. Given this approach, the question is the way we understand (interpret) 
"something as something"
2850
 within a "totality of involvements".
2851
 Put another way, when 
something "is encountered within the world as such, the thing in question already has an 
involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one 
which gets laid out in the interpretation".
2852
 The question, then, is how does an interpretation 
emerge within an understanding – i.e., where the "environmentally ready-to-hand"
2853
 can be 
meaningfully interpreted (understood) as a chair or table (amongst other things)? We need to 
proceed carefully here. Heidegger distinguishes between a hermeneutic 'as' and an assertive 
'as', and asserts that the latter derives from the former. Heidegger proceeds to claim that all 
"interpretation moreover operates in the fore-structure of understanding"
2854
 and "appropriates 
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understandingly that which is understood by it"
2855
 – i.e., enables and directs its own 
possibilities. Consequently, Heidegger divides the fore-structure of understanding into three 
interdependent parts in order to show the way understanding projects its Being upon 
possibilities – i.e. develops its own possibility for meaningful understanding and questioning. 
Heidegger calls these three parts fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception, and their 
movements form a complex whole. In this way,  "understanding does not become something 
different"
2856
 but "becomes itself"
2857





Fore-having refers to the way understanding encounters the ready-to-hand 
"circumspectively"
2859
 and interprets objects meaningfully without question. It "hides in itself the 
explicitness of the assignment-relations (of the in-order-to) which belong to that totality"
2860
 and 
so "recedes into an understanding which does not stand out from the background".
2861
 Since 
we find ourselves already moving within an understanding, fore-having is what comes before 
us: it moves understanding forward by making it possible against an intelligible background. 
Foresight is "something we see in advance"2862 and is "always done under the guidance of a 
point of view".
2863
 Foresight reflects the way human beings see the world – it reveals the 
direction in which we are already moving (or the distinct ways we move about in a given 
understanding and/or towards meaningful possibilities). It moves our interpretation of the world 
into the foreground by making parts of our understanding stand out or visible. Fore-conception 
is the way in which entities are meaningfully conceived (approached) and is "grounded in 
something we grasp in advance".
2864
 Specifically, "anything understood"
2865
 by way of fore-
having and foresight "becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation".
2866
 Consequently, 
it is the conception (interpretation) of entities that may be taken as given or questioned within 
understanding, and the question is determining "the way of conceiving"
2867
 their overall 
movements there.   
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Heidegger's analysis of the relationship between interpretation and understanding paves the 
way for his approach to assertion and language. Specifically, the phenomenon of language – 
and its relation to knowledge claims about the world – follows on from his interpretation of 
Dasein as 'being-there as understanding'. It is from within the circle of understanding that 
Heidegger claims that assertion is a derivative mode of interpretation, and that language – in 
turn – derives from the way human beings relate to (move within) an already meaningful world. 
In this way, Heidegger comes to "define assertion as a pointing out which gives something a 
definite character and which communicates"
2868
 through language. If we are already moving 
about in an understanding of Being, language gives expression to our being-there as 
understanding by making interpretation approachable (accessible, available, etc.) through 
assertions that either uncover or cover over the entities in question. Consequently, "asserting 
is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is"
2869
 and to "say that an assertion 'is true' signifies 
that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 
'be seen' in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as 
Being-uncovering".
2870
 It is important to stress, then, that Heidegger is not claiming that 
language makes a meaningful world possible here. It is the other way around: our being-in-the-
world makes language meaningful and/or possible – by disclosing (making intelligible) what is 
already understood. The world is first disclosed through significance – totality of meaningful 
involvements – and signification (the words of language) expresses the meaningfulness of such 
encounters and (possibly) conceals the truth of the being/s in question. In "so far as 
understanding and interpretation make up the existential state of Being of the 'there', 'meaning' 
must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to 
understanding. Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 
behind them or floating somewhere as an intermediate domain. Dasein only 'has' meaning , so 
far as the disclosedness of Being-in the-world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in 
that disclosedness"
2871
 Discourse  discloses the intelligibility of beings by way of articulating 
interpretation and understanding: language is the way in which a meaningful structure can 
emerge and determine itself as a structural totality. Being-in-the-world is intelligible because the 
totality of beings finds themselves expressed as discourse. Consequently, the “totality of 
significations of intelligibility is put into words. To significations words accrue”
2872
. Meaning 
antecedes signification as language, and words proceed to attach themselves – or occur in 
addition to – the phenomenon of a meaningful world. Although all discourse is “about 
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, we need to distinguish the question of how language itself comes ‘about’ (comes 
into being) and can make assertions about being-in-the-world. According to the early Heidegger, 
language has its basis in Dasein’s own possibility for meaning, and goes on to express whatever 
is meaningfully possible.
2874
 Heidegger thereby divides assertion into three related parts – it 
involves a "pointing out"
2875
 that lets an "entity be seen from itself"
2876
, it gives an entity a "definite 
character"
2877
 by the way such entities can be seen (approached) through the relationship 
between words and it allows others to similarly see entities through the act of communicating 
words about them. If a person asserts the hammer is too heavy,2878 for example, they are 
already moving within a given understanding and indicating their movement (interpretation) of 
the situation. Such an understanding discloses the way an interpretation becomes intelligible 
and/or questionable  – by making the ready-to-hand (or circumspect) present-to-hand (an object 
of thought).  
 
Given that the being of language has its basis in being-in-the-world, Heidegger goes on to ask 
‘where’ the ‘there’ of Dasein is to be found. Dasein’s mode of being is said to be rooted within 
the “they, and is mastered by it”
2879
. The "world is always the one that I share with Others. The 
world of Dasein is a with-world"
2880
 and Dasein typically speaks about it's world "by following 
the route of gossiping and passing the word along".
2881
 Indeed, Dasein has ‘fallen’ into the ‘they’ 
because of language, and finds itself lost ‘there’. The "they is constituted by the way things have 
been publicly interpreted, which expresses itself in idle talk".
2882
 Discourse becomes idle 
(directionless, groundless, unquestioning, etc.) in that whatever is communicated typically 
enacts and maintains an undifferentiated mode of being. The circle of understanding is thereby 
closed off – and enclosed within – whatever is publicly understood and shared. Dasein 
presumes to understand the nature and extent of its own involvement with the world, 
reproducing the limits of its own understanding and/or covering up its own way of being-in-the-
world. The ‘They’ – conceived as a public or cultural mode of being – leads the way into 
forgetfulness or carelessness. Heidegger describes Dasein as “falling”
2883
 into its own 
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involvement with the world: it has become so involved with the They that it's being–there 
threatens to become "inauthentic" 
2884
 with "never the possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and 
against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting and communicating, all rediscovering and 
appropriating anew, are performed"
2885
 in such a way as to conceal the underlying concern. In 
attempting to make everything other than its temporal existence an issue, Dasein has therefore 
misunderstood or displaced its primordial concern: the temporality of its existence. Dasein's 
primary concern lies "between birth and death"
2886
, and that "Being towards death in which either 
one flees it or anticipates it form a unity… As care, Dasein is the between"2887. Despite the 
totality of Dasein’s involvements, being-in-the-world therefore remains an open question, and 
the way it can be thrown (back) into question – become an issue – is by caring about its 
intermediate status. Heidegger's questioning thereby proposes to exhibit the ground on which 
Dasein stands and falls by referring us to something that may occur within the referential totality: 
the experience of anxiety, which is experienced as a nothingness. “As one of Dasein’s 
possibilities of Being, anxiety – together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it – provides the 




According to Heidegger, anxiety provides a way in which Dasein can be more authentically 
disclosed. Anxiety makes it possible to uncover Dasein's true mode of being-in-the world – by 
revealing that it's 'being' cannot remain 'there' indefinitely. Despite the fact that Dasein has made 
it's ‘home’ within the "world of its concern"
2889
, anxiety discloses the possibility of its own 
insignificance. "Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as 
that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-
hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world is, as such, of no consequence: it 
collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance”
2890
. Instead 
of understanding the privation of meaning (the significance of insignificance), Dasein will 
typically attempt to compensate by falling back further into what has been publicly understood 
as a meaningful world. In denying itself an understanding of the possibility to which it is 
ultimately projected, Dasein is caught in a fundamental misunderstanding – caught between life 
and death, it moves towards the former by moving away from the latter. A more authentic 
existence, however, can become possible: by being resolute and following the call of 
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conscience. "Resoluteness makes up the mode of authentic care"
2891
 by resolving an anxious 
situation and returning Dasein to itself.  Whilst being "closed off and covered up"
2892
 remains a 
part of being-in-the-world, the recovery (or uncovering) of the meaning of Being opens up a 
"clearing."
2893
  Specifically, conscience makes a demand upon Dasein by calling out to it and 
summoning itself (back) towards its Being towards death. By being resolute (or resolved to the 
situation), conscience “gives us something to understand, it discloses”
2894
 whatever can be 
understood as an appeal or summons. Conscience "manifests itself as the call of care: the caller 
is Dasein, which in its throwness (in its Being-already-in) is anxious about its potentiality-for-
Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein...and it is summoned out 
of this falling by the appeal".
2895
 Anxiety may disclose the possibility of a meaningless world but 
conscience may release Dasein from the possibility of being "in untruth"
2896
 (or concealment). 
Heidegger's concept of truth as unconcealment and untruth as concealment clearly 
presupposes the circle of understanding directing the movements of his own questioning. 
Consequently, there is either the way of uncovering (or recovering) the question of the meaning 
of being-in-the-world, or the way of covering over (or retreating) from such questioning. 
According to Heidegger, there "is truth only insofar as Dasein is"
2897 and being "in the truth"2898 
or "in untruth"
2899
 remains "relative to Dasein's Being".
2900 The question, then, becomes: what 
makes truth as unconcealment possible? Such an answer can only be meaningfully determined, 
of course, by way of the question of Being, and Dasein can only approach this question through 
an understanding of the ontological difference making questioning possible and/or necessary. 
"It is not we who presuppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that makes it all possible ontologically for us 





What Makes Truth Possible? Language as the House of Being. 
 
We have thus far being elucidating Heidegger's interpretation of the question of Being, and its 
relationship to the circle of understanding. Following Heidegger's lead, we have been 
emphasising the way human beings are placed within the question, and directed our questioning 
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towards Heidegger's way-making movements. Given Heidegger's circular approach, we have 
privileged the question of being-in-the-world, or the way the world is already understood as 
meaningful and can become questionable in turn. The question of the meaning of Being takes 
place as an existential analytic and so occurs as an inquiry into the intelligibility 
(meaningfulness) of beings. Heidegger distinguishes between Being and beings in order to 
question the way our being-in-the-world becomes meaningful and/or questionable. Heidegger 
argues that the meaningfulness of beings originates in the ontological difference enabling his  
questioning as such. Although Heidegger covers a lot of ground, there were intersecting 
themes. These themes moved towards the way a meaningful world opens up and/or encloses 
itself within a given understanding. We thereby encountered concepts such as concealment, 
disclosure, care and authenticity (amongst others). Heidegger's overall goal was to clear the 
way – by creating an opening for a more authentic understanding. The question of language 
figured centrally in Heidegger's original interpretation, and he argued that language derives from 
the circle of understanding. The latter Heidegger, however, approaches this question in a 
different way – by 'tuning' the question around and arguing that the circle of understanding 
derives from language's own directives or movements. The relationship between Dasein and 
Being is reversed and Heidegger's subsequent place within the question assigns priority to 
Being. Instead of directing his movements towards the meaning of Being, Heidegger now moves 
towards the truth (or historical emergence) of Being. As we have already seen, however, 
Heidegger anticipates this reversal from the outset: the possibility of truth is what first makes 
possible anything like presupposing and/or concealment within presuppositions. Nonetheless, 
it is the presupposition of truth – presupposing the beings in question and determining what 
such presuppositions can either reveal or conceal about the history of Being – that becomes 
the question. The question of Being now concerns the hidden essence of truth
2902
, and the 
question is trying to find our way towards an essentially concealed clearing. That is to say, 
towards the meaningful possibility of unconcealment (opening) within language. Heidegger 
thereby attempts to clear the way for – or seeks the clearing – in which the essence (being) of 
truth can emerge at a given time. According to the latter Heidegger, "Language is the house of 
Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it".
2903
 
The relation between truth and concealment, however, continues to be questionable: in what 
way may language's concealed essence be revealed and/or guarded?  
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Equally revealing is that Heidegger recalls a historical presupposition to bring forth the question 
of the truth of Being: concealed truth as kerygma. Specifically, it is possible to observe a through 
line between the 'early' and the 'latter' Heidegger by way of the "traditional concept of 
hermeneutics".
2904
 Heidegger initially traced the history of ‘hermeneutics’ back to the 
philosophical discourse of antiquity and Plato's attempt to determine the best way to approach 
the question of truth  (where poets were understood as mere interpreters of the god's words 
whilst philosophy sought knowledge of the relationship between words and worlds). As early as 
1923, Heidegger notes that ‘hermeneutics’ initially referred to the process of making present or 
intelligible what was previously absent or unintelligible – namely, a cryptic message sent from 
one kind of being (the gods) to another (human beings). Hermeneutics refers to "the 
announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to"
2905
 other 
beings within language. The problem, of course, is that the being of language can either cover 
or uncover the truth in question, and it is difficult to know whether an interpretation of divine 
messages hides or reveals the being to be understood. Thirty-six years later, Heidegger goes 
on to ask the question of Being via the (kerygmatic) experience of the poet – a kerygma which 
may be ‘received’ via an understanding of the being of language. He calls on the traditional 
concept of hermeneutics via a reference to poetry, and re-calls that “Hermes is the divine 
messenger. He brings the message of destiny".
2906
 Further, "the relation of message and 
message-bearer (still) prevails".
2907
 The "message-bearer must come from the message. But 
he must also have gone toward it".
2908
  Heidegger’s attempt to uncover the concealed truth of 
Being is therefore an attempt to go back towards the idea that "hermeneutics means not just 
the interpretation, but even before it, the bearing of message and tidings".
2909
  Consequently, 
"Heidegger's thought develops less in starts and stops and dramatic turnings, and more as a 
gradual recognition of the implications of pursuing an ontology of unconcealment".
2910
 Such a 
historical pursuit becomes a critical area of concern insofar as it calls our being back into 
question. The "heart of history, for Heidegger, is not a sequence of occurrences but the 
happening of be-ing – the eruption of significance at 'inceptions' or critical junctures. Such a 
juncture decides the course of an epoch… (and)…brings us into our own by making all being, 
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including our being, into an urgent issue. In emergency, being emerges"
2911
. We shall now briefly 
turn towards Heidegger's attempt to rethink his overall approach.  
 
We need to understand in advance, however, that Heidegger moves away from systematic – 
analytical or conceptual – thought, and encounters a "distressing difficulty"
2912
 in finding a place 





 insofar as the truth of Being lies "concealed"
2915
 in its 
historical origin and/or destination. The question is to what extent – or in what way – can the 
truth of Being be understood within a thrown projection. Specifically, if disclosedness as 
unconcealment is taken as a condition of possibility for the occurrence of truth, what can the 
projection of meaning refer to (uncover) other than its own in/capacity for disclosure (possibility 
for meaning)? The difficulty before us, then, is twofold. On the one hand, Heidegger struggles 
to make sense of his own question because he alleges that the truth of Being will always be 
concealed or obscured when trying to find our way towards the being of language. On the other 
hand, it has been alleged that Heidegger's willingness to retreat into linguistic obscurantism 
merely reveals that such questioning was nonsense to begin with and invariably leads thought 
astray.
2916
 Either way, any attempt at understanding Heidegger's approach runs the risk of 
concealing the true difficulty: being caught between conflicting interpretations or movements.2917 
Witness the way Sheehan attempts to make sense of Heidegger's overall approach – by 
oscillating between these two extremes. Sheehan readily acknowledges the "considerable 
confusion at the heart of the Heideggerian enterprise, and it may not be the fault of Heidegger 
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scholars. Heidegger himself said that “it remains unclear what we are supposed to think under 
the name ‘being.’”
2918
 Sheehan goes on to clarify Heidegger's meaning by attempting to make 
the question of Being "answerable"
2919
 for itself by way of coherence and consistency. Whilst 





 results in a questionable 'corrective' (or 
countermovement towards intelligibility and understatement). Sheehan is especially concerned 
by Heidegger's tendency to hypostatize and personalize Being and argues that "the obscurity 
and incomprehension that still haunts his philosophy"
2922
 invariably "turns…into a parody of 
itself"
2923
. Sheehan laments Heidegger's free fall2924 into a world of his own making, and despairs 
that the house of being would ideally bear the sign 'abandon all hope ye who enter here'.
2925
 
Sheehan encourages even the most sympathetic of interpreters to follow Virgil's advice to a 
distressed Dante when guiding him through the circles of hell in The Divine Comedy: by not 




Heidegger's own 'distress', of course, is no coincidence – it recalls the distinctive way in which 
Dasein is disclosed through anxiety when Dasein loses its bearings. Heidegger's subsequent 
questioning attempts to direct meaningful thought back to the "non-conceptual reticence of the 
essence"
2927
 of Being "which opens itself only to the full historical carrying out of inceptual 
thinking".
2928
 The authenticity of cultural experience becomes integral insofar as it is the 
historical relationship to language that determines whether a given culture can "begin to 
think"
2929
 the question of Being. The history of forgetfulness is said to have begun "with the 
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 Heidegger, Martin, "Only A God Can Save Us" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), p.113. In this posthumously 
published interview, Heidegger distinguishes cultural experience according to its alleged proximity 
to the question of Being. Specifically, he insists that German thought is closer to ancient Greek 
thought, and the issue of this proximity is grounded within the relation a given culture has to its own 
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appropriation of Greek words by Roman-Latin thought"
2930
, where a "different way of 
thinking"
2931
 the question of Being is "concealed"
2932
 through the spread of another culture's 
language. Witness the way Heidegger, for example, projects an ontological status onto the 
Greek word 'polis'. Although 'polis' has been traditionally translated as 'state' or 'city', such 
translations merely conceal its true meaning – "the polis is the site of history"
2933
. The polis is 
where "history happens"
2934
 and the history of being is essentially "political"
2935
 : the "spiritual 
fate of the West"
2936
 turns on the question. Dasein's  "inescapable…destiny"
2937
 is said to take 
place "by way of the grounding of the essence of truth"
2938
 and finding its way towards a clearing 
opened up by Being. Human beings must nonetheless approach the emergence of Being by 
way of "withdrawal"
2939
– i.e., where the truth of Being moves away from the understanding it 
makes possible and/or necessary (directs, calls out to, clears a way for, etc).  
 
Heidegger originally presupposed that the "history of the signification"
2940
 of concepts – together 
with an interrogation of their "significations"
2941
 – paved the way towards a more authentic 
understanding of the ontological difference. He thereby claimed that "the ultimate business of 
philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses 
itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off"
2942
 into an undifferentiated 
meaning of Being. Heidegger subsequently came to the understanding that he had approached 
language the wrong way, and that the difference between Being and beings is best understood 
via the question of their belonging together there. Specifically, where "the together is now 
determined by the belonging"
2943
 and they "are appropriated to each other".
2944
 The difficulty, 
then, is finding our place within the language making questioning possible (appropriate) in the 
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first place. Inquiry requires "the prior grant of what it is they approach and pursue with their 
queries. Every posing of every question takes place within the very grant of what is put in 
question".
2945
 Heidegger's 'turn' is intended to move towards a concealed clearing within 
language – by moving "beyond beings, not away from them but before them…In the midst of 
beings as a whole an open place occurs…Thought of in reference to beings, this clearing is 
more in being than are beings. This open center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather, 
the clearing center itself encircles all that is, as does the nothing, which we scarcely 
know... Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is cleared 
in this clearing".
2946
 If Heidegger does not appear to be making much sense here that's 
(presumably) because the "essential nature of language flatly refuses to express itself in words 
– in the language, that is, in which we make statements about language. If language everywhere 
withholds its nature in this sense, then such withholding is in the very nature of language".
2947
 
We "do not merely speak the language – we speak by way of it"2948 and can only do so because 
we have always heard language speaking to us.  Consequently, the way (back) to language 
requires us to listen more closely to what language has been trying to say to us: to let it be and 
answer its call. Instead of attempting to preserve the force of the words in which Dasein 
expresses it's being, Dasein must let the being of language speak for (express) itself. The 
question is determining our place and submitting to its expressive (or elemental) force. The way 
to language is to undergo it. Dasein must open itself to "the possibility of undergoing an 
experience with language. To undergo an experience with something — be it a thing, a person, 
or a god — means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and 
transforms us... the experience is not of our making; to undergo here means that we endure it, 
suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it…To undergo an experience with language, 
then, means to let ourselves be concerned by the claim of language by entering into it and 
submitting to it".
2949
 The way to language therefore also involves foregoing any attempt to seize 
control of it via assertions and statements. Instead of "explaining language in terms of one thing 
or another, and thus running away from it, the way to language intends to let language be 
experienced as language. In the nature of language, to be sure, language itself is conceptually 
grasped – but grasped in the grasp of something other than itself. If we attend to language 
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exclusively as language, however, then language requires us to put forward everything that 




The difficulty, though, is: how can we put forward everything that belongs to language as 
language when Dasein is merely – and will remain – a "sign" which "points towards what draws 
away".2951 Being is understood to be in (a) withdrawal and concealment and so "remains without 
interpretation"
2952
: Being refuses to come into being (thought) as it gives beings their being. 
Being is not only able to conceal itself with respect to the thought (revelation) of beings, it has 
also managed to conceal its own concealment: it remains withdrawn by being unthought 
(concealed) in thinking. In thinking the question of being, however, Heidegger is forced to ask: 
what is called thinking and/or calls thought forth (into being)? Thought remains directed and “on 
the way”
2953
 insofar as it has been called into thinking via Being’s own directive (calling) and 
thus "directs us into thought and gives us directives for thinking".
2954
 In an attempt to answer 
the question that calls thought into being, Heidegger moves thinking back towards the language 
that withdraws as it speaks.   
 
If we are to find our way back to the question of Being, we must therefore first move towards 
the Being of language. The move backwards can only occur as a movement forwards – on the 
way to that Being which enables the thinking of an original (or truthful) question. As a 
consequence, we shall find ourselves entangled within a "web of relations"
2955
 and encountering 
the problematic of a circular movement along the way: the attempt to put forward what belongs 
to language as language necessarily occurs by the way we can move back towards language. 
This circle “is meaningful because the direction and manner of the circular motion is determined 
by language itself, by a movement within language". 
2956
 The being of language is always 
moving ahead of the language of being/s insofar as those beings moving within it can only move 
backwards or forwards at any given time. According to Heidegger, human beings cannot enter 
into a meaningful dialogue with language because it is language itself which really speaks and 
its discourse remains a "monologue".
2957
 It is "language alone which speaks authentically" 
2958
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and we can only talk about (understand) language "to the extent to which language has itself 
has us in view, has appropriated itself to us".
2959
 Heidegger’s aim is to therefore raise the 
possibility of having a more authentic experience of language in order to make our 'belonging 
together' (appropriation to each other) less "lonesome".
2960
  Heidegger divides the 
transformative experience of language into a complex whole comprised of two parts, and 
attempts to determine their relationship to each other by examining the way in which each 
belongs together. Specifically,  
 




Since it is language which expresses the difference between Being and beings, beings endowed 
with speech are obliged to adopt a "different standard" 
2962
 when speaking about language. The 
ontological difference may be expressed via the assertion: "Language speaks".
2963
 Put in a more 
roundabout way, "language always speaks according to the mode in which the Appropriation 
as such reveals itself or withdraws"
2964
 and "spoken language is the delivering bond that binds 
by appropriating" 
2965
 Being and beings together. That is to say, "the essential being of language 
is saying as showing".
2966
  Heidegger's assertion about language speaking clearly raises two 
related questions: what does the 'saying of language' show us and how does the 'showing of 
language' say it? Perhaps the best way to make sense of Heidegger's statements here is via 
the interpretation that language is constitutive of our understanding of a meaningful world: the 
being of language is where (and how) a world comes into being and/or question. Specifically, 
the relation between word and world is grounded in the ontological difference and determines 
the way the world remains open to the possibility of an understanding. Language calls out to 
human beings by showing them "the way (of) appropriating"
2967
 and it appropriates beings by 
calling them "into the word". 
2968
  Only "where the word for the thing has been found is the thing 
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a thing. Only thus is it…The word alone gives being to a thing…to bring a thing into being".2969 
Language therefore presents a wor(l)d which would not have otherwise been called into being 
and/or question. By calling beings into (its) presence, the being of language makes itself 
conspicuous by its absence by withdrawing there. Language nonetheless offers a "vow"
2970
 to 





 of continuing to be part of a greater whole. But how does  "no 
thing"
2973
 – the nothing – show us that it is speaking in "every thing"?
2974
 Heidegger says that 
saying shows the way by causing "to appear what is present, and to fade from appearance what 
is absent"
2975
 and so "everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself".
2976
 Appropriation is 
therefore “the law”
2977
, and those on the way (back) to language are obliged to follow its 
"command"
2978
 into the concealed clearing.  Such a possibility may occur "because it gathers 
mortals into the appropriateness of their nature and there holds them"
2979
 until an "illuminating 
lightening flash enters into what is and what is taken to be".
2980
 Consequently, true history 
"begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and 
conserved in it, only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding 
beings as such. The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings 
as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a ‘time’, 




Heidegger provides a word to illuminate our understanding of authentic being-in-the-world. The 
question of the direction of fit between word and world is given a single name – that of "the 
fourfold"
2982
.  The meaningful presence and gathering of 'things' is expressed via a complex 
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whole that conveys the way Being and beings 'belong together' and are 'appropriated towards 
each other' in the wor(l)d. Specifically, where 'every thing' moves towards (or around) the 'no 
thing'. The fourfold, then, is an indirect reference to Being's unnameable and immeasurable 
movements in language – it refers to the way the nothing opens up an open region for every 
named being and measurement. Heidegger speaks in such a roundabout way to capture the 
movements of the hermeneutical circle throughout history, and calls the part/whole relation the 
"round dance of appropriating".
2983
 The "fourfold fulfils the bearing of the thing"
2984
 by granting 
to everything the "sufficiency of staying world"
2985
. And it does this by way of language's 
"calling"
2986
 everything into being there, since the whole world is "united primarily by being 
toward one another".
2987
 This ‘being toward’ is what happens between the being of language 
and the language of beings. It involves a "gathering, assembling, letting stay"
2988
 of the 
difference between Being and beings and "measures out, apportions" 
2989
 the nature of the 
difference between them. The world that which is measured out and apportioned is given four 
corresponding measures or portions (names): sky, earth, divinities and mortals. Whilst these 
words are allowed their ordinary or everyday meaning, they point to something quite 
extraordinary: the possibility of an everyday (or meaningful) world. These four parts "belong 
together by way" of appropriation 
2990
 and each part "mirrors in its own way the presence of the 
others. Each therewith reflects itself in its own way into its own". 
2991
 The "mirroring lightening 





In order to find the way back towards language, thinking must allow itself to be properly 
addressed by the call of language and be called back into it. Being called back involves 
answering the call of language, and so, following the calling of an original address – namely, by 
allowing our thinking to submit to what remains most “worthy of thought”
2993
 in order to be 
transformed and directed by it. Heidegger claims that what remains worthy of thought is poetry, 
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if only because it remains devotional to the way-making movement of language. Poetry permits 
the possibility of transforming our relation to language by showing us the way/s in which thought 
is related to the circle's movements and directives. The attempt to experience language as 
language is possible via a consideration of the way in which poetry ‘listens’ to language ‘speak’, 
and so, receives its address as a call to thinking. Heidegger calls upon poetry not just because 
he thinks it provides privileged access to language – rather; language is thought to be the 
original (and long forgotten) poem.
2994
 Everyday speaking is said to have lost its poetic 
dimension and poetry offers the possibility of a return to the being of language. This obviously 
requires the question: how does poetry return thinking to such an understanding? By lighting up 
the clearing in such a way as to “throw us around”
2995
 the round dance of appropriation. Being-
thrown-around the fourfold occurs so suddenly or violently it can throw into question the 
experience of language, thereby transforming a given relationship to it. The whole is revealed 
through its part/s and the parts are revealed with respect to a complex whole. One of the poems 




                         WORDS 
                 Wonder or dream from distant land 
                  I carried to my country’s strand 
 
                  And waited till the twilit norn 
                 Had found her name within her bourn- 
 
                 Then I could grasp it close and strong 
                 It blooms and shines now the front along… 
 
                  Once I returned from happy sail, 
                  I had a prize so rich and frail, 
 
                 She sought for long and tidings told: 
                “No like of this these depths enfold.” 
 
                 And straight it vanished from my hand, 
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Harper & Row, 1971), p.208. 
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 Heidegger, Martin, "The Nature Of Language", in On The Way to Language, trans: Hertz, Peter, 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982), p.57. 
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 Heidegger, Martin  "Words", in On The Way To Language, trans: Hertz, Peter, (San Francisco: 
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                 The treasure never graced my land… 
 
                 So renounced and sadly see: 
                 Where word breaks off no thing may be. 
 
As the name of the poem indicates, language is thought via the relationship it bears to itself2997. 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the poem emphasises the ‘significance’ of the last stanza, where 
a renunciation invokes an experience pointing towards the nature and limit of a ‘word’. The 
poem's saying shows us what cannot be pointed to (or shown) through language: the nothing. 
'Word's' renunciation, however, is not asserting the existence of some 'thing' in language – 
namely, that 'nothing' exists as such. Heidegger points to where 'no thing may be' as an instance 
of saying as showing – namely, the renunciation shows the boundary or limit between naming 
and what is (or can be) named. Naming "demarcates" and "circumscribes"
2998
 the content of (a) 
being by calling it into being, whilst the renunciation "gets the relation to the word underway 
toward that which concerns every saying as saying".
2999
 It points to a nearness that is furthest, 
and is enigmatic in the way in which it can bring near what remains furthest. It thereby shows 
the way - making movement of saying in that the being of words typically bestow being (or 
presence) but remain absent via the bestowal. In other words, it points to the otherness of Being 
– as being something other than words. The poet understands language because he cannot 
understand it, and so renounces his claim to identify the being of language with the being of his 
own understanding. The word marks the boundary between Being and beings, and points to 
the intersection between them. Saying and Being belong to each other, and the movement 
towards each other points to the way in which each point to and/or move away from each other. 
Consequently, Being can only refer to (name) the possibility of truth within a concealed clearing. 
The question of Being itself becomes questionable there: thought must invariably renounce its 
own claim to questioning and cross (back) over into thinking. In letting thought be spoken to so 
as "not to ask (further) questions"
3000
 of the being of language, the language of being/s finally 
understands that Being has no answer which can be understood in advance. Thinking merely 
prepares beings for the "readiness"
3001
 of Being, readying them for the arrival of an 
understanding. Indeed, thought true to its own calling is obliged to cross out Being as a word, 
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where the crossing out "points into the four areas of the fourfold and of their gathering at the 






Aims and Objectives: The main aim of this section is to critically discuss Heidegger's 
conception of the circularity of questioning, and its relation to the circle of understanding. 
Following Heidegger's lead, we shall prioritise the question of being and its relationship to the 
being of the question. Part of our aim to appropriate Heidegger so as to move beyond him, and 
we attempt to do this by questioning the appropriateness of Heidegger's own movements. We 
shall pursue this aim by returning to themes and questions outlined in our Introduction regarding 
the problem of the criterion and/or an inquiry's circular ontological commitments. The main 
objective is to determine our place within the circle making questioning both possible and 
necessary. In order to move back and forth as such, we therefore need to question the way we 
move about within a given understanding. Following Heidegger, such an approach becomes an 
inquiry into the conditions of the circle's own possibility and/or necessity. By throwing back into 
question the possibility and/or necessity of our movements, we shall bring forth the question of 
the status of Heidegger's own inquiry. Although Heidegger does not purport to offer a critique 
of reason or society, his conception of the history of being nonetheless places objects of inquiry 
within question. Consequently, the requirement is to determine the question of Being's historical 
status, and assess it's role within the circle of understanding. Specifically, what is the question 
of Being's ontological commitments, and how do such commitments determine our place within 
questioning? We shall argue that Heidegger's fundamental ontology provides an answer that 
needs to be thrown back into question. In arguing that the Being of Dasein is care, Heidegger 
inadvertently raises concerns about the being of his own questioning. We therefore move 
against Heidegger in order to find our way around his leading question.
3003
 We follow 
Heidegger's lead through three related parts, and urge that the corresponding movements form 
a complex whole. In the first part, we question Heidegger's attempt to account for the 
relationship between meaning and truth, and observe the tension within his own questioning. In 
the second part, we question the role the They plays in Heidegger's interpretation of the 
intelligibility of cultural experience, and do so via a consideration of attempts to make it more 
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 Heidegger, M, The Question of Being, p.83, trans: Wilde, J and Kluback, W, Albany: New College 
University Press, 1958. We have slightly modified the translation here – Wilde and Kluback prefer 
the term quadrangle to fourfold, and we have introduced the change to ensure greater parity 
between other translations of Heidegger’s concept. 
 
3003
 We mean 'leading' in two related ways – as Heidegger's guiding question, and as a question 
which indirectly and/or subtly guides human beings to respond in a particular way.  
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meaningful and/or truthful. In the final part, we turn towards the fourfold, and argue that it's 
'turning' remains a historical warning. 
 
 
Turning Towards (appropriating) Heidegger. 
 
We begin by reiterating the difficulty in interpreting Heidegger, and acknowledge that Heidegger 
thought it was 'suicidal' to locate (his) 'philosophy' within the bounds of human understanding 
anyway. The difficulty in moving towards Heidegger is evident in two main ways – Heidegger 
approaches the circle of understanding from different directions and his movements have led to 
many conflicting interpretations over time. We shall briefly take each difficulty in turn.  
 
As we've already seen, Heidegger approaches the question of Being from two directions – by 
way of the question of the meaning of Being and by way of the question of the truth of Being. 
Nonetheless, Heidegger's questioning continues to move within the circle directing his 
movements as such. Heidegger's way-making movements continually turned on the possibility 
of appropriation insofar as he attempted to appropriate (move towards, understand) the 
question of Being or urged that moving within an understanding of being was only possible 
because Being and beings were appropriated (moved towards, were directed to) each other. 
The question of appropriation therefore turns on – and returns to – an appropriation of the 
question in that it calls understanding (back) into question. Either way, the possibility of 
responding to such a call was said to enable a back and forth movement within the circle of 
understanding: re-calling the question of Being involved calling out to beings from different 
directions – via the meaning of being and the truth of being respectively. Answering such a 
calling allegedly involves being called back into the possibility of an authentic understanding, 
and whatever can/not be understood begs the question: what calls forth thinking (makes 
understanding possible, authenticated, directs thought into appropriate action, etc)?  In turning 
to this question, we shall attempt to find our way around the circle of understanding, and 
appropriate Heidegger’s question accordingly. Following Heidegger, such an approach should 
be understood as a preparatory for further understanding, guiding us (back) through that 
questioning already prepared or travelled upon. Whilst Heidegger’s thinking can hardly be said 
to be stationery, the way around this circle may nonetheless be understood via recurrent themes 
and movements. Specifically, Heidegger finds his way around the question of Being by dividing 
his questioning into distinct yet related parts. The question remained structured around the 
problem of the relation between meaning and truth, and his questioning exhibited a 
corresponding part/whole problematic. Indeed, it was Heidegger’s thinking of this relationship 
that divided his own questioning into distinct movements, thereby throwing into question the 
 416 
nature of the relation between part and whole. It is for this reason, of course, that there is a 
tendency within the literature to divide Heidegger’s thinking into separate parts – namely, the 
‘early’ versus the ‘latter’ Heidegger, a division apparently signified by his own use of the term 
‘turn’ (Kehre). The implication is that we can either turn this way or that way, but we cannot re-
turn to Heidegger either way. As Heidegger himself observes, however, the notion of a turn is 
integral to the way in which the question of Being remains structured around the problem of the 
relation between meaning and truth, where questioning calls beings (back) towards a part/whole 
problematic. Understanding has its “innermost occurrence and its widest reach in the turning”
3004
 
around the question. Being called upon re-turns us to Being’s own movement, requiring thinking 
beings to fall back upon their “guiding questions and the circle of under-standing…Turning holds 
sway between the call (to the one belonging) and the belonging (of the one who is called). 
Turning is counter-turning.
3005
 Furthermore, the division into early or latter questioning tends to 
divide Heidegger’s thinking into temporal parts not encouraged by Heidegger’s own emphasis 
upon temporality as being the horizon of Being. If we recall, Heidegger’s approach actually 
begins with a ‘turn’, where questioning turns back upon itself in order to question the pathway/s 
of thinking and/or its place within the question of Being. As Scharff observes, "clarification of 
the being-question is made dependent upon turning the seemingly closed and unreflective 
circularity of everyday understanding into a radically deepened sense of hermeneutical 
circularity… In its beginningless (i.e., circularly situated) beginning (i.e., point of departure), 
philosophy turns towards a hermeneutic of Dasein."
3006
 Understanding Heidegger’s relationship 
to the question, then, similarly involves a relatedness backwards and forwards, where his own 
questioning can guide us by re-turning us to the overall problematic of understanding. Indeed, 
only the way back can lead us forward into understanding.  
 
The difficulty in understanding Heidegger is apparent in a related way. Although Heidegger's 
questioning received its directives from the circle of understanding, the question remains: where 
was it directed? Specifically, what was it's 'object' (the goal to be reached and/or thought to be 
reachable in some way)? Whilst the difference between Being and beings might have been "the 
central thought of Heideggerian philosophy",
3007
 determining it's "intentional horizon"
3008
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remains an area of concern. The object of Heidegger's thought is a concern insofar as it raises 
the problem of intentional relations and/or objects within questioning. That is to say, Heidegger's 
central thought needs to be understood (approached) as being directed at, or about, the 'object' 
in question and so related to (moving within) a given intentional horizon.
3009
  Witness the 
widespread difficulty in trying to determine the direction of Heidegger's way-making movements. 







 a hermeneutic thinker,
3013
 a linguistic idealist
3014
 and a 
mystic.
3015
 It has also been suggested that interpretations can be generally divided into two 
competing tendencies – as either "bald aestheticism"
3016
 or "hermeneutic narrativism".
3017
 The 
difficulty in securing the intentional horizon of Heidegger's thinking has therefore not prevented 
other thinkers from moving towards it. An understanding (appropriation) of Heidegger can be 







 and Derrida's deconstructionism.
3021
  Part 
of the difficulty in interpreting Heidegger is that he appears to oscillate between conflicting 
movements towards 'beings', or attempts to approach the question of Being from two different 
directions simultaneously. On the one hand, Heidegger insists on the "phenomenological 
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(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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 Derrida, Jacques, "Implications" in Positions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 
Derrida readily acknowledges that "what I have attempted to do would not have been possible 




 or as "that which shows itself"
3023
 in the world of experience. 
Such a conception directs itself "to the things themselves"
3024
 and is "opposed to all free floating 
constructions and accidental findings".
3025
 The concept of phenomenon therefore needs to be 
"understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself",
3026
 and asks how "time itself 
manifests itself as the horizon of Being?"
3027
 Heidegger initially purports to understand 
'phenomenon' without presuppositions – and thereby attempts to question the conditions of 
possibility for objects of experience via the distinction between Being and beings. Specifically, 
where 'beings' involves a self showing or letting things be by way of (the question of) Being. The 
Being of entities occurs prior to the beings in question and must be distinguished from any given 
interpretation (experience) of them. Heidegger's presuppositionless approach questions 
'beings' in their "ontological constitution"
3028
, or the way beings are constituted throughout time. 
Heidegger's phenomenological conception of phenomenon is transcendental insofar as it 
pursues  ontology within the horizon of temporal unity and/or continuity, and so places itself at 
the limit of understanding.  On the other hand, Heidegger insists that being-in-the-world is a 
thrown "projection"
3029
 and that human beings always experience the world "as something 
interpreted".
3030
 Consequently, whatever is understood there is "disclosed as possible 
significance"
3031
 and so "throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it be as 
such".
3032
 Heidegger's recourse to the "perfect tense a priori"3033 of an already always 
meaningful world attempts to bridge the divide between the transcendent – that which occurs 
prior to or independent of experience  – and the immanent (that which operates within 
experience or comes through it). According to Heidegger, an always already world is possible 
(meaningful) because it "characterises the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself".
3034
 The 
world, however, is only possible because of the ontological difference and Being cannot be 
identified with beings or being-in-the-world as such. Specifically, Being is "no class or genus of 
entities, yet it pertains to every entity. It's 'universality' is to be sought higher up…Being lie 
beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the 
                                                
3022
 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, trans: Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward, (Oxford: 








 ibid. p.54. 
3027
 ibid, p.488. 
3028
 ibid, p.79. 
3029
 ibid, p.185. 
3030
 ibid, p.192. 
3031
 ibid, p.184. 
3032
 ibid, p.185. 
3033




transcendens pure and simple".
3035
 As their condition of possibility, "Being can never be 
explained by entities but is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity".
3036
 Given this 
approach, an "'aporia"
3037
 remains within Heidegger's "transcendental hermeneutics"
3038
 – 
namely, via Heidegger's insistence on the "primacy of practice"
3039
 when raising the question of 
Being and attempting to "acquire a priori knowledge of being"
3040
 by determining our place within 
the question. The impasse – or contradictory approach – results from Heidegger's attempt to 
move beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess through 
characterisations (interpretations) of the entities themselves. In other words, is it possible to 
pursue a transcendental ontology through historical vagaries and/or contingencies? Put another 
way: how can we bypass our knowledge of the world of experience when it necessarily occurs 
within the context of interpretations that remain historically determined and/or arbitrary? 
Perhaps the question is not so much methodological but adopting a questionable approach in 
the first place – i.e., one determined by obliqueness or misdirection. Indeed, it is arguable 
whether Heidegger was ever really interested in being a traditional (rational) philosopher from 
the outset, and concealed his true objectives within the question of Being. Specifically, 
Heidegger's philosophical questioning has its origins in "theological-speculative thinking"
3041
 
and he subsequently conceded that "without this theological background I would never have 
come upon the path of thinking".
3042
 Further, "a confrontation with Christianity reticently 
accompanied my entire path"
3043
 insofar as "the most inwards experiences and decisions remain 
foundational"
3044
 and would ideally "remain outside the domain of publicness".
3045
 Despite 
Heidegger's attempt to cover his tracks, "subterranean quakes have been at work in the 
pathway of my inquiry"
3046
, and his way-making movements have all circled "around the sole 
question: whether god is fleeing from us or not, and whether we…still experience this flight 
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  Theological speculation was also his introduction to hermeneutic inquiry in this 
this background brought forth the question of the relation between (the) word and world. 
Nonetheless, Heidegger was acutely aware that exploring philosophical questions within 
theological terms – or put another way, approaching theology thorough philosophy – was an 
"absolute square circle".
3048
  And yet there is no getting around the problem that Heidegger's 
transcendental hermeneutics pulls him in two different directions simultaneously – towards the 
absolute (limitless, unconditioned) and the contingent (limited, conditioned). Heidegger appears 
to have set out to secularise theological terms such as calling3049 and falling3050 and ended up 




The immediate question before us, however, is the role the quasi-transcendental plays within 
the circle (or historicity) of understanding. We shall briefly approach this question through 
conflicting interpretations in order to direct our own understanding. According to Adorno, 
Heidegger's Heidegger’s "transcendence is an absolutized immanence, obdurate against its 
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biblical thought to give a name to something or someone was to bestow an identity" by being called 
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 Further, historicized beings are called on to "conceive Being as 
the absolute"
3053
 because they "cannot conceive it"
3054
 as an entity. Heidegger thereby follows 
Plato's lead by attempting to "heal the concept of 'Being' of the wound of its conceptuality, of 
the split between thoughts and their contents".
3055
 Adorno accuses Heidegger of enabling a 
vicious circle – or "looping the loop"
3056
 – because of his attempt to "conceive Being without 
entity".
3057
 The conceptual "sleight of hand"
3058
 is said to occur via Heidegger's "ontologization 
of the ontical"
3059
, or throwing the Being of entities into question by creating a historical divide 
between Being and beings. Heidegger's goal is to allegedly bring forth a "cult of Being"
3060
 by 
questioning the authenticity of cultural experience – and so retreat into the "old Platonic 
austerity"
3061
 of the "one pure thought"
3062
 in order to recapture (the concept) of Being's 
"evaporating aura"
3063
 within history. Although Adorno's interpretation of Heidegger is clearly 
unsympathetic, it does highlight the way Heidegger attempts to "historicize the Platonic dividing 
line"
3064
 by reversing its direction and enabling the possibility of back and forth movement 
between levels of understanding. Heidegger might attempt to cross 'Being' out  – i.e., interpret 
the concept as being inexpressible or wordless – but the question of Being is directed towards 
the possibility of a crossing (movement) between the inconceivable and the conceptual. Like 
Plato before him, Heidegger argues that human beings move about within an understanding of 
being, and distinguishes between the intelligible and the phenomenal in order to question the 
nature of the relationship between them. Unlike Plato, however, Heidegger does not attempt to 
transcend – move beyond, climb above – time to determine the Being of beings. The temporal 
world is the 'absolute' (horizon). Being is transcendental in that it is thought to be immanent 
and/or imminent –  it determines beings by moving within time. The question, however, is 
whether it is even intelligible to conceive an ontology that points beyond (or exists prior to)  
phenomenal and/or factual existence – i.e., is it possible to introduce a dividing line between 
Being and beings in history? This is, of course, where Heidegger perfect tense a priori is 
supposed to play a constitutive role in understanding. Lafont provides a much more sympathetic 
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interpretation than Adorno, and acknowledges that the ontologization of the ontical clarifies 
Heidegger's transcendental approach. 
 
According to Lafont, Heidegger substitutes the "ontological difference for the 
empirical/transcendental dichotomy"
3065
 in order to distinguish between the "ontological 
structures of Dasein in general and its historical, ontic concretizations".3066 The question, 
however, is whether it is possible (meaningful) to distinguish between the structure and event/s 
of Being when the distinction between the ontological and the ontical emerges (is disclosed) 
within the historicity of understanding – i.e., remains contingent upon our understanding of 
being/s in time? Approached from another direction: in what way is Heidegger's transcendence 
an absolutized immanence, and does it undermine (move against) the question of its own 
conditions of possibility? This is, of course, where Heidegger's "a priori perfect ('the always 
already')"
3067
 plays a "quasi transcendental"
3068
 role and so paves the way for the question of 
being in the world. Specifically, within 
 
the framework of transcendental philosophy it would be impossible (meaningless) to contend that 
something empirical (factical) is also at the same time transcendental. But this is precisely the quasi-
transcendental status that Heidegger ascribes to world- disclosedness, to the particular world-disclosure 
in which Dasein is thrown. He can do this in virtue of the possibility of affirming that a world-disclosure 
is something ontic (factually given, a cultural product) but at the same time always already ontological 
(i.e., symbolical). On the other hand, precisely this possibility points to the implausibility of Heidegger's 
attempt to ascribe a transcendental status, in the strong normative sense of the term, to those cultural 
products simply by virtue of their symbolic nature.3069 
 
Lafont's interpretation attempts to make sense of Heidegger's approach by equating the 
ontological with the symbolical, and she wants to argue that the "understanding of a referential 
totality, like every understanding, must be clarified on the basis of the structure of the sign".
3070
 
Heidegger's questioning should therefore be understood as quasi transcendental: the question 
of Being is transcendental insofar as it is raised within the context of the given language making 
beings possible and/or questionable  – i.e. it emerges within the language that gives us 
(discloses) a world as already meaningful (useful). Consequently, Heidegger's approach to the 
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world of experience must be similarly taken as a given: as if it meaningfully referred to a world 
over and above the immediately given and/or culturally received. Heidegger's transcendental 
approach may thereby be thought of as qualified (limited or restricted) to the 'things' that appear 
within a "equipmental totality"
3071
 since the structure of the sign indicates the way language is 
used to refer to beings in the world. By ontologically "committing himself to the generalized 
primacy of equipment"
3072
, Heidegger is said to ontologize the ontical through his "conception 
of language as a tool"
3073
. Heidegger's "analysis of signs focuses on and explains a particular 
kind of reference, namely signifying"
3074
 and that "the world as a whole of significance is 
therefore of symbolic nature".
3075
 Lafont goes so far as to claim that Heidegger's conception of 
the ontological difference commits him to the understanding that meaning determines reference 
– i.e. the way entities are understood determines which entities can be meaningfully referred to 
in a given language.
3076
 The intelligibility of the world, then, is said to be linguistically determined 
through signs, and the world of significance is only possible (meaningful, truthful) because it 
"can arise only on the level of culture, which is characterised by symbolic structures".
3077
 
Although this is a noteworthy attempt to clarify Heidegger's transcendental approach to the 
question of Being
3078
, it unfortunately approaches Heidegger's phenomenological conception of 
phenomenon from the wrong direction.  As we've already seen, Heidegger insists on 
approaching the question of the meaning of Being by way of that 'which shows itself in itself', 
and he originally attempts to move past the "philosophy of language"
3079
 – with its analysis on 
the process of signifying by signs or any other symbolic means – in order to "inquire into the 
things themselves".
3080
 The ontological constitution of being cannot be identified with the way 
beings are linguistically constituted and/or signified as such. A sign's constitutive role "consists 
in showing or indicating"
3081
 our way around the circle of understanding, and so should not be 
understood as directing the circle's movements. It's true, of course, that Heidegger assigns 
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signs a "special status"
3082
 within the circle – they are said to provide an "ontological clue"
3083
 
for "characterising any entity whatsoever"
3084
. In other words, signs point to or indicate 
something other than themselves – namely, a conception of phenomenon which shows the 
question of the meaning of Being in itself. Heidegger distinguishes between signs and 
significance and his analysis of signs as "items of equipment"3085 is distinct from the way he is 
"led to the concepts of saying and speaking, to which we had purposely given no attention up 
that point".
3086
 It is the circle of understanding that points the way to language insofar as 
discourse is the "articulation of intelligibility"
3087
 and the "totality of significations"
3088
 gets 
"expressed in language". 
3089
 The being of language was originally said to be dependent upon 
our being in the world and that to meaningfully speak about our involvement with it is "derived 
from interpretation"
3090
 that is "grounded in understanding".
3091
 The phenomenon of language, 
then, is not only approached in a different way to signs, Heidegger asserts that language comes 
after what is already prior to it (understanding) and that the occurrence of understanding 
(interpretation) has its origins in being able to meaningfully speak about the world of significance 
thrown before it. Discourse "underlies both interpretation and assertion"
3092
 and the "existential-
ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk".
3093
  Language is not so much an item 
of equipment but the way in which Dasein becomes equipped to deal with (express) its 
concerns. Let's briefly contrast "an example of a sign"
3094
 Heidegger brings into the foreground 
of understanding  – a sign indicating a car turning. An indicator signals the "direction of the 
vehicle will take"
3095
 and is "constituted by reference or assignment"
3096
. An understanding of 
the sign's significance – of what is meaningfully involved here – can only be meaningfully 
understood, of course, within the totality of involvements that already refers or directs our 
understanding in some way. Such a signal is "an item of equipment which explicitly raises a 
totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the 
ready-to-hand announces itself"
3097
 and so "achieves…an orientation within our 
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 It would be meaningless to indicate a turn unless there already exists a context 
of intelligibility (significance), and such "giving way, as taking direction"
3099
 receives its directives 
from elsewhere: within a totality of involvements that is already on the way or directed in turn. 
The way we understand a referential totality is derived from significance and not the other way 
around. Within "significance…there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for 
Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as 
significations; upon these, in turn, is founded the Being of words and of language".
3100
 Whilst an 
interpretation might find its way into language, it must already be "disclosed in our 
understanding of the world"
3101
 and so the "totality of significations of intelligibility is put into 
words. To significations, words accrue".
3102
 In other words, meaning does not so much 
determine reference but it is the way in which the meaningful refers (back) to that totality that 
determines a self referential whole.  
 
This returns us, then, to the circle of understanding, or the way a meaningful whole raises the 
question of "the structure of self referentiality".
3103
  Following Heidegger, we must determine the 
way a self-referential whole throws its own directives and movements (back) into question. 
Specifically, any move towards (quasi) transcendental questioning necessarily moves within the 
complex whole directing (structuring) its movements as such, and so becomes an inquiry into 
the conditions of its own possibility (existence, occurrence). As Bubner observes, the 
"transcendental presupposition"
3104
 is directed by the question of its own being and so attempts 
to uncover "the conditions for the possibility…of understanding
3105
 by determining the  limits of 
its own "ontological commitment".
3106
 Specifically, knowledge that may be referred to as (quasi) 
"transcendental takes as its subject, together with the general conditions of knowledge, the 
conditions of its own genesis and functioning".
3107
 The question, however, is whether a self-
referential structure can determine the rational status of it own objects and events: is it even 
meaningful (intelligible, possible) for reason to question itself in this way? Bubner recognises 
the problem of transcendence as absolutized immanence, and locates this problematic within 
the tension between the structure and the event of understanding – i.e., within the possibility of 
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affirming understanding as something ontical (historically determined, a cultural artefact) whilst 
committing to the position that it is also ontological (self referential and/or determining).  The 
problem of grounding transcendental questioning invariably raises the question of whether 
'knowledge' merely refers to the limits of our own understanding. Heidegger's concept of the 
hermeneutical circle was introduced, of course, to circumvent the problem of begging such a 
question. Heidegger's questioning purported to get around the problem of "circular 
reasoning"
3108
 by directing our understanding towards that "unitary phenomenon"
3109
 calling 
itself back into question. Given the fact that we already always move within an understanding 
of being, Heidegger's questioning prioritizes the "remarkable relatedness backward or 
forward"
3110
 within the circle of understanding. Questioning relations of presupposition remains 




 was that "entity – the 
inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of 
Being…and one of the possibilities of its Being".
3113
 Heidegger thereby argues that we cannot 
make complete sense of – or completely refer to – the events of our own understanding. The 
circle of understanding turns against itself by calling its own movements and directives (back) 
into question. The divide between the structure and event of understanding raises the question 
of Being insofar as meaningful interpretations struggle with making sense of their own genesis 
and functioning. 
 
The Structure of the Hermeneutical Circle: As we've seen, Heidegger's original questioning 
emerged out of the everyday understanding in which we already move and find ourselves 
directed. In interrogating our being-there, Heidegger attempted to lay bare the grounds for the 
understanding that made such movement possible, and questioned the structure of meaning in 
accordance with the circle's directives. The circle of understanding was said to arise out of and 
fall back on the ground in which it already moved – and so it remain directed by the relations 
that Dasein found itself encircled by and/or entangled within. Consequently, Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the hermeneutical circle purports to uncover the ground on which the distinction 
between the structure and event of understanding can/not be found(ed). If interpretation brings 
forth the possibility of a meaningful world by way of the language of beings, however, it is difficult 
to understand what other kind of meaning (being) can be brought forth or held back t/here. That 
is to say, what can/not be understood other than a given understanding, and un/covered 
accordingly?  
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Note that Heidegger claims to be able to bring forth the distinction between Being and beings 
through that understanding passed down and levelled off into an undifferentiated mode of being. 
Whilst the structure of meaning is built up and held in being within language, it may nonetheless 
also be broken down and thrown into question within a given understanding. According to 
Heidegger, the circle of understanding can meaningfully bring forth the question of its own 
genesis and functioning, and the question is determining the direction of fit between its 
meaningful structure and event(s). We immediately encounter a problem regarding the 
intelligibility of Heidegger's questioning in that it invariably return us – or turns on – the question 
of the relation between part and whole. The problem is understanding how language can come 
to ‘possess’ (convey, withhold) content distinct from its referent – whether it can intelligibly be 
(say) anything other that what it is already of or about (beings). Correspondingly, the question 
is if language does possess content distinct from its referent – here, understood as a totality of 
significant beings – what can/not Being mean other than what it is already and always about 
(refers to)? If meaning ‘attaches’ itself to language, how does something prior to and 
independent of it (content) come after and depend upon it (attach itself to referents which 
meaningfully structure and lie over the content as such)? Given that ‘the They’ is integral to 
Heidegger’s account of the structure of understanding, it is significant to note that it is generally 




 Significantly, both interpretations 
independently call for the need to “reconstruct”
3116
 Heidegger’s account of authenticity in order 
to render the relation/s more appropriate (meaningful, true). Perhaps what is most interesting 
about the proposed reconstructions is that they inadvertently return us to the question of the 
intelligibility of the dividing line between the One and the many. To take each in turn. 
 
The One and The Many : Dreyfus and Phillpse.  
 
Dreyfus begins to clarify Heidegger’s early position by way of the latter Wittgenstein. According 
to Dreyfus, Wittgenstein’s notion of rule following helps lay the ground that human beings ‘fall’ 
(back) upon. Dreyfus proposes to clarify Heidegger’s position by first questioning the translation 
of das Man – instead of what has being traditionally understood as ‘the They’, Dreyfus interprets 
it as ‘the One’. He hopes to be able to clarify the question of Being here by bringing the Being 
of the ‘there’ (back) into the question. Specifically, the question of being is explicated via the 
attempt to ask: who goes there? According to Dreyfus, it is many beings (Dasein) acting as 
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One, where the who of the there is encountered by being-there (in language).  Dreyfus attempt 
to make sense of Heidegger's conception of 'The They' occurs by way of language as a form of 
life, and so insists on the ontological primacy of social practice in the formation of a meaningful 
world. Consequently, Dreyfus argues that "One is what one takes over"
3117
 and becomes and 
interprets the circle of understanding in the following way: there would be no norms without self 
interpreting beings, and no self interpreting beings without norms.
3118
 In other words, meaningful 
understanding is only possible because of the way it is determined through language: via criteria 
customarily ruling over action. Such clarification throws into question the problem underlying 
Heidegger’s entire questioning – namely, how the intelligibility of beings can get obscured within 
the circle of understanding. Given that Heidegger ontologizes the ontical via the "constituting 
activity"
3119
 of Dasein, Dreyfus is understandingly confused by the way language as world 
disclosure can also somehow meaningfully conceal the "phenomenal structure of the world".3120 
Significantly, Dreyfus finds himself asking a question that he does not understand – namely, 
“why say that in everyday life intelligibility gets obscured, rather than in public practice 
everything gets what intelligibility it has?”
3121
 In some way, the answer should already be 
intelligible to him: to avoid identifying the question of the meaning of Being with the everyday 
intelligibility of beings. It is worth noting in advance that Dreyfus has since questioned his original 
interpretation of Heidegger here. Whilst Dreyfus has continued to ask "could anything be more 
intelligible than everyday intelligibility?"
3122
, he has been forced to concede that he originally 
misunderstood Heidegger and that there exists a "more primordial understanding"
3123
 that 
cannot be interpreted away. Nonetheless, Dreyfus's "serious mistake"
3124
 remains illuminating 
in that it throws into question the intelligibility of his own approach. Let's begin, then, by citing 
the two Wittgenstein quotes that structure the event of his understanding.   
 
So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" -- It is what human 
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions 
but in form of life.3125  
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As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: 
it is an ungrounded way of acting.3126 
 
Dreyfus is able to interpret Heidegger through Wittgenstein because of Heidegger's claims that 
"the world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is being with others"
3127
 and the "common sense 
of the They knows only the satisfying of manipulative rules and public norms and the function 
to satisfy them".
3128
 Dreyfus's appropriation turns on the way a given understanding becomes 
"appropriate"
3129
 through social "norms and the averageness they sustain" 
3130
 in language. 
Consequently, self-interpreting beings can only understand the world as meaningful through 
“norming activity”,
3131
 and the ground such actions move upon are  "shared background 
practices"
3132
 that cannot be meaningfully questioned (brought forth) as such. Nonetheless, their 
mode of being may be understood as authentic by way of language’s own instrumental 
efficiency (language’s ability to get many beings to think as One through its tacit rulings). 
Norming activities involve the question of linguistic means to linguistic ends: they presuppose 
the use of language as the means for appropriating and authenticating its own ends. The 
question of the intelligibility of beings, then, corresponds to the way Dasein should stand in 
relation to its own actions: rule following determines the way language conceives its objects and 
there is nothing to understand beyond socially prescribed objectives. 
 
Dreyfus thereby assigns himself the understanding that "the only deep interpretation is that 
there is no deep interpretation."
3133
 Such an interpretation, however, barely scratches the 
surface of Heidegger's conception of understanding and fails to clear up the question of the 
meaning of Being. Dreyfus's interpretation does not so much encircle itself but runs intelligibility 
(back) into the ground by concealing an allegedly deeper truth. As Heidegger clarifies 
elsewhere, Dasein falsely believes that it is "at home in the immediate circle of beings…At 
bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-ordinary".3134 According to Dreyfus, however, the 
question of the intelligibility of being/s comes down to the one and same thing: following one 
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another’s lead in order to accommodate one another. Dreyfus's emphasis upon rule following 
as meaning constituting returns us to the problem of the criterion. Specifically, what is the rule 
for following a rule? We invariably find ourselves faced with the possibility of the inherent 
meaninglessness (arbitrariness) of given rules and the practices they rule over (regulate, 
constitute, etc,). The problem is: to what extent should the One  accommodate itself to rulings 
that could have gone – and may still go – either way. That is to say, do rules meaningfully refer 
to anything other than their own following and/or directives? We invariably find ourselves moving 
within a circle again and are now forced to ask about their mode of being (source of normativity, 
authenticity, etc.). Such a concern directs us towards the question of which rules should be 
thought socially appropriate (meaningful, authentic) in the first place and determines how the 
corresponding practices might become questionable (meaningless, problematic) in turn. 
Significantly, it was Wittgenstein who was originally concerned about the paradox of rule 
following, or the possibility that any action could be made to follow from an arbitrarily given rule.  
 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with 
the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And there would be neither accord nor conflict 
here.3135 
 
Wittgenstein attempted to resolve the paradox by arguing that understanding a rule occurs 
without an interpretation – we simply follow them without question insofar as they follow on from 
practices already directing our actions. Nonetheless, Kripke famously drew a more sceptical 
conclusion from Wittgenstein's line of questioning and argued that the arbitrariness of rules 
leads to the paradox "that all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed 
unintelligible."
3136
The circle of understanding is interpreted as meaningless because the 
paradox remains "unanswerable".
3137
 The paradox of rule following is therefore said to throw 
into question the very intelligibility of the constitution of meaning: rules invariably rule 
themselves out by undermining the very ground on which we move. According to Kripke's 
interpretation of Wittgenstein, "there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. 
Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted 
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Philipse similarly questions the intelligibility of Heidegger's "concept of the They or the One"
3139
. 
Specifically, "why does Heidegger argue that we are not (really being) ourselves if we behave 
according to common rules and roles?"
3140
 Philipse attempts to make Heidegger's reasoning 
more authentic (in accord with itself) by questioning the role the many – being-with-others – 
allegedly plays in the determination of our being-in-the-world. Philipse agrees with Dreyfus that 
Heidegger's approach to "traditional rules of conduct and standardised social roles"
3141
 is 
incoherent. The question is: in what way? According to Philipse, Heidegger attempts to have it 
both ways and that following Wittgenstein is completely inappropriate 
3142
 if one's form of life is 
"the result…of fallenness or falling".
3143
 Although Heidegger's interpretation of the authenticity 
of our being might insist on the ontological primacy of the meaning "constituting function of 
shared practices"
3144
, Heidegger is said to deliberately "blur"
3145
 the important distinction 
between rule following (principles regulating social action) and unquestionably following one 
another's lead (conforming with conventional thought or behaviour). Such a levelling off within 
our understanding is thought to be part of Heidegger's covert theological "strategy"
3146
 – to 
implicitly "wager"
3147
 that the question of the authenticity of our being-there really lies elsewhere 
(in a transcendent realm – by being one with God).) It "is only when we realise that our real true 
self is not of this world"
3148
 that we can authentically be in it. We therefore need to pave the way 
for a more appropriate being "which is not of this world".3149 The only way we can "make 
sense"
3150
 of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, then, is by accepting the possibility that 
Heidegger was the one really being inauthentic here. Consequently, Philipse turns Dreyfus's 
conception of relation between the one and the many around, and notes that the many – the 
One Being who we all are – may be better understood (or translated) as "the multitude" 
3151
 that 
has somehow "taken away and usurped"
3152
 one's true being. The question, then, is the way 
Heidegger introduces a dividing line – via the ontological difference – in the circle of 
understanding: how can there be a meaningful divide within the circle directing its own way-
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making movements? Philipse moves towards Heidegger's concept of being-towards-death in 
that it turns on the questions: how can our understanding of being-in-the-world authenticate 
itself via the privation of meaning and in what way may everyday intelligibility be meaningfully 
understood as inauthentic (thrown into question) there? Not insignificantly, the traditional 
problem of one over many is reintroduced via a reversal in direction here. Specifically, if the 
question of the meaning of Being is distinct (divisible, separate) from beings in some way, how 
can Being participate (determine, be in) many other beings and remain a meaningful unity over 
and above what has fallen away and covered over Being as such? Philipse's argues that the 
answer is buried so deep within Being and Time that we need to turn towards Heidegger's 
concept of "authentic being towards death"
3153
 to unearth it. 
 
Philipse asks if "death is Dasein's ownmost possibility", how does my own death "enter into my 
Dasein as a possibility of my being"?
3154
 As we've already seen, Dasein is said to be caught 
between life and death, and it attempts to conceal it's indeterminate (or finite) status by 
retreating into The They. By being with others, we invariably lose our way of being in the world. 
According to Heidegger, however, it is our being towards death (finitude) that makes our being 
in the world possible in the first place. Specifically, "with death, Dasein stands before itself in its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being"
3155
 and bringing ourselves to face the finitude of human 
existence ensures the possibility of a more authentic life. Given our potentially for Being, Dasein 
"cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
Dasein"
3156
, and when anxious "Dasein finds itself face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible 
impossibility of its existence".
3157
 Philipse claims that Heidegger is talking in a circle here, and 
asks how the inevitability of our non-being can "enter into my Dasein as a possibility for my 
being?"
3158
 To some extent, the answer should already be intelligible : death can make our being 
possible (more meaningful) insofar as Dasein remains "the possibility of Being-free for its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being".
3159
 As Heidegger maintains, "higher than actuality stands 
possibility".
3160
 Dasein should therefore actively move "against falling back behind itself"
3161
 
(existing social reality) and reclaim its ownmost possibility by becoming answerable 
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(responsible) for its being in the world. Dasein can only reach its highest state (or possibility for 
being) by accepting its being–towards-death and facing up to its existential guilt (fallen state, 
inauthenticity). Daisen is "essentially guilty"
3162
  in that its Being is always in question and it must 
be able to answer for itself in some way. The truth of our temporal existence "must be 
understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with it as 
possibility, in the way we comport ourselves to it".
3163
 Philipse questions Heidegger's ontological 
commitment to being-towards-death in different ways, but perhaps the most integral is the way 
"roles and rules are conceptually connected with substitutability".3164 That is to say, where it is 
possible for the many to exist without one person, but one cannot exist  – be substituted for – 
the many (meaningful practice built up and held in being through roles and rules). The possibility 
of being substituted for another means that it is possible for a person to be (act, serve) in the 
place of others.  Being with others, however is not similar possible in death: human beings 
cannot be (act, serve) in the place of others there. According to Philipse's interpretation of 
Heidegger, we can only really "become ourselves whenever the possibility of substitution breaks 
down"
3165
 and this possibility can only occur via (the fear of) certain death. As Heidegger directs 
us, "death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and 
which is not to be outstripped"3166.  
 
Philipse claims that Heidegger "confuses our attitude toward our own death for death itself"
3167
, 
and urges that his "secular analysis of the phenomenon of human existence"
3168
  is 
"misleading"
3169
 or the result of a conceptual sleight of hand.
3170
 On the one hand, Heidegger 
attempts to convince human beings that their form of life is "inauthentic, and that authenticity 
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consists in anticipating death with dread" and "facing up to existential guilt".
3171
 On the other 
hand, despite claiming that death "means a total annihilation"
3172
 of our being, Heidegger 
attempts to pave the way for the afterlife as "my most distinctive possibility"
3173
 in that our being-
towards death may reveal our true (mode of) being in the world. Whilst Philipse's interpretation 
is superficially plausible, it interprets away Heidegger's corresponding emphasis upon 
answering the call of conscience when trying to live an authentic life. Such a part/whole relation 
cannot be talked around since it presupposes the very being in question – namely, how can 
human beings answer the call of conscience and/or become authentic in this world? 
 
To some extent, these questions are only intelligible within prescribed rules and roles. According 
to Heidegger, the call of Dasein summons to itself its own possibility for being: it becomes a 
calling back into our selves in order to be called forth again. The call back "points forward"
3174
 
and "if we take the call this way and orient ourselves by it, we must first ask what it gives us to 
understand".
3175
 It is important to stress, however, that being called back involves a reversal – 
it involves "summoning one's ownmost Self"
3176
 from "the tasks, rules and standards"
3177
 of 
everyday intelligibility and so comes from "beyond"
3178
 the one lost in the many. Further, 
Heidegger insists that the call is wordless and is summoned "into the reticence of itself"
3179
 The 
"call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into any words; yet it remains 
nothing less than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the 
mode of keeping silent".
3180
 In other words, the call of conscience can only be answered without 
words and gives one something to answer for – our being "guilty!"3181 for having fallen into the 
world. Conscience is said to "manifest itself as an attestation"
3182
 and invariably makes Dasein 
answerable for its fallen state. Specifically, if being in the world involves one falling into the 
many, the "they are guilty in the very basis of their Being, and this being-guilty is what provides, 
above all, the ontological condition for Dasein's ability"
3183
 to question itself and/or answer the 
call of conscience. Consequently, our "Being-guilty cannot be defined by morality, since morality 
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already presupposes it for itself".
3184
 That is to say, our conception of 'good' and 'evil' is only 
intelligible because of "Dasein's falling Being"
3185
 in the first place.  And "only because Dasein 
is guilty in the basis of its Being and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling, 
is conscience possible, if indeed the call gives us this Being-guilty as something which at bottom 
we are to understand."
3186
 Nonetheless, the question becomes: how can we understand the call 
of conscience without calling on (bringing forth, moving back towards) the rules and roles thrown 
into question? 
 
Witness the way Heidegger calls upon language to recollect the question of Being. Heidegger 
claimed, of course, that the task of thinking was to "preserve the force of the most elemental 
words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling 
off"
3187
 into meaninglessness. Heidegger's use of the word force is particularly meaningful here 
– it draws attention to the power of language (or the way language can act upon other human 
beings). Although Heidegger questions the authenticity of cultural practice, he nonetheless 
invokes the authority of "the law"
3188
 when bringing forth the directive of appropriation – and 
goes so far as to urge that language users are forced to follow language's "command"
3189
 back 
to itself. Heidegger directly calls upon words that presuppose rules of conduct within society – 
i.e., where the rule of law similarly directs and/or constrains the many to act as one. 
Appropriation is said to have the force of law behind it and so may regarded as legally binding 
and/or naturally determined in some way. Specifically, the concept of a ‘law’ is always already 
meaningfully posited as a given  (embedded as an everyday fact or social principle, operating 
within and governing nature, etc.). Phenomenologically speaking, a law describes the way/s in 
which beings relate to the natural or social world: as something laid down, followed and 
enforced. Its corollary is that of ‘order’, be it ‘natural’ or ‘social’. Laws exhibit the ‘presupposition 
of the world’ in so far as they ‘bring forth’ the understanding that there is a world ordered and 
authenticated as such. In short: laws appropriate (assign, secure, determine) behaviour in 
accordance with what is understood to be appropriate (just, correct, regular). The concept of 
‘authority’ appears to be integral here, especially the way/s in which it relates to its "cognates 
‘author’, ‘authentic’, ‘authority, and ‘authorize."
3190
 Setting aside the question of what 
authenticates a law – i.e., how 'authority' comes into and/or is held in being – laws purport to be 
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about (describe, explain) the well being of given roles and relationships. Not insignificantly, 
Heidegger also appropriated the elemental word law in a particularly questionable social 
context. Within the dual role of professor of philosophy and rector of Freiburg University, 
Heidegger called on other Germans to "fulfil its historical mission"
3191
 by following the law of 
history brought forth (enacted, enforced) through Hitler. According to Heidegger, the "Führer 
himself and alone is today and in the future German reality and its law"
3192
 since  Hitler had 
managed to awaken the will in an "entire people and has welded it into a single resolve".
3193
 
Many years later, Heidegger continued to privilege German linguistic norms or practices 
because of their alleged proximity to the question of Being. Heidegger insisted that modern 
German thought was closer to ancient Greek thought, and the issue of this proximity 
(authenticity) was grounded within the relation a given culture has to its own language. 
Commenting on "the inner relationship of the German language with the language of the Greeks 
and with their thought"
3194
 Heidegger claims that we can only  "begin to think"
3195
 if we can speak 
German – i.e. follow prescribed linguistic rules connected to external social roles and/or 
relations. Whilst it is possible to question whether Heidegger's invocations of the law and/or the 
authenticity of German culture involves a thoroughgoing “fascism”
3196
 , there can be little doubt 
that the "authoritarian sense or nonsense of Heideggerian philosophy lies in its jargon and its 
linguistic gestures".
3197
  Terms like calling and falling are equally significant in that they refer 
(back) to the history of their own significations by way of their relationship to religious practice. 
The power of words was, of course, famously invoked in another way – Heidegger attempts to 
clear the way towards the question of being via "innovative but often obscure language."
3198
 
Indeed, Philipse ventures that "the appearance of novelty and profoundness was produced by 
a spectacular apparatus of verbal fireworks and hocus pocus, which dazzles the reader and 
tends to paralyse the capacity for lucid thought".
3199
 Sorren cautions that Heidegger's "evocative 
                                                
3191
 Heidegger, Martin, "The Self Assertion of the German University" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The 
Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p.38. 
3192
 Heidegger, Martin, "German Students" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger Controversy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p.47. 
3193
 Heidegger, Martin, "German Men and Women!" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger 
Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 49. Heidegger also claims that "our people is 
submitting to that essential law of human existence to which every people must first give allegiance 
if it is still to be a people", p. 48. 
3194
 Heidegger, Martin, "Only A God Can Save Us" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger 




 Edwards, James, The Authority of Language : Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Threat of 
Philosophical Nihilism, (Tampa: University South Florida Press, 1990), p.133. 
3197
 Sollner, Alfons, "Left Students of the Conservative Revolution" Telos Vol 61, 1984, p.59. 
3198
 Watts, Michael, The Philosophy of Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2014), p. viii. 
3199





 leads to a fatalistic and/or submissive attitude – the "gesture of founding 
meaning"
3201
 doesn't so much ask us to beg the original question but to prostrate ourselves 
before the question of Being. Glover concurs that Heidegger's questioning invariably forces 
human beings to their knees: his use of language is more about being deferential and directing 
thinking into an "impenetrable fog, in which ideas not clearly understood have to be taken on 
trust"
3202
. Such an "incommunicative mode of thought is linked to being dictatorial"
3203
 since the 
question of Being cannot be meaningfully questioned (rationally assessed via accepted norms) 
as such. We need to proceed carefully here. Heidegger approached language from different 
directions and the question of its 'forcefulness' needs to be distinguished. Heidegger originally 
claimed that we needed to move past the incapacitating effects of everyday language in order 
to find our way back to the question of the meaning of Being: the call of conscience's silent 
discourse with itself was thereby prioritised. Heidegger subsequently urged, however, that the 
requirement was to let language truthfully speak for itself: to listen to its silent calling and allow 
ourselves to be overcome. Whichever way he approached the question, however, language 
remained forceful in that particular words would ideally command our attention or action. 







 – in order to direct his way-making movements.
3207
 Calling on 
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the etymological connection between thinking and thanking, Heidegger thinks we should all be 
mindful of "the soundness of language"
3208
 (its well being) and gratefully follow its lead (back) 
towards the truth of Being. Throughout his thinking, then, Heidegger took it upon himself to call 
out to other human beings in order to perform the task of thinking, and one of the ways he did 
this was by invoking terms with cultural import and/or historical significance. He thereby 
performed the task of thinking by asking others to similarly answer the calling of Being, and he 
summoned them through that language already acting upon them in a forceful way. Heidegger's 
recall allegedly occurred as a "mutual calling of origin and future"
3209
, and human beings were 




The Problem of Criterionless: Heidegger's attempt to square the circle of understanding. 
 
The question, however, is: how can anyone answer a mutual calling (follow the call back to 
Being in order to be called forth towards beings)? Specifically, by what criteria can we all move 
back and forth as such? If we recall, Heidegger originally raised the problem of the criterion in 
order to underline the question of the circular relation between the content and referent of his 
own question. He did this in order to pave the way throughout his questioning. The problem of 
uncovering what was in question was divided into distinct yet related parts – by way of the 
question of the meaning of Being and/or via the question of the truth of Being respectively. 
Either way, the question of the relation between meaning and truth was an attempt to get around 
the problem of circular questioning. Heidegger’s aim was to avoid an arbitrary beginning/ending 
to his overall approach, and he attempted to do this by following the lead of the circle of 
understanding human beings already moved within. He thereby emphasised the existential 
structure of the question of Being and the corresponding priority or occurrence of such 
questioning. The question of being-in-the-world allegedly paved the way towards a more 
authentic understanding in so far as it was possible to approach the question of Being from two 
different directions (via the route of meaning and truth respectively). Given this overall directive 
– or back and forth movement – Heidegger was able to circumvent the problem of circularity. 
He ‘began’ his questioning in the way that he ‘ended’ it: by turning it back upon those beings 
already placed within question. By being placed within the question – and correspondingly, 
trying to determine our place within it – Heidegger thereby prioritised the relation between the 
structure and/or events of his own questioning. The difficulty with Heidegger’s characterization 
of a ‘mutual calling’ (the call back to be called forth), however, is that it directs beings into the 
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very situation that Heidegger sought to circumvent: the problem of an arbitrary 
beginning/ending.  
 
From the perspective of the meaning of the question of Being, the notions of answering ‘the call’ 
and being ‘resolved’ remain indeterminate (or meaningless) within Heidegger’s account. Their 
content and/or status are left an open question, and remain open to questioning. As Polt 
observes, however, if "conscience speaks by remaining silent"
3211
, it seems "to give us no 
standards whatsoever"
3212
 to question (rationally assess) the call back to move forwards. We 
can be resolved, but only "towards what I don't know".
3213
 The question of Being, therefore, 
requires us to ask:  by what criterion can we meaningfully understand the content and/or 
authenticity of a given calling? Further, does the question of Being authenticate the possibility 
for a conflict of interpretations regarding the meaning and/or authenticity of ‘the call?’ If not, how 
do human beings resolve a conflict of interpretations regarding the meaning and/or authenticity 
of competing callings? Is it possible that the ‘mutual calling’ of a given conscience may be 
mutually exclusive callings, and if so, is the question of their authenticity equally open to 
questioning and/or authentication? Indeed, how do human beings arbitrate – resolve, move 
between – what is possibly an equally arbitrary understanding of one another's calling? The 
problem of the criterion threatens to become "the problem of criterionlessness"
3214
 in that there 
does not appear to be a rational standard for questioning our respective places within the 
question of Being. To some extent, Heidegger’s notion of resolve is meant to resolve the 
problem of indeterminacy – by locating the call of Being within the movements of history. History 
becomes the way to determine the content and/or status of ‘the call’: the unfolding of events call 
out to human beings in some meaningful way and they must be similarly resolved to act 
(answer) accordingly. Such a resolution, however, merely displaces the problem of the criterion 
– or criterionless – onto turns of events beyond human understanding or control. As Edwards 
notes, human beings remain at "the mercy of history" (Being)
3215
 and the question is determining 
the authenticity of their calling and/or resolve within events subject to back and forth movements 
(questioning). Specifically, history’s way-making movements can either be understood 
(followed) in two competing ways: as being entirely arbitrary (wayward) or as irreducibly 
determined (inescapable). Either way, determining our place within the question of Being is 
displaced elsewhere: onto history as governing movement or principle.  
 
                                                
3211






 Wolin, Richard,  Politics Of Being, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.57. 
3215 Edwards, James, The Authority of Language : Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Threat of 
Philosophical Nihilism, (Tampa: University South Florida Press, 1990), p.130. 
 440 
From the perspective of the question of the truth (history) of Being, human beings find 
themselves displaced in a different way – they are now left at the mercy of the language calling 
out to them throughout history. Whatever our resolutions, only so called 'Being' can be truly 
resolute there (self directed and/or determined via way-making movements that cannot be 
completely understood or controlled as such). If the question of the truth of being necessarily 
occurs within a referentially opaque context determining the historical significance of events 
threatens to become entirely questionable (arbitrary, opportunistic, unresolvable, etc.). 
Specifically, if it is not possible to refer to the turn of events via two related terms – Beings and 
beings respectively – how do we determine the nature (truth value) of their belonging together 
and/or moving away from each other? Heidegger argues, of course, that it is language that 
speaks, and that we may find our way back to it "through thinking and poetising".
3216
  
Nonetheless, we are now required to ask: by what authority does Heidegger speak for language 
and where does he direct it (or us)? According to Heidegger, poetry is the way in which language 
truly and/or indirectly speaks to thought: it gathers entities and let's them show their true 
significance there. That is to say, (interpretations of) poetry reflects the mood (being) of the 
times, and so opens up a clearing in which to understand the history of Being. Such an 
approach, however, merely reintroduces the problem of the criterion. Specifically, by what 
criteria do we select poetry without presupposing the being in question, and how do we 
determine the status of any given (or potentially conflicting) interpretations? As Davis notes, 
Heidegger's selective thinking appears to be more "pretext than text"
3217
 in two related ways – 
Heidegger selects texts that confirm his preconceptions about the question of Being, and then 
goes on to provide interpretations in accordance with his own questioning.
3218
 This returns us 
to Heidegger’s relationship to Nazism. Our aim here is not to presuppose this relationship as 
given, but to bring about the question of relations of presupposition. Whilst the being of 
Heidegger's questioning and his (ontological) commitment to Nazism might merely be a 
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 event, the question remains: contingent upon what?
3220
 The only possible 




We shall approach this question in a roundabout way, and turn towards a sign that directs our 
own questioning. Specifically, we shall move about within an understanding of being signifying 
the totality of our involvement with the world. Following Heidegger's lead, we shall find ourselves 
moving (back) towards an understanding "already directed and on its way"
3222
, and allow a 
referential totality to "become accessible in such a way that our concernful dealings take on an 
orientation and hold it secure"
3223
. As Heidegger directs us, "a sign to mark something indicates 
what one is 'at' at any time. Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein one lives, where one's 
concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something".
3224
 On our way to determining 
the significance of the swastika, we must remain concerned about the role such a 
"primordial"
3225
 ‘sign’ occupies within historical thought. As we shall argue, the swastika paves 
the way back and forth in so far as it indicates the way the world 'turns' (moves, shows itself) 
and so signifies the question of our involvement with events taken as a complex whole. The 
swastika announces the worldhood of the world by directing us back towards a referential totality 
called (back) into question. Specifically, the swastika is significant for our purposes in that it is 
the "original wheel of time"
3226
 and simultaneously "depicts time forward and time backward".
3227
   
Either way, the "fourfold movement of the swastika suggests the circling of the square and the 
squaring of the circle"
3228
 and so is directed towards the question of its own possibility. This near 
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 has come to signify something particularly significant within the Western world 
and so has equipped it with a given understanding: the Final Solution. Posing as an answer to 
a question, the finality of such a 'resolution' is itself beyond understanding3230 and is now 
interpreted as  "a symptom or a warning signal"
3231
 within the West. Consequently, an inquiry 
into the (original) question’s “phenomenal core… extends in many directions, affecting among 
other things those hermeneutic principles on which the study of society and culture is 
founded”
3232
. What needs to be understood, however, is that the swastika had been 
“appropriated”
3233
 by the Nazis and historicized beings must attempt to understand “the 
consequences of misappropriation”.
3234
 Whilst the swastika is amongst the most conspicuous 
signs within recent history, an interpretation of it is conspicuous by its absence within 
Heidegger’s thinking.
3235
 Nonetheless, there are three things to note with respect to it. Firstly, 
the swastika was traditionally understood as being the most primary or originary sign known to 
beings.
3236
 Prior to its appropriation by the Nazis, its occurrence has been traced back to 
prehistory and its presence may be found within cultures all around the world. Prior to the Nazi 
appropriation, its "migration"
3237
 around the world was said to require a philosophical question 
regarding its origin, meaning and movements.
3238
 Secondly, there was an attempt to appropriate 
history in the form of the swastika, and such an attempt coincided with the question of proximity 
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to an original culture or language.
3239
 The re-turn towards this sign was seen as a retrieval of a 
primary relationship to history. Indeed, there continues to be a struggle over the question of its 
significance. People calling themselves the Friends of the Swastika have attempted to ‘turn’ 
back the hands of time by ‘turning’ the sign around in order to re-call its primary or originary 
meaning.
3240
 The act of turning back (or reappropriation), however, remains misguided insofar 
as they're are two signs of the swastika : one moving clockwise, the other counterclockwise. 
Either way, it's back and forth movements bring us to the question of the swastika's etymology 
and/or signification. According to interpretations that predate Heidegger’s thinking
3241
, its 
content coincides with the question of being-in-the-world. Whilst interpretations conflict as to 
what is exactly called for here, it is generally understood to ‘turn’ on this question, and itself 
signifies the problem of how to turn towards the question of being in time. Specifically, it is 
derived from the Sanskrit word svastika 
3242
 and signifies two possible modes of being. Primarily 
composed of ‘su’ (good) and asti (being), it can be either taken to mean ‘well being’ – it is, to be 
– or as a way of ‘being well‘– so be it. The content of the swastika therefore signifies the question 
of one’s involvement with the world in two possible modes: actively or passively. As either 
attempting to bring about well-being or as a way of resigning oneself to whatever has been 
brought about.
3243
 Either way, the swastika traditionally signifies auspiciousness and is an 
invocation to take care and/or to be cared for.
3244
 The referent of the sign points to a structure 
(or structuring) of events: it is typically understood to be referring to the chain of being in the 
form of “the revolution of the wheel of life”
3245
 and as signifying a fourfold in the “sense of the 
configuration of a movement split up into four points, related to the poles and four cardinal 
directions”
3246
. Generally speaking, the significance of this relationship is divided into distinct 
                                                
3239
 Schliemann, Heinrich, Troy and Its Remains: A Narrative of Researches and Discoveries Made 
on the Site of Ilium and in the Trojan Plain  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Perhaps 
the most famous example is Schliemann’s excavation of Troy. Specifically, the discovery of the 
ancient and/or ‘migratory’ swastika was appropriated as confirmation of Germany’s relationship to 
its own language and/or history. Indeed, the uncovering of swastikas on pottery at Troy and 
Germany was identified as a sign pointing to the origin and migration of Western civilization itself.  
We "must draw attention to the fact" that images of the swastika can be traced back to Troy and  
"the primitive Trojans, therefore, belonged to the Ayran race", p.157.  
3240
 ManWoman, Gentle Swastika: Reclaiming The Innocence, (London: Flyfoot Press, 2000).  
3241
 Wilson, Thomas The Swastika: The Earliest Known Symbol and Its Migrations, (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Report, 1894). 
3242
 Ibid, pgs. 768-769. If we recall, Heidegger cited Sanskrit (and Greek) as a way of determining 
the original meaning of ‘call’. According to his re-call, ‘call’ originally meant to get something on the 
way by providing a way in which to be situated and directed.  
3243
 Wilson, Thomas, The Swastika: The Earliest Known Symbol and Its Migrations, pgs.768–774, 
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Report, 1894).  
3244
 Ibid, p.800.  As Wilson notes, "it is construed to mean long life, a multitude of blessings, great 
happiness, etc.…In modern and well as ancient times, this sign stood for blessing, good wishes, and 
by slight extension, for good luck". 
3245
 Cooper, J.C An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Traditional Symbols, (London, Thames and London, 
1978), p.165. 
3246
 Circlot, Juan,  A Dictionary of Symbols, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), p.323. 
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way-making movements: as involving an attempt to circle the square, or square the circle.
3247
 
Our concern, however, is not the question of how the swastika should be understood, but note 
that it already (and has always been) related to the question of being and time. 
 
Adopting a Heigeggarian move, the relationship can be understood both etymologically and 
phenomenologically, and may be appropriated accordingly. The signification of the swastika 
can be regarded as indeterminate in that it has come to occupy an ‘in between’ status within 
history. On the one hand, it moves beings towards (and conveys the movement of) life. On the 
other hand, it moves us back to the occurrence of death. In many parts of the world, it continues 
to be a sign of ‘well being’. In other parts, it has come to be (mean) death personified. Caught 
between this part/whole problematic, the swastika may be understood as signifying the question 
of being and time itself. Consequently, we should endeavour to locate this question/movement 
on “the boundary or limit”
3248
 of understanding. Whilst such a delimitation need not pave the 
path towards the Final Solution, it may nonetheless clear a way backward and enable us to ask 
whether events “might have taken another turn”
3249
. One way to determine the movement of our 
own question is to highlight the way Heidegger responded to an attempt to clarify the nature 
and extent of his own ‘involvement’ with Nazism. Specifically, when the possibility of this 
question was raised during the course of a proposed interview, Heidegger found himself at a 
loss for words. Discussing it would cause him anxiety. Faced with the question, he urges that 
they “cross it out”
3250
 Despite his intentions, this response inadvertently returns us to the 
question of Being. Such a crossing places us at the intersection of our questioning. Perhaps 
most importantly, however, is the way this question intersects with the phenomenon of 
interpretation and the corresponding way–making movement of Being itself. Specifically, what 
is at issue here is the way we interpret Heidegger’s understanding of the question. Heidegger’s 
questionable relationship to Nazism can be summed up in the following way:  
 
                                                
3247 Cooper, J.C An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Traditional Symbols, (London: Thames and London, 
1978). Interestingly, Wilson favors a fourfold or quadrant view, although he acknowledges that the 
evidence gathered permit either interpretation. 
3248
 Quinn, Malcolm, The Swastika: Constructing A Symbol (London: Routledge, 2005), p.9. 
3249
 Diner, Dan, Beyond The Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism and the Holocaust, (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), p.2. It should be understood that we appropriate Diner 
in accordance with our own questioning, and it is quite conceivable that he might understand the 
purported approach to be entirely inappropriate. 
3250
 Neske, Gunther and Kettering, Emil (eds) Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions 
and Answers, (New York, Paragon House, 1990), p.100. If we wanted to take the parallel further, 
we may note that Heidegger is reputed to have had a nervous ‘breakdown’ over the question of his 
involvement, a situation hinted at by his own inability to refer to the anxiety it had caused him. 
Specifically, “It ..it is all so difficult for me…I have had quite a few experiences… I’ve alluded to some 
to you… We’ll cross it out”., ibid. 
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The works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism have nothing 
to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement.3251  
 
Note that Heidegger is accusing other avowed Nazis of misinterpreting what he understands to 
be the ‘inner truth and greatness of this movement’. Works that bear that name have apparently 
‘erred’ along the way: they are to be understood as inauthentic since they have been led astray. 
Given his own understanding, however, errancy is part of the way–making movement (inner 
truth and/or history) of Being.
3252
 Untruth does not so much presuppose a falsity (or falsification) 
of Being but reveals the way (the question of) Being may be hidden or concealed within 
questionable presuppositions.
3253
 Consequently, the question is not whether Heidegger really 
was (or remained) a Nazi. Rather, the question involves understanding the question itself – 
namely, where such questioning might lead. Or to appropriate the question in Heidegger’s own 




Attempting to understand the inconceivable has led to a crisis3255 concerning the historization 
of Nazism and its relationship to the swastika. The very presence of this sign has come to 
structure our understanding of history – and yet, intelligibility remains conspicuous by its 
absence. Nazism's historical significance appears to be concealed “by a language that seems 
unable to express”
3256
 it in thought, resulting in a “clearcut inability to offer (a) meaningful 
interpretation”.
3257
 Its very inappropriateness – the problem of formulating a criteria even 
remotely appropriate to it – therefore seems to “warrant the critical indictment failure of 
thought.”3258 Apart from the problem of being ‘beyond’ understanding, we nonetheless find 
                                                
3251 Heidegger, Martin, An Introduction To Metaphysics, trans: Manheim, Ralph, (London: Oxford 
University Press,1959), p.199. We italicize the pivotal terms in this infamous quote. 
3252
 Heidegger, Martin,  "On The Essence Of Truth", in Basic Writings, ed. Krell, David, (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), p.129-30. Specifically, any given criteria will be characterised by 
its own misunderstanding, especially if it leads itself – or is led into – untruth proper: the concealment 
of beings as whole. Heidegger urges, however, that errancy is part of the whole truth (or history of 
being), since any given interpretation of the relation between the revealing-concealing of Being 
belongs to the essence of truth itself: the revelation of Being as a whole. Indeed,“errancy is the open 
site for and ground of error. Error is not just an isolated mistake but rather the realm (the domain) of 
the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get interwoven”, p.133. 
3253
 Heidegger, Martin, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans: Emad, Parvis and Maly, 
Kenneth, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pgs.249-259. 
3254
 These are, of course, the words the open Heidegger's collected works and act as a sign post to 
his overall movements.  
3255
 Kren, George and Rappoport, Leon. The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behaviour,  (New 
York: Holmes and Meier, 1980). The authors go so far as to talk of an “open wound” that cannot be 
appropriated into “normative thought structures” by way of “Western history and culture”, p.12. 
3256
 ibid, p.18. 
3257
 Kren, George and Rappoportt, Leon, "Failures of Thought in Holocaust Interpretation" in 
Dobkowski, Michael and Wallimann, Isidor, (eds) Towards the Holocaust: The Social and Economic 
Collapse of the Weimar Republic, (London: Greenwood Press, 1983). p.377. 
3258
 Ibid, p. 378.  
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ourselves ‘before’ an event that calls out for an understanding. Part of the difficulty is attempting 
to specify the content of that which it points back to and calls forth – namely, the phenomenon 
of Nazism. The crisis concerns – amongst other things – understanding what National Socialism 
was of or about, who may  be thought answerable, and why it found expression within the Fuhrer 
principle and/or Final Solution.
3259
 Despite the problem of understanding, it is minimally 
understood that Germany somehow interpreted itself to be on a "special path"
3260
, and that 
National Socialism invoked the way forward via the experience of a "community of fate"
3261
 in a 
"turn towards authenticity".
3262
 The swastika was called upon in order to authenticate this re-
turn towards ‘fatality’. Whilst the swastika signifies the problem of understanding our relationship 
history, it also returns us the question of its own signification. Trying to determine the 
‘significance’ of the swastika – the meaning of its appropriation, and/or the appropriation of its 
meaning – is obviously a route fraught with difficulties. By finding our place within the question, 
we may nonetheless lay bare the grounds of our questioning and find our way around (situate 
our own relations of presupposition). The question of its ‘significance’ is therefore best 
understood as preparatory in that it may clear a way – by directing us into thought and giving 
us directions for further thinking. 
 
Throughout his thinking, Heidegger attempted to place thought at the intersection between 
Being and beings. Heidegger called this dividing line the ontological difference, and his 
questioning attempted to move towards the point where Being and beings were understood to 
divide and/or cross one another (out) in language. Specifically, Being and beings intersect by 
moving in opposite directions and/or cross in passing – at the "crossing place"
3263
 where they 
pass through or lie across each other. In this way, Being and beings were said to belong 
together and are appropriated (move) towards each other in a given understanding.  Heidegger 
thereby "historicises the Platonic dividing line" in order to cross it (out). Following Plato, the 
ontological difference is an attempt to relate levels of being to depths of understanding, and is 
                                                
3259
 See, for example, Broszart, Martin. "A Plea for the Historization of National Socialism" in 
Baldwin, Peter (ed), Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historian’s Debate (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1990). Broszart observes that the "question of the historicity of National Socialism, 
of whether historical understanding must halt helplessly in the face of the Nazi phenomenon, has 
become more and more important", p.82. The problem, however, is whether it is possible to 
formulate criteria adequate to the task of understanding something inconceivable. 
3260




 Ibid, 82. 
3263
 Heidegger, Martin, Holderlin's Hymn The Ister  trans. William McNeil and Julia Davis 
(Blomington: Indiania University Press, 1998), p128. 
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similarly divided into a "fourfold"
3264
 topology across Plato's dialogues
3265
.  Unlike Plato, 
however, Heidegger does not recollect the question of Being via a distinction between 
transcendent objects and phenomenal experience. Instead of the traditional problem of the One 
over many, Heidegger approaches Being and becoming from a different direction – from across 
a historical divide. Being placed at such an intersection was said to point thought towards a 
fourfold, directing our being-there in accordance with (the question of) Being's own way-making 
movements. The intentionality of thought – being directed upon a given content and/or object – 
is therefore about being given directions or directives within language and/or the historical 
practices in which a linguistically determined understanding moves. Witness the way Heidegger 
calls upon four particularly significant words to direct the question of our being-there. He 
answers a (higher) calling by way of what is already called into being (so called or named in the 
world). Specifically, Heidegger's conception of the fourfold leads thinking to the earth which 
grounds and/or moves it, to the sky which provides thought with its intentional horizon or 
movement, to those mortals capable of thinking the question of Being and devoting themselves 
to its movements, and to those gods which call thinking back into question. Language provides 
the compass by directing thought around a given understanding, and it encompasses 
understanding by moving in for different directions simultaneously. Heidegger points the way 
back and forth by crossing Being out, and such a fourfold is an attempt to locate human beings 
at a historical crossroads (along a pathway that simultaneously points in four different directions 
by directing/recalling the question of Being's own way-making movements). 
 
The question of Being becomes a complex whole insofar as Being and beings remain on the 
way: as either moving towards a given understanding and/or calling whatever is understood 
back into question via the fourfold (turning, divide, etc). Now this obviously begs the question: 
what can the fourfold possibly be (mean, refer to)? It has been noted that that a "crucial turning 
point"
3266
 within Heidegger's thinking typically receives “little attention”
3267
 and that this "rarely 
discussed"
3268
 concept lies beyond conventional understanding.  It should therefore be thought 
appropriate to enquire into its mode of being. Given Heidegger’s approach to the question, 
                                                
3264
 Hahn, Robert, "A Note On Plato's Divided Line", Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, 1983, p.235.  
3265
 The most famous example, of course, is in The Republic (509d–511e), where Plato divides 
levels of being into distinct stages of knowledge: Understanding, Thought, Belief, and Imagination. 
See also (amongst other places) The Philebus (23b-32b) where Plato introduces a "division of 
everything that actually exists" into four different kinds of being that are in reality "one and many". 
Below we cite Gorgias 508 a – a text that Heidegger appears to have appropriated in its entirety 
when mapping out his own fourfold.  
3266
 Mitchel, J. Andrew, "The Fourfold" in Davis, W. Brett (ed) Heidegger: Key Concepts (Durham: 
Acumen Publishing, 2010), p.215. 
3267
 Kockelmans, Joseph, On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p.96. 
3268
 Harman, Graham, The Quadruple Object ( Washington: Zero Books, 2010), p.220. 
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however, such an appropriation can only occur in the form of "reflections"
3269
. This latter term is 
particularly appropriate for our purposes. As we shall argue, the fourfold is Heidegger's 
roundabout attempt to give expression to the quasi-transcendental: it brings forth the way each 




Heidegger calls on the fourfold to bring forth the question of dwelling – being – in the wor(l)d.3270 
The concept of the fourfold is also encountered elsewhere – in Heidegger's conception of 
language as the house of Being. Language is the "Saying of the world's fourfold"3271 in that it is 
the "relation of all relations"
3272
: it is where Being dwells and how our being-in-the-world turns. 
The fourfold is tacitly offered at the criteria for determining the way Being and beings intersect 
– i.e., turn towards and/or move away from each other. By way of the fourfold, Being and beings 
dwell together and may therefore be called (back) into question there. It cannot be thought 
insignificant that Heidegger thought it appropriate to call upon words with distinct significations 
(‘callings’). Being might remain wordless, but the fourfold re-collects four words in particular. 
The fourfold calls forth our entire way of being in the wor(l)d), and moves us back towards 
language’s way-making movements. The totality of beings dwell together out of their “originary 
                                                
3269
 Ibid, 94. 
3270
 Heidegger, Martin  "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans: 
Hofstadter, Albert, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.149. 
3271
 Kockelmans, Joseph, On the Truth of Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p.94. 
3272
 Heidegger, Martin, "The Nature Of Language", in On The Way To Language, trans: Hertz, Peter, 




, although we cannot possibly give any “thought to the onefold of the four”.
3274
 
Whilst Heidegger thinks it appropriate to cross out the word ‘Being’, the crossing (out) 
nonetheless directs understanding via "terms of which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted".
3275
 The fourfold reveals itself to be a cosmology insofar as thinking beings are 
called upon to interpret their wor(l)d with respect to the way each part forms a complex whole. 
Such a quasi transcendental is not to be understood as an explanation of the way the wor(l)d is 
ordered: it is the way of understanding itself and determines the nature of the direction of fit 
between word and world – i.e. the way each so called part mirrors the whole. The fourfold’s 
cosmology is reflective in the same way that microcosm and macrocosm reflect each other  – 
i.e. as above (gods, sky), so below (mortals, earth). Not insignificantly, Heidegger’s invocation 
of a fourfold is mirrored in the Platonic recollection of Being as an ordered ("lawful")
3276
 whole, 
where four parts are collectively called the  "world order".
3277
 The cosmos is said to be composed 
of “heaven and earth, gods and men”
3278
, and such a fourfold turns on the question of the world's 
well-being3279 or "what’s appropriate with respect to human beings".3280 The movement of the 
fourfold therefore turns on the "type of care"
3281
 to be called for3282 or (back) into Being and/or 
question. 
 
Throughout his questioning, Heidegger called out to beings in order to perform the ‘task of 
thinking’. Heidegger’s intervention moved the directedness (or intentionality) of thought in two 
distinct directions – towards the meaning and truth of Being respectively. Taken together, their 
respective movements turned (back) towards each other. Within this ‘turning’, we witnessed the 
ways Heidegger moves through and to language – by re-turning to the circle of understanding. 
Consequently, the lasting element in Heidegger’s thinking is the way in which Being and beings 
can turn (back) towards each other throughout time. Heidegger thereby historicises the Platonic 
                                                
3273
 Heidegger, Martin,  "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought,  trans: 
Hofstadter, A, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.149. 
3274
 Ibid, p.149-150. 
3275
 Whitehead, Arthur, Process and Reality, (New York: Free Press, 1978), p.3. Although we are 
quoting Whitehead completely out of context here, we do so because (like Heidegger), Whitehead's 
'speculative philosophy' is looking for a way in which to delimit understanding.  
3276
 Gorgias, 504d 
3277




 According to the Gorgias dialogue, the “way” of being-in-the-world involves be-ing “organized 
and having order…when in a certain order, the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in it 
that it makes each of the things there are, good”, 507 e. The issue of its well being occurs by way of 
bodily ‘”health and strength”, where “states of organization…comes into being” as such. 504 b and 
c respectively. 
3280
 ibid, 507 b 
3281
 Ibid, 521 a. 
3282
 ibid, 526e-527e. These passages are very explicit about the need to "call on all other people" to 
answer the higher calling of a new world order (returning the fourfold to a state of well being). 
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dividing line in two related ways. On the one hand, he similarly divides Being and beings into 
distinct parts forming a complex whole, and ontologically commits himself to the question of the 
world's care (concern for its well being and/or potentiality for Being). On the other hand, 
Heidegger topological arrangement locates the question of Being – its unity and division – within 
turns of events, and so attempts to 'take care' via Being's own way-making movements. The 
question we briefly return to, then, is Being towards death via a fourfold's 'turning' (the swastika's 
back and forth movements or sense of direction).  
 
According to Heidegger's final address to the world – a posthumously published interview where 
he calls out to human beings from beyond the grave – "only a god can save us"
3283
 now. During 
this interview, Heidegger attempts to lay to rest the question of his commitment to Nazism by 
indirectly calling on the fourfold. We shall not concern ourselves with the question of the nature 
and extent of Heidegger's 'guilt' – such a determination lies beyond our understanding. We shall 
note, however, that Heidegger's continued – and infamous
3284
 – silence about the Holocaust 
may nonetheless be interpreted along Heideggerian lines. Specifically, if discourse is the 
articulation of the meaningfulness of being, then such an inconceivable event may be expressed 
via the mood of keeping silent: we can all understand why the Holocaust would render any 
speaker speechless. The Holocaust remains beyond the conceivable because understanding 
founders (breaks down, falls away) within conventional discourse. Despite the intelligibility of 
being summoned into the reticence of itself, we also need to recall that Heidegger invariably 
gives language the final say by speaking in silence. The house of Being discourses solely by 
being silent and/or reticent about its directives (questions, movements and/or place of dwelling). 
In other words, Heidegger can conveniently displace the question of guilt onto the truth (or 
history) of Being – and inconceivable events somehow become intelligible via Being’s own 
(questionable) appeals or summoning.
3285
 The events in question may therefore be located 
                                                
3283
 Heidegger, Martin, "Only A God Can Save Us" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger 
Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p. 107. 
3284
 See, for example, John Caputo’s "Heidegger’s Scandal: Thinking and the Essence of the Victim" 
in Rockmore, Tom and Margolis, Joseph, (eds), The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics, 
(Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1992). Caputo interprets Heidegger’s silence as a “scandal” 
and urges that “Heidegger failed to hear everything that calls, failed to respond to everything that 
addresses him, failed his responsibility as a thinker”, p.266. 
3285
 Heidegger, Martin, "Only A God Can Save Us Now" in Wolin, Richard (ed) The Heidegger 
Controversy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), p.111. According to Heidegger, National Socialism had 
answered the call of Being by moving in the right "direction. But those people were too far limited in 
their thinking to acquire an explicit relationship to what is really happening today". In other words, 
the Nazis didn't go far (back) enough: mass murder, totalitarian rule and world domination was a 
'limitation' in understanding. So what was "really happening" when the world turned on its axis? 
Heidegger maintains that it needed to "achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of 
technology" and forcibly resist the call of democracy and communism. Consequently, the Nazi's 
were merely following Being's directives when mobilizing their forces against the pitfalls of modernity.  
Unfortunately, Heidegger does not see a contradiction between Nazi ideals and Nazi methods – i.e., 
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beyond understanding and interpreted away. Witness the way Heidegger indirectly calls on the 
fourfold to direct thought and/or complete our understanding. We can only take care 
(understand appropriately) insofar as the gods can care for us (appropriate our understanding). 
Our being–in-the-world becomes contingent upon whether an absent god can be moved to 
show concern for our being-there (well being, salvation, etc.). Specifically, the "sole possibility 
that is left for us is to prepare a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the 
appearance of the god or the absence of the god in the time of foundering; for in the face of the 
god who is absent, we founder". 
3286
  Heidegger calls on the gods – or God – to take care of us 
now, and so moves the question of Being towards the possibility of divine intervention and/or 
an eschatological event. Heidegger thereby squares the circle of understanding by turning the 
question of being and time around. The historicity of understanding now turns on the question 
of whether the gods will remember mortals and deliver them from their limited conception of 
themselves. Heidegger clearly takes it upon himself to speak to  (and for) mortals from beyond 
death – but only so he can obscure their place within a leading question. The question, then, is 
not whether the question of Being directs thought towards the swastika but whether it can 
prevent human beings from moving (back) in its direction.  
 
Summary 
We have critically discussed Heidegger's conception of the circularity of questioning, and its 
relation to the circle of understanding. Following Heidegger's lead, we prioritised the question 
of Being and its relation to the being of the question. We thereby attempted to determine our 
place within the circle of understanding in which we already moved and were directed, and so, 
questioned the ways in which questioning becomes possible and/or necessary. The goal was 
to determine the limits of Heidegger's ontological commitment to the historicity of understanding, 
or the way in which our being-there allegedly followed the question of Being's own directives or 
movements. We argued that Heidegger's fails to historicise the Platonic dividing line when 
turning it on its head. By displacing the question of Being into history, Heidegger's attempt to 
return to a point of origin – or an originating reference point – invariably falls by the wayside. 
Specifically, we argued that there was an impasse within Heidegger's transcendental 
historicism, and we approached this aporia in distinct but related ways. By insisting on the 
primacy of historical practice in the determination of meaning and/or revelation of truth, we found 
that Heidegger could never transcend (move beyond) what was meaningfully understood and/or 
in question there. We approached the impasse through conflicting interpretations of Heidegger's 
way-making movements, and explored the way a self-referential (or determining) whole could 
                                                
the attempt to reclaim a more originary or primary history was only possible (intelligible) via 
modernity (the use of instruments of mass destruction, state controlled media, etc).  
3286
 ibid, p.107. 
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be meaningfully determined and/or questioned in accordance with the circle's own directives 
and movements (rulings). We thereby found ourselves entangled within Heidegger's 
interpretation of the circle of understanding, and sought to extricate ourselves via a 
reconsideration of Heidegger's conception of cultural rules and roles.  We observed that a 
variant of the problem of the One over many recurred in Heidegger's conception of the They or 
the One. We found ourselves moving within a vicious circle when questioning the status of rules 
within the historicity of understanding. Specifically, what was the rule for following a rule across 
social rules and practices, and by what rules can we question the status of rules governing 
(legitimating, directing, authenticating) cultural experience? We observed that the problem of 
the criterion gave rise to the problem of criterionlessnes within Heidegger's interpretation of 
understanding. We argued that the question of Being was a leading question in two related 
ways – that it was it subtly directed towards eliciting given responses and that respondents were 
being led to follow questionable directives. As a consequence, Heidegger's questioning 
invariably left human beings at the mercy of (interpretations of) history and/or language –i.e., 
there was no rational way to determine the status of its way-making movements or resolve 
conflicting interpretations as to its directives. We turned towards a fourfold – the swastika – to 
reflect on the significance of this possibility, and argued that it was relevant to the question of 
Being via an etymological and/or phenomenological approach. We argued that the swastika's 
back and forth movements signified the phenomenon of being in time, or being-towards life and 
death. By simultaneously moving towards past and future, the swastika called its own directives 
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